Judgment Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. 1. This regular second appeal is directed against the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the learned courts below. The plaintiffs-respondents filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in any manner in the possession of the plaintiff formerly as tenants and now as owners of land measuring 4 Kanal 2 Marlas, bearing Khewat No. 369 min, Khatauni No. 659 Rectangle 15 Killa No.12/4 as entered in the jamabandi for the year 1983-84, situated in village Jakhera, Tehsil and District Una. 2. It was alleged that land in dispute was owned by one Shiv Ram and was mortgaged by him with Mehar Chand and defendant Ram Lok, while plaintiffs Harnam and Babu, predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs No. 2 to 6 possessed the same as non-occupancy tenants on payment of Battai. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that they being in possession of the suit land as non-occupancy tenants became owners thereof on the appointed date in terms of the provisions of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The defendant was alleged to be head-strong person and Lambardar of the village, who had threatened to interfere in the possession of the plaintiffs, given rise to the present suit. 3. The defendants contested the suit by filing written statement, wherein they set up a plea of tenancy under Shiv Ram, whom they admitted to be the owner of the suit land. The factum of mortgage was also admitted, but they claimed to be non-occupancy tenants for the last 30 years and further claimed to have become owners of the land in terms of provisions of the Act (supra). Though they continued in possession since long, but the entries regarding this fact could not be effected in the revenue record and accordingly they moved an application for correction of entries before Tehsildar (Settlement), Una, who after visiting the spot and recording evidence of the witnesses, allowed correction of entries vide order dated 26.2.1988. The defendants on the strength of order passed by Tehsildar (Settlement) now claimed themselves to be owners and in possession of the suit land. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court on 23.8.1988 framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of permanent injunction, as prayed for? OPP. 2. The defendants on the strength of order passed by Tehsildar (Settlement) now claimed themselves to be owners and in possession of the suit land. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court on 23.8.1988 framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of permanent injunction, as prayed for? OPP. 2. Whether the suit in the present form is not maintainable? OPD. 3. Relief. 5. After recording evidence, the learned trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs and the defendants were permanently restrained from interfering with the plaintiffs’ possession over the suit land. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, the defendants/ appellants preferred appeal before the learned District Judge, Una, who vide his judgment and decree dated 18.11.2000 was pleased to affirm the judgment and decree passed by the leaned trial court. The defendants- appellants have come up in appeal before this court. 6. On 5.3.2002, this court was pleased to admit the appeal on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the findings of trial court as affirmed by first appellate court are dehors of evidence? 2. Whether the trial court and first appellate court ignored the material documentary evidence and if that evidence was considered, opposite conclusion would have been arrived at? Since both the substantial questions of law framed above are interconnected and inter-related, I propose to deal with both these questions jointly. Before the case is dealt on the respective merits, it is apt to reproduce the provisions of section 45 of H.P. Land Revenue Act, which reads thus:- “Section 45 Presumption in favour of entries in records of rights and annual record. Any entry made in a record of rights in accordance with the law for the time being in force, or an annual record in accordance with the provisions of this chapter and the rules thereunder, shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted thereof. Provided that not withstanding anything contained in this section any entry made (during the period between the first day of April 1948 and the first day of April 1956 in record of rights of an annual record whereby the land is shown as under self cultivation shall not be presumed to be true.” 7. Provided that not withstanding anything contained in this section any entry made (during the period between the first day of April 1948 and the first day of April 1956 in record of rights of an annual record whereby the land is shown as under self cultivation shall not be presumed to be true.” 7. In this case, the plaintiffs have placed on record the copies of jamabandies for the year 1983-84 Ex. P-1, 1978-79 Ex. P-2, 1973-74 Ex. P-3, khasra girdawari from kharif 1984 to rabi 1986 Ex. P-4 wherein Babu Ram and Harnama are recorded in possession of the land in dispute as tenants on payment of Battai Nisfi. 8. No doubt, as per copy of order Ex. D-1, correction has been ordered regarding the land in dispute in favour of Ram Asra and Ram Lok and appeal against that order has also been dismissed vide order Ex. D-2. The copy of Rojnamcha is Ex.DW 1/A according to which the effect was given to this order. The statements of the parties were recorded by the Settlement Officer are Ex. DW 4/A to Ex. DW 4/F and the statement of plaintiff Harnama Ex. PW 4/B reveals that he had stated before the Settlement Officer that civil suit was pending inter-se the parties before the civil court. Therefore, it is clear that order was passed by the Settlement Officer, when the civil suit was already pending. 9. I have gone through the record of the case to determine as to which proceeding was initiated first in point of time. The record reveals that civil suit had been instituted in the trial court on 7.8.1986, whereas the proceedings before the Settlement Officer were launched definitely after the initiation of the civil suit. In fact, the documents of Settlement Officer exhibited on record show different dates of institution, like 26.8.1986, 21.9.1986, 7.8.1986 and 1.1.1987 etc. But nonetheless the fact remains that in case all documents are read together, then also, these clearly establish that proceedings before the Settlement Officer were initiated by the defendants after the proceedings were pending in the civil court. 10. But nonetheless the fact remains that in case all documents are read together, then also, these clearly establish that proceedings before the Settlement Officer were initiated by the defendants after the proceedings were pending in the civil court. 10. To my mind, the defendants can take no advantage of the revenue order passed by the Settlement Officer, for more than one reason, firstly, the said order was passed when the proceedings were already pending before the civil court, secondly even dehors these proceedings the defendants are required to independently establish their title in order to rebut the presumption as attached to the revenue entries in terms of section 45 of H.P. Land Revenue Act. The defendants are required to prove as to how the entries are wrong or have been incorrectly recorded. 11. Though the defendants have led evidence and examined DW 1 Vinod Kumar, Patwari to prove Rojnamcha Ex. DW1/A. and DW 2 Ram Asra to prove that land in dispute was given to the defendants for cultivation by Shiv Ram through Amar Nath Mukhtiar. DW 3 Pirthi Chand has stated that he had been seeing the land in dispute in possession of the defendants for the last 20-25 years and DW 4 Pawan Kumar, Patwari to prove that statements Ex. DW 4/A to Ex. DW 4/F were correct. However, this evidence is not only shaky but contrary to the documentary evidence. 12. The plaintiff on the other hand has clearly stated regarding his possession over the land in dispute as tenant. Even, if the entire evidence led by the parties is treated to be equally balanced, then heavy burden lies upon the defendants- appellants to rebut the presumption as attached to the revenue entries under section 45 of H.P. Land Revenue Act. It is for the defendants to prove by leading cogent evidence that it was only defendants, who were in possession of the land in dispute on payment of rent. The land was allegedly taken on rent by Shiv Ram through Amar Nath Mukhtiar, but strangely enough, neither Shiv Ram nor Amar Nath has been examined nor any other person has been examined in whose presence the rent of the land in dispute was paid by the defendants. Thus the defendants have failed to rebut the presumption as attached to the entries recorded in jamabandies Ex. P-1 to Ex. P-5. 13. Sh. Thus the defendants have failed to rebut the presumption as attached to the entries recorded in jamabandies Ex. P-1 to Ex. P-5. 13. Sh. Bimal Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants has canvassed that there was ample amount of evidence on record to prove that plaintiffs had been paying Battai (rent) to Ram Asra, while the defendants-respondents had failed to prove on record their tenancy as there is no bilateral agreement proved by them on record. He further stated that statements of the witnesses or that of plaintiff as his own witness was crucial since he had admitted that he had no rent receipt nor did he know the original owner Shiv Ram. According to him once the plaintiff feigned ignorance regarding the owner of the suit land, then the question arises as to with whom he entered into tenancy. Therefore, the defendants have successfully rebutted the presumption as attached to the longstanding revenue entries. He further placed reliance upon the judgment of this court in State of Himachal Pradesh and other vs. Ajay Vij and others Latest HLJ 2011 (HP) 409 to claim that tenancy was the creation of contract between the parties which was required to be pleaded and proved. He, in fact, relied upon the following observations:- “15. The pleaded case of the plaintiff in the plaint is that he was inducted as tenant by appellant No.2 through Tehsildar Kasumpti over the suit land on annual rent of Rs.25/- about 40 years ago. The suit was filed on 15.1.1993. It means according to plaintiff he was inducted tenant on the suit land somewhere in the year 1953. The term ‘tenant’ has been defined in sub-section 17 of Section 2 of the Act as follows:- “Tenant means a person who holds land under a landowner, and is, or but for a contract to the contrary would be liable to pay rent for that land to that landowner, and includes- (i) A sub-tenant. (ii) The predecessors or successors in interest of a tenant or a sub-tenant, as the case may be; but it does not include— (a) A [mere] mortgagee of the rights of landowner. (ii) The predecessors or successors in interest of a tenant or a sub-tenant, as the case may be; but it does not include— (a) A [mere] mortgagee of the rights of landowner. (b) A person to whom a holding has been transferred or an estate or holding has been let in farm under the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954 (6 of 1954) or the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (17 of 1887) as the case may be, for the recovery of an arrear of land revenue or of a sum recoverable as such an arrear. (c)………… 16. The term ‘tenant’ has also been defined under sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 as follows:- “Tenant means a person who holds land under another person, and is, or but for a special contract would be, liable to pay rent for that land to that other person; but it does not include— (a) An inferior land-owner. (b) A mortgagee of the rights of a land-owner. (c) A person to whom a holding has been transferred, or an estate or holding has been let in farm, under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, for the recovery of an arrear of land revenue or of a sum recoverable as such an arrear, or (d) A person who takes from the [Government] a lease of unoccupied land for the purpose of sub-letting it.” 17. The tenancy is the creation of contract between the parties which is required to be pleaded and proved. In Smt. Surjit Kaur alias Santo and another vs. Jarnail Singh and others 1965 P.L.J.137, after noticing definition of tenant in the Punjab Tenancy Act it has been held ‘tenant’ means a person who holds land under another person who is or, but for a special contract, would be liable to pay rent for that land to that other person. In Ram Karan vs. The Financial Commissioner and others 1980 P.L.J. 295, it has been held that tenancy, it cannot be disputed, comes into existence as a result of bilateral agreement which may be oral or documentary. In Mukat Singh vs. Smt. Jawala Devi and others 1983 P.L.J. 183, it has been held that a tenancy would come into existence only when there is a bilateral agreement between the parties about it. In Mukat Singh vs. Smt. Jawala Devi and others 1983 P.L.J. 183, it has been held that a tenancy would come into existence only when there is a bilateral agreement between the parties about it. In Vinay Kumar and others vs. Parshotam Dass and others 1992 P.L.J. 77, it has been held that in order to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant, consent of both the parties was necessary. Such consent could be proved either from the documentary evidence or from oral evidence. The documentary evidence could be in the form of rent note, lease deed or payment of rent or batai. In Khazana Ram vs. Ghungar 1996 (1) Current Law Journal (H.P.) 424, it has been held that it is an admitted proposition of law that tenancy is the creation of an agreement and in order to prove the factum of tenancy, the party claiming such a status, has not only to prove such an agreement but also to plead the same. In Prem Dass and others vs. Jagdish 1997(2) S.L.J. 984, it has been held that no doubt, the tenancy comes on the surface on account of a bilateral contract between the parties, but the entries forming record of rights cannot be ignored in the absence of any agreement or a contract. In Lal Chand and others vs. Pala 1998(2) S.L.J. 1526, it has been held that party claiming the status of a tenant has not only to prove the alleged agreement of tenancy but also to plead the name.” 14. On the other hand, Naresh Thakur, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Ishita Bhandari, Advocate, has contended that once the entries in the revenue record exist in favour of the defendants, then the plaintiffs are required to prove the contrary as presumption of truth to such entries was attached under section 45 of H.P. Land Revenue Act. In fact, he too relied upon this judgment to claim that in the given facts and circumstances, particularly when the revenue entries supported the claim of the plaintiffs, it was incumbent upon the defendants to have satisfied the test and conditions of tenancy as set out in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh and other vs. Ajay Vij and others (supra). Having failed to do so, no relief could be granted to the defendants as the plaintiffs had already become owners of the suit land on the appointed date in accordance with law. 15. I find force in the submission of Sh. Thakur because the defendants have failed to rebut the presumption of truth as attached to the revenue record, under section 45 of H.P. Land Revenue Act. In the given facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly, taking into consideration the revenue entries supports the case of the defendants, it was obligatory upon the plaintiffs to have rebutted these entries by leading cogent and convincing evidence. Having failed to do so, no fault can be found with the findings recorded by the learned courts below on these count. 16. Sh. Bimal Gupta, learned counsel, then pressed into service the order of Settlement Collector, whereby correction has been ordered in the revenue record by showing the names of the defendants as tenants in possession to contend that the revenue record has now been set right by a competent authority and therefore, the suit be dismissed more particularly when these proceedings were unsuccessfully challenged in appeal and have now attained finality. I am not impressed by such argument. 17. To counter such submission, Sh. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, has relied upon a judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Gurnam Singh and others vs. S. Jagjit Singh Rosha 1975 PLJ 505, wherein the court has held as follows:- “2. The point in controversy between the parties is whether possession of the land had been transferred to the proposed vendee under the agreement of sale. There were entries in Khasra Girdawaris which showed that the vendee had succeeded in obtaining possession. These entries have been ordered to be corrected on an application filed by the appellants before the revenue authorities but once the disputes have arisen between the parties, the controversy cannot be allowed to be transferred for decision to the revenue authorities. If any orders for the correction of the entries in the Khasra Girdawaris have been made by these authorities, they would hardly be relevant in the civil proceedings and the evidence adduced by the parties in connection with the prayer for the correction of the entries in the Khasra Girdawaris shall have to be assessed independently by the civil Courts. If any orders for the correction of the entries in the Khasra Girdawaris have been made by these authorities, they would hardly be relevant in the civil proceedings and the evidence adduced by the parties in connection with the prayer for the correction of the entries in the Khasra Girdawaris shall have to be assessed independently by the civil Courts. A Local Commissioner appointed by the trial court had also reported that the respondent was in possession of the land in dispute. Under the circumstances, there was prima facie evidence about the plaintiff- respondent having succeeded in obtaining possession of the land under the agreement of sale. No final verdict can, however, be given as to which party is in possession unless the parties have had a full opportunity of examining their entire evidence. The order under appeal is apparently intended to maintain the status quo with regard to possession over the land as it existed on the date of the passing of the temporary injunction on 9.6.1970 in the absence of the appellants. This order had been made absolute by the trial Court on 26.6.1971 after hearing them. It is, however, made clear that this temporary injunction is not supposed to authorize any party to disturb the actual physical possession of the opposite party. The temporary injunction may, however, appear to be fully justified as the plaintiff- respondent had made out a prima facie case.” 18. He has further relied upon another judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Shri Niranjan Singh and others vs. The Financial Commissioner, Punjab (Revenue) and others 1979 PLJ 352, wherein the court has held that though the correction of khasra girdawari entries was within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue officer, however, the civil court was seized of the matter. It is the civil court, which can interpret entry either singly or in context of other relevant evidence proved on record by the parties. It has further been held that the findings of civil court regarding the status of contesting party over-rides the findings of revenue authorities:- “6. The learned counsel for the petitioners confining his arguments to respondent No. 3 only has argued that the issue whether the latter is a trespasser or a tenant of the land measuring 52 Kanals 7 Marlas is sub judice before the civil Court. The learned counsel for the petitioners confining his arguments to respondent No. 3 only has argued that the issue whether the latter is a trespasser or a tenant of the land measuring 52 Kanals 7 Marlas is sub judice before the civil Court. The trial Court vide judgment dated December 19, 1966 (A. 5) has found that respondent No. 3 was a trespasser. The civil court shall continue to be seized of this matter because respondent No. 3 has filed an appeal against that judgment which is still pending. In this situation, the orders of the revenue authorities ordering the change of the entries in the Girdawaris from 1962 to 1965 showing respondent No. 3 as a tenant of the land is ultra vires and the same are liable to be quashed. I see no force in this contention. The Commissioner in his impugned order dated July 25, 1967, said that it was within the exclusive jurisdiction of a revenue officer to correct the Khasra Girdawari and it is up to the civil court to interpret it in any particular civil proceeding pending before it either singly or in the context of other relevant evidence brought on record by the parties. The learned counsel for the parties do not (and rightly) dispute the correctness of the observation made by the Commissioner. The revenue authorities shall continue to be competent to effect change in the entries in the Girdawaris irrespective of the fact that the civil court is seized of the same matter, though the finding of the civil court regarding the status of the contesting respondents including respondent No. 3 being a tenant or otherwise will over-ride the finding of the revenue authorities resulting in the change of entries in the Girdawaris.” 19. Admittedly the correction of revenue entries have been ordered by the revenue authorities during the pendency of the proceedings in the civil court the same would be of no avail as it is settled law that revenue authorities are bound by the order, judgment and decree of the civil court and not vice versa. In view of the aforesaid discussion and findings, the substantial questions of law are answered against the defendants- appellants. 20. Consequently, I find no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly ordered to be dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.