Judgment : 1. Heard the learned Senior Counsel, Sri K.Ravindra Kumar for petitioner and the learned Government Pleader for Home for respondents. 2. The petitioner is a former Director General of Police and Chairman of Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission. O.S.No.183 of 2005 was filed by the third respondent, who was the General Secretary of the A.P. Police Officers Association and Inspector of Police, on the file of the Court of Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad seeking the relief of damages of Rs.1 crore with interest against the petitioner and others. The petitioner filed the Writ Petition seeking a Writ of Mandamus to quash the said suit. 3. It is the case of the third respondent in the above suit that with the permission of the Commissioner of Police, he purchased a plot of 500 square yards from Kakatiya Cooperative Housing Society Limited in the year 1990 and it appears that some disputes arose with regard to the said society. Crime No.58 of 2000 was registered against him under Sections 448, 323, 504, 506 of Indian Penal Code at Ramgopalpet Police Station and another case in Crime No.19 of 2001 was also registered against him and he filed a private complaint against the then Assistant Commissioner of Police and others in C.C.No.1236 of 2001. There were some civil disputes and writ petitions were also pending involving the third respondent. The third respondent was suspended from service in March, 1999. The Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal in O.A.No.1989 of 2000 quashed the orders of suspension and in spite of the same, he was not given posting. He was also overlooked for promotion to Deputy Superintendent of Police in the years 2000 and 2001. It appears that the order of detention was passed by the writ petitioner in the capacity of District Magistrate under the provisions of A.P.Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot Leggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (for short, Act 1 of 1986) on 19.12.2001. The plaint discloses that several allegations were made against various officers in the police department and private individuals. It appears that at the instance of the then Director General and Inspector General, a special report was prepared by the then DCP, DD and on the said report, the petitioner suspended the third respondent on 18.05.2001. The plaint discloses that several allegations were made against various officers in the police department and private individuals. It appears that at the instance of the then Director General and Inspector General, a special report was prepared by the then DCP, DD and on the said report, the petitioner suspended the third respondent on 18.05.2001. Though the third respondent submitted his written statement on 31.10.2001, the petitioner without going through the same, summarily rejected it on 03.01.2002. The representation submitted by the third respondent to the Chief Secretary for review was also rejected on 16.01.2002. 4. As per the opinion of the Advisory Board, the Government issued G.O.Rt.No.421, dated 25.01.2002, revoking the detention order and releasing the third respondent on 25.01.2002 from Chanchalguda prison. Ultimately, the third respondent stated in the above suit that the action of the petitioner herein does not form part of official duties or legal orders or discharging of lawful duties with bonafides. The television relay and the press note given by the petitioner on 21.12.2001, gave the impression to the readers as well as to the viewers that the third respondent was a land grabber. The said news was published and the television relay shocked the third respondent, his relatives, friends and acquaintances in the society and office colleagues, subordinates and senior officers in the department. The third respondent in the above suit sought Rs.1 crore towards damages for loss of reputation, mental agony, illegal detention for 36 days, hardship, reputation of family members and spoiling of health. 5. The office of the XIV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad (trial court) initially took an objection with regard to maintainability and the Court heard the matter and a docket order was passed on 08.06.2005 holding that the question whether the detention was malafide or referable to sovereign power or functions could be considered at the time of trial of the suit and ordered for registering the suit. 6. The petitioner also filed I.A.No.337 of 2007 under Order VII Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to decide the issues relating to limitation and protection given under the City Police Act as well as Act 1 of 1986 as preliminary issues and to reject the plaint and the said petition was dismissed on 30.04.2007. 6. The petitioner also filed I.A.No.337 of 2007 under Order VII Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to decide the issues relating to limitation and protection given under the City Police Act as well as Act 1 of 1986 as preliminary issues and to reject the plaint and the said petition was dismissed on 30.04.2007. The present writ petition was filed on 16.04.2007 seeking a declaration that the above suit as invalid and abuse of process of law apart from being in violation of Section 88 of the Hyderabad City Police Act, 1348 Fasli and Section 16 of Act 1 of 1986. This Court on 17.04.2007 ordered notice in the writ petition at the admission stage and subsequently admitted the writ petition on 10.07.2007 and granted stay of all further proceedings in the above suit. When this Court ordered notice on 17.04.2007 and did not pass any orders in the stay application, the petitioner filed W.A.No.572 of 2007. After arguing W.A.No.572 of 2007 for some time, counsel for the Writ Petitioner withdrew the same on 19.04.2007. 7. The learned Senior Counsel, relying on a case in Tiny V. Jacky 2012(1) Kerala Law Times 155and also a case in Radhey Shyam V. Chhabi Nath (2009) 5 SCC 616 , argued that the above suit is liable to be held as invalid and abuse of process of law. When this Court pointed out to the learned Senior Counsel to show any direct authority on the point of quashing the suit on the same lines of quashing a FIR, he could not show any direct authority except the case of Tiny referred above. 8. In a case of this nature, the petitioner has to satisfy two points i.e., the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to hold a suit as illegal and thereafter he must be in a position to show that the allegations in the complaint do not necessitate in trial of the suit. 9. So far as the procedure governing the suits is concerned, the CPC is a complete Code in itself and governs various situations. 9. So far as the procedure governing the suits is concerned, the CPC is a complete Code in itself and governs various situations. Though this Court is having wide powers under Article 226 to issue appropriate Writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo-Warranto and Certiorari or any other of them for the enforcement of the any of the rights conferred by Part-III for any other purposes (emphasis supplied), the said power has to be exercised subject to the limitations on the power and other provisions of the Constitution. Article 227 of the Constitution gives power of superintendence over all Courts by the High Court. This power of superintendence is not a substitute for exercising the power exclusively vested in the Courts under the CPC. 10. Order VII of CPC deals with the plaint and Rule 11 thereof states the circumstances in which a plaint can be rejected. It also contains Rule 10 dealing with return of a plaint, but that power can be exercised only for presentation of the plaint to the proper Court. Rule 11 of Order VII reads as follows: “11. 10. Order VII of CPC deals with the plaint and Rule 11 thereof states the circumstances in which a plaint can be rejected. It also contains Rule 10 dealing with return of a plaint, but that power can be exercised only for presentation of the plaint to the proper Court. Rule 11 of Order VII reads as follows: “11. Rejection of plaint:- The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:- (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of the rule 9; Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature for correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.” 11. A perusal of the above Rule clearly discloses that the plaint can be rejected when it does not disclose cause of action and where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law apart from other circumstances indicated therein. Though Rule 11 is not exhaustive, the court can use its inherent power as and when the occasion demands as held in Radhakishen Vs. Wali Mohammad AIR 1956 Hyd. 133. The Supreme Court in T.Arivandandam Vs. Though Rule 11 is not exhaustive, the court can use its inherent power as and when the occasion demands as held in Radhakishen Vs. Wali Mohammad AIR 1956 Hyd. 133. The Supreme Court in T.Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapat AIR 1977 SC 2421 speaking through Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, held as follows: “The learned Munsiff must remember that if on a meaningful-not formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X, CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits.” Thus Rule 11 is a sufficient safeguard against vexatious litigation. 12. The petitioner appeared before the trial court at the time of numbering the suit and the trial court after hearing the parties passed an order on 08.06.2005 for registering the suit. After registration of the suit, when this writ petition was pending, the petitioner filed I.A.No.337 of 2007 invoking Order VII Rule 11 CPC and the same was dismissed on 30.04.2007 and that order has become final. The Petitioner filed written statement and the suit is coming up for trial. 13. In Radhey Shyam’s case (2 supra), the Supreme Court examined the previous case law and while expressing its agreement with the Constitution Bench ratio laid down in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar V. State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1 did not find favour with the observations made in Surya Dev Rai V. Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC 675 , wherein it was held that judicial orders passed by a civil court can be examined and then corrected/reversed by the writ court under Article 226 in exercise of its power under a writ of Certiorari and held it to be contrary to the ratio and hence ordered for placing the matter before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger Bench, to consider the correctness or otherwise of the said opinion. As on today, the ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar’s case (5 supra) holds the field and in the said Constitution Bench, it was clearly held that “Certiorari does not lie to quash the judgments of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction”. 14. The opinion expressed by a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Tiny’s case (1 supra) in para 38 holding that orders and proceedings of a judicial court subordinate to the High Court are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution does not lay down a correct law. Para 38 in the said judgement reads as follows. “38. Therefore, in the light of the above pronouncement, it cannot any more be doubted whether the judicial courts subordinate to High Court are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226. They can also be subjected to the writ jurisdiction under Art.226 of Constitution. Taking all the above facts and circumstances into consideration, I hold that nothing shall in the way of this Court to terminate a civil proceedings initiated with mala fides or with ulterior motive, the continuance of which will amount to abuse of process of court. No threat of flood of litigation in the High Court dissuades or baffles me from taking this view. The courts exist to uphold justice without baseless apprehensions or fear. So, to secure ends of justice and to uproot gross injustice, this court has power under Art.226, Art.227 or S.151 of C.P.C. to quash a plaint which contains pleadings which are false to the knowledge of the plaintiff and without which, the plaint is no plaint at all. A person who suffers at the hands of another who has filed a false suit cannot be sent back to the civil court by saying that he has another remedy under law. May be, he has another remedy, but it may not be as efficacious as the remedy of quashing an ill-motivated and false plaint which is filed with ulterior motives. May be, he has another remedy, but it may not be as efficacious as the remedy of quashing an ill-motivated and false plaint which is filed with ulterior motives. The question is not whether a party has any other remedy, but the real question is whether the remedy, if any, available is as efficacious as the one which can be granted under Art.226 of Art.227.” With due respect to the learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court, the above decision does not reflect the correct legal position as enunciated by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. The provisions of C.P.C. with regard to the rejection of plaint cannot be said to be efficacious when compared to the discretionary remedy of Article 226. 15. The Petitioner in the present case asked for a Writ of Mandamus which does not lie against a trial court. He did not ask for other Writs. He suffered an order under Order VII Rule 11 CPC already. In the circumstances, the present Petition is not an appropriate remedy and it is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly the same is dismissed. No costs. Miscellaneous Petitions pending, if any in this writ petition, shall stand closed.