JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Heard Sri Vijay Krishna Majumdar, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State-respondents and Sri Amresh Singh, learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha. 2. Through this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 20.2.2014 passed by the Assistant Collector First Class/Tehsildar Sadar, Pilibhit, District Pilibhit in Case No. 39/2013-14 (Gaon Sabha v. Dodram) and the order dated 8.8.2014 passed by the Collector, Pilibhit in case No. D2014125600497 (Doodram v. Gram Samaj). 3. vide order dated 20.2.2014 the proceeding initiated by the Gaon Sabha under Section 122-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) being Case No. 39/2013-14 (Gaon Sabha v. Dodram) was allowed and the petitioner’s possession over the land in dispute was found to be unauthorised, therefore, an order of dispossession has also been passed after imposing damages of Rs. 1,440/- alongwith execution cost of Rs. 5/-. The revision filed by the petitioner against the the aforesaid order has been dismissed as barred by time vide order dated 8.8.2014. 4. The facts giving rise to this case are that the Gaon Sabha has initiated a proceeding against the petitioner under Section 122-B of the Act which was allowed and damages of Rs. 1440/- alongwith execution cost was also imposed. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the petitioner has filed revision before the Collector Pilibhit which was numbered as case No. D2014125600497 (Doodram v. Gram Samaj). The revision was barred by time, therefore, an application for condonation of delay was also filed. The Collector Pilibhit has found that the revision is barred by two months and ten days and there is no satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay, therefore, he rejected the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. and dismissed the revision as barred by time. Aforesaid orders are under challenge before this Court. 6. Learned standing counsel as well the learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha on being confronted as to whether they propose of file counter-affidavit or not, they submit that the writ petition may be decided on its own merits on the basis of the material available on record. 7. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties the writ petition is taken up for final disposal. 8. 7. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties the writ petition is taken up for final disposal. 8. It is not in dispute that the order of eviction was passed against the petitioner on 20.2.2014. Against that order revision was filed on 2.5.2014. The limitation for filing the revision is 30 days. In the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner the revision was barred by only 40 days and not 2 months and 10 days. He has also contended that since the wife of the petitioner was doing pairvy of the case he was not made aware of order prior to April, 2014, therefore, revision could not be filed earlier and immediately after coming to know steps have been taken to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector but because of the strike of lawyers in the lower Court the revision could not be filed earlier. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that delay was not deliberate and whatever delay has occurred that was beyound the control of the applicant. He further contends that there has been consistent insistence of the Apex Court as well as this Court that while considering the delay condonation application the Court should take liberal view and in case there is some substance on merit the delay should be condoned. In support of his submission he has placed reliance of the decision of this Court in Ramesh v. Collector, (2013) 2 Laws 186 (All). 10. Here in this case as per learned counsel for the petitioner the revision was barred by time by 40 days and not two months and ten days as recorded by the Court below. 11. It may be noticed that the order impugned in the revision was passed on 20.2.2014 and the revision was filed on 2.5.2014. The limitation for filing the revision under Section 122B(4A) of the Act is thirty days from the date of the order, therefore, the revision could be filed up to 22.3.2014 whereas it was filed on 2.5.2014. He has calculated the limitation from the date of impugned order in revision without excluding the period of limitation of thirty days, therefore the observation of the collector that it was barred by time by two months ten days is illegal. He has calculated the limitation from the date of impugned order in revision without excluding the period of limitation of thirty days, therefore the observation of the collector that it was barred by time by two months ten days is illegal. Otherwise also the order of eviction was challenged before the Court below where the matter of eviction of the petitioner from the house and its demolition was involved, therefore, this was a matter which could not be thrown out on the ground of delay particularly in the circumstances when the delay is not inordinate, mala fide or without there being any explanation for condonation of the same. 12. While considering the condonation of delay in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, JT 1987 (1) SC 537, the Apex Court after considering the various aspects of delay condonation in judicial proceeding issued following guidelines: “1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. ‘Every day’s delay must be explained’ does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.” Taking note of the aforesaid decisions, the Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Singh and others, JT 2000 (5) 389, after considering various cases of the Apex Court on condonation of delay application, has held : “Para 12................ The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented process approach rather than the technical detention of sufficient case for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of pragmatic approach in justice -oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause.” Para 13................. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory." 13. This view has constantly been followed by the Apex Court in numerous cases thereafter. Reference may be given in Apanshu Mohan Lodh v. State of Tripura, (2004) 1 SCC 119 , State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan, 2008 (10) JT 179 , Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Subrata Borah Chowlek, (2010) 262 ELT 3. In Jeet Narain and another v. Govind Prasad and others, (2010) 3 ADJ SC 470, the Apex Court has condoned the delay of 26 years considering the merit of the case in which the order was obtained by playing fraud. 14. In Jeet Narain and another v. Govind Prasad and others, (2010) 3 ADJ SC 470, the Apex Court has condoned the delay of 26 years considering the merit of the case in which the order was obtained by playing fraud. 14. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid cases, it is abundantly clear that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court has to see the merit of the case also as the law of limitation is not meant to take away the right of appeal. The Courts are meant for imparting substantial justice and not to scuttle the justice on technicalities. The length of delay is also not very much material if there is substance on merit. 15. However, if the Court/tribunal, while dealing with such applications, comes to the conclusion that there had been any slackness/negligence on the part of the parties in not instituting the action well within time and that has caused inconvenience to the other side, the inconvenience caused to the other side cannot be made basis for not extending the time of period of limitation and the inconvenience caused to the other side may be compensated by imposing some cost payable to the person to whom such inconvenience is caused, but in all circumstances, efforts should be made to adjudicate the matter on merit instead of throwing it at the threshold on the ground of limitation, unless the explanation is hopeless and it revives a stale claim. 16. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case I am of the view even if the explanation furnished by the petitioner was not satisfactory even then such order should not have been passed and delay should have been condoned after imposing costs as there was no mala fide on the part of the petitioner and the reason for not filing the revision within time was also explained. 17. In view of the foregoing discussions, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 8.8.2014 passed by the Collector, Pilibhit in case No. D2014125600497 (Doodram v. Gram Samaj) is hereby quashed. The delay in filing the revision is condoned on payment of Rs. 2,000/- as costs to the Gaon Sabha. On deposit of cost of Rs. 17. In view of the foregoing discussions, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 8.8.2014 passed by the Collector, Pilibhit in case No. D2014125600497 (Doodram v. Gram Samaj) is hereby quashed. The delay in filing the revision is condoned on payment of Rs. 2,000/- as costs to the Gaon Sabha. On deposit of cost of Rs. 2,000/- alongwith a certified copy of the order of this Court before the Collector, Pilibhit, the revision shall be treated within time and and be decided on its own merit expeditiously without granting any unnecessary adjournment to the learned counsel for the parties. Till the revision is decided, the parties shall maintain status quo regarding the nature and possession over the house in dispute. It is further provided that neither any third party right shall be created nor any new construction shall be raised over the land in dispute in the meantime. —————