JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rakesh Tiwari, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record in the appeal. 2. This appeal by State of U.P. and others challenges the findings of the writ Court in its judgment dated 31.1.2006 passed in Writ Petition No. 15629 of 1993, Rameshwar Prasad Singh v. State of U.P. and others. 3. Rameshwar Prasad Singh Respondent employee in this appeal was working on the post of Collection Amin. A criminal prosecution was launched against him under Section 409 I.P.C. which ended in his acquittal on 13.6.1990. Thereafter, the respondent employee applied for reinstatement in service, however, by communications dated 13.1.1993 and 14.1.1992 he was informed that he has been dismissed from service after holding disciplinary enquiry, hence, he cannot be reinstated in service even after his acquittal in the criminal case. 4. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15629 of 1993, Rameshwar Prasad Singh v. State of U.P. and others, was preferred by the respondent employee challenging the communications aforesaid and, inter alia, stating that he is entitled to reinstatement in service in the facts and circumstances of the case. He also claimed consequential benefits on the ground that disciplinary enquiry alleged to have been held against him was in violation of principles of natural justice, was behind his back, illegal and liable to be set aside and as such, the order of suspension said to have been passed on 20.6.1980 and consequential dismissal from service by the said ex parte enquiry is ab-initio null and void. 5. The writ Court found that neither any charge-sheet had been served upon the respondent nor any disciplinary enquiry had been conducted wherein the charge against him are said to have been proved. The writ Court also noted that there is nothing on record to establish that even the Disciplinary Authority ever held the employee to be guilty, as such, after having been acquitted from the criminal charges after appreciation of evidence on the record, he was entitled for reinstatement. It further noted that the respondent, in the meantime, had also attained the age of superannuation, i.e., 58 years on 30.9.1997 during the pendency of the writ petition and a period of more than eight years had passed since then. 6. It further noted that the respondent, in the meantime, had also attained the age of superannuation, i.e., 58 years on 30.9.1997 during the pendency of the writ petition and a period of more than eight years had passed since then. 6. While allowing the writ petition, the Court was of the view that in the given circumstance no disciplinary inquiry could be held afresh against him particularly in view of Article 351-A of Civil Services Regulations, as the same is barred by time. Moreover, since the incident in question which resulted in his dismissal relates to year 1978-80, hence, in view of oldness and staleness of the matter, the disciplinary inquiry is also neither permissible nor feasible now in absence of any rule empowering the department to proceed with departmental enquiry after eight years of retirement of the Government Servant. For these reasons the Court could not order either reinstatement of the respondent in service or issue directions for holding disciplinary inquiry afresh. Hence, in the facts and circumstances, the writ Court directed the appellants to make payment of all arrears of salary to the respondent from the date of his illegal termination till his date of superannuation with 20% of backwages. The writ Court further directed the employee to be paid all his retiral dues on gratuity and pensionary benefits on the basis of notional revision of his pay from time to time with increments, subject to any actual payment of the revised salary. 7. Assailing the judgement impugned, contention of learned Standing Counsel for the appellant is that on the date of suspension, i.e. 23.2.1978 respondent had absconded from the department, therefore, Disciplinary Authority had to publish the order of suspension and charge-sheet in a daily news paper “Bhrigu Kshetra” dated 11.5.1979 against which no response was received from the appellant. It is further contended that it was only after 10 years of termination of his service that employee moved representation for reinstatement but as he had not appeared in the departmental proceedings, the conduct of delinquent employee was not such that he should be given benefit of provision contained in Article 351-A of Civil Services Regulations, as has been given by the writ Court which is misconceived and appeal is liable to be allowed on this score only. It is stated that in writ petition No. 3195 of 1992, the delinquent employee had concealed the fact of departmental proceedings and subsequent termination order passed against him but had only stated that he was acquitted on 13.6.1990 in Criminal trial and inspite of this fact employer was not reinstating him. On account of the aforesaid facts and the non-cooperation of the respondent employee, which amounts to misconduct, the amount embezzled by him also could not be recovered from him which is explicit from the report of Naib Tehsildar. Therefore, the findings of the writ Court are liable to be set aside. 8. Per contra learned counsel for the respondent in this appeal submits that the employee was not paid any subsistence allowance during his alleged period of suspension from the date of suspension till the date of his removal from service, hence for this reason also the order of termination on basis of alleged ex parte enquiry is arbitrary, illegal and that the writ Court has rightly come to the conclusion that no enquiry could be held now in the facts and circumstances of the case, after eight years of his reaching the age of superannuation and in any case the petitioner having been acquitted of the criminal charge, is entitled to all his salary, retiral dues, gratuity pension etc. on basis of notional services since the date of his suspension with increments as directed by the writ Court. 9. Having heard learned Standing Counsel for the appellant-state, we are of the considered view that the findings of the writ Court in the judgement dated 31.2.2006 impugned in this appeal holding that no inquiry could be held against the respondent employee in this appeal after 8 years of his retirement in view of the provisions under Article 351-A of the Civil Services Regulations and further holding that he could not have been denied benefits of his reinstatement in the facts and circumstances of this case by treating him to be in continuous service till his age of superannuation on 30.9.1997, do not suffer from any illegality or perversity as admittedly the alleged departmental enquiry was found to be farce by the writ Court and the respondent employee to be entitled to benefits of service on acquittal from the same charge in the criminal Court. 10. 10. Moreover, we also find that the writ Court in its judgement has categorically found that respondent had not been paid his subsistence allowance, which alone is sufficient to set aside the departmental enquiry proceedings, the subsequent orders of his suspension and his illegal termination. 11. Even otherwise, if the the notices of holding departmental enquiry had been published in the newspaper as claimed by the appellants, then also the enquiry proceeding cannot be sustained for non-payment of subsistence allowances to the employee and would render the enquiry null and void. We are supported in our view by the judgement in K.K. Jaggia v. State of Punjab, AIR 1968 P H 97, wherein held as under: “I have gone through the three Supreme Court decisions referred to above. It is significant to mention that in all of them, Wanchoo, J. had prepared the Judgment on behalf of the Court. In R.P. Kapur’s case, AIR 1964 SC 787 , he has referred to the earlier two authorities and then observed thus— “Before we investigate what rights a member of the former Secretary of State’s Services had with respect to suspension, whether as a punishment or pending departmental enquiry or pending criminal proceedings, we must consider what rights the Government has in the matter of suspension of one kind or the other The general law on the subject of suspension has been laid down by this Court in two cases namely, (1960) 1 SCR 476 - AIR 1959 SC 1342 and (1961) I SCE 750 AIR 1961 SC 276 . These two cases lay down that it is well-settled that under the ordinary law of master and servant the power to suspend the servant without pay could not be implied as a term in an ordinary contract of service between the master and the servant, but must arise either from an express term in the contract Itself, or a statutory provision governing such contract. It was further held that an order of interim suspension could be passed against an employee while enquiry was pending against his conduct even though there was no specific provision to that effect in his terms of appointment or in the rules. But in such a case he would be entitled to his remuneration for the period of his interim suspension if there is no statute or rule existing under which it could be withheld. But in such a case he would be entitled to his remuneration for the period of his interim suspension if there is no statute or rule existing under which it could be withheld. The general principle therefore is that an employer can suspend an employee pending an enquiry into his conduct and the only question that can arise on such suspension will relate to the payment during the period of such suspension. If there is no express term in the contract relating to suspension and payment during such suspension or if there is no statutory provision in any law or rule, the employee is entitled to his full remuneration for the period of his interim suspension; on the other hand if there is a term in this respect in the contract or there is a provision in the statute or the rules framed there under providing for the scale of payment during suspension, the payment would be in accordance therewith. These general principles in our opinion apply with equal force in a case where the Government is the employer and a public servant is the employee with this modification that in view of the peculiar structural hierarchy of Government, the employer in the case of Government, must be held to be the authority which has the power to appoint a public servant. On general principles therefore the authority entitled to appoint a public servant would be entitled to suspend him pending a departmental enquiry into his conduct or pending a criminal proceeding which may eventually result, in a departmental enquiry against him. This general principle is illustrated by the provision in Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, No. 10 of 1897 which lays down that where any Central Act or Regulation gives power of appointment that includes the power to suspend or dismiss unless a different intention appears.” 12. The other ground taken by the appellant in the appeal that the respondent had absconded from the department does not appeal to reason. Respondent had attended Court and the criminal proceeding in which he was acquitted. He could have been personally served with order of suspension and the charge-sheet for holding departmental enquiry in Court when he attended the criminal case. Respondent had attended Court and the criminal proceeding in which he was acquitted. He could have been personally served with order of suspension and the charge-sheet for holding departmental enquiry in Court when he attended the criminal case. Moreover, there is no cogent reason or any basis of the writ petition brought on record by the department in their counter-affidavit for us to infer that he was absconding. As such, we are not inclined to believe that the employee had absconded without trace. Merely because, the respondent after his acquittal came to know about the termination order pursuant to ex parte enquiry after his acquittal from the criminal proceeding and moved application for his reinstatement, does not mean that his services had been legally terminated after holding a fair and proper departmental enquiry, in accordance with law. On the contrary, the writ Court has rightly found that his services had been terminated illegally without holding any departmental enquiry or payment of subsistence allowances. The charge-sheet alleged to have been published in newspaper “Bhrigu Kshetra” was not sufficient as it is neither a national newspaper nor a local newspaper having wide circulation in the area. As such publication of any notice in an obsolete newspaper would not be proper notice of departmental enquiry to the employee. The department could have sent the subsistence allowance by money orders month to month at his address to establish their bonafides but it appears that the department was in a hurry to do away with the services of the employee without even complying with basic principles of natural justice. Therefore, the finding of the writ Court that claim of the employee would not become barred by time as he was already before the Court regarding his claim cannot be faulted with continuing cause of action. The cause of action for payment of his retiral dues etc. is a continuing cause of action. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that respondent had concealed the fact of departmental enquiry and termination order in Writ Petition No. 31951 of 1992 is also incorrect as has been found in the impugned judgement from the record. 13. The judgement rendered by the writ Court is not based on any sympathy or any misapprehension of fact as argued by the appellant’s counsel. 13. The judgement rendered by the writ Court is not based on any sympathy or any misapprehension of fact as argued by the appellant’s counsel. Apart from direction for payment of retiral benefits and gratuity to the respondent in the impugned judgement on notional revision of pay with increments till the date of superannuation of the employee, is in accordance with law also for the reason that appellants had not passed any order as to why the period of suspension would not be treated as spent on duty. It appears that they were in a hurry to terminate his services without holding departmental inquiry in order to deprive the employee of all his legal dues in case he was acquitted from the criminal case. The charge of non-cooperation and alleged misconduct of embezzlement said to have been committed by him from the record of Nib Tehsildar is inconsequential in the facts and circumstances of this case for the reasons that the respondent was acquitted from the criminal case for embezzlement. Therefore, plea of the appellants, at this stage, for quashing of the impugned judgement of the writ Court dated 31.1.2006 and for non-payment of gratuity and other retiral benefits to the employee cannot be sustained. 14. For all the reasons stated above, the special appeal filed by the State is dismissed. The appellants are directed to comply with the directions of the Court passed in the judgement rendered in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15629 of 1993 forthwith . No order as to costs. —————