JUDGMENT B.K. PATEL, J. In this writ petition, petitioner has made prayer to quash Annexure-10 dated 11.8.2011 by which he was discharged from the services of National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) and Annexure-12 dated 15.5.2012 by which his letter of appeal requesting for re-instatement/re-appointment in the service was rejected by the Board. 2. While in practice as an Advocate, petitioner participated in a recruitment process, and received offer for appointment under Annexure-1 dated 16.12.2010 as Manager (Legal Service) in Grade ‘B’. It is stipulated under Annexure-1 that the petitioner would be on probation for a period of 2 years (extendable up to 3 years at the discretion of the Bank) from the date of his appointment. Upon acceptance of terms and conditions of appointment by the petitioner, and completion of Induction Training Programme, appointment letter under Annexure-3 dated 9.2.2011 as Manager (Direct Recruit) in Grade ‘B’ (on probation) was issued to the petitioner. 3. It is not disputed that in course of recruitment and appointment, the petitioner made suppression on two occasions with regard to criminal prosecutions against him and detention in custody. Before appearing for interview on 30.11.2010, the petitioner submitted Bio-Data-Cum-Attestation Form under Annexure-A in which in answer to column no. 27 providing for “Particulars of any prosecution/detention/fine/conviction/sentence against you awarded by any court of law for any offence”, the petitioner answered “NOT APPLICABLE” and in answer to column no. 28 providing for “Particulars of any case pending against you in any Court of Law at the time of filling up this form”, also the petitioner answered “NOT APPLICABLE”. Thereafter, at the time of joining for induction training on 31.1.2011, the petitioner submitted Staff Application Form at Annexure-B in which at column no.19, in answer to the query, “Whether he/she was ever arrested for any reason or convicted or committed to prison or subjected to any penalties by any previous employer or adjudicated insolvent”, the petitioner answered “NOT APPLICABLE”. From the police report dated 24.5.2011 under Annexure-D received by NABARD, it was found that at the relevant time as many as seven criminal cases were pending against the petitioner. It was also reported that the petitioner had been arrested and remanded to Berhampur Circle Jail in connection with the criminal cases. 4. Petitioner’s case is that he had been falsely implicated in seven criminal cases and was arrested and released on bail. It was also reported that the petitioner had been arrested and remanded to Berhampur Circle Jail in connection with the criminal cases. 4. Petitioner’s case is that he had been falsely implicated in seven criminal cases and was arrested and released on bail. On completion of investigation, charge sheets were submitted. It is however pleaded that the petitioner being falsely implicated on misconception had not indicated in Annexures-A and B regarding those seven cases. Upon receipt of letter under Annexure-5 from NABARD, he submitted his explanation under Annexure-6 stating therein that he was ignorant regarding the fact that G.R. cases were filed against the members of Bar Association. Petitioner also stated therein that he did not mention regarding the criminal cases while joining “because due to spelt out of” petitioner’s mind. It is further averred that letters under Annexures-7 and 8 were written to NABARD by the concerned Assistant Public Prosecutor and the Secretary, Ganjam Bar Association stating that there is no prima facie evidence against the petitioner and that as the cases related to incidents which occurred during agitation by the Bar members for establishment of High Court Bench at Berhampur, steps were being taken for withdrawal of the cases. The Law Department of NABARD also in the report under Annexure-9 observed that though the petitioner had technically not mentioned the details of arrest in the Staff Application Form, the case may be treated as non-submission of full facts and not as a case of furnishing wrong declaration for which the Bank may not terminate the petitioner from his service. After the order of discharge under Annexure-10, the petitioner approached this Court for quashing of the criminal case and by order dated 13.12.2011 the criminal cases against the petitioner were quashed. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred appeal under Annexure-11 in response to which order under Annexure-12 was passed. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that suppression by the petitioner of the fact of pendency of criminal cases and detention in custody, under the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the nature of criminal cases instituted in connection with the agitation, is disproportionate. Opposite parties representing NABARD ought to have taken lenient view in the matter. Opposite parties representing NABARD ought to have taken lenient view in the matter. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decisions in T.S.Vasudavan Nair vs. Director of Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre and others: 1988(Supp) Supreme Court Cases 795; Commissioner of Police and others vs. Sandeep Kumar : (2011) 4 Supreme Court Cases 644; and Ram Kumar vs.State of Uttar Pradesh and others: (2011) 14 Supreme Court Cases 709. 6. The second limb of argument was that the petitioner was discharged from the services in violation of the provision under Rule-16 (1) of the NABARD (Staff) Rules, 1982 (for short, ‘the Rules’). It was also contended that penalty of termination of the services of the petitioner having been imposed by the selfsame authority which passed order on petitioner’s appeal under Annexure-12, the order under Annexure-12 is not sustainable. 7. Counter-affidavit has been filed by the opposite parties asserting therein that discharge of the petitioner from service was in accordance with the specific provisions of the terms of contract of employment as contained in the offer of appointment at Annexure-1, candidate’s Bio-Data-Cum-Attestation Form at Annexure-A and Staff Application Form at Annexure-B. Annexure-1 stipulates, inter alia, as follows: “Clause-1 Xxx xxx xxx Clause-(i) Xxx xxx xxx. Clause(xxiii)- Your appointment will be subject to your furnishing such information as the Bank may require from time to time and subject to your services being acceptable in the light of the information furnished. Xxx xxx xxx Clause(xxvi) – Your appointment will be subject to verification of your character and antecedents by the police authorities concerned. In the event of NABARD receiving any unfavourable police report/s at a later date, your appointment in NABARD would be liable for termination forthwith without any notice or compensation in lieu thereof. Xxx xxx xxx 3. Xxx xxx xxx Clause(xxvi) – Your appointment will be subject to verification of your character and antecedents by the police authorities concerned. In the event of NABARD receiving any unfavourable police report/s at a later date, your appointment in NABARD would be liable for termination forthwith without any notice or compensation in lieu thereof. Xxx xxx xxx 3. Your appointment in the Bank’s service shall be liable to be terminated forthwith without any notice, if any, of the informations/documents submitted by you are found to be false or incorrect.” Annexure-A stipulates, inter alia, as follows:- “xxx xxx xxx Warning: If the fact that false information has been furnished or that there has been suppression of any factual information in the Bio-data-cum-attestation form comes to notice at any time during the service of a person, his services would be liable to be terminated without any notice or compensation in lieu thereof.” Annexure-B, inter alia, filled up, signed and submitted by the petitioner at the end contains the following undertaking in the form of declaration:- “I hereby declare that all the information and particulars given by me in this form are true and correct. I also note that if any of the above statements are incorrect or false or if any material information or particulars have been suppressed or omitted therefrom, my appointment will be liable to be terminated without notice or any compensation in lieu of notice.” It is further averred that in terms of Clause (xxvi) at Annexure-1 the opposite parties required verification report with regard to antecedents of the petitioner from the local police by letter dated 22.3.2011 at Annexure-C in response to which police report dated 24.5.2011 at Annexure-D was received indicating that the petitioner was involved in seven criminal cases in connection with which he was arrested and remanded to Berhampur Circle Jail. In the report at Annexure-D it was specifically stated that “Character and antecedents of the candidate is unsatisfactory as per the verification of the P.S. records.” In the above circumstances, in accordance with the specific terms in Annexures-1 and A, and undertaking in Annexure-B, which were accepted by the petitioner, the opposite parties discharged services of the petitioner while he was on probation for a period of only about six months on account of suppression of information. Discharge of the petitioner from service was not by way of imposition of any punishment, and as such there is no scope to contend that punishment or penalty is highly disproportionate to the charges. The petitioner having categorically admitted that criminal cases were pending against him while filling up, signing and submitting Annexures 1, A and B, plea of the petitioner, who is an advocate, of ignorance cannot be accepted as petitioner’s appointment was to the legal department in the officers category in the Bank. In the note sheet of the Law Department of the Bank at Annexure-9, it has been opined that technically the petitioner had suppressed information about pending of criminal cases. Such opinion was duly considered before discharging the petitioner from service in accordance with the stipulations and undertaking made at Annexures 1, A and B. Petitioner, being a lawyer, well understood that his discharge from service is consequential to the terms of declaration made by him and the conditional appointment against omission/commission on his part while furnishing information required from him at the time of his selection and appointment. Board of Directors examined petitioner’s appeal for reappointment/reinstatement and thereafter order of rejection at Annexure-12 was passed. Petitioner was discharged from service in accordance with Rule 16(1) of the NABARD (Staff) Rules,1982 for suppression of facts under Annexures 1, A and B in terms of undertaking and stipulations made thereunder. In terms of Rule 16(1) of the Rules the petitioner has been paid one month salary in lieu of notice as is evident from salary slip at Annexure-E. Conduct of the petitioner in suppressing information pertaining to pendency of criminal cases tells upon petitioner’s integrity and truthfulness. By suppressing fact of pendency of criminal cases the petitioner deliberately furnished false/ wrong information. 8. Learned counsel for the opposite parties, in course of hearing, reiterated the stand taken in the counter-affidavit. It was argued that order of discharge of the petitioner from service was not by way of imposition of penalty or punishment consequent upon departmental proceeding but automatic consequence of terms of employment voluntarily accepted by the petitioner under the Rules which governed service conditions of the petitioner. It was argued that order of discharge of the petitioner from service was not by way of imposition of penalty or punishment consequent upon departmental proceeding but automatic consequence of terms of employment voluntarily accepted by the petitioner under the Rules which governed service conditions of the petitioner. Petitioner has not disputed pendency of seven criminal cases or his detention in judicial custody in connection with criminal cases at the time of filling up, signing and submitting forms at Annexures 1, A and B. Even though criminal cases are stated to have been quashed subsequently, the petitioner cannot escape from imputation of having suppressed required information and submitting false particulars in Annexures 1, A and B. ‘Discharge from service’ has not been provided as one of the penalties under Rule 47 which occurs at Part-I of Chapter-IV of the Rules providing for ‘Conduct, Discipline and Appeals’. Order of discharge was passed in accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules which occurs under Part-II of Chapter-II providing for ‘Probation’. Provision for appeals has been made under Part-II of Chapter-IV. Therefore, petitioner has no scope to urge that his appeal was one under Rule 47 of the Rules. On the contrary, it is apparent that petitioner simply submitted a representation or letter of appeal at Annexure-11 directly to the Chairman, NABARB and not to the appellate authority through proper channel as required under the Rules and that too “to reconsider his case and, to recall” the order of discharge. Therefore, order of discharge having not been passed as one of the penalties contemplated under the Rules, petitioner’s technical plea that order of discharge being disproportionate with the alleged conduct of the petitioner and the appeal to have been considered by the Board, are misconceived. Placing strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Devendra Kumar vs. State of Uttaranchal and others: 2013(139) FLR 284 it was argued that it is well settled that information sought for by the employer if not disclosed as required, would definitely amount to suppression of material information, and in that eventuality the service becomes liable to be terminated, even if there had been no further trial or the person concerned stood acquitted or discharged. It was argued that there is no scope to take a liberal view as urged on behalf of petitioner in view of the fact that suppression of material information sought by the employer or furnishing false information itself amounts to moral turpitude. Considering the status of the petitioner as a lawyer, and importance of the post in NABARD to which he was seeking appointment, there is absolutely no scope to bestow leniency. It was submitted that in accordance with the provision under Rule 16 (1) of the Rules the petitioner was directed to be paid salary for one month in lieu of notice. 9. It has been rightly contended that ‘discharge from service’ is not one of the penalties provided under Rule 47 of the Rules. Rule 47 provides for six types of penalties namely (a) Reprimand; (b) delay or stoppage of increment or promotion; (c) degradation to a lower post or grade or to a lower stage in his incremental scale; (d) recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the National Bank by the employee; (dd) compulsory retirement and (e) dismissal. Chapter-IV of the Rules providing for Conduct, Discipline and Appeals containing Part-I from Rules 25 to 47 and Part-II from Rules 48 to 57 does not provide for the eventuality of ‘discharge from service’. One of the conditions for filing appeal under Rule 50 is that it shall be submitted through proper channel. Under Rule 49 in case of Officers in Grade ‘B’ an appeal lies to the Managing Director. Thus, it is evident that neither order of discharge of the petitioner was by way of imposition of penalty nor the appeal under Annexure-11 submitted by the petitioner to the Chairman of the NABARD was an appeal under Part-IV of Chapter of the Rules. 10. The petitioner was discharged from service while he was on probation. Sub-Rule(1) of Rule 16 of the Rules provides: “During the first three months of his probationary period, a directly recruited employee shall be liable to be discharged at one day’s notice or pay in lieu thereof and thereafter at one month’s notice or pay in lieu thereof.” The petitioner had completed first three months of his probationary period. Sub-Rule(1) of Rule 16 of the Rules provides: “During the first three months of his probationary period, a directly recruited employee shall be liable to be discharged at one day’s notice or pay in lieu thereof and thereafter at one month’s notice or pay in lieu thereof.” The petitioner had completed first three months of his probationary period. In such circumstances, as is evident from pay slip of the petitioner for the month of August, 2011 at Annexure-E, one month salary was directed to be paid to the petitioner in lieu of one month notice in accordance with Sub-Rule(1) of Rule 16 of the Rules. In such circumstances, the petitioner has no scope to raise the plea of that order under Annexure-12 passed in response to his letter under Annexure-11 appealing for reinstatement/reappointment violates of any provision under Chapter-IV of the Rules. 11. In the offer of appointment at Annexure-1 it is categorically stipulated that petitioner’s appointment would be subject to furnishing such information as the Bank might require, and subject to verification of his character and antecedents by the police authority. It is also stipulated that in the event of receipt of any unfavourable police report, petitioner’s appointment in Bank would be liable for termination. It is further stipulated that petitioner’s appointment shall be liable to be terminated forthwith if any information/documents submitted were found to be false or incorrect. Bio-Data-cum-Attestation Form at Annexure-A contains a specific ‘WARNING’ to the effect that if furnishing of false information or suppression of any factual information would come to the notice at any time, petitioner’s service shall be liable to be terminated. In the Staff Application Form at Annexure-B the petitioner himself furnished undertaking that if any of the statements were found incorrect or false or if any material information or particulars had been suppressed or omitted, petitioner’s appointment would be liable to be terminated. The petitioner does not dispute to have suppressed the fact of pendency of criminal cases as well as the fact of his detention in jail. Therefore, evidently it was well within NABARD’s jurisdiction to discharge petitioner from service in exercise of provision under Sub-Rule(1) of Rule-16 of the Rules. 12. The main thrust of the argument by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that under the facts and circumstances of the case a lenient view should to be taken. Therefore, evidently it was well within NABARD’s jurisdiction to discharge petitioner from service in exercise of provision under Sub-Rule(1) of Rule-16 of the Rules. 12. The main thrust of the argument by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that under the facts and circumstances of the case a lenient view should to be taken. It was in fact urged that the writ petition be treated as a ‘mercy petition’, and misconduct on the part of the petitioner in suppressing pendency of criminal cases and detention in custody may be condoned. However, decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner to claim leniency are of no assistance to him. In T.S.Vasudavan Nair vs. Director of Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre and others (supra) it has been specifically pointed out by the Supreme Court that in the special facts and circumstances of the case, as appellant had been convicted under the Defence of India Rules for having shouted slogans on one occasion only, order cancelling offer of appointment to the appellant was set aside and the respondents were directed to issue order of appointment as a Lower Division Clerk. Decision in Commissioner of Police and others vs. Sandeep Kumar(supra) related to cancellation of offer of appointment as Head Constable (ministerial) and decision in Ram Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others(supra) related to cancellation of appointment to the post of Constable. In Sandeep Kumar’s case (supra) Supreme Court was inclined to bestow mercy on and condone the petitioner considering the facts that though the respondent did not mention in his application form for appointment that he was involved in a criminal case, he had disclosed the same while filling up in the Attestation Form after his selection; and that the alleged occurrence in the criminal case had taken place when the respondent was about 20 years of age. In Ram Kumar’s case(supra) order of cancellation of appellant’s candidature was quashed on the basis of observation that the recruiting authority Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaziabad had cancelled the order of selection of the appellant without going into the question and satisfying himself as to whether the appellant was suitable for appointment to the post of Constable as required under the Government Order providing for, “Verification of the character and antecedents of government servants before their first appointment.” 13. In the present case, petitioner is an Advocate and he got himself involved in as many as seven criminal cases while in practice as a lawyer. He was arrested, forwarded to judicial custody and detained in jail. His appointment related to the post of Manager (Legal Service) in a Bank. Importance of such an office does not require elaboration. Petitioner suppressed the fact of pendency of criminal cases and detention in judicial custody on two different occasions – once while filling up Bio-Data-Cum-Attestation Form at Annexure-A and for the second time while filling up Staff Application Form at Annexure-B. He admitted regarding prosecution, arrest and detention in jail only after his employer sought for his reply after receipt of police verification report. Therefore, it is obvious that the petitioner consciously suppressed the information and also violated the stipulations in the Forms accepted and undertaking made by him. 14. Facts and circumstances of the present case are similar to the facts and circumstances in Devendra Kumar vs. State of Uttaranchal and others(supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the opposite parties. The facts and circumstances in the above cited decision as enumerated by the Supreme Court were as follows: “A. An advertisement was published in September, 2001 inviting applications from candidates eligible for the 250 posts of Constables in the State of Uttaranchal. The appellant applied in response to the same vide application dated 7.9.2001. He appeared for the physical test and qualified on 28.9.2001. Subsequently, upon passing the written test, the appellant faced an interview in September, 2001 and, ultimately his name was mentioned in the list of selected candidates published on 30.9.2001. The appellant was called for medical examination on 4/5.10.2001, by which he was found fit. Thus, he was sent for training of six months on 18.10.2001. B. While joining the training, the appellant was asked to submit an affidavit giving certain information particularly, whether he had even been involved in any criminal case. The appellant submitted an affidavit stating that he had never been involved a criminal case. The appellant completed his training satisfactorily and it was at this time in January, 2002, that the respondent authorities in pursuance of the process of character verification came to know that the appellant was in fact involved in a criminal case. The appellant submitted an affidavit stating that he had never been involved a criminal case. The appellant completed his training satisfactorily and it was at this time in January, 2002, that the respondent authorities in pursuance of the process of character verification came to know that the appellant was in fact involved in a criminal case. The final report in that case had been submitted by the prosecution and accepted by the learned Magistrate. C. On the basis of the same, the appellant was discharged abruptly on 8.4.2002 on the ground that since he was a temporary Government servant, he could be removed from service without holding any inquiry.” It was observed and propounded by the Supreme Court at paragraph-10 of the decision as follows: “So far as the issue of obtaining the appointment by misrepresentation is concerned, it is no more res integra. The question is not whether the applicant is suitable for the post. The pendency of a criminal case/proceeding is different from suppressing the information of such pendency. The case pending against a person might not involve moral turpitude but suppressing of this information itself amounts to moral turpitude. In fact, the information sought by the employer if not disclosed as required, would definitely amount to suppression of material information. In that eventuality, the service becomes liable to be terminated, even if there had been no further trial or the person concerned stood acquitted/ discharged.” At paragraph-22 of the decision it was further held: “xxx xxx xxx xxx The purpose of seeking such information is not to find out the nature or gravity of the offence or the ultimate result of a criminal case, rather such information is sought with a view to judge the character and antecedents of the job seeker or suitability to continue in service. Withholding such material information or making false representation itself amounts to moral turpitude and is a separate and distinct matter altogether than what is involved in the criminal case.” 15. Thus, it has been propounded by the Supreme Court that suppression of material information sought by the employer or furnishing false information itself amounts to moral turpitude and is separate and distinct from the involvement in a criminal case. Therefore, nature and result of criminal case in which the person seeking employment was involved are not relevant. Thus, it has been propounded by the Supreme Court that suppression of material information sought by the employer or furnishing false information itself amounts to moral turpitude and is separate and distinct from the involvement in a criminal case. Therefore, nature and result of criminal case in which the person seeking employment was involved are not relevant. In the present case, there being no dispute that the petitioner had made material suppression of information sought by the employer, there is no scope to interfere with the order of discharge. There is no merit in the writ petition and the writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.