Judgment : R. Sudhakar, J. 1. The above appeal has been filed by the Revenue against the Final Order No.1204 dated 26.7.05, passed by the 2nd respondent and the appeal was admitted by this Court on 13.6.07 the following substantial questions of law :- “i) Whether the order of the CESTAT vide its Majority Order holding that as no contrary evidence is produced by the Revenue to show that the process is undertaken by the assessee, amounts to shrink proofing which amount to manufacture as defined under the Act. ii) Whether, after considering the technical expert opinion, the conclusion of the adjudicating authority that the process undertaken by the assessee are of wetting and dampening and as of not a lasting character and the same cannot be held to be shrink proofing is legally correct and proper.” 2. The respondent assessee is engaged in the making of denim fabrics for which the company uses air jet looms, which are shuttle-less looms. In addition to the above, in the process of making denim fabrics, the company undertakes an operation, whereby the cloth is subject to a process through a machine called 'MONTFORT' machine and that the denim cloth undergoes processing in the 'MONTFORT' machine, which process, according to the department, amounts to manufacture and has to suffer duty. According to the assessee, it does not amount to manufacture and, therefore, not liable for duty. This issue was considered by the adjudicating authority in favour of the assessee, which was appealed by the department. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner against which the present appeal has been filed by the Department. 3. Heard the learned standing counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent and also perused the typed set of papers and other documents produced by the parties. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents also placed reliance on the following decisions :- “a) Navin Chemicals Mfg. & Trading Co. Ltd. Vs. Collector of Customs - 1993 (68) ELT 3 (SC) ; b) Commissioner of C. Ex. & Customs Vs. Swiss Glass Coat Equipments Ltd. – 2011 (273) ELT 364 (Guj.) ; c) Commissioner of C. Ex., Hyderabad IV Vs. Shriram Refrigeration Industries – 2009 (240) ELT 201 (AP) ; d) C.C.E., C & S.T., Thiruvananthapuram Vs. Kerala State Beverages – 2014 (33) STR 484 (Ker.) ; e) C.C.E., Mangalore Vs. & Customs Vs. Swiss Glass Coat Equipments Ltd. – 2011 (273) ELT 364 (Guj.) ; c) Commissioner of C. Ex., Hyderabad IV Vs. Shriram Refrigeration Industries – 2009 (240) ELT 201 (AP) ; d) C.C.E., C & S.T., Thiruvananthapuram Vs. Kerala State Beverages – 2014 (33) STR 484 (Ker.) ; e) C.C.E., Mangalore Vs. Mangalore Refineries & Petrochemicals Ltd. - 2011 (270) ELT 49 (Kar.) f) Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai Vs. M.F.Tools & Ors. - CMA No.1264 of 2008 dated 03.01.2014.” 4. Though two questions of law have been framed for consideration at the time of admission, as stated above, the 2nd substantial question of law is material for this case. The 2nd substantial question of law that processing of the cloth by the use of 'MONTFORT' machine, though according to the department, amounts to manufacture, but the same was disputed successfully by the assessee before the adjudicating authority as also the Tribunal, requires consideration for the purpose of arriving at a decision as to whether the same would amount to manufacture or not. In such an event, the result would have a bearing on whether the goods will be liable to duty or not. In this regard, learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent placed reliance upon Section 35L (b) of the Central Excise Act and submitted that the since the issue relates to rate of excise duty, as per the mandate of Section 35-L, appeal will lie only before the Supreme Court, which stand is not disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant. For better clarity, Section 35-L of the Act is extracted hereunder :- “Appeal to the Supreme Court 35L. For better clarity, Section 35-L of the Act is extracted hereunder :- “Appeal to the Supreme Court 35L. — An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from — (a) any judgment of the High Court delivered - (i) in an appeal made under section 35G; or (ii) on a reference made under section 35G by the Appellate Tribunal before the 1st day of July, 2003; (iii) on a reference made under section 35H, in any case which, on its own motion or on an oral application made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved, immediately after passing of the judgment, the High Court certifies to be a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court; (b) or any order passed [before the establishment of the National Tax Tribunal] by the Appellate Tribunal relating, among other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment.” 5. From a bare reading of the above said Section 35-L, more particularly sub-section (b), as extracted above, it is clear that the said Section stands attracts to the facts of the present case. The decisions, cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, more particularly, Navin Chemicals case (supra), would clearly reveal that the Courts have consistently held that where the issue directly involves, among other things, determination of rate of duty, the matter should be agitated before the Supreme Court, which ratio is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case, as the present case stands on similar footing. 6. Following the judgment of the Supreme Court in Navin Chemicals case (supra), as also the judgment of this Court in C.M.A. No.1264 of 2008, this Court holds that the issue involved relates to classification of products and, therefore, this appeal is not maintainable before this Court. Accordingly, this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal stands dismissed as not maintainable. However, liberty is granted to the appellant to file an appeal before the Supreme Court within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. However, there shall be no order as to costs.