JUDGMENT L.K. Mohapatra, Actg. C.J. This writ appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 12.11.2003 passed in W.P. (C) No. 1033 of 1999. The appellant initially joined as a Post Graduate Teacher in the year 1973 in Sainik School at Imphal. The respondent No. 1 issued an advertisement on 25.10.1994 for filling up the post of Principal of Manipur Public School. In response to the said advertisement, the appellant submitted his application. The Academic Committee conducted an interview and recommended the appellant for such appointment. Accordingly on the basis of such recommendation, the appellant was appointed as Principal of Manipur Public School and was placed on probation for a period of 2 (two) years vide order dated 20.06.1996. Thereafter by two subsequent orders dated 1.8.1998 and 23.12.1998, the period of probation was extended up to 23rd April, 1999. No further extension of probation was directed and the service of the appellant was terminated vide order dated 17.04.1999. The appellant filed review on 15.5.1999 against the order of termination. The General Body of the Society considered the review and rejected the same. Challenging the order of termination as well as the order passed on the application filed for review, the appellant filed the writ application. 2. The respondents filed counter affidavit and additional affidavit to the said writ petition. A preliminary objection was raised with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition against the respondents, as it being a Society which is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. On merit, it was contended by the respondents in their affidavit that the appellant accepted the offer of appointment on the condition that he would remain on probation for a period of 2 years. He was kept on probation for determining his suitability for confirmation. Considering the unsatisfactory performance, the respondents have granted two extensions during the probation period and when ultimately it was found that the performance of the appellant was not up to the mark, a decision was taken to terminate his service. Accordingly, the order of termination was passed. The review filed by the appellant was also considered by the General Body and the General Body was also came to the conclusion that the performance of the appellant was not satisfactory during the probation period and accordingly rejected the review petition. 3. Accordingly, the order of termination was passed. The review filed by the appellant was also considered by the General Body and the General Body was also came to the conclusion that the performance of the appellant was not satisfactory during the probation period and accordingly rejected the review petition. 3. The learned Single Judge held that considering the constitution of the Society, the finance given by the State as well the land provided by the State and it’s pervasive control, it cannot be said that the respondent No. 1 is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and accordingly held the writ application to be maintainable. 3.1. So far as the merit of the case is concerned, the learned Single Judge held that during the probation period the performance of the appellant was not found to be satisfactory and accordingly his service was terminated. It was further found that since the order of termination was a termination simpliciter considering the poor performance of the appellant during probation period, there was no requirement to initiate any proceeding against the appellant before termination and therefore Article 311 of the Constitution does not apply the case of the appellant. The writ application was accordingly dismissed. 4. Mr. N. Ibotombi Singh, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. H. Surajkumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant assailed the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge on three grounds, namely (1) protection of Article 311 of the Constitution of India can be invoked not only in respect of public servants but also in respect of public servants who are employed on temporary basis or are continuing as probationers; (2) the background on which the order of termination has been passed is stigmatic and therefore, the appellant is entitled to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India; and (3) in absence of any rule, on completion of two years of probation, the appellant shall be deemed to be a permanent employee and therefore, his service could not be terminated without a regular proceeding. 5. Mr. A. Bimol Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the appellant was offered appointment on condition that he should be placed on probation for a period of two years. During the period of probation, his service was not found to be satisfactory and the period of probation was extended twice. 5. Mr. A. Bimol Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the appellant was offered appointment on condition that he should be placed on probation for a period of two years. During the period of probation, his service was not found to be satisfactory and the period of probation was extended twice. Even during the extended period of probation, his service was not found to be satisfactory and therefore, a decision was taken to terminate the service. Since the appellant was on probation and the order of termination was passed solely on the ground that his performance was not satisfactory during the period of probation, he is not entitled to protect under Article 311 of the Constitution. It was also contended by Mr. A. Bimol Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondents that the question of automatic confirmation on completion of two years of probation does not arise in this case as the period of probation was extended twice and at no point of time the appellant raised any objection with regard to such extension of probation. 6. Annexure-X/3 dated 20.06.1996 is the order of appointment. From the said order dated 20.6.1996, it appears that on the recommendation of the DPC the appellant was appointed as Principal of Manipur Public School, Koirengei and that he was put on probation for a period of two years. The said order of appointment is quoted below: OFFICE OF THE MANIPUR PUBLIC SCHOOL SOCIETY IMPHAL ---- ORDERS Imphal, the 20th June, 1996 No. 2/Adm./24/MPS/92: On the recommendation of the DPC constituted vide order of even no dated 26.2.96, held on 27.2.96, Shri L. Dorendro Singh, presently Master in Mathematics (Senior Scale) of Sainik School, Imphal, is appointed as Principal of Manipur Public School, Koirengei in the scale of pay of Rs. 3000-100-3500-125-4500/- with other admissible allowances as per Manipur Public School Society Rules with immediate effect. The appointment is temporary. The Officer will be on probation for a period of 2 (two) years. Sd/-20.6.96 (S. Kunjabihari Singh) Secretary Manipur Public School Society, Imphal 7. After completion of the two years of service on probation, another order was passed on 1.8.1998 in Annexure-X/10 extending the period of probation by another six months. The appointment is temporary. The Officer will be on probation for a period of 2 (two) years. Sd/-20.6.96 (S. Kunjabihari Singh) Secretary Manipur Public School Society, Imphal 7. After completion of the two years of service on probation, another order was passed on 1.8.1998 in Annexure-X/10 extending the period of probation by another six months. The said order is quoted below: OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY MANIPUR PUBLIC SCHOOL SOCIETY: IMPHAL Orders by the Chairman, M.P.S.S. Imphal, the 1st August, 1998 No. 2/Adm./24/MPS-92: After due assessment of the performance of Shri L. Dorendro Singh, Principal, Manipur Public School during the period of his probation, the Chairman, Manipur Public School Society is pleased to extend the period of probation for another six months w.e.f. 21.6.98. Further, the Chairman is pleased to order that the performance of the officer will again be reviewed after completion of the period of six month after. By orders etc. Sd/- 1.8.98 (Ch. Birendra Singh) Secretary, Manipur Public School Society. 7.1. Again, vide order dated 23.12.1998 in Annexure-X/11, the period of probation was extended by another four months. The said order is also quoted below: OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY MANIPUR PUBLIC SCHOOL SOCIETY IMPHAL ORDERS Imphal, the 23rd December, 1998 No. 2/Adm./24/MPS-92: After due assessment of the performance of Shri L. Dorendro Singh, Principal, Manipur Public School during the extended period of probation for a period of 6 (six) months w.e.f. 21.6.1998, the Chairman, Manipur Public School Society is pleased to extend the period of probation of the said Shri L. Dorendro Singh by a further and last period of 4 (four) months ending April 23, 1999. Further, the Chairman is pleased to order that the performance of the Principal will again be reviewed. By orders etc. Sd/- (Henry K. Heni) Secretary Manipur Public School Society 8. Further, the Chairman is pleased to order that the performance of the Principal will again be reviewed. By orders etc. Sd/- (Henry K. Heni) Secretary Manipur Public School Society 8. After completion of the two extended period of probation, the impugned order of termination was passed on 17th April, 1999 in Annexure-X/15, which is quoted below: OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY MANIPUR PUBLIC SCHOOL SOCIETY: IMPHAL ORDERS Imphal, the 17th April, 1999 No. 2/1/SECY(MPSS)/97(Pt): Whereas Shri L. Dorendro Singh was appointed temporarily as Principal of Manipur Public School vide order No. 2/Adm/24/MPS-92 dated 20.6.96 placing him under probation for a period of 2 (two) years; And whereas, on completion of the 2 (two) years probation period as the services of Shri L. Dorendro Singh, Principal of Manipur Public School were not satisfactory, the term of his probation was extended for another period of 6 (six) months w.e.f. 21.12.1998 vide order No. 2/Adm/24/MPS-92 dt. 1.8.1998; And whereas even on completion of the extended term of probation of 6 (six) months as the services of the said L. Dorendro Singh were found not to be satisfactory, the term of his probation period was extended by a further period of 4 (four) months by way of giving him last and final chance, vide order No. 2/Adm/24/MPS-92 dt.23.12.1998; And whereas, the General Body of the Manipur Public School Society in its meeting held on 17.4.99 minutely reconsidered/reassessed the overall performance of the said Shri L. Dorendro Singh as Principal of the Manipur Public School during his probation period and found that his services are still unsatisfactory and accordingly decided that the services of Shri L. Dorendro Singh, Principal of Manipur Public School is no longer required; Now, therefore, the Chairman of the Manipur Public School Society is pleased to order termination of the services of Shri L. Dorendro Singh as Principal, Manipur Public School and he stands released from the Manipur Public School with immediate effect in public interest. Further, the Chairman, Manipur Public School Society is pleased to order that Smt. S. Premabati Devi, Senior Teacher of the Manipur Public School shall look after the works of the Principal of the Manipur Public School with immediate effect till alternative arrangement is made. By order & in the name of the Chairman, MPSS Sd/- (Henry K. Heni) Secretary, Manipur Public School Society Imphal 9. By order & in the name of the Chairman, MPSS Sd/- (Henry K. Heni) Secretary, Manipur Public School Society Imphal 9. The appellant thereafter filed a review challenging the order of termination and the same was rejected on 24.06.1999 in Annexure-X/17. On perusal of the order of appointment, it is clear that the appellant was to remain on probation for a period of two years and this condition was accepted by the appellant. Though it was contended by the learned Sr. Counsel, Mr. N. Ibotombi Singh, appearing on behalf of the appellant that on completion of two years’ probation, in absence of any rule, the appellant shall be deemed to be a permanent employee but, it is found that on 1.8.1998 his probation was extended for further period of six months. The appellant did not challenge the said order of extension on the above ground and accepted the same. Thereafter the second extension was granted on 23.12.1998 for a period of four months. This order was also not challenged by the appellant and he accepted it. Therefore, after accepting two extension orders, it is no more open for the appellant now to claim deemed permanency in service on completion of two years of probation. Therefore, so far as the 3rd ground taken by the learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant is concerned, we find no substance. 10. The first and second grounds taken by the learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant relate to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Law relating to applicability of Article311 of the Constitution of India in case of probationer has been dealt with in case of Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in (2000) 5 SCC 152 . In paragraph-12 of the judgment, the Court observed that it is settled that the temporary government servants or probationers are as much entitled to the protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution as the permanent employees despite the fact that temporary government servants have no right to hold the post and their services are liable to be terminated at any time by giving them a month’s notice without assigning any reason either in terms of the contract of service or under the relevant statutory rules regulating the terms and conditions of such service. The courts can, therefore, lift the veil of an innocuously - worded order to look at the real face of the order. In paragraph 15 of the judgment, the Court referred to an earlier decision of the same court in case of State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur Air 1968 SC 1089 : (1968) 3 SCR 234 and made the following observations: 1. The services of a temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the rules of his employment and such termination without anything more would not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. 2. The circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination of service have to be examined in each case, the motive behind it being immaterial. 3. If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts an aspersion against his character or integrity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant. 4. An order of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an inquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service, does not attract the operation of Article 311of the Constitution. 5. If there be a full-scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Article 311, i.e. an enquiry officer is appointed, a charge-sheet submitted, explanation called for an considered, any order of termination of service made thereafter will attract the operation of the said article. In paragraph-16 of the judgment, the Court, further, held that in order to attract the provisions of Article311 of the Constitution, it has to be seen whether the misconduct or negligence was a mere motive for the order of reversion or termination or whether it was the very foundation of that order. In paragraph-16 of the judgment, the Court, further, held that in order to attract the provisions of Article311 of the Constitution, it has to be seen whether the misconduct or negligence was a mere motive for the order of reversion or termination or whether it was the very foundation of that order. The said paragraph is also quoted below: Para-16: These principles as also the principle laid down in Champaklal case, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1854 : (1964) 5 SCR 190 , were reiterated by this Court in Union of India v. R.S. Dhaba : (1969) 3 SCC 603 , State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra (1970) 2 SCC 871 : AIR 1971 SC 1011 , R.S. Sial v. State of U.P. (1975) 3 SCC 111 : AIR 1974 SC 1317 and it was laid down that in order to attract the provisions of Article 311(2) it has to be seen whether the misconduct or negligence was a mere motive for the order of reversion or termination or whether it was the very foundation of that order. It was again reiterated that the form of the order was not conclusive of its true nature and the court has to examine the entirety of circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. Sughar Singh (1974) 1 SCC 218 : AIR 1974 SC 423 which related to reversion and in which reliance was placed on two earlier decisions in Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe v. State of Mysore AIR 1962 SC 8 : (1962) 1 SCR 886 , and State of Bombay v. F.A. Abraham AIR 1962 SC 794 : 1962 Supp. (2) SCR 92. It was, however, laid down that if the order visits the employee with penal consequences, the order would be punitive. It was for this reason that the order of reversion in that case was held to be bad. 11. In view of what has been laid down in the above decision, we proceed to examine the order of termination and reasons behind such termination. The order of termination dated 17.04.1999, which has been quoted earlier, speaks of ’unsatisfactory’ work as the reason for termination. The learned Sr. 11. In view of what has been laid down in the above decision, we proceed to examine the order of termination and reasons behind such termination. The order of termination dated 17.04.1999, which has been quoted earlier, speaks of ’unsatisfactory’ work as the reason for termination. The learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant referring to the letter dated 24.6.1999 in which the review was dismissed, submitted that the record indicated that the reason for termination of service of the appellant was not because of unsatisfactory work but because of the fact that his continuance was considered to be harmful to the academic activities of the school. According to Mr. N. Ibotombi Singh, the learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, termination of the service of the appellant on the above ground amounts to attachment of stigma and therefore, Article 311 of the Constitution is attracted. Reliance was place by the learned Sr. Counsel for the appellant on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Abhijit Gupta v. S.N.B. National Centre, Basic Sciences & Ors., reported in (2006) 4 SCC 469 . In the said reported case, service of the appellant therein was terminated while in service and the said order of termination was the subject matter of challenge. The order of termination disclosed that the reason for such termination was that the appellant therein was a person having perverted mind and dishonest, duffer having no capacity to learn. Considering the above, the Apex Court held that the order of termination was not an order of termination simpliciter but it was punitive in nature and as such the appellant therein was entitled to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution. In another decision relied upon by the appellant in the case of V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab & Ors. reported in (2000) 3 SCC 239 the Court held the following observations such as "failed in the performance of his duties administratively and technically and as stigmatic and punitive" as stigmatic accordingly held that the appellant therein was entitled to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 11.1. reported in (2000) 3 SCC 239 the Court held the following observations such as "failed in the performance of his duties administratively and technically and as stigmatic and punitive" as stigmatic accordingly held that the appellant therein was entitled to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 11.1. The question as to whether the order of termination is punitive or simpliciter and as to whether there is stigma in the termination order or not came for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta & Ors. reported in (1999) 3 SCC 60 . In para-19 of the judgment, the Court held that as to in what circumstances an order of termination of a probationer can be said to be punitive or not depends upon whether certain allegations which are the cause of the termination are the motive or foundation. In the said case a lengthy termination order was passed which has not only said about the performance during the probation period as unsatisfactory but also said that the conduct, performance, ability and capacity during the probation period was not satisfactory and that the said appellant was considered unsuitable for the post for which he was appointed. Much reliance was placed by the learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the appellant in the above observation, but each case has to be decided on facts and circumstances of that case as has been observed and decided in the said judgment in paragraph-31. 12. In the present case, the order of termination only speaks of unsatisfactory work. Two orders of extension also speak unsatisfactory work. Therefore, the foundation of passing the order of termination is unsatisfactory work. On 24.6.1999 while rejecting the review, it was mentioned that General Body decided that the continuance of the appellant would be harmful to the academic activities of the School. The foundation for terminating the service of the appellant as is evident from the two orders of extension and order of termination is only unsatisfactory performance and not the above observation made by the General Body. Though it was contended by the learned Sr. The foundation for terminating the service of the appellant as is evident from the two orders of extension and order of termination is only unsatisfactory performance and not the above observation made by the General Body. Though it was contended by the learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner that the above observation was made by the General Body on the basis of a report which was also the basis of order of termination, we are unable to accept the above contention as even on the face of above observation made in the report, the same was not acted upon and termination order was passed only on ground of unsatisfactory performance. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the order of termination does not contain any stigma and accordingly the appellant is not entitled to protection under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. We also find that the order of termination is an order of termination simpliciter and not punitive in nature. For the reasons stated above, we find no reason to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge. The writ appeal is accordingly dismissed.