JUDGMENT Deepak Gupta, C.J.:-- 1. The short question which arises in these writ appeals is whether bamboo sticks which are used to make Agarbattis are forest produce or not. 2. A learned Single Judge of this Court relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Suresh Lohiya v. State of Maharashtra and another, (1996) 10 SCC 397 ] wherein the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Fatesang Gimba Vasava and others v. State of Gujarat and others, : AIR 1987 Gujarat 9] was approved held that bamboo sticks used for making Agarbatti are not forest produce. The learned Single Judge has also made reference to a large number of other judgments for coming to the conclusion that bamboo sticks are made out of bamboo by a process of manufacture and, therefore, the end product is different. He, therefore, held that bamboo sticks meant for use in Agarbattis would not be subject to royalty as forest produce under the Indian Forest Act. 3. We have heard Sri S. Deb, learned Sr. Counsel for the State, and Sri S.M. Chakraborty, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the respondents. 4. At the outset, we may mention that we are clearly of the view that even assuming that bamboo sticks are manufactured out of bamboo that by itself would not mean that they are not forest produce. A number of judgments relied upon by the learned Single Judge relate to tax laws, specially Excise Law wherein the issues were what was the test for determining whether a good had been manufactured or not. Even if goods are manufactured and becomes a different category of goods, this does not necessarily mean that the goods lose their inherent character. They may be termed as different goods because they have been manufactured and may have come into being by manufacturing process, but that would not necessarily mean that it has lost its initial character. The learned Single Judge relying upon the definition of manufacture has come to the conclusion that since bamboo sticks are produced by a manufacturing process, they cannot be treated to be forest produce. He has thus come to the conclusion that the original commodity namely bamboo then ceases to exist and it is Agarbatti sticks or bamboo sticks which remain and, therefore, they are not forest produce. He has thus come to the conclusion that the original commodity namely bamboo then ceases to exist and it is Agarbatti sticks or bamboo sticks which remain and, therefore, they are not forest produce. Relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:- Here the original commodity, namely, the bamboo could not be used for the same purpose until it is processed to be used as Agarbati sticks. It is only by the process of cutting the bamboo into chips or sticks, it is made marketable. The bamboo cannot be used for the same purpose as the bamboo chips or sticks have been cut into specified sizes to render it marketable. 5. With due respect, we are unable to accept this part of the judgment to be correct. Assuming that the bamboo sticks, also known as Agarbatti sticks, come into being after manufacturing process that by itself will not mean that they cease to be forest produce. While determining whether manufacture has taken place, one of the tests is to see whether a different product comes into being but that does not necessarily mean that just because a different product has come into existence, it loses its inherent character. That will depend on the definition of the word “forest produce” which is defined in Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 which reads as follows:- 2 (4) “forest-produce” includes-- (a) the following whether found in, or brought from, a forest or not, that is to say--timber, charcoal, caoutchouc, catechu, wood-oil, resin, natural varnish, bark, lac, mahua flowers, mahua seeds, kuth and myrabolams, and (b) the following when found in, or brought from a forest, that is to say-- (i) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits, and all other parts or produce not hereinbefore mentioned, of trees, (ii) plants not being trees (including grass, creepers, reeds and moss), and all parts or produce of such plants, (iii) wild animals and skins, tusks, horns, bones, silk, cocoons, honey and wax, and all other parts or produce of animals, and (iv) peat, surface soil, rock and minerals (including lime-stone, laterite, mineral oils, and all products of mines or quarries); 6. Even if the opening words are seen, timber is forest produce. Timber may not necessarily be wood in its original form. Timber may be wood which has been cut from the tree. Even if the opening words are seen, timber is forest produce. Timber may not necessarily be wood in its original form. Timber may be wood which has been cut from the tree. The tree may be cut into logs and then into sleepers and thereafter the timber may be fashioned into specific sizes. The timber may not have been fashioned into another product like furniture, but definitely a process of manufacture has been used to cut the tree and shape the wood into pieces of different sizes and shapes, but this product would remain forest produce. 7. Similarly, charcoal is produced by a manufacturing process. The wood is semi-burnt and then charcoal comes into existence. Charcoal is not a natural product. Similarly, catechu (katha), wood oil, resin all come into being after a manufacturing process is used. Despite a manufacturing process being used, these items are forest produce within the meaning of the Act. These items continue to remain forest produce whether they are found in, or brought from, a forest or not. Therefore, as far as this portion of the judgment is concerned, we find that the same is not in accordance with the definition of forest produce. 8. Having held so, we must come to the second more important issue. Forest produce is defined in Section 2(4) quoted above. Clause (a) of sub-section (4) deals with that “forest-produce” which may be found in, or brought from, a forest or not. Therefore, the items mentioned in Clause (a) would be termed to be “forest produce” whether they were found in, or brought from, a forest or not. Therefore, wherever these goods may be found, they shall be treated to be forest produce. 9. Clause (b) of sub-section (4), however, deals with a separate category of goods. These items can be treated as forest produce only when it is shown that they were either found in a forest or brought from a forest. 10. We are concerned only with the sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of section 2(4) which deals with trees and leaves, flowers and fruits, and all other parts or produce of a tree not mentioned before. Therefore, each and every part of a tree is forest produce. 11. “Tree” has been defined in sub-section (7) of Section 2 of the Act as follows:- 2(7) “tree” includes palms, bamboos, skumps, brush-wood and canes. Therefore, each and every part of a tree is forest produce. 11. “Tree” has been defined in sub-section (7) of Section 2 of the Act as follows:- 2(7) “tree” includes palms, bamboos, skumps, brush-wood and canes. Therefore, “tree” includes bamboos and canes and the parts of the bamboo would also be included in the definition of trees. 12. The learned Single Judge has relied on the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Fatesang Gimba Vasava and others v. State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1987 Gujarat 9] especially on the following observations:- Now the expression ‘forest produce’ as defined by S. 2(4) of the Act includes trees and leaves, flowers and fruits and all other parts or produce of trees. Section 2(7) which defines ‘tree’ includes a bamboo. Therefore, bamboos are undoubtedly forest-produce. Toplas, palas and supdas are undoubtedly prepared from bamboo chips and can be described as bamboo-articles, but do such articles fall within the definition of ‘forest produce’? A careful look at the various clauses of the definition of forest-produce makes it clear that it takes within its fold all that is produced by nature but does not include man-made products such as toplas, palas, supdas, etc., made from bamboo chips. True it is that if bamboo as a whole is forest-produce, every part thereof including chips would fall within that definition but once the chips cease to be a ‘produce’ of nature and get merged into a ‘product’ brought about by human labour and if the product so made is commercially new and distinct, known to the business community as a totally different commodity having a distinct character, such an article or product ceases to be a forest-produce, i.e., furniture made from timber or paper produced from bamboo-pulp. Therefore, bamboo being a tree would certainly fall within Cl. (b) of the definition of ‘forest-produce’, but toplas, supdas and palas made out of bamboo chips would not fall within the definition of forest-produce. (emphasis supplied) 13. The Apex Court in Suresh Lohiya v. State of Maharashtra and another, : (1996) 10 SCC 397 ] approved the law laid down by the Gujarat High Court and held that a bamboo mat is not forest produce. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:- 6. We have given our considered thought to the rival contentions. The Apex Court in Suresh Lohiya v. State of Maharashtra and another, : (1996) 10 SCC 397 ] approved the law laid down by the Gujarat High Court and held that a bamboo mat is not forest produce. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:- 6. We have given our considered thought to the rival contentions. It appears to us that the High Court erred in taking the abovesaid view by referring to the definition of ‘timber’ inasmuch as we agree with Shri Bhatia that the second part of the definition does not take within its fold fashioned bamboo as that part is relatable to wood, and not tree. We have said so because the definition of tree includes even canes, and a cane cannot be taken as a wood, even if a tree could be. But then, the High Court has also referred to sub-clause (i) (supra) which speaks of produce of tree as well. As to this, submission of the appellant’s counsel has been that when sub-clause (i) is read as a whole the same would clearly indicate that such produce of tree alone is contemplated which is a natural growth or product like flowers and fruits. This submission has force when the definition of forest-produce is read in its entirety which would show that the definition either includes nature’s gifts like charcoal, mahua flowers or minerals. Wild animals of which sub-clause (iii) speaks of is also a God’s gift and not man-made. Wherever the legislature wanted to include article produced with the aid of human labour, it has said so specifically as would appear from sub-clause (iv), as it speaks, apart from minerals etc. of “all products of mines or quarries”. 7. The legislature having defined “forest-produce”, it is not permissible to us to read in the definition something which is not there. We are conscious of the fact that forest wealth is required to be preserved; but, it is not open to us to legislate, as what a court can do in a matter like at hand is to iron out creases; it cannot weave a new texture. If there be any lacuna in the definition it is really for the legislature to take care of the same. 8. If there be any lacuna in the definition it is really for the legislature to take care of the same. 8. We may also state that according to us the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in Fatesang’s case is correct, because though bamboo as a whole is forest-produce, if a product, commercially new and distinct, known to the business community as totally different is brought into existence by human labour, such an article and product would cease to be a forest-produce. The definition of this expression leaves nothing to doubt that it would not take within its fold an article or thing which is totally different from forest-produce having a distinct character. May it be stated that where a word or an expression is defined by the legislature, courts have to look to that definition; the general understanding of it cannot be determinative. So, what has been stated in Strouds’ Judicial Dictionary regarding a ‘produce’ cannot be decisive. Therefore, where a product from bamboo is commercially different from it and in common parlance taken as a distinct product, the same would not be encompassed within the expression “forest-produce” as defined in section 2(4) of the Act, despite it being inclusive in nature. That bamboo mat is taken as a product distinct from bamboo in the commercial world, has not been disputed before us, and rightly. 14. The main issue is whether bamboo sticks used in Agarbattis can be said to be a product so commercially new and distinct that it cannot be related to bamboo at all. We must while dealing with this definition also note that the judgments of the Gujarat High Court and the Apex Court were delivered before the intervention by the Apex Court in forest matters in T.N. Godavarman’s case. The notification which is the subject matter of the writ petition and which imposes royalty on bamboo sticks used as Agarbatti sticks has been issued purportedly in compliance of the judgment of the Apex Court in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India and others. 15. We cannot be oblivious to the fact that in T.N. Godavarman’s case the Apex Court has virtually redefined the definition of forest and forest produce. We may make reference to the orders of the Apex Court in the same case delivered on 12-05-2001 wherein the Apex Court held as follows:- 2. 15. We cannot be oblivious to the fact that in T.N. Godavarman’s case the Apex Court has virtually redefined the definition of forest and forest produce. We may make reference to the orders of the Apex Court in the same case delivered on 12-05-2001 wherein the Apex Court held as follows:- 2. Movement of timber and timber products, including sawn timber, veneer and plywood, outside the North-East shall be permitted only if sourced from or processed in High-Powered Committee cleared wood-based units situated inside approved industrial estates except in respect of Mizoram where no industrial estates exist. Round and hand-sawn timber, save in cases where specific approval is accorded by the High-Powered Committee/Ministry of Environment and Forests, shall not be allowed to be transported outside the North-East except in the case of Mizoram. Movement of timber and timber products for Mizoram shall be regulated as per guidelines prescribed by the Special Investigating Team. 3. Felling of trees from forests shall be only in accordance with working plans/schemes or felling schemes approved by Ministry of Environment and Forests as per this Court’s order dated 15.01.1998. It is again clarified that such working plans/schemes shall also be needed for felling of trees from any non-government forest area including the lands which are required to be treated as “forest” as per this Court’s order dated 12.12.1996. While implementing the working plans/schemes approved by the Central Government, the State Government or the authority concerned, as the case may be, shall ensure that no felling is done unless and until sufficient financial provisions exist for regeneration of such areas as per this Court’s directions dated 22.9.2000. For felling of trees from non-forest area including in respect of plantations on non-forest areas, detailed guidelines/rules shall be framed by the State Governments concerned which shall come into effect after the same are concurred with modification, if any, by the Ministry of Environment and Forests. The guidelines/rules shall also include provision for penalties and mode of disposal in respect of any felling done in violation of such guidelines/rules. Till such guidelines/rules become effective, no felling from any area other than under approved working plans/schemes or felling schemes shall be permitted. The schemes, guidelines/rules which shall be framed by the State Government concerned within three months and decision thereon shall be taken by the Ministry of Environment and Forests within one month of the date of receipt. 16. Till such guidelines/rules become effective, no felling from any area other than under approved working plans/schemes or felling schemes shall be permitted. The schemes, guidelines/rules which shall be framed by the State Government concerned within three months and decision thereon shall be taken by the Ministry of Environment and Forests within one month of the date of receipt. 16. If the judgment of the Gujarat High Court is carefully analysed, then we find that the Gujarat High Court itself said that bamboo is a forest produce and every part thereof including chips would fall within that definition. Thereafter, what was brought about by human labour and if the product so made is commercially new and distinct, known to the business community as a totally different commodity having a distinct character, such an article ceases to be a forest produce. It was in this context that it was held that bamboo articles such as toplas, supdas and palas were totally distinct articles and would not fall within the meaning of bamboo. A bamboo stick is not such a distinct article. The only manufacturing process is that the bamboo is cut down into smaller pieces. It retains the essential character of being a bamboo. No evidence has been led before us nor has it been urged in the writ petition that bamboo sticks is a product totally different from bamboo. In fact, in the writ petition, it is stated that the petitioners collect, purchase bamboo sticks from different villages, cottage industries and are selling the same within and outside the State of Tripura. They have referred to the product as bamboo sticks. They also do not deny that for years on they have paid royalty on this bamboo sticks but only when the rate was enhanced after the decision in T.N. Godavarman’s case, did they file the petition. 17. This Court is of the considered view that bamboo sticks do not lose the inherent character of a bamboo and they cannot be compared to bamboo mats which were the subject matter of the decision of the Apex Court or supdas, palas and toplas which were the subject matter of the judgment of the Gujarat High Court. Both the Apex Court as well as the Gujarat High Court held that bamboo chips would be forest produce and bamboo chips are akin to bamboo sticks. 18. Both the Apex Court as well as the Gujarat High Court held that bamboo chips would be forest produce and bamboo chips are akin to bamboo sticks. 18. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to the situation that as per the definition of “forest produce”, Clause (b) will apply only when the goods are shown to have been either found in, or brought from a forest. The goods falling in Clause (b) of subsection (4) of Section 2 can be treated to be forest produce only if they are found in the forest or if they are found to have been brought from a forest. 19. We are aware of this fact that once the bamboo has been split into sticks, it is very difficult to find out whether it was found or brought from a forest or not. At this stage, it cannot be said that the bamboo which the petitioners used had come from the forest. Therefore, though we are of the view that bamboo sticks used for making Agarbattis can be treated to be forest produce, the State must also prove that either the sticks were found in the forest or they were produced out of bamboo which was growing in a forest. If the Agarbatti sticks have been fashioned out of bamboo growing in homestead or private land which is not forest, then it cannot be treated to be forest produce. At this stage, it would be impossible to decide whether the bamboo sticks which might be used by the petitioners had been fashioned from bamboo which had been come out from the forest or not and, therefore, though the legal question is answered in the manner aforesaid, the State will not be entitled to recover any amount from the petitioners and, to this extent, the writ appeals are rejected. However, for future the State can lay down certain guidelines and procedure whereby the maker of the bamboo sticks will have to show from where he/she purchases the bamboo and the transportation of bamboo being a forest produce must be kept strictly in control as has been laid down by the Apex Court in T.N. Godavarman’s case (supra). It is for the State to prepare proper guidelines or rules to ensure how to determine whether the bamboo sticks have been produced out of bamboos which come from the forest or not. 20. It is for the State to prepare proper guidelines or rules to ensure how to determine whether the bamboo sticks have been produced out of bamboos which come from the forest or not. 20. In view of the order which we have passed above, the royalty, if any, realized by the State shall be refunded in terms of the order dated 03-08-2001 as passed in C.M. Application No. 348 of 2001 in WP(C) No. 395 of 2001 and C.M. Application No. 345 of 2001 in WP(C) No. 390 of 2001 within 3(three) months from today. 21. The appeals are, therefore, disposed of in the aforesaid terms.