JUDGMENT : Anil Kumar, J. Heard Ms. Sufia Saba, learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record. Facts, in brief, of the present case are that the plaintiff/appellant filed a suit for permanent injunction for restraining the defendant/respondents for demolition of structure in question. As per version of the plaintiff/appellant, the structure in question has been constructed according to sanctioned map plan no. 471/92-93, In respect to the same, a complaint case no. 2524 of 1998 was filed by the defendant/respondent under section 25 of the U.P. Urban Planing and Development Act, 1973 in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate,Moradabad, rejected by order dated 11.5.1999. In spite of the said fact, defendant/respondent has given letter/order dated 5.10.2001 to plaintiff/appellant. Accordingly for redressal of his grievance, a suit has been filed by the plaintiff, registered as Suit No.467 of 2001 Praveen Kumar Garg v. Mordadabad Development Authority, Mooradabad. 2. The trial court in order to decide the controversy involved in the suit has framed five issues and on the basis of material evidence oral as well as documentary on record, by means of judgment and decree dated 16.5.2011, dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the said fact, plaintiff-appellant filed a Civil Appeal, registered as Civil Appeal No.5 of 2011 (Praveen Kumar Garg v. Moradabad Development Authority, Mooradabad) before the appellate court/Additional District Judge, Moradabad and by means of judgment and decree dated 26.4.2014 dismissed the appeal. 3. In view of the said factual background, present second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff/appellant before this Court under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has pressed the second appeal on the following substantial question of law:- "(a) Whether the action of the defendant/respondent is bared by the provisions of U.P. Urban Planing and Development Act, 1973? (b) Whether before initiation of the proceedings under the provisions of U.P. Urban Planing and Development Act, 1973 against the plaintiff, the defendants complied with the mandatory provisions of law?" 5. While pressing the above substantial question of law, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the plaintiff had constructed a commercial place at Sihora Govind Rampur Road, Moradabad. The said premises was constructed in accordance to the map sanctioned by the defendant/respondent bearing Map Plan No.471/92-93. While pressing the above substantial question of law, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the plaintiff had constructed a commercial place at Sihora Govind Rampur Road, Moradabad. The said premises was constructed in accordance to the map sanctioned by the defendant/respondent bearing Map Plan No.471/92-93. However the defendant/respondent was instituted a Complaint Case under Section 26 of the U.P. Urban Planing and Development Act, 1973 being Complaint No. 2524 of 1998 before the Court of C.J.M. Moradabad and the said Complaint Case has been rejected by the C.J.M. Moradabad vide order dated 11.5.1999. He further submits that defendant/respondent has filed a Criminal Revision No. 211 of 1999 before the Court of Session Judge, Moradabad against the order dated 11.5.1999 and the said revision has been dismissed by the Additional Session Judge, Court No. 12, Moradabad vide judgment and order dated 15.5.2002. 6. After hearing learned counsel for the appellant and gong through the record the position which emerge out is that categorical findings have been given by the trial court that the order dated 5.10.2001 which is the basis of filing of the suit by the plaintiff/appellant for permanent injunction has been withdrawn by the competent authority/Moradabad Development Authority by means of letter dated 13.11.2001 (on record as document no. 21-GA), taking into consideration the said document, the trial court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant being infructuous. The said finding has been confirmed by the appellate court after placing reliance on the statements given by Sri Ashok Arora (D.W.-1), Sri P.B. Yadav (D.W-2) and Mohd. Qumar (D.W.-4) on behalf of the Moradabad Development Authority that the notice given by Moradabad Development Authority to the plaintiff/appellant for demolition of structure in question has been withdrawn, relevant portion is quoted as under:- ^^oknh }kjk vius okni= esa tks okn dkj.k nf'kZr fd;s Fks os fnukad 5-10-2001 dk vkns'k [kf.Mr gksus ds mijkUr vfLrRo esa ugha jg x;s gSa vkSj la'kks/ku }kjk c<+k;s x;s okn ds dkj.k dks oknh@vihykFkhZ i=koyh ij miyC/k lk{; ls fl) ugha dj ldrk gSA vr% oknh dks okn ;ksftr djus ds okn dk dkj.k ugha jg x;k gS vkSj oknh dk okn mn~ns';ghu gks x;k gSA rn~uqlkj vo/kk;Z fcUnq la[;k 2 oknh ds fo:) fu.khZr fd;k tkrk gSA^^ 7. Accordingly, the findings recorded by the Courts below while rejecting the case of the plaintiff/appellant cannot be set aside on flimsy arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants and without there being any question of law. In the instant case, arguments of the counsel for the appellants are factual in nature and by no stretch of imagination can constitute substantial questions of law. Re-appraisal of evidence is not permissible. Interference of the facts from recital or content of the document or after shifting oral evidence does not leave any scope of re-appraisal in exercise of jurisdiction under section 100 C.P.C. 8. It is well settled by a long series of decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and of this Court, that a High Court, in second appeal, cannot go into questions of fact, however, erroneous the findings of fact recorded by the courts of fact may be, the learned counsel for the appellant did not and could not contend that the High Court was competent to go behind the findings of fact concurrently recorded by the two courts of fact. (See Mustafa v. Vakil @ Iqbal and another 2008 (105) RD 392 ). 9. The Apex Court depreciated the liberal construction and generous application of provisions of section 100 C.P.C. Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that only because there is another view possible on appreciation of evidence that can not be sufficient for interference under section 100 C.P.C. For ready reference, extract of paragraph No.7, of the vase of Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal reported in 2002 (1) SCC 134 : 2001(45) ALR 691 (SC) is quoted below: "7......We have noticed with distress that despite amendment, the provisions of section 100 of the Code have been liberally construed and generously applied by some judges of the High Courts with the result that objective intended to be achieved by the amendment of section 100 appears to have been frustrated. Even before the amendment of section 100 of the Code, the concurrent finding of facts could not be disturbed in the second appeal." 10. In the case of Santosh Hazari v. Purshottam Tiwari reported in 2001 (92) RD 336 (SC) had held that a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be preposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. In the case of Santosh Hazari v. Purshottam Tiwari reported in 2001 (92) RD 336 (SC) had held that a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be preposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be 'substantial' a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. If will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of the each case whether a question of law is substantial one and involved in the case or not. The same view has been expressed again by the Apex Court in the case of Govinda Raju v. Marriamman 2005 (98) RD 731. 11. For the fore-going reasons, no substantial question of law involved in this appeal. The judgements and decrees under challenged in the present case are perfectly valid and needs no interference. In the result, the second appeal lacks merit and is dismissed. Appeal Dismissed.