Judgment : 1. Heard both sides. 2. The petitioner is a Headmistress in the Panchayat Union Primary School, Therku Vellur, Kammaburam Block, Cuddalore District. She was placed under suspension by an order dated 24.06.2012 under Rule 17(e) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, on the ground that public interest requires to keep the petitioner under suspension. Though the pendency of the investigation or trail in a criminal case is not mentioned in the suspension order, since it is stated that the petitioner was placed under suspension as it was necessary in the public interest, it can be taken that she was placed under suspension invoking the powers under rule 17 (e)(1)(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. 3. Counter affidavit is filed by the respondent stating that the petitioner committed a serious criminal offence. It is alleged in the counter affidavit that the petitioner attempted to encash a sum of Rs.6,50,00,000/- (Rupees Six Crores Fifty Lakhs only) from the Cuddalore Central Cooperative Bank, Viruthachalam on 15.06.2012, by using ICICI Bank cheque dated 15.06.2012 payable to Mother Teresa Social Economic Educational Trust. When the genuineness of the cheque was verified by the ICICI Bank, it was found that the cheque was bogus and forged one. Based on the complaint lodged by the Branch Manager, ICICI Bank, the Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Cuddalore registered a criminal case in crime No.17/2012 under Sections 420, 468, 471, 507 and 511 IPC, against the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner was arrested on 23.06.2012 and remanded to judicial custody for 13 days. In the said circumstances, the petitioner was placed under suspension. 4. The petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking to quash the order of suspension dated 24.06.2012 on the ground that she was not issued a charge memo, even nine months after the issuance of the suspension order. She presumed that she was suspended contemplating disciplinary action. 5. In the said circumstances, the petitioner was placed under suspension. 4. The petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking to quash the order of suspension dated 24.06.2012 on the ground that she was not issued a charge memo, even nine months after the issuance of the suspension order. She presumed that she was suspended contemplating disciplinary action. 5. Rule 17(e) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules is extracted hereunder: “Rule 17(e) – Conditions under which a member of a Civil Service be placed under suspension: (e)(1) A member of a service may be placed under suspension from service, where (i) an enquiry into grave charges against him is contemplated, or is pending; or (ii) a complaint against him of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial and if such suspension is necessary in the public interest.” 6. The suspension order merely refers to rule 17(e) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. In my considered view, the petitioner was placed under suspension invoking rule 17(e)(1)(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, as the suspension was made under public interest. The suspension order nowhere states that she was placed under suspension as the department contemplated an enquiry into grave charges. Admittedly, no departmental enquiry was pending at the time of issuance of the suspension order. Hence, rule 17(e)(1)(i) cannot be attracted. 7. Further, in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent, it is stated in para 2 that the petitioner was placed under suspension in public interest. Para 3 of the counter affidavit narrates about the criminal prosecution that was launched against the petitioner leading to her arrest on 23.06.2013. Apart from mentioned “public interest”, in the suspension order, the suspension order refers to a news items that appeared on 24.06.2012 in “Daily Thanthi”. In fact, it is useful to extract paras 2 and 3 of the counter affidavit, as follows: “2. It is submitted that the abovesaid Writ Petition has been filed praying to quash the proceedings of the Respondent in R.C.No.2579/A7/2012 dated 24.06.2012 and to direct the Respondent to permit the Petitioner to work as a Headmaster. In the proceedings impugned, the Petitioner was placed under suspension in the public interest. 3. It is submitted that the abovesaid Writ Petition has been filed praying to quash the proceedings of the Respondent in R.C.No.2579/A7/2012 dated 24.06.2012 and to direct the Respondent to permit the Petitioner to work as a Headmaster. In the proceedings impugned, the Petitioner was placed under suspension in the public interest. 3. It is submitted that it is true that the Petitioner was working as Headmaster in the Panchayat Union Primary School, Therku Vellur, Kammaluram Block, Cuddalore District. It is submitted that the Petitioner has opened an Account in the Cuddalore Central Co-operative Bank at Viruthachalam in the name of “Mother Teresa Social Economic Educational Trust” run by her in Pondicherry. The Petitioner has attempted to encash Rs.6,50,00,000/- (Rupees Six crores and fifty lakhs only) from the Cuddalore Central Co-operative Bank, Viruthachalam on 15.06.2012 by using I.C.I.C.I. Bank cheque dated 15.6.2012 payable to Mother Teresa Social Economic Educational Trust. When the genuineness of the cheque was verified by the ICICI Bank on reference it was found that the cheque was bogus and forged one. Based on the complaint lodged by the Branch Manager of ICICI Bank, before the Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Cuddalore against the Petitioner, a Crl. Case in No.17/2012 under sections 420, 468, 471, 507 and 511 of IPC was registered against the Petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner was arrested on 23.06.2012 and remanded to custody for 13 days.” 8. It is true that after the notice of motion was ordered on 03.04.2013 in the writ petition returnable by 16.04.2013 a charge memo dated 15.04.2013 was issued. 9. Hence, in my considered view, the petitioner was placed under suspension invoking rule 17(e) (1)(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the criminal case is still pending. 11. The petitioner is facing a grave charge that she attempted to encash a sum of Rs.6,50,00,000/- (Rupees Six Crores Fifty Lakhs only) from the Cuddalore Central Co-operative Bank, Viruthachalam on 15.06.2012, by using ICICI Bank cheque dated 15.06.2012 payable to Mother Teresa Social Economic Educational Trust. When the genuineness of the cheque was verified by the ICICI Bank, it was found that the cheque was bogus and forged one. Based on the complaint lodged by the Branch Manager, ICICI Bank, the Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Cuddalore registered a criminal case. When the genuineness of the cheque was verified by the ICICI Bank, it was found that the cheque was bogus and forged one. Based on the complaint lodged by the Branch Manager, ICICI Bank, the Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Cuddalore registered a criminal case. Subsequently, the petitioner was arrested and remanded to judicial custody. In the said circumstances, the petitioner was placed under suspension. Hence, I am not inclined to interfere with the suspension order. 12. At this juncture, it is also useful to refer to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in CHAIRMAN, TAMIL NADU ELECTRICITY BOARD AND ANOTHER VS. S.VENKATESAN AND ANOTHER [ 2014 (5) MLJ 769 ]. Paras 19, 24 and 25 of the said judgment are extracted hereunder: “19. In yet another decision in C.Balasubramanian v. The Commissioner, Tiruchirappalli Corporation and another [2011 (1) CWC 319], a Division Bench of this Court has considered the case of the appellant, who was placed under suspension on account of demand acceptance of bribe and it was put to challenge and even after filing of the charge sheet in the criminal case, his suspension continued and it has been held in the said decision that simply because criminal trial is pending for more than 3 years, it is not fair to interfere with the order of suspension, especially when the employee suspended on account of corruption. 24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in State of M.P. And Others v. Ram Singh [ (2000) 5 SCC 88 ] has observed as follows: “8. Corruption in a civilised society is a disease like cancer, which if not detected in time, is sure to maliganise (sic) the polity of the country leading to disastrous consequences. It is termed as a plague which is not only contagious but if not controlled spreads like a fire in a jungle. Its virus is compared with HIV leading to AIDS, being incurable. It has also been termed as royal thievery. The socio-political system exposed to such a dreaded communicable disease is likely to crumble under its own weight. Corruption is opposed to democracy and social order, being not only anti-people, but aimed and targeted against them. It affects the economy and destroys the cultural heritage. It has also been termed as royal thievery. The socio-political system exposed to such a dreaded communicable disease is likely to crumble under its own weight. Corruption is opposed to democracy and social order, being not only anti-people, but aimed and targeted against them. It affects the economy and destroys the cultural heritage. Unless nipped in the bud at the earliest, it is likely to cause turbulence — shaking of the socio-economic-political system in an otherwise healthy, wealthy, effective and vibrating society. 9. The menace of corruption was found to have enormously increased by the First and Second World War conditions. Corruption, at the initial stages, was considered confined to the bureaucracy which had the opportunities to deal with a variety of State largesse in the form of contracts, licences and grants. Even after the war the opportunities for corruption continued as large amounts of government surplus stores were required to be disposed of by the public servants. As a consequence of the wars the shortage of various goods necessitated the imposition of controls and extensive schemes of post-war reconstruction involving the disbursement of huge sums of money which lay in the control of the public servants giving them a wide discretion with the result of luring them to the glittering shine of wealth and property. In order to consolidate and amend the laws relating to prevention of corruption and matters connected thereto, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was enacted which was amended from time to time. In the year 1988 a new Act on the subject being Act 49 of 1988 was enacted with the object of dealing with the circumstances, contingencies and shortcomings which were noticed in the working and implementation of the 1947 Act. The law relating to prevention of corruption was essentially made to deal with the public servants, not as understood in common parlance but specifically defined in the Act. 10. The Act was intended to make effective provisions for the prevention of bribery and corruption rampant amongst the public servants. It is a social legislation intended to curb illegal activities of the public servants and is designed to be liberally construed so as to advance its object. Dealing with the object underlying the Act this Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay [ (1984) 2 SCC 183 ] held: (SCC p. 200, para 18) “18. It is a social legislation intended to curb illegal activities of the public servants and is designed to be liberally construed so as to advance its object. Dealing with the object underlying the Act this Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay [ (1984) 2 SCC 183 ] held: (SCC p. 200, para 18) “18. The 1947 Act was enacted, as its long title shows, to make more effective provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption. Indisputably, therefore, the provisions of the Act must receive such construction at the hands of the court as would advance the object and purpose underlying the Act and at any rate not defeat it. If the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises only in the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used in the statute would be self-defeating. The court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the legislature to remove the ambiguity by construing the provision of the statute as a whole keeping in view what was the mischief when the statute was enacted and to remove which the legislature enacted the statute. This rule of construction is so universally accepted that it need not be supported by precedents. Adopting this rule of construction, whenever a question of construction arises upon ambiguity or where two views are possible of a provision, it would be the duty of the court to adopt that construction which would advance the object underlying the Act, namely, to make effective provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption and at any rate not defeat it.” 25. The case of the petitioner is one of deemed suspension and merely because criminal prosecution is keeping prolonged and that the first respondent/writ petitioner is also kept under suspension for over 5 years, cannot be a ground to revoke the order of suspension with an consequential order of reinstatement. The case of the petitioner is one of deemed suspension and merely because criminal prosecution is keeping prolonged and that the first respondent/writ petitioner is also kept under suspension for over 5 years, cannot be a ground to revoke the order of suspension with an consequential order of reinstatement. The cases referred to by the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent/writ petitioner would disclose that in some cases pursuant to the Court orders and orders of acquittal passed by the Criminal Court, orders of suspension have been revoked and in some cases, based on the recommendation made by the Chief Vigilance Officer, ADGP-Vigilance attached to TANGEDCO, orders of suspension have been revoked and each case depends upon its own facts and circumstances and in cases involving bribery and moral turpitude, there cannot be any uniform guideline especially with regard to revoking the orders of suspension.” 13. In the light of the above, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.