JUDGMENT Dinesh Gupta, J. 1. This second appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree dated 21.9.1999 passed by 10th Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad in Civil Appeal No. 115 of 1997 arising out of judgment dated 29.4.1997 passed by Additional Civil Judge (S.D.), Hapur, Ghaziabad in O.S. No. 61 of 1995. The brief facts which give rise to this appeal are that: The plaintiff respondent, hereinafter called "the respondent" filed a suit against the Life Insurance Corporation of India, hereinafter called "the appellant" for the relief of recovery of  Rs. 1,50,000/- and interest @ of 18% and other benefits arising out of the Insurance policies No. 250932112 and 250920589 with the allegation that the father of the plaintiff made two proposals for issuing of two Life Insurance Policies for one lakh under table 88 for a period of 24 years and another for  Rs. 50,000/- under table 75 for a period of 20 years. These proposals were presented before the appellant corporation on 26.11.1991 and 3.12.1991. At the time of submitting the proposal the father of the plaintiff was hail and hearty and was not suffering from any disease. The appellant corporation after getting the plaintiff's father examined from a registered medical practitioner, accepted both the proposals and after taking the premium issued the receipts. 2. Father of the respondent deposited first installment of both the policies amounting to  Rs. 4,359.60 and  Rs. 315/-. In the policies the plaintiffs was nominated to receive the amount of policies. 3. Father of the plaintiff expired on 21.5.1992, due to Hapatic Enclohalipathy he remained ill only for one week before his death then plaintiff preferred his claim before the appellant corporation which was repudiated by the corporation. 4. The suit was contested by the appellant corporation on the ground that the father of the plaintiff was suffering from some acute disease even before applying for the policies and he concealed the facts of these diseases from the corporation and as such the corporation has rightly repudiated their claim. 5. The Corporation further contended that the insured has to declare a declaration that in case the information furnished by the insured found incorrect later on then Corporation will have right to repudiate the policies. The claim of the plaintiff is also barred by section 45 of Insurance Act. The plaintiff is also not entitled to any amount or interest thereon. 6. The claim of the plaintiff is also barred by section 45 of Insurance Act. The plaintiff is also not entitled to any amount or interest thereon. 6. After taking the evidence of the parties the Trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff for an amount of  Rs. 1,50,000/- alongwith interest @ of 18% during the pendency of the suit and later on till the date of actual payment alongwith other benefits. 7. The appellant Corporation filed civil appeal against the said judgment which was registered as civil appeal No. 115 of 1997 and was transferred to the Court of 10th Additional District Judge who dismissed the appeal vide order dated 21.9.1999, however, the Appellate Court reduced the rate of interest from 18% to 12% and also awarded the interest from the date of decision of the suit i.e., 29.4.1997. 8. Feeling aggrieved the appellant Corporation filed this appeal. The plaintiff also filed cross appeal under Order XLI, Rule 22 of C.P.C. and prayed that the order of the Appellate Court so far as it relates to the rate of interest mesne profits and consequential relief may be granted to the plaintiff appellant. 9. While admitting the appeal this Court has formulated the following substantial questions of law: "1. Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, the Corporation was entitled to take action under section 45 of the Insurance Act and to re-open the insurance policies taken by the deceased/insured and to re-assess the facts and circumstances in which the insurance policies were taken by the insured especially when he died only within a period of six months from the date of insurance policies? 2. Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, insurance contracts being in the nature of ubernimae fidei i.e., contracts of utmost good faith, there was any deliberate and willful concealment about the serious illness made by the insured? 3. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, and especially in view of section 45 of Insurance Act, the onus could be shifted on the defendant-appellants i.e., Life Insurance Corporation of India and whether various cases cited by the Corporation before the Courts below have been correctly considered and applied?" 10. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 11. 3. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, and especially in view of section 45 of Insurance Act, the onus could be shifted on the defendant-appellants i.e., Life Insurance Corporation of India and whether various cases cited by the Corporation before the Courts below have been correctly considered and applied?" 10. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 11. The Counsel for the appellant submitted that the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below are contrary to law and are liable to be quashed. 12. The finding recorded by both the Courts below are perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. 13. The contracts of the insurance are in the nature of utmost good faith and any concealment by the insured is sufficient to render the insurance contract null and void. In this case the insured willingly and deliberately concealed the fact that he was suffering from serious ailments and remained ill continuously, namely, the disease of liver cirrhosis which was the cause of his death. 14. The insured had given false statement while taking the policies. 15. Insured has given a false statement while taking the policies of high amount that he was income tax payee which in fact he was not income tax payee and insured has furnished wrong and incorrect facts which render the insured policy as null and void. 16. Under section 45 of Insurance Act if death occurred within a period of two years from the date of insurance then the Corporation is entitled to reopen the case and to reassess the circumstances in which insurance policy was taken. 17. In the present case the Corporation had rightly taken recourse to repudiate the insurance policies since the insured died within a period of six months. 18. No independent witness or evidence adduced by the plaintiff respondent and on the basis of sole oral testimony of plaintiff respondent the suit could not have been decreed. 19. The Court has wrongly shifted the burden on the Corporation appellant which was infact upon the plaintiff respondent to prove their case. 20. The Counsel further submitted that the plaintiff respondent is not entitled for the sum assured by the policies of late Sita Ram Verma since material facts were concealed by the policy holder by late Sita Ram Verma while taking the policy. 21. Special provision of law duly incorporated in the Insurance Act 1978. 20. The Counsel further submitted that the plaintiff respondent is not entitled for the sum assured by the policies of late Sita Ram Verma since material facts were concealed by the policy holder by late Sita Ram Verma while taking the policy. 21. Special provision of law duly incorporated in the Insurance Act 1978. According to section 45 no policy of Life Corporation of India be called in question by insured on the ground that statement made in proposal for insurance is false or incorrect. 22. The Counsel drew my attention towards section 45 of Insurance Act 23. The Counsel also relied upon the case of Mithoo Lal Nayak v. L.I.C. of India AIR 1962 SC 814 . 24. In another case also P.C. Chako v. Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India 2008 (1) SCC 321 , the Apex Court took the same view. 25. The Counsel for the appellant further advanced arguments on the cross appeal filed by the respondent. 26. The appellants' Counsel submitted that the cross appeal filed by the appellant is barred by limitation. The cross appeal or the cross-objection should be filed as per the Order XLI, Rule 22(2) within a period of 30 days from the service of the notice of the appeal. 27. The respondent has not filed any delay condonation application for condoning the delay in filing the cross appeal. In the cross appeal no valuation of the cross appeal was mentioned nor any Court fees paid on the memorandum of cross appeal. 28. The Counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the following authorities: Mahadev Govind Gharge v. Special Land Acquisition Officer 2011 (103) AIC 99 (SC) : 2011 (87) ALR 219 (SC) : 2011 (113) RD 680. Superintending Engineer v. B. Subha Reddy AIR 1999 SC 1747 . Ram Kripal v. Radhey Shyam AIR 1970 Raj 234 (DB). Arya Samaj v. Manhoman Tiwari 1994 (1) ARC 435. Babu Lal Agarwal v. Smt. Jyoti Srivastava AIR 2000 MP 83 (DB). 29. The Counsel for the appellant further submitted that respondent has not deposited any Court fees alongwith memorandum of appeal and as such the appeal is not maintainable and placed reliance on the following authorities: Prahalad v. State of Maharashtra 2010 (95) AIC 67 (SC) : 2010 (83) ALR 240 (SC). 29. The Counsel for the appellant further submitted that respondent has not deposited any Court fees alongwith memorandum of appeal and as such the appeal is not maintainable and placed reliance on the following authorities: Prahalad v. State of Maharashtra 2010 (95) AIC 67 (SC) : 2010 (83) ALR 240 (SC). Banarsi v. Ram Phal 2003 (4) AIC 641 (SC) : 2003 (50) ALR 769 (SC) : 2003 (94) RD 541 (SC). Samundra Devi another v. Narendra Kaur and another 2008 (9) SCC 100 . 30. The Counsel for the appellant advanced arguments in respect of interest claimed by the plaintiff and awarded by both the Courts below. The Counsel for the appellant submitted that the Trial Court without any reasons and ground awarded rate of interest @ 18% that to from the date of filing of the suit. While dealing with the issue No. 5 the Trial Court illegally awarded 18% interest without giving any findings in this regard. 31. Before the First Appellate Court the Appellate Court also dealt with the issue regarding the interest, however, the Appellate Court awarded the interest @ 12% per annum and that from the date the suit was decreed. 32. Under section 34 of C.P.C. the Civil Court has been empowered to award the interest upon the principal amount. The findings in respect of the payment of interest in this regard are perverse and without any reasons even circular of Life Insurance Corporation issued from time to time the rate of interest on delayed payment is only 11%. In a recent judgment dated 4.8.2014, (Civil Misc. Writ Petition (Tax) No. 1264 of 2008) in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation v. State of U.P. the Division Bench of this Court granted 9% interest treated it to be reasonable. 33. The Counsel further submitted that in view of the argument raised by the appellant, appeal deserves to be allowed and the judgment and decree of both the Courts below deserves to be set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed with costs. 34. Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court recorded the concurrent findings regarding the factum of issuance of policy and entitlement of the respondent of the amount of insurance alongwith the interest. 34. Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court recorded the concurrent findings regarding the factum of issuance of policy and entitlement of the respondent of the amount of insurance alongwith the interest. Learned Counsel further submitted that admittedly insurance policies were issued by the insurance Corporation after satisfying themselves with the proposal and it is also admitted to the Corporation appellant that the insured was examined by Registered Medical Practitioner who was on the panel of the Corporation at the relevant time who after examining the insured found the insurer fit for insurance. 35. The Trial Court while deciding the suit framed issue regarding the illness of the insured and cause of death and the fact whether the insured was remained ill for one week before death and on these two issues there is finding recorded by the Trial Court that the decease was remained ill only for a week before his death and the decease was not suffering from any disease at the time of issuance of the policy. These findings was recorded by the Trial Court after assessing the evidence adduced by the parties. 36. On behalf of the plaintiff himself appeared in the witness box and on behalf of the appellant Corporation only two witnesses were examined in which one doctor A.P. Agarwal and other Rajendra Kumar Sharma were examined as witnesses. However, the doctor who examined the insured at the time of issuance of insurance policy was not examined even the statement of Dr. A.P. Agarwal and Rajendra Kumar Sharma were failed to earn the satisfaction of the Court and the Court after discussing in detail found that neither the illness of the insured was concealed nor the insured was ill at the time of insurance policy. These findings were also not set aside by the Appellate Court and as such the findings are concurrent in nature and the Counsel for the appellant has not given any cogent ground to the second Appellate Court to interfere with these findings recorded by both the Courts below. 37. These findings were also not set aside by the Appellate Court and as such the findings are concurrent in nature and the Counsel for the appellant has not given any cogent ground to the second Appellate Court to interfere with these findings recorded by both the Courts below. 37. So far as the section 45 of the Insurance Act is concerned the Counsel for the respondent submitted that the Principal of section 45 of Insurance Act has been completely dealt and decided by the different Courts in Saurabh Basu v. Union of India Laws (All) 2007 (12) 58, Smt. Meena Sahu alias Meenu Sahu v. L.I.C. of India 2006 (62) ALR 661 (SC), L.I.C. of India v. G.M. Channabasemma 1991 (17) ALR 118 (SC) and L.I.C. of India v. Shakuntala Bai AIR 1975 AP 68 . 38. The Counsel for the respondent further argued of his cross appeal and submitted that the plaintiff appellant preferred this cross appeal against the findings of the Appellate Court regarding the award of interest. The Counsel for the appellant submitted that as per Order XLI, Rule 22 the respondent can take the objection even without filing the cross-objections. The Counsel further submitted that the plaintiff prayed through his suit and demanded an interest @  Rs. 18% per annum from the date of filing of the suit alongwith all other consequential benefits. The Trial Court after considering the facts of the case decided the issue regarding the interest and awarded interest @ of 18% per annum from the date of filing of the suit alongwith the other benefits. 39. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant, however, without any reasons the Appellate Court reduced the rate of interest from 18% to 12% and also awarded the same from the date of decree of the suit. The Appellate Court while doing so fails to record any reasons for doing so. 40. The Counsel further submitted that in fact he paid court-fees on the memorandum of appeal and cross appeal, however, in case any further court-fees is required this Court may direct the plaintiff respondent to deposit the same before the Executing Court. 41. The Appellate Court while doing so fails to record any reasons for doing so. 40. The Counsel further submitted that in fact he paid court-fees on the memorandum of appeal and cross appeal, however, in case any further court-fees is required this Court may direct the plaintiff respondent to deposit the same before the Executing Court. 41. The Counsel further submitted that the award of 18% interest from the date could not be said to be unreasonable as in the commercial transaction, normally Court awarded the interest on higher side, even the Corporation also charged interest on delayed payment very heavily and as such the plaintiff appellant cross appeal deserves to be allowed and the order of the Trial Court deserves to be restored. 42. I am unable to accept the contention raised by learned Counsel for the appellant so far as the contention of the appellant that insured was ill at the time of proposal and that he concealed his illness with the Corporation and also furnished wrong declaration is concerned both the Courts below have recorded a categorical findings in this regard that the insured was neither ill at the time of proposal nor he concealed any illness nor he made any wrong declaration. The insured was remained ill only for a week before his death. The Corporation appellant miserably fail to adduce evidence in this regard that the insured has willfully and knowingly concealed his illness. It is also admitted by the appellant that the insured was examined by their own registered medical practitioner who found the insured fit for insurance. At the relevant time failure to produce the doctor who examined the insured at the time of insurance drew adverse inference against the appellant as rightly held by both the Courts below. Even evidence adduced by the appellant was not suffice to prove the allegations made by the appellant on which they repudiated the insurance policy. The main thrust of the appellant Counsel is on the section 45 of the Insurance Act. Section 45 of the Act reads as under: "45. Even evidence adduced by the appellant was not suffice to prove the allegations made by the appellant on which they repudiated the insurance policy. The main thrust of the appellant Counsel is on the section 45 of the Insurance Act. Section 45 of the Act reads as under: "45. Policy not to be called in question on ground of mis-statement after two years.--No policy of life insurance effected before the commencement of this Act shall after the expiry of two years from the date of commencement of this Act and no policy of life insurance effected after the coming into force of this Act shall after the expiry of two years from the date on which it was effected, be called in question by an insurer on the ground that a statement made in the proposal for insurance or in any report of a medical officer, or referee, or friend of the insured, or in any other document leading to the issue of the policy, was inaccurate or false, unless the insurer shows that such statement [was on a material matter or suppressed facts which it was material to disclose and that it was fraudulently made] by the policy-holder and that the policy-holder knew at the time of making it that the statement was false or that it suppressed facts which it was material to disclose: Provided that nothing in this section shall prevent the insurer from calling for proof of age at any time if he is entitled to do so, and no policy shall be deemed to be called in question merely because the terms of the policy are adjusted on subsequent proof that the age of the life insured was incorrectly stated in the proposal." 43. The appellant also relied upon two judgments in this regard one is Mithoo Lal Nayak v. L.I.C. of India AIR 1962 SC 814 . This case will not help the appellant Corporation. 44. For application of section 45 three conditions are must: (a) the statement must be on a material matter or must suppress facts which it was material to disclose; (b) the suppression must be fraudulently made by the policy-holder, and (c) the policy-holder must have known at the time of the making of the statement that it was false or that it suppressed facts which it was material to disclose. 45. 45. In the present case the Insurance Corporation-appellant failed to prove before both the Courts below regarding the above said three conditions. 46. The learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon P.C. Chako v. Chairman Life Insurance Corporation (supra). 47. In fact the insured had undergone an operation adenoma thyroid while filing up application form he answered in the negative. 48. The question relating to his health he has never undergone any operation, on concealment of fact the Apex Court held that the policy has been rightly repudiated by the Corporation. 49. In the present case there is no concealment of fact by the insured at the time of filing of the application form and declaration form. Moreso the appellant was examined by own Corporation's doctor and was found fit for insurance. 50. In the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. G.M. Channabasemma (supra) the Apex Court held that since the Corporation made the allegation of false representation and suppression of material facts, therefore, the burden of proving the same is on the Corporation. 51. In Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Meena Sahu alias Meenu Sahu v. L.I.C. of India (supra) the Court while dealing with section 45 held as under: "8. The deceased having died within two years of taking Life Insurance Policy the provisions of section 45 of the Insurance Act are not applicable to the present case. The matter is governed by section 19 of the Indian Contract Act, which runs as under; 19. When the consent to an agreement is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation the agreement is a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. A party to a contract, whose consent was caused by fraud or misrepresentation, may, if he thinks fit, insist that the contract shall be performed, and that he shall be put in the position in which he would have been if the representation made had been true. Exception.--If such consent was caused by misrepresentation or by silence, fraudulent within the meaning of section 17, the contract, nevertheless, is not voidable, if the party whose consent was so caused had the means of discovering the truth with ordinary diligence. Exception.--If such consent was caused by misrepresentation or by silence, fraudulent within the meaning of section 17, the contract, nevertheless, is not voidable, if the party whose consent was so caused had the means of discovering the truth with ordinary diligence. Explanation.--A fraud or misrepresentation which did not cause the consent to a contract of the party on whom such fraud was practiced, or to whom such misrepresentation was made, does not render a contract voidable." "Misrepresentation" as defined under section 18 of the Contract Act means and includes-- (1) the positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information of the person making it, of that which is not true, though he believes it to be true; (2) any breach of duty which without an intent to deceive; gains an advantage to the person committing it, or any one claiming under him, by misleading another to his prejudice or to the prejudice of anyone claiming under him; (3) causing however innocently a party to an agreement to make a mistake as to the substance of the thing which is the subject of the agreement. 9. The Corporation has repudiated the claim on the ground of suppression of material facts. There is no allegation of playing fraud. The pleas taken by the respondent Corporation for avoiding its liability under the policy in question are that the deceased made a declaration in the proposal form that the statements and answers contained therein were true in every particular and that the assured suppressed the material facts about his health. The learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the assured having suppressed material facts about his health, the policy is void. It was argued that acceptance of the proposal was recommended by the doctor and agent because of misstatements and suppression made by the assured. The learned Counsel for the respondent in support of his contentions relied on the decision in Mitthoolal Nayak v. L.I.C. of India AIR 1962 SC 814 ." 52. It was argued that acceptance of the proposal was recommended by the doctor and agent because of misstatements and suppression made by the assured. The learned Counsel for the respondent in support of his contentions relied on the decision in Mitthoolal Nayak v. L.I.C. of India AIR 1962 SC 814 ." 52. In the instant case also the medical examiner's confidential report enclosed with the policy in question reveals that no sign or symptoms of suffering from any physical disorder were found in the medical examination of life assured by the doctor of the corporation nor the Life Insurance Corporation has produced any evidence to show that there was misrepresentation of facts which if know earlier would have stopped the Corporation from issuing the policy. The medical examiner of the Corporation having examined the assured and submitted a favourable report regarding his health, the Life Insurance Corporation cannot wriggle out of the contract by saying that it was void or voidable at its option. 53. In the case of Saurabh Basu v. Union of India (supra) this Court held as under: "In view of the aforesaid submissions and judgment passed by this Court I do not find any such case has been made out on behalf of the Insurance Company to repudiate the agreement ignoring payment of the amount of  Rs. 1 lakh to the petitioner. It is also to be noted that this Court is coming across various cases in which the life Insurance Corporation-respondent is rejecting the claims of various persons without any cogent reasons. If a person is not suffering from any decease which can be said to be a certain death after a very short period then the it is not open to the respondents to say or held that at the time of agreement or at the time of proposal if a person was suffering from diseases like Jaundice, Hypertension or Diabetes, if that fact has not been disclosed in the proposal and after two or three years some serious disease took place to the insurer and he died due to that decease and a claim is forwarded, it can be lead or held by the respondents that this fact was not disclosed in the proposal, therefore, it amounts to breach of Clause 11 of the proposal. As similar type of controversy arose before the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hon'ble Amitava Lala and Hon'ble Shishir Kumar, JJ. (one of us) arose in Writ Petition No. 69235 of 2005 decided on 20.11.2007. In that case also the claim was rejected on a very technical ground. After considering the cases the Division Bench held that the payment be released with 12% interest per annum at a simple rate from the date of first refusal till the date of actual payment." 54. In the present case also, admittedly from the record, it is clear that the deceased was not suffering from any decease, which can be treated to be so serious and there is no proof on behalf of the Corporation or they have not examined any doctor to show thereof that the statement given by the deceased was in any way false. It is already held in various judgments that the Insurance Act is a beneficial piece of legislation, therefore, the officers of the respondents have to take into consideration all these factors and unless and until there is a very serious material on record that a policy has been obtained by concealing certain material facts and there is evidence to that effect, then it can be refused. But like cases in India where the heirs of the deceased are being harassed after the death of the insurer. For getting the meager amount from pillar to post and ultimately after rejection has to approached the Court for his own money. 55. So far as the cross appeal filed by the plaintiff respondent is concerned even in the absence of any such appeal or without going into the merit of maintainability of the same it is safer to say that the grant of 12% interest by the Appellate Court cannot be said to be unreasonable. 56. However, the date of award of the interest from the date of decree of the suit is absolutely against the law and norms. 56. However, the date of award of the interest from the date of decree of the suit is absolutely against the law and norms. The Appellate Court has failed to record any reason while Appellate Court is awarding interest from the date of decree of the suit infact in various judgments of the Apex Court as well as this Court held that the insured is entitled to interest from the date of first refusal, however, the Trial Court has awarded interest from the date of filing of the suit cannot be said to be unreasonable or illegal in any way. 57. In the case of Saurabh Basu (supra) this Court also held that in a similar matter in a Division Bench of this Court held that the claim was rejected on a very technical ground and after considering the cases the Division Bench held that the payment be released with 12% per annum at simple rate from the date of first refusal till the date of actual payment. 58. Even in other cases cited by the appellant an amount of rate of 12% per annum held to be reasonable and it is undisputed fact that amount of interest should be awarded from the date of filing of the suit. 59. The claim of the insured person should not be repudiated at very flimsy technical grounds and in all cases where there is early death an insured person unnecessarily had to run from one place to another for recovering their own money considering the such apathy of the insured the Court awarded 12% of interest. 60. In the present case also Appellate Court also awarded 12% interest per annum which cannot be said to be unreasonable. However, so far as awarding the interest from the date of decree is concerned that is not proper and without recording any reasons is not sustainable. 61. In view of the above the appeal lacks merit, deserve to be dismissed. Substantial question of law answered accordingly and the suit of the plaintiff stands decreed for the original amount of the policies as well as alongwith 12% interest from the date of filing of the suit. Cross appeal also deserves to be dismissed.