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2014 DIGILAW 289 (PNJ)

Hazura Singh v. Joint Development Commissioner, Punjab

2014-02-06

FATEH DEEP SINGH, HEMANT GUPTA

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JUDGMENT Mr. Hemant Gupta, J.: - Challenge in the present writ petition is to an order dated 05.10.1994 (Annexure P-4) passed by the Joint Development Commissioner, Punjab exercising the powers of Commissioner in terms of the provisions of Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961 (for short ‘the Act’) affirming the order passed by the Collector on 14.09.1992 (Annexure P-2) allowing an application filed by the Gram Panchayat – respondent No.3 under Section 7 of the Act. 2. The Gram Panchayat sought eviction of the petitioner from the shamlat land alleging the petitioner to be unauthorized occupant. It was pleaded that the land is abadi and used for resting of animals. Earlier there was a well, where the people of village used to get water, but now is a part of plot measuring 200’ x 45’ over which the petitioner has taken unauthorized possession. 3. The petitioner resisted the claim of the Gram Panchayat by asserting that the land was never used as the resting place of the animals nor there was any well. The Gram Panchayat has intentionally not disclosed the Khasra Number of the land in dispute nor produced any revenue record from which the ownership of the Gram Panchayat could be proved. It was denied that he is in unauthorized possession of the land in dispute. It was asserted that the possession of the petitioners over the land is since their forefathers. 4. In evidence, Gram Panchayat examined PW-1 Harnek Singh, Samiti Patwari, who has prepared the map (Ex.P-1) on the spot and deposed that the land falls within Lal Lakir and it is used as resting place for animals and that a banian tree is standing on the land in dispute. PW-2 Lal Singh, Panch produced a resolution Ex.P-2 of the Panchyat. On the other hand, the petitioner examined RW-1 Hardial Singh, Draftsman, who prepared the map (Ex.R-1) of land in dispute after visiting the spot in which the construction raised by the petitioner is reflected in red colour; and RW-2 Balbir Singh - attorney of the present petitioner, who deposed that they are in possession since their forefathers. 5. After considering the entire evidence, the learned Collector returned a finding that the land in dispute is located within Lal Lakir and is being used by general public. 5. After considering the entire evidence, the learned Collector returned a finding that the land in dispute is located within Lal Lakir and is being used by general public. Except bald statement that the petitioner is in possession from the time of their forefathers, there is no support to such assertion. In view of the said findings, the petitioner was ordered to be evicted. 6. In appeal, the learned Commissioner returned the following finding: “After hearing both the parties and on examination of the record, it transpires that the land in dispute falls within the Abadi Deh of the village, but this land is used as sitting place of animals. Therefore, this land falls within the definition of Shamlat under Section 2(g) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961. The appellant is in unauthorized possession on it. The appellant has not produced any such proof which proves that he is the owner of this land.” 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that as per the assertions of the Gram Panchayat, the land is abadi, thus, such land is not shamlat deh, as defined in clause (1) of Section 2 (g) of the Act. Therefore, the eviction orders passed against the petitioner are not sustainable. Reliance is placed on Bachna @ Bachan Singh Vs. State of Haryana 1986 PLJ 83; Tale Ram (died) by his Legal Representatives Vs. Assistant Collector, Ist Grade Bahadurgarh & another 1987 PLJ 262; Bawa Lachhman Dass & another Vs. The Collector, Kurukshetra & others 1988 (2) PLR 32; and Tara Chand and Fateh Singh Vs. Gram Panchayat and Gram Sabha of Village Atail & others 1979 PLJ 1. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Gram Panchayat argued that the finding of both the Authorities under the Act is that land is being used for the benefit of village community such as for resting of the animals, therefore, it would be shamlat deh in terms of clause (4) of Section 2 (g) of the Act. The relevant provision of the Statue reads as under: “2. The relevant provision of the Statue reads as under: “2. Definitions – In this Act unless the context otherwise requires – xxx xxx xxx (g) “shamlat deh” includes – (1) lands described in the revenue records as Shamlat Deh excluding abadi deh; xx xx (4) lands used or reserved for the benefit of village community including streets, lanes, playgrounds, schools, drinking wells, or ponds within abadi deh or gorah deh; and xxx xxx xxx” 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance gone through the record as well judgments relied upon by Mr. Gurcharan Singh. All the judgments relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner pertain to the Act as applicable in the State of Haryana. There is no analogous provision as contained in clause (4) of Section 2(g) of the Act now in the said State. In fact, Clause (4a) of Section 2(g) was initially inserted in Haryana vide Haryana Act No.23 of 1973, but later omitted by Act No.2 of 1981 and re-inserted by Act No.15 of 1983 w.e.f. 12.02.1981 i.e. the date it was omitted. Clause (4) as was existing in Punjab was substituted by Haryana Act No.9 of 1992. Thus, Clause (4) of Section 2(g) was in co-existence with Clause (1) of Section 2(g) of the Act till 1992. 10. In Bachan Singh’s case (supra), the Court was considering clause (4a) of Section 2(g) of the Act and has not considered clause (4) of Section 2 (g) of the Act then in existence. Still further, in the said case, the land was not recorded as shamlat deh, but was shown to be property of right holders. Jumla Mustarka land is not shamlat land in terms of Section 2(g)(1) of the Act. Therefore, the aforesaid judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In Tale Ram’s case (supra), a finding was returned that the plot is in uninterrupted possession since the time of his forefathers. Thus, it cannot be said that it is used or reserved for the benefit of the village community. It is a finding of fact in the said case and such finding is not even remotely applicable to the present case, wherein the finding is of common use of the land. Thus, it cannot be said that it is used or reserved for the benefit of the village community. It is a finding of fact in the said case and such finding is not even remotely applicable to the present case, wherein the finding is of common use of the land. In Bawa Lachhman Dass’s case (supra), it was found that the question of title is raised and the matter was remitted to adjudicate upon the said question. The judgment in Tara Chand and Fateh Singh’s case (supra) deals with the question of res judicata of an order passed under Section 7 of the Act in proceedings under Section 13-B of the Act. Such question does not arise for consideration in the present case. 11. In the present case, the scope of Clauses (1) & (4) of Section 2(g) of the Act requires to be examined. As per Clause (1), the land described in the revenue records as Shamlat Deh excluding abadi deh vests in Panchayat in terms of Section 2(g) of the Act; whereas, Clause (4) deals with the land, which is used for common purposes irrespective of the fact whether it is situated in the abadi deh or gorah deh, it will vest in Panchayat. Therefore, if in the revenue record, the land is recorded as shamlat deh, it will vest in Panchayat, but excluding abadi deh. However, where land is not described in the revenue record as shamlat deh, but is being used for common purposes of the village community or reserved for use of common purposes i.e. during the process of consolidation, would again be a shamlat falling in Clause (4) of Section 2(g) of the Act. The present is a case, which falls in Clause (4) of Section 2(g) of the Act i.e. the land used for common purposes of the inhabitants of the village. 12. Consequently, we do not find any illegality or irregularity in the order passed by the Commissioner, which may warrants any interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. 13. Dismissed. ---------0.B.S.0------------ —————————