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2014 DIGILAW 2916 (ALL)

Santosh Devi v. Dy. Director of Consolidation

2014-09-18

ANJANI KUMAR MISHRA

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JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar Mishra, J. 1. Heard Smt. Durga Tiwari, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Sri Riduvant Pratap Singh and Sri S.C. Verma, who have appeared for the caveator. This writ petition arises out of an objection under section 9A(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and is directed against the order dated 2.9.2014 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation as also the order dated 24.7.2013 passed by the Consolidation Officer in Case No. 31 under section 9A(2), Somdutt v. Rameshwar. 2. The dispute in the writ petition pertains to plot No. 778 area 6-7-0, situated in village Jaroda Panda, Pargana Deoband, Tehsil Rampur Maniharan, District Saharanpur, which admittedly belonged to one Rameshwar Dayal. Both the parties claim on the basis of registered sale deeds executed by the said Rameshwar Dayal in their favour. The respondent No. 4 claims on the basis of a registered sale deed dated 13.8.1973 while the claim of the petitioners' is based on a registered sale deed dated 21.1.1981. 3. On the start of consolidation operations, an objection under section 9A(2) was filed by respondent No. 4. The Consolidation Officer allowed this objection. The appeal filed by the petitioners was allowed and the order passed by the Consolidation Officer was reversed and the petitioners was ordered to be recorded over the land in question. This order has been set aside by the Revisional Court and the order passed by the Consolidation Officer has been affirmed. 4. It appears that prior to the start of consolidation operations, proceedings for mutation were taken under section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. 5. It is admitted between the parties that these proceedings ultimately abated on the start of consolidation operations and it is thereafter that the objection under section 9A(2) was filed by the contesting respondent. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the S.D.O. by his order passed on the mutation application under section 34 recorded a finding that the sale deed in favour of the respondent No. 4 was a forged document. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the S.D.O. by his order passed on the mutation application under section 34 recorded a finding that the sale deed in favour of the respondent No. 4 was a forged document. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that this finding has not been set aside by any Court of competent jurisdiction and, therefore, the same is operative even today, inspite of the fact that such proceedings, wherein the finding was returned, were ordered to abate under section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, once the unit was brought under consolidation operations. 7. The second, submission of learned Counsel for the petitioners is that a criminal case had been instituted by Rameshwar Dayal against respondent No. 4, Somdutt, on the ground that the alleged sale deed was a forged and fictitious document. The respondent No. 4, Somdutt, was convicted and underwent incarceration. It is, therefore, submitted that since the Criminal Court had held the sale deed in favour of Somdutt to be a forged document and convicted Somdutt, the Courts below have committed manifest illegality in relying on such forged sale deed and granting rights in favour of the respondent No. 4. 8. The third and last submission of learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has wrongly and illegally recorded a finding on adverse possession in favour of the contesting respondents. She submits that such finding could not have been returned in the absence of any pleadings or any claim of adverse possession having been set up by the contesting respondents before any of the Courts below. 9. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the judgment Asgari Begum v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 2006 (100) RD 560 . She has relied upon paragraph 6 of the said judgment, wherein this Court has held that section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act gives power to the Deputy Director of Consolidation to examine correctness, legality and propriety of any order/proceedings of the authorities below and not otherwise. It has further been held that the Revisional Court does not possess any administrative powers, so as to be entitled to pass any order just on an application being moved before him. 10. It has further been held that the Revisional Court does not possess any administrative powers, so as to be entitled to pass any order just on an application being moved before him. 10. Having considered the authority cited, I find that it has absolutely no application to the facts and circumstance of the instant case. The authority has been cited to canvass that adverse possession was not the respondents' claim and this aspect has been wrongly dealt with in the impugned order. 11. Upon a consideration of the submissions made by learned Counsel for the petitioners and upon a perusal of the writ petition as also the orders impugned, it emerges that the petitioners claim that the sale deed in favour of respondent No. 4 was forged and fictitious, is based upon findings recorded to this effect by the mutation Court as also the Criminal Court Insofar as the findings recorded by the mutation Court are concerned, it is admitted that the mutation proceedings ultimately abated on the start of consolidation operations. 12. It is settled law that proceedings under section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act are purely fiscal in nature and mutation does not create or extinguish title and, therefore, any finding recorded by the mutation Court cannot be binding in regular proceedings. In the case at hand, the situation is still worse as these proceedings abated on the start of consolidation operations. 13. In such circumstances, the submission that the findings recorded by the mutation Court or any Court in proceedings, which ultimately are ordered to abate would be binding, is wholly misconceived. Once the proceedings are abated, the orders passed therein cease to have effect and the matter is to be re-determined by the Consolidation Courts. Even otherwise proceedings under section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act are summary proceedings and any findings recorded by such Courts in exercise of jurisdiction under section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act are not binding in regular proceedings in view of section 40-A of the Act. For this reason also, the submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioners is without any substance. 14. Insofar as the findings recorded by the Criminal Court are concerned, it would again suffice to state that the Civil Courts are not bound by any finding that may have been recorded during a criminal trial. 15. For this reason also, the submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioners is without any substance. 14. Insofar as the findings recorded by the Criminal Court are concerned, it would again suffice to state that the Civil Courts are not bound by any finding that may have been recorded during a criminal trial. 15. A Full Bench in the case of Ramnath v. Munna 1976 RD 220, has been held that a registered sale deed, unless cancelled by the Civil Court, is liable to be given effect to. A void document, however can be ignored by the Revenue or Consolidation Courts. 16. I have carefully gone through the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, which order was in favour of the petitioners. The Consolidation Officer relied exclusively upon the judgment of the Criminal Court to decide the case in favour of the petitioners. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation has not recorded any independent finding on the basis of the evidence on record, which could lead to even an interference that the sale deed in favour of respondent No. 4 is a void document. 17. In the absence of such findings, the view taken by the Consolidation Officer as also the Deputy Director of Consolidation that the sale deed was binding, till such time it was set aside in regular proceedings, cannot be faulted with. 18. Insofar as the contention regarding the so called finding on the question of adverse possession is concerned, the perusal of the impugned order shows that no such finding has been returned. The reference to sections 209 and 210 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is only illustrative and is not the basis on which the order impugned has been passed. 19. Accordingly, and for the reasons given above, I find no illegality in the impugned order. The writ petition is wholly devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed.