JUDGMENT Ram Surat Ram (Maurya), J. 1. Heard Sri M.A. Khan, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri M.E. Khan for the petitioners and Sri Avdhesh Kumar for the contesting respondents. 2. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the entire proceedings pending before the CO as well as before the Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Barabanki, instituted by respondents-6 and 7. Subsequently, the writ petition was amended and relief 1-A has been added in it for quashing the restoration application nos. 264, 265 and 266 of 2012-13 and the proceedings pending before the SOC in Appeal No. 61, 62 and 63 and proceeding pending before the DDC in Revision No. 1016/2013 filed by the respondents. 3. It has been stated by the petitioners that the property in dispute originally belonged to Chaudhary Rashiduddin Ashraf, who died in the year 1939, leaving behind him his four sons, Chaudhary Azimuddin Ashraf, Chaudhary Ziyauddin Ashraf, Chaudhary Imamuddin Ashraf and Chaudhary Naziruddin Ashraf. The petitioners claim to be transferee of Chaudhary Azimuddin Ashraf of plot no. 90 (area 10-5-7 bigha), plot no. 91 (area 0-17-5 bigha) and plot no. 94 (area 0-17-8 bigha), situated at village Satrikh, tahsil Nawabganj, district Barabanki, which is lying outsdie the limits of town area Satrikh, Barabanki. 4. It is alleged that there has been family settlement between four sons of Chaudhary Rashiduddin Ashraf in the year 1948. In family settlement, the land in dispute came in the share of Chaudhary Azimuddin Ashraf, who executed the sale deed dated 11.9.1974 in respect of the land in dispute in favour of Krishna Chandra Shah and Shatrohan Lal. Krishna Chandra Shah executed a sale deed dated 4.11.2004 in respect of his ½ share to Bharat Bhushan Singh (petitioner-2). Sons of Shatrohan Lal executed a sale deed dated 4.12.2004 in respect of their ½ share in the land in dispute to Parmeet Singh (petitioner-1). 5. The proceedings under U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 was started against Chaudhary Azimuddin Ashraf, who filed his objection dated 21.8.1979 before the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling), in which, he had stated that the land in dispute came in his share in family settlement and he had executed the sale deed dated 11.9.1974 in favour of Krishna Chandra Shah and Shatrohan Lal, after taking sale consideration and handed over possession to them. Before the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling), Smt. Khalida Fazli, daughter of Chaudhary Azimuddin Ashraf, Smt. Jahan Ara Sher, daughter of Chaudhary Ziyauddin Ashraf, Smt. Anjum Fatima Ashraf, daughter of Chaudhary Imamuddin Ashraf and Smt. Sufia Kidwai (respondent-7), daughter of Chaudhary Naziruddin Ashraf, were examined. All of them admitted family partition amongst the four sons of Chaudhary Rashiduddin Ashraf and also admitted that the land in dispute fell in the share of Chaudhary Azimuddin Ashraf. The Prescribed Authority (ceiling) earlier by the order dated 21.3.2003 decided the ceiling case, but the appeal filed against that order was allowed by the Additional Commissioner by order dated 29.11.2003. Thereafter, the Prescribed Authority again decided the ceiling case by order dated 18.8.2011 and the appeal filed against the aforesaid order is pending before the Additional Commissioner. In the order dated 18.8.2011, the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) has not declared the land in dispute as surplus land. 6. In the meantime, the village was placed under consolidation operation. The petitioners filed objections u/s 9A of UPCH Act, 1953 (registered as Case Nos. 936 and 1127) for recording their names over the land in dispute. The CO by the order dated 8.7.2011 directed for recording the names of the petitioners over the land in dispute. However, subsequently, Smt. Sufia Kidwai (respondent-7) filed an application for recall of the aforesaid order on 7.8.2012, which was rejected by the CO by order dated 21.1.2013. The appeal filed by Smt. Sufia Kidwai against the order dated 21.1.2013 was dismissed on 2.4.2013 and thereafter, she filed a revision against the aforesaid order, which is pending before the DDC, which is being sought to be quashed in this writ petition. 7. It is alleged that in the meantime, Smt. Sufia Kidwai also filed an appeal against the order dated 8.7.2011, which was dismissed by order dated 16.11.2012. Then Ashish Kumar Rathor (respondent-6) filed an appeal against the order dated 8.7.2011, which was dismissed by order dated 20.9.2012 and the revision filed by respondent-6 was also dismissed by order 11.12.2012. 8. It is further alleged that in the meantime, respondents-6 and 7 started to create hindrance in the rights of the petitioners, therefore, the petitioners filed a regular suit (registered as Regular Suit No. 269/2003) before the Civil Court for permanent injunction, restraining them from interfering in their possession over the land in dispute. The suit was decreed by judgment dated 13.1.2010. The suit was decreed by judgment dated 13.1.2010. However, the respondents have filed a recall application in this suit also which is pending. 9. The counsel for the petitioner submits that the family settlement between the parties has been admitted by all the four co-sharers before the Prescribed Authority (ceiling) and it has been also categorically admitted by them that plot nos. 90, 91 and 94 of village Satrikh, which is at present in dispute, fell in the share of Chaudhary Azimuddin Ashraf. In view of the admission made by all the co-sharers, the sale deed executed by Chaudhary Azimuddin Ashraf dated 11.9.1974 is a conclusive proof. Therefore, the respondents have no right to raise a frivolous objection before the consolidation authorities as well as before the civil court against their admissions. It is merely an abuse of process of the court and also amounts to harassment of the parties. 10. The counsel for the petitioner submits that the Supreme Court in Narain Bhawant Rao Gosavi Balajwale vs. Gopal Vinayay Gosavi, AIR 1960 SC 100 has held that admission is the best evidence and can be relied against the defendant. He further submits that Supreme Court in Kale vs. DDC, AIR 1976 SC 876 has held that family partition having been acted upon between the co-sharers, is liable to be given effect to. In such circumstances, the sale deed of the petitioners cannot be questioned by the respondents and their right to challenge it is barred by estoppel as contained u/s 115 of Evidence Act 1872. The proceeding before the consolidation authorities as well as the civil court, are frivolous proceedings and abuse of process of court and liable to be quashed. 11. I have considered the submissions of counsel for the parties and perused the record. The writ petition has been filed on the basis of admission of respondent-7 and her co-sharers before the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling). It is well known that in ceiling proceeding, the parties used to make self-serving statements. Otherwise also, the admission which comes on the record by way of evidence cannot be treated to be conclusive proof, without giving opportunity to the person who made the admission to explain it. Admittedly, the proceeding before the Consolidation Officer was started by the petitioners and the order of CO was ex parte against Smt. Sufia Kidwai (respondent-7). Otherwise also, the admission which comes on the record by way of evidence cannot be treated to be conclusive proof, without giving opportunity to the person who made the admission to explain it. Admittedly, the proceeding before the Consolidation Officer was started by the petitioners and the order of CO was ex parte against Smt. Sufia Kidwai (respondent-7). She was not given opportunity to contradict/explain her alleged admission. There is nothing on the record to say that the alleged statement before the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) was recorded by Smt. Sufia Kidwai herself and the admission was proved according to provision of Section 21 of the Evidence Act, 1872. In such circumstances, it is not proper for this Court to quash the entire proceeding before the consolidation authorities or before the civil court. 12. The admission comes on record in three ways, namely in pleading, in oral statement in the case itself and previous admission adduced by way of documentary evidence. So far as the admissions in pleading and oral statement in the case are concerned, Supreme Court in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam, AIR 1974 SCC 471 , held that admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. Documentary evidence are governed under Section 17 to 21 of the Evidence Act, 1872 Supreme Court in Mritunjoy Sett v. Jadunath Basak, (2011) 11 SCC 402 , held that Section 17 which defines "admission" of a party and Section 21 prescribes the procedure of proving such an admission in the Evidence Act, 1872. In order to record a finding on the basis of admission, the admission must be clear and not vague. In order to record a finding on the basis of admission, the admission must be clear and not vague. Supreme Court in Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd, (2011) 15 SCC 273 , held that the court, on examination of the facts and circumstances, has to exercise its judicial discretion, keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant, by way of an appeal on merits. Therefore unless the admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional, the discretion of the Court should not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim. In short the discretion should be used only when there is a clear "admission" which can be acted upon. 13. Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in State of M.P. vs. Bhai Lal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006 has held that in exercise of writ jurisdiction, the original proceeding before the statutory court should not be quashed, unless it is barred under any law or suffers from lack of jurisdiction. The present proceedings do not come in those categories. 14. The writ petition has no merit and is dismissed.