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2014 DIGILAW 292 (KER)

Manager, M. M. L. P. School v. V. B. Sajitha

2014-03-31

A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE, THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN

body2014
Judgment Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J. 1. These writ appeals, though arise from three writ petitions and relate to two different aided schools, were heard together, accepting the suggestion of the learned counsel appearing for all parties in that regard, in view of the identity of the questions of law arising for decision, it is pointed out at the Bar that there is conflict on issues of law and also on the approach adopted by the two learned single Judges in appreciating the relevant judicial precedents and applying them while rendering the judgments under appeal. W.A. No. 1462 of 2012 2. This appeal is by the Manager of an aided Upper Primary school and Smt.K.u.Rukiya Beevi, a teacher in that school. Smt.lshoo Bai M. retired as Headmistress of that school on 31.3.2008. Smt.P.K.Rabiya was appointed as Headmistress with effect from 1.4.2008. She thereafter relinquished her claim as Headmistress on 6.5.2008. The Manager appointed smt.K.u.Rukiya Beevi as the Headmistress, it is not in dispute that Smt .V.B.Sajitha, who instituted the writ petition from which this appeal arises, is senior to smt.K.u.Rukiya Beevi. The Assistant Educational Officer refused to approve the appointment of Smt.K.u.Rukiya Beevi as Headmistress as she was junior to smt.V.B.Sajitha. That decision of the AEO dated 20.5.2008 is Ext.P2 in the writ petition. Manager filed a revision against that decision of the AEO. Going by the revisional order, the Additional Director of Public Instruction had noticed that the reason for the AEO's refusal to approve the appointment of smt.K.u.Rukiya Beevi was the preferential claim of Smt.V.B.Sajitha on ground of seniority. However, the Add!.DPI, in his wisdom, did not choose to issue notice or afford opportunity of hearing to Smt.V.B.Sajitha in relation to that revision. By that time, it appears that Government had issued a Government order on 29.9.2008 stating that having examined the matter in detail, Government are "pleased to grant Minority Status" to the educational institution. Addl.DPl's decision comes on 27.1.2009 stating that the approval of appointment of Smt.K.U.Rukiya Beevi as Headmistress with effect from 7.5.2008 onwards deserves consideration in view of the minority status of the establishment. This decision was challenged by smt.V.B.sajitha in the writ petition. 3. Addl.DPl's decision comes on 27.1.2009 stating that the approval of appointment of Smt.K.U.Rukiya Beevi as Headmistress with effect from 7.5.2008 onwards deserves consideration in view of the minority status of the establishment. This decision was challenged by smt.V.B.sajitha in the writ petition. 3. Besides other issues, arguments were advanced before the learned single Judge on the question as to whether the Full Bench decision of this Court in Kurian Lizv v. State of Kerala [2006(4) KLT 264 (FB)] governed the field while the Manager appointed Smt.K.U.Rukiya Beevi with effect from 7.5.2008. The controversy raised was based on the sequencing of the decision rendered by the Full Bench of this Court in Kurian Lizy (supra)-, that rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Manager. S.S.H.S.School v. Liiin [ 2007 (3) KLT 663 ] and the later Full Bench decision of this Court in Bel si v. Corporate Management of Latin Catholic Schoolsr201QC2>) KLT 134(FB)]. In its nutshell, the issue projected before the learned single Judge was as to whether the declaration of law by the Full Bench in Kurian Lizy stood watered down by the ratio of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme court of India in Secretary. Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T.Jose & others [ (2007) 1 SCC 386 ] as noted in Lijin and whether the later declaration of the Full Bench, to the contrary, in Bel si overruling Lijin's case on that point saves those appointments made by minority educational institutions between 25.7.2007, the date of pronouncement of Lijin and 18.3.2010, the date on which the Full Bench delivered its decision in Belsi. The learned single Judge found against the argument on behalf of the Manager that all appointments made between the dates of the decisions in Lijin's case and Belsi's case must be deemed to have been done validly. Making reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in Asst. Commissioner. income Tax. Raikot v.Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. f2008 KHC 5282] and the decision of this Court in Kerala Agro-Industries Corporation Ltd. v. Amminikuttv Anuria [1997 KHC 480], the learned single Judge held that in view of the declaration of law by the Full Bench in Bel si, the decision of the Full Bench in Kurian Lizy is to be taken as the declaration that continued to run notwithstanding a contrary expression by the Division Bench in Lijin. [We may here point out immediately that there are certain errors in mentioning the citations in the judgment of the learned single Judge in WP(C).No.14185 of 2012 from which this appeal, namely, W.A.No.1462 of 2012 arises]. According to the learned single Judge, that apart, the question has to be decided applying the correct law since the issue relating to the appointment of Smt.K.U.Rukiya Beevi by the Manager was challenged by the petitioner and is live all along, it was held that the Manager had not been able to satisfy the learned single Judge with any material whatsoever that a fair procedure as laid down in Kurian Lizy was adopted before selecting Smt.K.U.Rukiya Beevi for appointment as Headmi stress. 4. Resul tantly, the learned single Judge quashed the appointment of smt.K.u.Rukiya Beevi as Headmistress and directed the Manager to make fresh appointment as Headmistress in the school after considering all eligible persons for such appointment in accordance with the principles laid down in Kurian Lizy. 5. For the present, we keep aside the question as to what is the law that would govern the period between the dates of the judgments rendered in Lijin and Belsi. 6. We now proceed to consider some of the other aspects of this writ appeal, namely, w.A.No.1462 of 2012. 7. For one thing, the AEO's order rejecting the approval of appointment of Smt.K.u.Rukiya Beevi is a statutory order. The reason stated in that order is that the seniority of Smt.v.B.sajitha, the seniormost teacher of that school, was overlooked. Ext.Pi seniority list shows that Smt.v.B.Sajitha is at Sl. No. 22 and Smt.K.U.Rukiya-Beevi is at Sl.No.27. The statutory revision before the DPI could not have been disposed of adverse to the interest of Smt.V.B.sajitha without affording her an opportunity of being heard. At once, we may state that we are not impressed at all in law or on facts by the plea of the Manager in his counter affidavit to the writ petition that the other teachers are not necessary parties to the statutory appeal that he had filed before the DPI. The availability of Smt.v.B.sajitha as senior to Smt.K.U.Rukiya Beevi in the seniority list is a fact reflected by the AEO's order, when the decision of the AEO is upturned by the higher statutory authority, namely, the DPI, it will adversely affect the statutory rights and interests of smt.v.B.sajitha. The availability of Smt.v.B.sajitha as senior to Smt.K.U.Rukiya Beevi in the seniority list is a fact reflected by the AEO's order, when the decision of the AEO is upturned by the higher statutory authority, namely, the DPI, it will adversely affect the statutory rights and interests of smt.v.B.sajitha. Therefore, smt.v.B.sajitha was a necessary party to the Manager's revision before the DPI. Even if the Manager had not chosen to implead smt.v.B.sajitha, the DPI could not have reversed the AEO's decision without notice and opportunity of pre-decisional hearing being extended to smt.v.B.sajitha. On this short ground, the writ petition filed by smt.V.B.Sajitha was entitled to succeed. 8. Now, it is not disputed by the Manager that he gave Ext.P4 declaration on 7.5.2008 stating that as on that date, all the senior claimants as per Rules 51A and 43 of Chapter XIV A Kerala Education Rules have been given appointments in the regular posts of Headmistress. This is how he pushed forward the appointment of Smt.K.u.Rukiya Beevi without even mentioning the availability of Smt.V.B.Sajitha (writ petitioner). In his counter affidavit to the writ petition, he did not deny the writ petitioner's plea that the Manager gave such declaration. For one thing, that declaration has been demonstrated to be false. More importantly, it also shows that the appointment of Smt.K.u.Rukiya Beevi was being made as if she is the seniormost claimant, in such event, there was no requirement for the Manager to project any claim as a minority institution or for the Add!.DPI to fall back on the minority status of the school to approve the appointment of smt.K.u.Rukiya Beevi. This is notwithstanding the position that the Add"!.DPI, as noted above, did not think it necessary to afford opportunity of being heard to smt.v.B.sajitha. W.A. Nos. 568 of 2013 & 580 of 2013 9. These appeals arise from two writ petitions which relate to the post of Headmaster in the vimala Matha High school. in anticipation of the occurrence of that vacancy of Headmaster, Sri.James Mathew, High School Assistant, applied to the Manager that he be appointed to that post as he was the seniormost HSA under that Corporate Educational Agency and offered that on such appointment, he will do his best for the institution. The Manager appointed sr.Daisamma Michael with effect from 1.4.2009 in the vacancy that arose on the retirement of Sr.Molly Joseph on the previous day. The Manager appointed sr.Daisamma Michael with effect from 1.4.2009 in the vacancy that arose on the retirement of Sr.Molly Joseph on the previous day. That appointment order dated 1.4.2009 says, among other things, that the appointment of Sr.Daisamma Michael is subject to the provisions of the Kerala Education Act and the Rules thereunder and such other rules or orders issued from time to time by Government or other competent authority. It is also certified in that appointment order that there is no qualified teacher existing in service under that educational agency who is eligible for promotion to the vacancy for which the said appointment is made. Sri.James Mathew represented to the District Educational officer making reference to his earlier representation dated 13.3.2009 and requesting that the appointment of Sr.Daisamma Michael is in violation of Rule 44(1) chapter XIVA K.E.R. and the Note thereunder because Sri.James Mathew is indisputably senior to Sr.Daisamma Michael and Sri.James Mathew had not filed any relinquishment letter with the Manager renouncing his claim for the post of Headmaster. DEO rejected the proposal for approval of appointment of Sr.Daisamma Michael stating that Sri.James Mathew and Sr.Philomina are seniors and qualified in terms of Rule 43 of chapter XIVA K.E.R. under that Corporate Educational Agency and that Sri.James Mathew is the qualified and seniormost in terms of that rule for the post of promotion as Headmaster under that educational agency and the Manager had not submitted the statement of relinquishment of that senior claimant. The DEO had also recorded that the Manager had reported that the said educational institution is a minority institution under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, but the order of formal declaration of minority status was not produced. DEO's decision was challenged by the Manager before the Deputy Director of Education. DDE concurred with the DEO's views and held that in terms of the recognised seniority list of the educational agency, Sri.James Mathew is the seniormost eligible claimant and the Manager has not produced any document proving minority right, though it was claimed by the Manager before the DDE that the institution is entitled to minority rights under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. DDE, therefore, directed the Manager to appoint Sri.James Mathew to the post of Headmaster with effect from 1.4.2009. DDE, therefore, directed the Manager to appoint Sri.James Mathew to the post of Headmaster with effect from 1.4.2009. The appeal carried by the Manager to the DPI was decided on 15.6.2010 against the Manager by holding that the Manager could not produce any solid proof to claim minority status of the institution and therefore, the senior claimant Sri.James Mathew deserves to be appointed. The revision of the Manager was rejected by the Addl.DPI and the Manager was directed to appoint Sri.James Mathew as Headmaster instead. 10. The aforesaid decision of the DPI was challenged by the Manager by filing WP(C).No.24745 of 2010. In that writ petition, the Manager produced a document as Ext.Pi. That document was never produced before any of the statutory authorities, in fact, it was not available even on the day when the DPI decided the appeal on 15.6.2010. That document is one issued by the National commission for Minority Educational institutions on 15th July, 2010 stating that on consideration of the documentary evidence produced before the Commission, the commission is satisfied that the schools enumerated therein are minority educational institutions within the meaning of section 2(g) of the National commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2004, "NC Act", for short, it is stated in that certificate that, consequently, it is thereby declared that those schools are minority educational institutions covered under Article 30 (1) of the constitution of India. The school involved in this litigation is an institution included in that document. 11. Sri.James Mathew filed WP(C).No.25995 of 2010 seeking a direction to the statutory authorities to obtain obedience of their directions to appoint him as the Headmaster. 12. The two writ petitions were heard jointly by the learned single Judge. 13. It was held that having regard to the law laid by the Apex Court in N.Ammad v. Manager. Emiav High School [ (1998) 6 SCC 674 ], the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions, having issued the aforesaid certificate, the fact that the school is a minority institution cannot be refuted and the benefit has to be held to operate at any given point of time. Emiav High School [ (1998) 6 SCC 674 ], the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions, having issued the aforesaid certificate, the fact that the school is a minority institution cannot be refuted and the benefit has to be held to operate at any given point of time. It was further held that the declaration of law laid by the Full Bench in Kurian Lizy was noted by the Division Bench in Lijin as not good law and the later Full Bench in Belsi having been rendered only at a later point of time on 24.3.2010, the appointment of Sr.Daisamma Michael made on 1.4.2009, between the dates of judgments rendered in Lijin and Belsi respectively, cannot be found fault on the ground that the Manager had not prescribed and duly published a procedure for selection of Headmaster. The learned single Judge also went on to hold that Sr.Daisamma Michael was appointed as Headmistress as she was having a higher qualification and according to the management, there was some allegation against Sri.James Mathew. The learned single Judge concluded that in view of Malankara Syrian Catholic College, the Manager was justified in appointing the Headmistress of the choice of the management and Sri.James Mathew cannot claim any right to become the Headmaster on the basis of the Rules. Accordingly, the learned single Judge set aside the decisions of the statutory authorities and directed the DEO to approve the appointment of Sr.Daisamma Michael as Headmistress of the school. Thereby, the writ petition filed by the Manager was allowed and the writ petition filed by Sri.James Mathew was consequentially dismissed. 14. Since the aforesaid was a composite judgment in two writ petitions, Sri.James Mathew has filed these writ appeals. 15. Following the procedure adopted by us in relation to w.A.No.1462 of 2012, for the time being, we keep aside the question as to what is the law that would govern the period between the dates of the judgments rendered in Lijin and Belsi and we now proceed to consider some of the other aspects of these writ appeals. 16. The certification by the National Commission for Minority Educational institutions in favour of this educational establishment was issued only on 15th July, 2010. We will later on consider the legal effect of that declaration also taking note of N.Ammad. 17. But, one thing is certain. 16. The certification by the National Commission for Minority Educational institutions in favour of this educational establishment was issued only on 15th July, 2010. We will later on consider the legal effect of that declaration also taking note of N.Ammad. 17. But, one thing is certain. The order of appointment of Sr.Daisamma Michael was made by the Manager without any express reference to the protection, if any, that was available to that educational institution as one established by a minority. We say this in the context of the fact that the appointment order dated 31.3.2009 does not contain any expression by the Manager of any choice having been made by the educational institution or its management which is a choice made in exercise of the right to administer, of its own choice. The appointment order dated 1.4.2009, which is Ext.P2 in WP(C).No.25995 of 2010, states that the appointment is subject to the provisions of the Kerala Education Act and the Rules thereunder and such other rules or orders issued from time to time by Government or other competent authority. It is certified in that appointment order that there is no qualified teacher existing in service under that educational agency who is eligible for promotion to the vacancy for which the above appointment is made. Therefore, whatever be the status of the educational agency in terms of Article 30(1) of the Constitution, there is no express or implied intention through the appointment order whether the provisions of the Kerala Education Act and Rules are sought to be given a go-by. More particularly, the appointment is made subject to the provisions of that Act and Rules. No exemption is also expressed, to take away the eligibility of a qualified senior from being promoted in preference to the teacher who was being promoted. This is abundantly clear from the statement in that appointment order that there is no qualified teacher existing in the service under that educational agency who is eligible for promotion to the vacancy to which Sr.Daisamma Michael was being appointed. These views emanating out of that appointment order stand fortified by the contents of the order dated 31.3.2009 which is issued by the Manager of the corporate Educational Agency and produced as Ext.P3 along with WP(C).No.24745 of 2010 which shows that Sr.Daisamma Michael is promoted Subject to Departmental Rules and posted as Headmistress in the vimala Matha High school. These views emanating out of that appointment order stand fortified by the contents of the order dated 31.3.2009 which is issued by the Manager of the corporate Educational Agency and produced as Ext.P3 along with WP(C).No.24745 of 2010 which shows that Sr.Daisamma Michael is promoted Subject to Departmental Rules and posted as Headmistress in the vimala Matha High school. Thus, even while the corporate Manager issued that promotion and transfer order, there is nothing therein indicative of the management's decision to deviate from the prescription as to choice and appointment, including by promotion that it had to make in terms of the statutory rules. 18. can an act already done without in any manner expressing it to have been done in conscious exercise of the protective constitutional covenant contained in Article 30(1), be later on cloaked with the garb of having been done as an act in furtherance of the right of a minority to establish and administer an educational institution of its choice? This question, in our view, is of abundant importance and looms large, particularly, in the light of the constitutional need to balance the Fundamental Rights of individuals and to shake off institutional arbitrariness. The reasoning process that led the Full Bench to decide Kurian Lizy in the manner in which it has been laid down, necessarily underscores the need to maintain intra- institutional transparency at least in so far as members of the same minority community are concerned. This is built on the seminal constitutional principle of equality. 19. Here, the undisputed fact is that Sri.James Mathew and Sr.Daisamma Michael belong to the same community to which the institution is pleaded to belong, if there was a conscious decision to make a choice between them, the appointment order Ext.P2 in WP(c).No.25995 of 2010 and the transfer/promotion order Ext.P3 in WP(C).No.24745 of 2010 would never have been worded in the manner in which they have been issued, we are unable to appreciate those documents in any other manner. Obviously therefore, the statutory authorities under the Kerala Education Act and Rules cannot be criticised of having denounced the refusal to appoint Sri.James Mathew as Headmaster by promotion in preference to sr.Daisamma Michael. 20. Obviously therefore, the statutory authorities under the Kerala Education Act and Rules cannot be criticised of having denounced the refusal to appoint Sri.James Mathew as Headmaster by promotion in preference to sr.Daisamma Michael. 20. N.Ammad dealt with a case where the Government had declared the school as a minority school and the law laid down in that precedent is that when a factual position has been recognised by the Government, that declaration is an open acceptance of a legal character which should necessarily have existed antecedent to such declaration, it was in that context that the Hon'ble Supreme Court said that it cannot be accepted as a contention that the school can claim protection only after the Government declared it as a minority school on 2.8.1994. in the case in hand, there is no declaration by the Government of Kerala that the institution in question is a minority school. There is, therefore, no question of the statutory authorities under the Kerala Education Act and Rules being bound by any declaration as to the so- called minority status of the school in question, even as the DPI dismissed the Manager's appeal on 15.6.2010. The said decision of the DPI which affirmed the decisions of the subordinate statutory authorities in the hierarchy in terms of the Kerala Education Act and Rules did not warrant interference in judicial review at the hands of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the bunch of facts and materials placed before those authorities and considered in accordance with law. This is more particularly so because, the solitary document that is now relied on by the learned single Judge is Ext.P1 issued by the National Commission for Minority Educational institutions on 15th July, 2010, as already noted, after the DPI's decision which is the last one in the statutory hierarchy. 21. It was much after N.Ammad was decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1998 that the NC Act came into force on 6th January, 2005. That Act was one to constitute a National Commission for Minority Educational institutions and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto, chapter III of that Act deals with the rights of a minority educational institution. That Act was one to constitute a National Commission for Minority Educational institutions and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto, chapter III of that Act deals with the rights of a minority educational institution. Sub-section 1 of Section 10 provides that any person who desires to establish a Minority Educational institution may apply to the competent authority for the grant of no objection certificate for the said purpose, sub-section 2 provides the procedure for decision on application by the competent authority and subsection 3 provides a presumptive grant of certificate with efflux of time. Sub-section 4 of Section 10 provides that on the grant of a no objection certificate or where the competent authority has to be deemed to have granted the no objection certificate, the applicant shall be entitled to commence and proceed with the establishment of a Minority Educational Institution in accordance with the rules and regulations, as the case may be, laid down by or under any law for the time being in force. Clause (f) of Section 11 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Commission shall decide all questions relating to the status of any institution as a Minority Educational institution and declare its status as such. Clause (g) of Section 2 defines "Minority Educational institution" to mean a college or institution (other than a University) established or maintained by a person or group of persons from amongst the minorities. Adv.Sri.v.M.Kurian, learned counsel appearing for the management in W.A.Nos.568 and 580 of 2013 argued that the provisions in the NC Act regarding certification do not appear to apply to minority educational institutions which were already in existence at the commencement of that Act and no new certification is actually required, if that were so, the ratio of N.Ammad does not come to the aid of the management for two reasons. Firstly, that precedent is only to the effect that the Government having declared the school involved in that litigation as a minority school, such declaration would apply to the earlier point of time as well. Firstly, that precedent is only to the effect that the Government having declared the school involved in that litigation as a minority school, such declaration would apply to the earlier point of time as well. There is no declaration by the Government at any point of time, in relation to the school involved in this litigation, secondly, if the declaration given by the competent authority under the NC Act is for the purpose of the commencement and proceeding with the establishment of a new minority educational institution, as argued by the learned counsel for the management, that certificate cannot be utilised by any existing institution as a declaration of its status. Jurisprudentially, while Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in deciding N.Ammad appear to have applied, among other principles, the logic reflected in the permissive presumption at Illustration (d) in Section 114 of the Evidence Act, such reasoning cannot be applied to a situation where a certification is only for the purpose of future acts, that is to say, commencement and establishment of a new minority educational institution. Taking all these together, when a declaration is granted by the competent authority under the NC Act, such declaration would be relevant to operate only as regards acts done by the management of that institution on and from the date of grant or the date of presumptive grant of certificate in terms of sub-section 3 or sub-section 4, as the case may be, of Section 10 of that Act. in this view of the matter, what the management has produced as Ext.Pi in WP(C).No.24745 of 2010 could be relied upon by the educational authorities only for actions and matters in relation to the management of the institution on and after 15.7.2010, the date of its grant. Therefore, the production of that notification before this Court, in writ jurisdiction, could not have set at naught the decisions of the statutory authorities under the Kerala Education Act and the Rules thereunder, unlike in statutory appeals or revisions, subject of course to the restrictions, if any, to take note of subsequent further pleadings and evidence. What is the law that would govern the period between the dates of the judgments rendered in Liiin and Belsi? 22. Reverting to paragraphs 5 and 15 above, this question was kept aside while considering the other issues in the three writ appeals arising from the two writ petitions. What is the law that would govern the period between the dates of the judgments rendered in Liiin and Belsi? 22. Reverting to paragraphs 5 and 15 above, this question was kept aside while considering the other issues in the three writ appeals arising from the two writ petitions. Now, we proceed to consider this particular issue pointedly. 23. In Belsi, the Full Bench answered the reference stating that the directions in Kurian Lizy to follow a fair procedure for appointment of Headmasters is not impliedly overruled by Malankara Syrian catholic college. Though, in Lijin, the Division Bench took the view that the declaration of law by the Full Bench in Kurian Lizy was contrary to the decision of the Apex court in Malankara Syrian Catholic College, the declaration of law by the Full Bench in Belsi is a declaration which would operate as law with no limitation as to the point of time from which it applies. It is a declaration of law by the High Court. The power of a High Court to do so is not akin to, but is clearly unlike, that of the Apex court of the land which is clothed with the exclusive authority to confine its declaration to operate, in given cases, in the realm of prospective overruling. in Amminikutty Anuria, the learned single Judge noted that when a Full Bench overrules a prior precedent, the effect of the same is that it is a declaration of the law as it always has been and that there is no question of the declaration of law by the Full Bench having operation only from the date of such declaration. Making reference to Bodenheimer in his text book on Jurisprudence, quoting from People v. Graves T273 NYS 582], the learned single Judge referred to the decision of the Apex Court in Suresh Chandra verma v. Chancellor. Making reference to Bodenheimer in his text book on Jurisprudence, quoting from People v. Graves T273 NYS 582], the learned single Judge referred to the decision of the Apex Court in Suresh Chandra verma v. Chancellor. Naapur University T AIR 1990 SC 2023 ] to the effect that "it is unnecessary to point out that when the Court decides that the interpretation of a particular provision as given earlier was not legal, it in effect declares that the law as it stood from the beginning was as per its decision, and that it was never the law otherwise." The evolution of the principle of prospective overruling applied in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1967 SC 1643 ] was also noticed by the learned single Judge to ultimately say that when a precedent is overruled, what the overruling decision does is to declare the law as it always has been, we are in complete agreement with that. Equally, the reference made by the learned single Judge in the judgment in WP(c). No.14185 of 2009 to Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. is apposite in the context. There is, therefore, no question of carving out an interregnum between the dates of pronouncements of the judgments rendered in Lijin and Belsi as a period during which the declaration of law as contained in Kurian Lizy did not run to operate. The aforesaid being the law, the effect of Kurian Lizy never stood diluted and the management of a minority educational institution had to follow the procedure prescribed therein while making the appointment regarding posts to which that precedent applies. It is also the settled law that ignorance, inconvenience or misunderstanding do not constitute excuse from obeying the laws and they do not form exclusion for enforcement of the laws. 24. For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment in WP(C). No. 14185 of 2009 does not call for interference, while we are unable to sustain the findings and directions in the judgment in WP(C).Nos.24745 and 25995 of 2010 and that judgment is liable to be set aside leading to relief to Sri.James Mathew. In the result:- (i) W.A. Nos. 1462 of 2012 is dismissed. (ii) W.A. Nos. 568 and 580 of 2013 are allowed setting aside the common judgment dated 6.2.2013 in WP (C).Nos.24745 and 25995 of 2010 and granting the reliefs sought for in WP(C).No.25995 of 2010. In the result:- (i) W.A. Nos. 1462 of 2012 is dismissed. (ii) W.A. Nos. 568 and 580 of 2013 are allowed setting aside the common judgment dated 6.2.2013 in WP (C).Nos.24745 and 25995 of 2010 and granting the reliefs sought for in WP(C).No.25995 of 2010. The said writ petition will stand allowed as prayed for. (iii) The parties will bear their respective costs.