Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 292 (RAJ)

Tata Iron Steel Company Ltd. v. Union of India

2014-01-28

ALOK SHARAM

body2014
JUDGMENT : ” This misc. appeal under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 (hereinafter ' the 1987 Act” ) has been filed against the order dated 8-11-1996 passed by the Railway Claims Tribunal, Jaipur Bench (hereinafter ' the Tribunal” ) dismissing appellant” s-claimant (hereinafter ' the claimant” ) claim petition for refund of Rs.42,214.68 allegedly wrongly charged on account of wharfage and demurrage. 2. The facts of the case are that in respect of a consignment booked by the claimant with respondents Railways (hereinafter ' the Railways” ) dispute arose on arrival of the consignment at Bharatpur with regard to quantity received, as apparently the packaging of the consignment was disturbed and out of bundles of steel bars consigned only three and a half bundles were available in the railway van. Requests for reweighing made were refused. Representations for the purpose moved before the Divisional Railway Manager, Western Railway was also rejected. Since the Railways refused to reweigh the consignment, the claimant had no option but to take delivery of the consignment under protest on 21-7-1988 in the presence of a Notary Public and a representative of Bharatpur Chamber of Commerce and Industry. On reweighing of the consignment as collected from Railways, a certificate was issued by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Bharatpur regarding shortage of goods received as against the goods consigned through the Railways duly received. Shortage of 11.480 metric ton was certified. 3. Owing to the aforesaid dispute with regard to consignment being received short at Bharatpur, it appears that the consignment was not deboarded from the railway van nor was it thereafter timely cleared from the railway siding. In these circumstances, the Railway Administration demanded Rs.28,332/-as demurrage and wharfage charges from the consignee (now the claimant) which amount was paid under protest on 27-1-1988. According to the claimant demurrage and wharfage on the goods in issue were occasioned by the obstinate inaction of the Railways in refusing to reweigh the consignment in spite of the apparent shortage of about one and a half bundles of steel bars. This had resulted in the delay in deboarding the consignment from railway van or carrying it away within permissible time from the railway siding. The delays were thus attributable not to the claimant but to Railways and demurrage and wharfage charges were consequently unwarranted. This had resulted in the delay in deboarding the consignment from railway van or carrying it away within permissible time from the railway siding. The delays were thus attributable not to the claimant but to Railways and demurrage and wharfage charges were consequently unwarranted. A Notice under Section 78-B of the Railways Act, 1989 (hereinafter ' the 1989 Act” ) were sent to Railways seeking refund of the wharfage and demurrage charges aforesaid levied against the claimant and recovered unjustifiably. The claim was however not settled by the Railways. 4. In the circumstances a claim petition was filed by the claimant before the Tribunal claiming of Rs.42,214.68, on account of unjustifiable wharfage and demurrage as also interest thereupon from the date of payment under protest till the date of filing of claim petition. In spite of notice of the claim petition, the Railway Administration remained ex parte and it failed to file reply to the claim petition. The claimant relied upon the affidavit of Mr. B.D. Maloo in support of its case even while Railways set up no defence in evidence. However the learned Tribunal proceeded to dismiss the claim petition on account of it lacking jurisdiction, as according to it, its jurisdiction was limited to consideration of cases of refund of freight which was differentially defined under the Railways Act, 1989 (hereinafter ' the Act of 1989) as against the wharfage and demurrage. Hence this appeal. 5. Mr. Suresh Goyal, the learned counsel for the claimant has submitted that the learned Tribunal has taken a wholly unjustifiably restrictive and illegal view of the matter by holding that freight, wharfage and demurrage are distinct and separate from each other for the purposes of its jurisdiction. He submitted that whatever the nomenclature of the charges i.e. freight, wharfage and demurrage, they were all expanded by the customer of railways in the course of carriage of goods. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Hon” ble High Court of Gujarat in the case of Shah Raichand Amulakh (Dead) by his heir v. Union of India and Ors. [(1971) 12 GLR 93]. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order dated 8-11-1996 passed by the Tribunal. 7. The Railway Claims Tribunal constituted under the 1987 Act is a creature of Statute. It is trite that such tribunals have limited jurisdiction confined to specific conferment by the Statute. [(1971) 12 GLR 93]. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order dated 8-11-1996 passed by the Tribunal. 7. The Railway Claims Tribunal constituted under the 1987 Act is a creature of Statute. It is trite that such tribunals have limited jurisdiction confined to specific conferment by the Statute. Jurisdiction being a legislative conferment of State powers to adjudicate it cannot be extended or expanded either by logic, common sense, or convenience. Such Tribunals have no plenary jurisdiction. Section 13 of the 1987 Act reads as under: 13. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Claims Tribunal. (1) The Claims Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as are exercisable immediately before that day by any civil court or a Claims Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the Railways Act (a) x x x (b) in respect of the claims for refund of fares or part thereof or for refund of any freight paid in respect of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration to be carried by railway. 8. It is thus apparent that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is inter alia limited to claims for refund of fares or refundable freight. Section 2(o) of the 1987 Act provides that words and expressions used and not defined in the Act of 1987 but defined in the Railways Act 1989 or the rules made thereunder shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act or the said rules. Section 2 (17) of the 1989 Act defines the ' freight' to mean the charge levied for the carriage of goods including transhipment charges, if any. Section 2 (11) of the 1989 Act distinctly defines ' demurrage' to mean the charge levied for the detention of any rolling stock after the expiry of free time, if any, allowed for such detention. Section 2 (41) of the 1989 Act defines the ' wharfage' to mean the charge levied on goods for not removing them from the railway after the expiry of the free time for such removal. 9. Section 2 (41) of the 1989 Act defines the ' wharfage' to mean the charge levied on goods for not removing them from the railway after the expiry of the free time for such removal. 9. It is no doubt true that freight, wharfage and demurrage all relate to the goods carried by the railways but that by itself cannot entail overriding the separate and distinct definitions thereof in the 1989 Act and coalesce the three definitions into one overreaching concept of ' goods carried by railway' for purposes of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. That would be a clear misreading of Section 13(1) of the 1987 Act. A bare look at Section 13 (1) (b) of the 1987 Act indicates that claim before the Tribunal have to relate inter alia to the refund of the freight or fares. The Tribunal has not been conferred jurisdiction to entertain claims for refund of the wharfage or demurrage. It is worthwhile noting that charge towards freight is a contractual charge for the carriage of goods while both demurrage and wharfage are in the nature of penalty/damage to the railways for breach of the consignee” s obligation to clear the van carrying the goods and thereafter railway sidings within permissible free time. As stated earlier freight thus cannot be equated with wharfage and demurrage. 10. In my considered opinion, in the state of conclusions drawn on the interpretation of Section 13 (1) (b) of the 1987 Act, the learned Tribunal can not be said to have erred or otherwise wrongfully refused to exercise its jurisdiction on the claim petition filed by the claimant-appellant. 11. I therefore find no force in the appeal and the same is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.