JUDGMENT S.C. Das, J.:-- 1. This second appeal under Section 100 of CPC is directed against the judgment and decree dated 17.07.2003 passed by learned Addl. District Judge (Fast Track Court), North Tripura, Kailashahar in Title Appeal No. 08 of 1993, whereunder, the learned Addl. District Judge dismissed the appeal and affirmed the original judgment and decree dated 31.07.1980 passed by learned Subordinate Judge (re-designated as Civil Judge, Sr. Division), Kailashahar, North Tripura in Title Suit No. 18 of 1978. 2. Heard learned senior counsel, Mr. D. Chakraborty, assisted by learned counsel, Mr. H. Laskar for the appellants and learned counsel, Mr. D.K. Biswas for respondent No. 1. No representation on behalf of the other proforma respondents. 3. The second appeal has been admitted for hearing by order dated 31.08.2004 on the following substantial questions of law: (i) Whether the appellants are protected under Section 60(B) of the Easement Act, 1882? (ii) Whether the predecessor of the appellants were/are entitled to enjoy usufruct, rent or profit of the suit under the terms of solenama? 4. For disposal of the second appeal, let us first briefly state the facts pleaded by the parties. 4.1. Respondent No. 1, as plaintiff instituted Title Suit No. 18 of 1978 seeking eviction of the defendants from the suit land, described in the schedule of the plaint against Kalipada Dey (since deceased), the predecessor of the present appellants, as the principal defendant (hereinafter mentioned as defendant) and eight other proforma-defendants including the pro-defendant-respondent Nos. 2 to 4, mentioned in the Memo. of Appeal and only the principal-defendant contested the suit by filing written statement. 4.2. The plaintiff, inter alia, contended that the suit land belonged to the plaintiff and the plaintiff brought a suit in the Court of Munsiff, Dharmanagar (T.S. No. 76 of 1960) against the defendants for eviction from the suit land and the said suit was decreed on compromise on 21.08.1961. The compromise petitions filed by both side formed a part of the decree. The compromise petitions filed by both side formed a part of the decree. As per the terms of compromise decree it was agreed that the plaintiff is the owner of the land and the defendant was allowed to reside in the suit land as a licensee under the plaintiff without payment of any rent on condition that the defendant will have no title in respect of the suit land and further that he will have no right to transfer the suit land in any manner and the right to reside on the suit land shall be inheritable. It is alleged that the principal-defendant violating the terms of compromise constructed pucca and semi-pucca buildings and let out it to the proforma-defendants as tenants and since the defendant violated the terms of compromise, the plaintiff prayed for eviction of the defendant. 4.3. The principal-defendant No. 1 contested the suit by filing written statement, inter alia, stating that he did not violate the terms and conditions of compromise decree and that he raised the pucca construction within the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff and so there is no question of violation of the terms and conditions of compromise decree and the suit shall be dismissed. 5. Based on the pleadings of the parties, trial Court formulated six issues, namely-- (i) Is the suit property valued and court fees paid sufficient? (ii) Is the suit barred by estoppel, acquiescence and waiver? (iii) Is the defendant No. 1 a licencee in respect of the suit land under the plaintiff? (iv) Has the defendant No. 1 constructed permanent structures on the suit land with knowledge and consent of the plaintiff? (v) Is the defendant No. 1 protected u/s. 60 of the Easement Act? (vi) Is the plaintiff entitled to recover khas possession by evicting the defendants. 6. In course of trial, both side adduced evidence and considering the pleadings and evidence the trial Court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and accordingly decreed the suit. 7. Aggrieved, the defendant preferred Title Appeal No. 08 of 1993 and by impugned judgment dated 17.07.2003, the learned Addl. District Judge (Fast Track Court), Dharmanagar dismissed the appeal, and hence the present second appeal. 8. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Chakraborty has submitted that the bone of contention of this second appeal is the compromise dated 21.08.1961 in TS No. 76 of 1960. According to Mr. District Judge (Fast Track Court), Dharmanagar dismissed the appeal, and hence the present second appeal. 8. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Chakraborty has submitted that the bone of contention of this second appeal is the compromise dated 21.08.1961 in TS No. 76 of 1960. According to Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel, the trial Court as well as the appellate Court failed to make a harmonious construction of the terms and conditions of the compromise decree and arrived at a wrong decision. It is submitted that there is no prohibition in the terms and conditions of the compromise decree that the defendant cannot raise any pucca construction and cannot let out any such premises for his earning purposes. In the absence of any such specific terms and conditions in the compromise decree, it should be construed harmoniously in favour of the defendant. Since the defendant is a licensee and in terms of the compromise he is in possession of the suit land the plaintiff cannot revoke the license and the defendant-appellants are entitled to the protection as prescribed in Section 60 of the Indian Easement Act, 1882. 9. Countering the submission of Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel, Mr. Biswas has submitted that the intention of the parties to the compromise should be gathered reading the document as a whole. The main object of the compromise decree has to be gathered from a careful reading of the same and it would be evident that the license was given to the defendant only to reside over the suit land in perpetuity and no right of transfer in any form was given in the license. Admittedly, the defendant let out the premises to different tenants and thereby violated the terms and conditions and hence the trial Court and the appellate Court rightly passed the judgment and decree. 10. The trial Court while deciding issue No. 5 in para 9 of the judgment held: 9. It is an admitted position that the defendant resides in the suit land. It is an admitted position that the defendant has let out the structures, constructed by him on the suit land to the proforma defendants. So it remains a fact that he transferred a portion of the suit property to his tenants by creating tenancy in their favour. It is an admitted position that the defendant resides in the suit land. It is an admitted position that the defendant has let out the structures, constructed by him on the suit land to the proforma defendants. So it remains a fact that he transferred a portion of the suit property to his tenants by creating tenancy in their favour. According to terms of compromise the intention of the granter was only to allow the defendant to use the suit property for only residential purpose in consideration of his service given to the plaintiff company for a long period. It was never intention of the granter that the defendant would use the suit property for earning profits. Shri S.C. Chakraborty, Advocate appearing for the defendant urges that the defendant constructed the pucca building on the suit land acting on the licence granted to him by petition of compromise and as such he is protected for eviction according to Sec. 60 of the Easement Act. Now under Section 60(B) of the Easement Act, the licensee if acting upon the licensee has executed a work of permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution, such license cannot be revoked. In the present case the defendant would have got the benefit of Sec. 60 of Easement Act if the building was constructed only for his residential purpose according to the condition of license. But the fact is otherwise. He has violated the terms of license and also the terms of the contract as embodied in the petition of compromise (Ext. 5) and hence according to the terms of the contract he is liable to be evicted. It is not an ordinary license but a license with some conditions. 11. The bone of contention of the suit is the terms and conditions of the compromise petition, dated 21.08.1961 by the plaintiff and the principal-defendant in T.S. No. 76 of 1960. It is clearly stated in the terms and conditions of the compromise petition that the principal-defendant, Kalipada Dey, the predecessor of the present appellants, shall have no title to the suit land but shall continue to reside over the suit land constructing houses thereon and such right to live on the suit land shall be inheritable. It is clearly stated in the terms and conditions of the compromise petition that the principal-defendant, Kalipada Dey, the predecessor of the present appellants, shall have no title to the suit land but shall continue to reside over the suit land constructing houses thereon and such right to live on the suit land shall be inheritable. The reason for giving such license has also been stated in the compromise petition stating that the defendant looked after the properties of the plaintiff and therefore the plaintiff allowed the license to the defendant to reside over the suit land without any revenue and rent. It has been clearly stipulated that the defendant shall never claim any right title or interest in the suit land and until the defendant voluntarily vacate the suit land, he will not be subjected to eviction. The defendants shall have no right to transfer the suit land by way of sale, gift or any other form. If the defendants vacate the suit land the plaintiff will be automatically in possession of the suit land. 12. The above terms and conditions of the compromise decree clearly spelt out that license was given to the defendant to reside over the suit land with right of inheritance, constructing houses thereon, without any right to transfer any part of the suit land in any manner. A lease is, no doubt, a form of transfer. Admittedly, the defendant leased out the building constructed by him to different tenants and thereby violated the terms and conditions of the compromise decree. 13. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Chakraborty referring to the case of Mahinder Kumar & Ors. v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2013) 11 SCC 87 (para 43 and 44) has submitted that the terms and conditions of the compromise decree should be harmoniously construed keeping in mind that the defendant, since all along is in possession, cannot be evicted from the suit land simply because he let out a portion of the suit land to different tenants for his earning purpose. The harmonious construction should be that he cannot be evicted since he has not vacated the suit land voluntarily. Para 43 and 44 of the judgment reads as follows: 43. The harmonious construction should be that he cannot be evicted since he has not vacated the suit land voluntarily. Para 43 and 44 of the judgment reads as follows: 43. We are concerned with one of the contentions raised therein, namely, that in Para 9(iv) of the advertisement, it is prescribed that only such candidates will be called for interview as the High Court will decide on the basis of evaluation of their performance in the written examination, while in Para (vi) it is stated that the candidates will be selected on the basis of the aggregate marks in the written examination and the interview. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant before the Division Bench was that sub-clauses (iv) and (vi) of Para 9 of the advertisement, have to be harmoniously construed and such harmonious construction would lead to the conclusion that all candidates whose answer sheets were evaluated, will have to be allowed to participate in the interview and that based on the aggregate marks scored by them in the written examination and the interview, the ultimate selection should have been made. 44. The Division Bench, while considering the said submission of the learned Senior Counsel, held as under in para 6: Mr. Nagrath submitted that both sub-clauses (iv) and (vi) of Para 9 of the advertisement have to be harmoniously constructed. We agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that sub-clauses (iv) and (vi) of Para 9 have to be harmoniously construed. Harmonious construction would mean such a construction as will ensure that both sub-clauses (iv) and (vi) of Para 9 are given effect to. If we construe sub-clause (vi) of Para 9 to mean that the number of candidates to be called for interview shall be twice the number of vacancies irrespective of their performance in the written examination as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner then sub-clause (iv) of Para 9 which provides that only such candidates will be called for interview as the High Court may decide on the basis of valuation of their performance in the written examination, will be rendered nugatory. On the other hand, if we construe sub-clause (vi) of Para 9 of the advertisement to mean that aggregate marks in the written and interview obtained by only those candidates who are called for interview on the basis of their performance in the written examination are to be taken into consideration for the selection of the candidates then both sub-clause (iv) and (vi) of Para 9 are given effect to. A harmonious construction of sub-clauses (iv) and (vi) of Para 9 of the advertisement would thus mean that only candidates who secure the qualifying marks on the valuation of the written examination, are called for interview and the marks of such candidates called for interview are aggregated to find out their position in the merit list for the purpose of selection (emphasis supplied) having regard to our conclusions stated above, we find that the conclusion of the Division Bench is also well justified. A careful reading of the above observation of the apex Court and the judgment as a whole, I find nothing to apply the ratio in favour of the appellants, rather I am of considered opinion that the harmonious construction should be the construction of the document as a whole and not isolated reading of a particular term or condition but the intention of the document in its entirety. If we read the document from beginning to end it would be evident that the right title and interest of the suit land has been vested in the plaintiff. Only a limited license to reside over the suit land constructing houses thereon with the right of inheritance was given to the defendant and no other right was conferred. It was clearly stipulated that the defendant will not be in a position to transfer it in any manner. While the defendant let out the part of the building constructed in the suit land to different tenants, certainly, he has violated the terms and conditions and the harmonious construction should go to favour the plaintiff and not the defendant. 14. According to Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel, since there is no condition in the compromise petition that the defendant cannot use the suit land for income purpose, the ambiguity in respect of the compromise decree should favour the defendant and not the plaintiff. 14. According to Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel, since there is no condition in the compromise petition that the defendant cannot use the suit land for income purpose, the ambiguity in respect of the compromise decree should favour the defendant and not the plaintiff. In support of his contention he has referred para 32 of the judgment in the case of Bank of India v. K. Mohandas reported in (2009) 5 SCC 313 . Para 32 of the judgment reads as follows: 32. The fundamental position is that it is the banks who were responsible for formulation of the terms in the contractual Scheme that the optees of the voluntary retirement under that Scheme will be eligible to pension under the Pension Regulations, 1995, and, therefore, they bear the risk of lack of clarity, if any. It is a well-known principle of construction of a contract that if the terms applied by one party are unclear, an interpretation against that party is preferred (verva chartarun fortius accipiuntur contra proferentem). I find no logic at all to refer this judgment in the facts of the present case. It is an admitted position that the defendant is a licensee in terms of the compromise decree of T.S. 76 OF 1960. 15. Let us now see whether provision of Section 60 of the Indian Easement Act protects the interest of the defendant in any manner. Section 60 reads as follows: 60. License when revocable.--A license may be revoked by the grantor, unless-- (a) it is coupled with a transfer of property and such transfer is in force. (b) the licensee, acting upon the license, has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution. The word, ‘License’ is defined in Section 52 of the said Act which reads as follows: 52. “License” defined.--Where on person grants to another, or to be a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a license. In the present case, by the compromise decree the defendant was allowed only the right to reside in the suit land with the right of inheritance. In the present case, by the compromise decree the defendant was allowed only the right to reside in the suit land with the right of inheritance. He was forbidden from transferring the suit land in any manner. It was stipulated that he cannot be evicted from the suit land until he voluntarily vacates it. Admittedly, he did not vacate the suit land voluntarily but it is also an admitted position that he constructed a building in the suit land and let out it to different tenants and thereby he violated the terms and conditions of the compromise and therefore the provision of Section 60 of the Easement Act cannot protect him from eviction. 16. In view of the discussions made above, I find no merit in the second appeal and hence the appeal is dismissed with costs. 17. Send back the L.C. record along with a copy of this judgment.