ORDER 1. The following observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in case of Standard Chartered Bank vs. Directorate of Enforcement and others, 2005 (4) SCC 530 , aptly and squarely applies to the facts of the instant case:- “77. In other words, sentence must inexorably follow conviction, as night follows the day. The argument that it is open to the court to abandon its duty midway without imposition of punishment of the offender, is one without merit.” 2. The necessary relevant facts are stated hereunder to appreciate the case of the petitioner and also for find out whether he is entitled for the relief as prayed in the revision:- 2.1 That the Respondent No. 2 & 3 were charge-sheeted by the Station House Officer, Supela, Bhilai, for commission of offence punishable under Section 498-A Indian Penal Code. After appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence on record, the trial magistrate by its judgment dated 04.10.2004 found the respondent No. 2 & 3 guilty of offence punishable under Section 498-A of Indian Penal Code (for short, IPC) and sentenced them for six months rigorous imprisonment and also sentenced to pay fine of Rs. 100/- to each of them with default stipulations. 2.2 The respondent No. 2 & 3 preferred criminal appeal under Section 374 of the Cr. P.C. before the Court of Session. The learned Sessions Judge, Durg by its judgment impugned set aside the substantive jail sentence and enhanced the fine from Rs. 100/- to Rs. 1100/-to each of them with default stipulation and thereby partly allowed the appeal. 2.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the part of impugned judgment dated 19.04.2005, passed by Second Additional Sessions Judge, Durg, in Criminal Appeal No. 330/2004 interfering with sentence awarded by trial Magistrate, instant revision has been preferred by the petitioner/complainant. 3. Ms. Fouzia Mirza, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that order of learned Sessions Judge setting aside the punishment of substantive jail sentence by enhancing the sentence of fine is clearly illegal and in teeth of Section 498-A IPC, which mandatorily prescribes punishment of imprisonment plus fine, therefore, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside and respondent No. 2 & 3 be punished with imprisonment and fine as well. 4. Mr. 4. Mr. Ravish Verma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 & 3 opposing the aforesaid submission, would submit that learned Sessions Judge was absolutely justified in interfering with the sentence of imprisonment by enhancing the sentence of fine, and as such, the revision deserves to be dismissed. Mr. Arvind Shukla, learned counsel for the State would support the impugned judgment. 5. I have heard the counsel appearing for the parties and considered their rival submission made therein and perused the order impugned including records with utmost circumspection. 6. The seminal issue falling for consideration in this revision is whether for commission of offence under Section 498-A IPC, punishment of imprisonment is mandatory along with sentence of fine? 7. In order to appreciate the rivalised submissions raised at the bar, it would be profitable to notice Section 498-A IPC, which reads as under: “498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.” 8. From a careful and close perusal of Section 498-A IPC it would appear that offence under Section 498-A IPC is punishable with imprisonment and fine. In Section 498-A IPC, the conjunctive and has been used. 9. In Principle of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh (12th Edition), learned eminent author has held that word and is normally conjunctive in following words:- “The word ‘or’ is normally disjunctive and ‘and’ is normally conjunctive but at times they are read as vice versa to give effect to the manifest intention of the Legislature as disclosed from the context. As stated by SCRUTTON, L.J. “You do sometimes read ‘or’ as ‘and’ in a statute. But you do not do it unless you are obliged because ‘or’ does not generally mean ‘and’ and ‘and’ does not generally mean ‘or’. And as pointed out by LORD HALSBURY the reading of ‘or’ as ‘and’ is not to be resorted to, “unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it requires that to be done.” 10. And as pointed out by LORD HALSBURY the reading of ‘or’ as ‘and’ is not to be resorted to, “unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it requires that to be done.” 10. Similarly in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary (Fifth Edition) it is stated at page 124 as under:- “(1) “And” has generally a cumulative sense, requiring the fulfillment of all the conditions that it joins together, and herein it is the antithesis of OR. Sometimes, however, even in such a connection, it is, by force of a context, read as “or.” 11. The Supreme Court in case of M. Satyanarayan vs. The State of Karnataka and another, AIR 1986 SC 1162 , has held that the expression ‘and’ has generally cumulative effect requiring the fulfillment of all the conditions it joins together. Paragraph five of the aforesaid report states as under: “5. If the expression ‘and’ in clause (a) is read independently then there was no need for him to suffer at all and mere participation would be enough to make him a political sufferer. That would defeat the rationale behind the rule. It would, therefore, frustrate the intention and purpose of the legislature. The expression ‘and’ in these circumstances cannot be read disjunctively. It is not possible to hold that sub-clause (a) should be read independently of sub-clause (b). A statute cannot be construed merely with reference to grammar. Statute whenever the language, permits must be construed reasonably and rationally to give effect to the intention and purpose of the legislature.” 12. The expression ‘and’ in these circumstances cannot be read disjunctively. It is not possible to hold that sub-clause (a) should be read independently of sub-clause (b). A statute cannot be construed merely with reference to grammar. Statute whenever the language, permits must be construed reasonably and rationally to give effect to the intention and purpose of the legislature.” 12. From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is quite vivid that the conjunctive 'And' employed in Section 498-A IPC clearly indicates that criminal court sentencing the convicted person for commission of an offence under Section 498-A IPC has left with no discretion in imposing sentence and said court has necessarily to impose the sentence of imprisonment plus sentence of fine upon a person convicted for said offence in view of conjunctive word “and” in the aforesaid penal provision as it clearly expresses intention of legislature that, such convicted person has to suffer sentence of imprisonment and fine as well looking to the nature and gravity of the offence committed by said person against an woman, as the said provision was introduced with the avowed object to combat the menace of harassment to a woman at the hands of her husband and his relatives. 13. In case of State of Maharashtra vs. Jugmander Lal, AIR 1966 SC 940 , the Supreme Court has held that, expression 'shall be punishable for imprisonment and also for the fine', means that the court is bound to award a sentence comprising both imprisonment and fine and the word “punishable” does not mean anything different from “shall be punished”, punishment being obligatory in either case in following words:- “The plain meaning of the words “shall, on conviction, be punishable for the first offence with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months and with fine which may extend to rupees on thousand” would be that the Court convicting a person of an offence under the Act was bound to award a sentence consisting both of imprisonment and fine. Months” The words ‘may extend” preceding “six and “rupees one thousand” respectively merely give discretion to the Court in so far as the extent of imprisonment or fine to be awarded is concerned and nothing more. It is obvious that the Legislature replaced the original “or” which gave an option to the Magistrate by “and” to make its intention clear.” 14. It is obvious that the Legislature replaced the original “or” which gave an option to the Magistrate by “and” to make its intention clear.” 14. Furthermore, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a decision reported in Assistant Commissioner, Assessment-II, Bangalore and others vs. Velliapa Textiles Ltd. And another, 2003 (11) SCC 405 has held in Paragraph thirty five as under:- “35. Where the legislature has granted discretion to the court in the matter of sentencing, it is open to the court to use its discretion. Where, however, the legislature, for reasons of policy, has done away with this discretion, it is not open to the court to impose only a part of the sentence prescribed by the legislature, for that would amount to rewriting the provisions of the statute.” 15. Thus, on the basis of aforesaid analysis it is transparently clear, once the court, after full-fledged trial in accordance with prescribed procedure comes to the finding of guilt and convicts the offender, the court is bound to sentence the offender with the punishment prescribed in particular penal provision as in the instant case Section 498-A IPC which prescribes imposition of sentence consisting both of imprisonment and fine. 16. Thus after having examined the mandatory nature of punishment of imprisonment plus fine to be imposed upon the person convicted for offence under Section 498-A IPC, falling back to the facts of instant case, it would be profitable to notice paragraph four of impugned judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge, while considering and imposing sentence to the respondent No. 2 & 3 convicted for above stated offence, said paragraph concludes as under:- ^^4- mijksDr reke ifjfLFkfr;ksa dks ns[krs gq, fo)ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; ,oa naMkns'k fnukad 4-10-2004 dks vikLr fd;k tkrk gSA rFkk vihykFkhZ.k@vH;qDrx.k dh vihy dks vkaf’kd :i ls Lohdkj :i ls Lohdkj djrs gq, vihykFkhZ.k@vH;qDrx.k dks /kkjk 498&, Hkkjrh; naM lafgrk ds naMuh; vijk/k ds vkjksi esa 1100@&1100@&:i;s ds vFkZnaM ls nafMr fd;k tkrk gS] vFkZnaM dh jkf'k vnk ugh djus ij 3&3 ekg ds lk/kkj.k dkjkokl dh ltk i`Fkd ls Hkqxrk;h tkosA** 17. From the careful reading of aforesaid paragraph of the impugned judgment would clearly show that while maintaining the conviction of respondent No. 2 & 3 under Section 498-A IPC, the learned Sessions Judge has enhanced the fine sentence in lieu of sentence of imprisonment holding the punishment of imprisonment is optional as well as discretionary for the aforesaid offence. In the considered opinion of this court, the course adopted and sentence awarded by the learned Sessions Judge is in the teeth of Section 498-A IPC, as it has already been held in forgoing paragraphs that for commission of offence under Section 498-A IPC sentence of imprisonment plus sentence of fine both are the mandatory to the person convicted for said offence. 18. Thus, based on forgoing analysis, the part of the impugned judgment interfering with sentence for offence under Section 498-A IPC and sentencing only by fine to the respondent No.2 and deserves to be set aside being contrary to express provision of law. 19. Resultantly the part of the impugned judgment as indicated above is set aside and the Criminal Appeal No. 330/04 (Usman Khan & another vs. State of Chhattisgarh) in the court of Second Additional Sessions Judge, Durg is restored to its original number for hearing and disposal on the question of sentence in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made hereinabove within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. No order as to costs.