Research › Search › Judgment

Tripura High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 295 (TRI)

Dilip Kumar Datta v. State of Tripura

2014-07-28

S.C.DAS

body2014
JUDGMENT S.C. Das, J.:-- 1. The genesis of both the writ petitions is an incident occurred on 03.03.2003 at about 01-30 pm at the Forest Rest House/Office of the Range Officer, Dharmanagar and a common disciplinary proceeding was drawn up against both the writ petitioners named above and another Sri. Amal Laskar (Mali-cum-Watcher) by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, Tripura vide Memo No. F.19(569)-VIG/FOR-2003/18,954-58 dated 18.10.2003 and an inquiry under Section 14 of the CCS(CCA) Rules was directed for major punishment. In the inquiry both the petitioners and Sri. Amal Laskar were found guilty and accordingly, the disciplinary authority inflicted punishment against both the writ petitioners by separate orders and challenging those orders the present writ petitions are filed by Shri Dilip Datta, Forester, the petitioner of W.P.(C) No. 242 of 2009 and Sri. Makhan Lal Dey, Forest Guard, the petitioner of W.P. (C) No. 164 of 2010. 2. Both the writ petitions were heard analogously on the prayer of the learned counsel of both side since common questions of law are involved and this common judgment shall govern both the cases. 3. Since both the writ petitions are identical, W.P.(C) No. 242 of 2009 is taken up as lead case for reference in the judgment. 4. Heard learned counsel, Mr. P. Roy Barman for the petitioner of W.P.(C) No. 242 of 2009 and learned counsel, Mr. P. Datta for the petitioner of W.P.(C) No. 164 of 2010. Heard also learned Government Advocate, Mr. T.D. Majumder for the respondents in both the cases. 5. Fact of the case: Bereft of unnecessary details, the short fact, leading to the common disciplinary proceeding against the petitioners, is that, on 03.03.2003 at about 01-30 pm Sri. Sailendra Singh, an Indian Forest Service Officer, working as Divisional Forest Officer (‘DFO’ for short), Kanchanpur, visited Forest Range Office/Forest Rest House at Dharmanagar along with staff of Divisional Forest Protection Party (for short ‘DFPP’), Kanchanpur. The Range Officer of Dharmanagar Forest Range Office was away from his Office. When Sri. Singh reached the Forest Rest House, suddenly Sri. Dilip Datta, Forester appeared in the Rest House and came in front of Sri. Singh in a challenging mood using abusive language with filthy words and suddenly caught left hand of Sri. Singh in his fist and started dragging Sri. Singh towards the room of the Rest House. Sri. Singh tried to restrain Sri. Datta, but Sri. Dilip Datta, Forester appeared in the Rest House and came in front of Sri. Singh in a challenging mood using abusive language with filthy words and suddenly caught left hand of Sri. Singh in his fist and started dragging Sri. Singh towards the room of the Rest House. Sri. Singh tried to restrain Sri. Datta, but Sri. Datta was beyond control. It was found that Sri. Datta was fully intoxicated and when he could not resist Sri. Datta he called the DFPP staff and the staff of DFPP soon appeared and separated Sri. Singh from the hold of Sri. Datta. Being a superior officer of the department, Sri. Singh felt extremely humiliated because of the unruly behaviour of Sri. Datta while on duty and he at once went to the Chamber of the Range Officer for making a phone call to the Conservator of Forests, Northern Circle, Kumarghat and when he was trying to make the phone call, Sri. Datta again entered into the Chamber of the Range Officer in a charging mood and offensively asked Sri. Singh to put down the phone, but Sri. Singh ignoring the words of Sri. Datta while was trying to make the phone call, Sri. Datta grabbed the phone from the hand of Sri. Singh and at that time Sri. Makhan Lal Dey, Forest Guard and Sri. Amal Laskar, Mali-cum-watcher of the Range Office also arrived there and made attempt to physically assault Sri. Singh and pushed him from behind. At that juncture DFPP staff of Kanchanpur appeared there and managed to rescue Sri. Singh from further assault and humiliation and took him to the vehicle, wherefrom Sri. Singh directly went to Dharmanagar Police Station and lodged an FIR with the O/C of Dharmanagar P.S. about the incident. A police case was registered against both the petitioners and other delinquent, Sri. Amal Laskar and after investigation the police case was charge sheeted against the accused persons. A disciplinary proceeding was initiated simultaneously against the petitioners and Sri. Amal Laskar by Memorandum dated 18.10.2003 issued by order of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (‘PCCF’ for short) on the following distinct Articles of charge:- “Statement of Articles of charge framed against Sh. Dilip Dutta, Forester, Sh. Makhan Lal Dey, FG and Sh. Amal Laskar, MCW of the Forest Department, Govt. of Tripura. Article: I That Sh. Amal Laskar by Memorandum dated 18.10.2003 issued by order of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (‘PCCF’ for short) on the following distinct Articles of charge:- “Statement of Articles of charge framed against Sh. Dilip Dutta, Forester, Sh. Makhan Lal Dey, FG and Sh. Amal Laskar, MCW of the Forest Department, Govt. of Tripura. Article: I That Sh. Dilip Dutta, Forester while functioning as Range Assistant, Dharmanagar was found unable to take care of himself under influence of intoxicating drink & appeared at the place of his employment in a state of intoxication during the course of his duty on 03/03/2003. such behavior on the part of a Government employee is most unbecoming involving violation of Rule 3(1) (iii), 22(b) & (d) of the Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988. Article: II That while functioning in the aforesaid office, the said Sh. Dutta, Forester during the course of his duty on 03/03/2003 behaved in a most disorderly manner by using abusive language at a senior Officer of the Department namely Sh. Sailendra Singh, IFS, DFO Kanchanpur at the Forest Rest House, Dharmanagar and even attempted physical assault on him. Such disorderly behavior on the part of a Government employee amounts to violation of Rule 3(1)(ii) & (iii) of the Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988. Article: III That while functioning in the aforesaid office, the said Sh. Dutta, Forester during the course of his duty on 03/03/2003 disturbed peace at the place of his employment under influence of intoxicating drinks and behaved rudely once again with Sh. Sailendra Singh, IFS, DFO, Kanchanpur in the Range Officer’s Chamber and even prevented him from making phone calls. Such behavior on the part of a Government employee is most unbecoming involving gross violation of Rule 3(1)(ii) & (iii) and 22(b) of the Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988. Article: IV That Sh. Makhan Lal Dey, FG and Sh. Amal Laskar, MCW while functioning under Dharmanagar Range acted in most unbecoming manner by resorting to disorderly behavior, subversive of discipline, during the course of their duty on 03/03/2003 by joining hands & abetting others to cause physical as well as mental assault on Sh. Sailendra Singh, IFS, DFO, Kanchanpur. Article: IV That Sh. Makhan Lal Dey, FG and Sh. Amal Laskar, MCW while functioning under Dharmanagar Range acted in most unbecoming manner by resorting to disorderly behavior, subversive of discipline, during the course of their duty on 03/03/2003 by joining hands & abetting others to cause physical as well as mental assault on Sh. Sailendra Singh, IFS, DFO, Kanchanpur. Such behavior on the part of Government employees are most unbecoming involving violation of Rule 3(1)(ii) & (iii) of the Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988.” Annexure-II to the Memorandum dated 18.10.2003 is the statement of imputation of misconduct and misbehaviour in support of the Article of charges and Annexure-III is the list of documents relied on by the disciplinary authority and Annexure-IV is the list of witnesses by whom the Article of charges framed against the delinquent were proposed to be proved. 6. By order dated 29.10.2004 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition), issued by PCCF, Sri. B.K. Bhattacharjee, Assistant Conservator of Forests (TFS Gr.-II) was appointed as the presenting officer and Sri. K. Chakraborty, TJS Gr.-II, Additional Commissioner of Departmental Inquires was appointed as the inquiry authority/inquiry officer and accordingly, the departmental inquiry was taken up. But by order dated 05.08.2005 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) the PCCF cancelled the appointment of Sri. K. Chakraborty as the inquiry officer and thereafter by order dated 21.12.2005 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) the PCCF appointed Sri. G.R. Paul, IFS, Conservator of Forests as the inquiring authority to enquire into the charges and submit the report. The delinquents submitted representation to the PCCF against the order changing the inquiring authority and also submitted no confidence against the appointment of Sri. G.R. Paul as inquiring authority. The request of the delinquents against the change of inquiring authority was turned down by the PCCF by order dated 26.07.2006 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) and challenging the order dated 05.08.2003 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition), order dated 21.12.2005 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) and order dated 26.07.2006 (Annexure-10 of the writ petition) the delinquents preferred writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 316 of 2006 and by order dated 24.08.2006 the writ petition was disposed of with certain directions. 7. Sri. G.R. Paul, inquiring authority, thereafter took up the disciplinary proceeding for the rest part of the inquiry and issued notice to the delinquents, but the delinquents, i.e., the petitioners and another said Sri. 7. Sri. G.R. Paul, inquiring authority, thereafter took up the disciplinary proceeding for the rest part of the inquiry and issued notice to the delinquents, but the delinquents, i.e., the petitioners and another said Sri. Amal Laskar did not participate in the inquiry proceeding and so, the inquiring authority proceeded ex parte against them. In course of inquiry, out of 11 listed witnesses, the first inquiring authority, Sri. K. Chakraborty, examined 7 witnesses. After taking up the inquiry, the second inquiring authority, Sri. G.R. Paul, re-examined PW2, the victim Sri. Sailendra Singh, IFS, DFO and examined rest 4 witnesses and thereby to prove the charges the disciplinary authority examined altogether 11 witnesses, namely, (1) PW1, Sri. Prasanta Reang, MCW, (2) PW2, Sri. Sailendra Singh, IFS, DFO, Teliamura (the then DFO, Kanchanpur), (3) PW3, Sri. Prabir Bhattacharjee, Dy, CF (the then DFO, Kailashahar), (4) PW4, Md. Aftab Ali, Forester, (5) PW5, Sri. Joyanta Lahir, MCW, (6) PW6, Sri. Brajendra Debbarma, F.G., (7) PW7, Sri. Swadesh Ch. Barman, MCW, (8) PW8, Sri. Nahar Kumar Reang, MCW, (9) PW9, Sri. A.K. Roy, IFS, Conservator of Forests, (10), PW10, Sri. Nirmal Chakraborty, Forester (the then FG) and (11) PW11, Sri. Jarendra Reang, Casual Worker (Driver). In course of inquiry the disciplinary authority also proved the following documents, which are marked as Exhibits: 8. The delinquents in their turn adduced no evidence. By filing defence statement as well as in the course of cross-examination of PWs 1 to 7, the delinquent Sri. Dilip Datta, Forester stated that Sri. Sailendra Singh, DFO (PW2) on his arrival at Dharmanagar Forest Range Office/Rest House ordered Sri. Datta to bring a bottle of whiskey and also to arrange other things necessary for his entertainment and that he will stay for the night in the Rest House. But Sri. Datta refused to oblige Sri. Singh supplying the materials as per his demand and, therefore, Sri. Singh got irritated and instituted a false criminal case against him. The other delinquent stated that they tried to resist Sri. Singh from delting blows and kicks by holding his hands and therefore, Sri. Singh entangled them in false case. 9. On 17.11.2007 the inquiring authority submitted report holding that the charges framed against the delinquents were established and proved. After receipt of the report the disciplinary authority issued notices to the delinquents proposing punishment to show cause and the delinquents submitted show cause reply. Singh entangled them in false case. 9. On 17.11.2007 the inquiring authority submitted report holding that the charges framed against the delinquents were established and proved. After receipt of the report the disciplinary authority issued notices to the delinquents proposing punishment to show cause and the delinquents submitted show cause reply. Considering the inquiry report and the representation of the delinquents, in the case of Sri. Dilip Datta, Forester, the disciplinary authority imposed the order of following punishment:- “ **** **** **** **** **** **** **** I, the Disciplinary Authority, after careful consideration of all aspect of the case, take a lenient view and order to inflict the proposed penalty order issued vide No. F.19(569)/Vig/For-2003/23528-31 dated 24.11.2008 of reduction of his pay to the lowest stage to Rs. 4,200/- in the time scale of pay Rs. 4200-120-6000-130-7300-150-8650/- with cumulative effect till he is found fit by the Disciplinary Authority to be allowed to earn increment from this stage i.e. the lowest stage of time scale of pay. It is further directed that Shri Dilip Kumar Datta, Forester will not earn any increment of pay during the period of such reduction and on expiry of such period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing the future increment of his pay.” In the case of the petitioner, Sri. Makhan Lal Dey, Forest Guard, the disciplinary authority imposed the following punishment:- “ **** **** **** **** **** **** **** I, the Disciplinary Authority, after careful consideration of all aspect of the case, take a lenient view and order to inflict the proposed penalty order issued vide No. F.19(569)/Vig/For-2003/23532-35 dated 24.11.2008 of reduction of his pay to the lowest stage to Rs. 3,200/- in the time scale of pay Rs. 3200-90-4280-100-5480-110-6030/- with cumulative effect till he is found fit by the Disciplinary Authority to be allowed to earn increment from this stage i.e. the lowest stage of time scale of pay. It is further directed that Shri Makhan Lal Dey, Forest Guard will not earn any increment of pay during the period of such reduction and on expiry of such period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing the future increment of his pay.” 10. It is further directed that Shri Makhan Lal Dey, Forest Guard will not earn any increment of pay during the period of such reduction and on expiry of such period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing the future increment of his pay.” 10. The delinquents preferred appeal against the order of punishment before the Secretary to the Government of Tripura, Forest Department and the appellate authority dismissed the appeal and hence, the present writ petitions have been filed challenging the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority and also challenging the order passed by the appellate authority dismissing the appeal. 11. It is submitted by learned counsel of the petitioners that the disciplinary authority by an order dated 29.10.2004 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) appointed Sri. K. Chakraborty, a Judicial Officer, the Additional Commissioner of Departmental Inquiries as the inquiring authority and he was holding the inquiry impartially and effectively. But all on a sudden he was changed by the disciplinary authority simply because Sri. Chakraborty recorded some unauthorized act of Sri. Sailendra Singh, DFO while recording his deposition and, therefore, in the midst of the inquiry the inquiring authority was changed which violated procedural fairness and, therefore, the order of punishment cannot sustain. It is also submitted by learned counsel of the petitioners that Sri. K. Chakraborty, the inquiring authority observed that Sri. Sailendra Singh tempered his deposition recorded during inquiry which was reported to the PCCF and to protect Sri. Sailendra Singh, the appointment of Sri. K. Chakraborty as the inquiring authority was cancelled and subsequently defying the protest of no confidence raised by the delinquents, Sri. G.R. Paul was appointed as the inquiring authority against which the petitioners preferred writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 316 of 2006 and though there was definite direction of the writ Court, the disciplinary authority did not follow the directions of the writ Court in its true spirit and allowed the inquiring authority to conclude the inquiry against the delinquents which has vitiated the inquiry proceeding as a whole. 12. Mr. Datta Majumder, learned Government Advocate, argued that it is the absolute domain of the disciplinary authority as to who shall be appointed as the inquiring authority. It is submitted that the presenting officer by a petition made to the disciplinary authority (Annexure R/1 to the counter affidavit) raised certain issues against Sri. 12. Mr. Datta Majumder, learned Government Advocate, argued that it is the absolute domain of the disciplinary authority as to who shall be appointed as the inquiring authority. It is submitted that the presenting officer by a petition made to the disciplinary authority (Annexure R/1 to the counter affidavit) raised certain issues against Sri. K. Chakraborty, inquiring authority that fair inquiry may not be possible in case Sri. Chakraborty continues as the inquiring authority and that was taken into consideration and thereafter the disciplinary authority changed the inquiring officer and appointed Sri. G.R. Paul as the inquiring officer. The order canceling the appointment of Sri. K. Chakraborty and the order appointing Sri. G.R. Paul as the inquiring authority were challenged in the writ petition, but those orders were not interfered with by the writ Court rather writ petition was disposed of with certain directions and those directions were strictly followed by the disciplinary authority as well as the inquiring authority and there was no procedural or legal infirmity in the proceeding. 13. The points raised on behalf of the petitioners and countered by the respondents have been carefully considered in the light of the materials on record. It is a fact that by order dated 29.10.2004 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) Sri. K. Chakraborty was appointed as the inquiring authority and he examined 7 witnesses including Sri. Sailendra Singh, the victim (PW2) and thereafter by order dated 05.08.2003 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) appointment of Sri. K. Chakraborty was cancelled. Annexure-4 to the writ petition shows that Sri. K. Chakraborty, the inquiring authority, passed an order on 21.09.2005 in the disciplinary proceeding that Sri. Sailendra Singh has tempered his statement recorded by the inquiring authority and that was reported to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority did not take any action on the letter of the inquiring authority, but subsequently by the order dated 21.12.2005 appointed Sri. G.R. Paul, IFS as the inquiring authority (Annexure-5 to the writ petition). A demand notice was issued by the petitioners (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) challenging the order dated 05.08.2003, passed by the disciplinary authority, changing the inquiring authority, but no action was taken by the disciplinary authority on that demand notice. G.R. Paul, IFS as the inquiring authority (Annexure-5 to the writ petition). A demand notice was issued by the petitioners (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) challenging the order dated 05.08.2003, passed by the disciplinary authority, changing the inquiring authority, but no action was taken by the disciplinary authority on that demand notice. A letter of no confidence (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) was also given by the petitioners against the newly appointed inquiring authority, but by Memorandum dated 26.07.2006 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) that no confidence was turned down by the disciplinary authority. 14. It is an admitted position that by filing W.P.(C) No. 316 of 2006 the delinquents challenged the order of the disciplinary authority dated 05.08.2003 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition), order dated 21.12.2005 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) as well as Memorandum dated 26.07.2006 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) and it is also an admitted position that the writ Court did not interfere with those orders/Memorandum issued by the disciplinary authority and disposed the writ petition with the following directions:- “The petitioners vide Annexure-10 letter dated 5.6.2006 expressed their no confidence on the new Enquiry Officer. However, admittedly no reason for such no confidence was assigned. According to the petitioners, since there was inference with the earlier enquiry proceeding conducted by Mr. Chakraborty by the respondent No. 3, and the respondent No. 4, the new Enquiry Officer belong to the same department and since both of them are the IFS officers, the petitioner will not get justice at the hands of the new Enquiry Officer. The Disciplinary authority by his impugned communication dated 26.7.2006 (Annexure-11) has rejected the prayer of the petitioners for changing the Enquiry Officer on the ground of non assignment of any reason. Since the matter pertains to disciplinary proceeding, it will be in the interest of all concerned that the same comes to an end at the earliest opportunity. I propose to dispose of the writ petition at the motion stage itself to which, learned counsel for the parties have also agreed. Considering the materials on record and the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, the following order is passed: (I) Before proceeding further with the enquiry proceeding against the petitioners, the disciplinary authority shall specify as to from which stage the new Enquiry Officer shall conduct the enquiry. Considering the materials on record and the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, the following order is passed: (I) Before proceeding further with the enquiry proceeding against the petitioners, the disciplinary authority shall specify as to from which stage the new Enquiry Officer shall conduct the enquiry. (II) The disciplinary authority shall bear in mind that till cancellation of the appointment of the earlier Enquiry Officer, the enquiry had proceeded by examining as may as 7 witnesses and that there is serious allegation of interference in the matter by the respondent No. 3 which is also reflected in the note furnished by the earlier Enquiry Officer. (III) The petitioners will be entitled to make appropriate application before the disciplinary authority assigning the detail reasons as to why they feel that there should be change of the Enquiry Officer. In the event of making any such application, the disciplinary authority shall dispose of the same in accordance with law. (IV) It is made clear that there should be no interference from any corner to the disciplinary proceeding and whosoever be the Enquiry Officer, he will proceed with the matter according to his wisdom and sound discretion unguided by any outside influence. The PCCF, Tripura shall now consider the matter taking into account all the facts and circumstances as reflected above. Entire exercise now required to be carried out by him consistently with the observation made above, shall be so carried out, within a period of one month from the date of furnishing a certified copy of this order along with a copy of the writ petition and its enclosures. Writ petition stands disposed of.” The above order passed by the writ Court makes it abundantly clear that the writ Court did not interfere in the order passed by the disciplinary authority cancelling the appointment of Sri. K. Chakraborty as the inquiry officer and also in the order appointing Sri. G.R. Paul as the subsequent inquiring authority. The writ Court also did not interfere in the order of the disciplinary authority dated 26.07.2006 by which the disciplinary authority turned down the no confidence raised against Sri. G.R. Paul. The directions given by the writ Court, as it appears, complied by the disciplinary authority. 15. Annexure-13 to the writ petition is the order issued by the disciplinary authority pursuant to the directions issued by the writ Court. G.R. Paul. The directions given by the writ Court, as it appears, complied by the disciplinary authority. 15. Annexure-13 to the writ petition is the order issued by the disciplinary authority pursuant to the directions issued by the writ Court. Annexure-13 reads as follows:- “Government of Tripura Office of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, Aranya Bhavan, Pt. Nehru Complex, Gurkhavasti, Agartala-6. Sub: Order of Hon’ble High Court dated 24.08.2006 in the W.P.(C) No. 316 of 2006 of Shri Dilip Kr. Datta & others V. State of Tripura & others. ORDER I have gone through the representation dated 05.09.2006 submitted by S/Shri Dilip Datta, Fr., Makhanlal Dey, FG and Amal Laskar, MCW and the judgment of Hon’ble High Court dated 24.08.2006 in connection with a common departmental proceedings against the petitioners. Pursuant to the direction issued by Hon’ble High Court and after careful consideration of all records relating to the disciplinary proceedings, I hereby order that the present Inquiring Authority Shri G.R. Paul, CF (WRT) shall proceed with the enquiry as per provision of Rule 14, Sub-Rule 22 of CCA(CCS) Rules, 1965. The Inquiring Authority in the instant proceedings shall bear in mind the directions issued by Hon’ble High Court especially with respect to the examination of witnesses by the earlier Inquiring Authority, in the interest of justice and fair play. (R.P. Tangwan) Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, Tripura.” It is, therefore, evident that the disciplinary authority complied the directions given by the writ Court and the argument that the disciplinary authority did not follow the directions given by the writ Court, in my opinion, has no leg to stand. 16. There is no legal embargo in changing the inquiring authority at any time during the process of inquiry. Obviously it should not be on any extraneous consideration. The inquiring authority, Sri. K. Chakraborty passed an order on 21.09.2005 reflecting that after the deposition of PW2, Sri. Sailendra Singh was recorded, while it was under correction, Sri. Singh tempered his statement recorded by the inquiring authority. The inquiring authority was supposed to record the statement of witnesses and made correction of the statement himself. The inquiring authority, Sri. K. Chakraborty passed an order on 21.09.2005 reflecting that after the deposition of PW2, Sri. Sailendra Singh was recorded, while it was under correction, Sri. Singh tempered his statement recorded by the inquiring authority. The inquiring authority was supposed to record the statement of witnesses and made correction of the statement himself. He was not supposed to give the statement to the witness concerned for making correction and if the inquiring authority left the statement to the witness for making correction and thereby he made some correction or changes, the witness cannot be blamed, rather the inquiring authority is supposed to be blamed since the inquiring authority has failed to discharge his duty according to law. Annexure-4 to the writ petition, i.e. order of Sri. K. Chakraborty, inquiring authority, dated 21.09.2005 with his letter to the disciplinary authority making allegation against Sri. Sailendra Singh rather goes against the inquiring authority, since the inquiring authority, Sri. K. Chakraborty, in my considered opinion, failed to discharge his responsibility according to law. Even if it is presumed that on this issue the inquiring authority was changed by the disciplinary authority, I find nothing to blame the disciplinary authority in the factual circumstances of the issue. 17. In the no confidence letter dated 05.06.2006 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) submitted by the delinquents to the inquiring authority, Sri. G.R. Paul, no particular allegation was made. It was simply stated that they raised no confidence against the inquiring authority. Such a vague no confidence was rightly rejected by the disciplinary authority by Memorandum dated 26.07.2006 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition). 18. Further, the delinquents by filing writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 316 of 2006 challenged those impugned Memorandum dated 05.08.2003 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition), order dated 21.12.2005 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) and order dated 26.07.2006 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition), but the writ Court did not interfere in those orders/Memorandums passed by the disciplinary authority and hence, the petitioners cannot question the validity of those orders/Memorandums issued by the disciplinary authority in the present writ petition. I find nothing to hold that the procedural fairness was violated or that injustice occasioned in any manner to the writ petitioners. 19. The next argument advanced by the learned counsel of the petitioners is that the second inquiring authority, Sri. I find nothing to hold that the procedural fairness was violated or that injustice occasioned in any manner to the writ petitioners. 19. The next argument advanced by the learned counsel of the petitioners is that the second inquiring authority, Sri. G.R. Paul, after usurping the charge of inquiring authority, issued notice to the petitioners on 10.04.2006 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition) to appear before him on 05.05.2006 for preliminary statement etc. and thereby proposed a de novo inquiry ignoring the inquiry already done by his previous inquiring authority. So, from the very inception the second inquiring authority proceeded wrongly and that has caused miscarriage of justice. 20. On the contrary, learned Government Advocate has submitted that it is a formal notice issued to the delinquents to appear before the inquiring authority on 05.05.2006 at 10-30 am and that does not mean that it was issued for a de novo inquiry. 21. On perusal of Annexure-8, i.e. notice dated 10.04.2006, I find nothing to arrive at a conclusion that it was issued only for preliminary statement and thereby to initiate a de novo inquiry ignoring the inquiry already done by previous inquiring authority. Practically the inquiry report itself makes it abundantly clear that the inquiring authority relied on the earlier inquiry done by previous inquiring authority and this argument is totally unfounded argument made on behalf of the petitioners. 22. The next argument advanced by the learned counsel of the petitioners is that the second inquiring authority reexamined PW2, the victim Sri. Sailendra Singh and thereby committed gross miscarriage of justice since he was not supposed to examine PW2 afresh in view of the directions issued by the writ Court in W.P.(C) No. 316 of 2006. Learned Government Advocate has submitted that the disciplinary authority passed an order dated 23.09.2006 (Annexure-13 to the writ petition) authorizing the inquiring authority to deal with the witnesses as per Rule 14(22) of the CCS(CCA) Rules and there was nothing wrong in reexamining the PW2 which has been elaborately stated by the inquiring authority in his order dated 10.10.2006 (Annexure-12 to the writ petition). 23. I have already reproduced hereinbefore the material part of the order passed by the writ Court. 23. I have already reproduced hereinbefore the material part of the order passed by the writ Court. Pursuant to the order passed by the writ Court the petitioners made representation and the disciplinary authority accordingly passed the order dated 23.09.2006 (Annexure-13 to the writ petition), which is also reproduced herein before. The order passed by the disciplinary authority clearly stipulates that the inquiring authority shall proceed with the inquiry as per the provisions of Rule 14(22) of the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965. Rule 14(22) of the CCS(CCA) Rules reads as follows: “(22) Whenever any Inquiring Authority, after having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in an inquiry ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein, and is succeeded by another Inquiring Authority which has, and which exercises, such jurisdiction, the Inquiring Authority so succeeding may act on the evidence so recorded by its predecessor, or partly recorded by its predecessor and partly recorded by itself: Provided that if the succeeding Inquiring Authority is of the opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses whose evidence has already been recorded is necessary in the interests of justice, it may recall, examine, cross-examine and re-examine any such witnesses as hereinbefore provided.” The above provision clearly stipulates that the succeeding inquiring authority may re-examine any witness already examined by the previous inquiring authority. PW2, the victim of the incident, is the star witness of the proceeding and regarding his statement recorded by the previous inquiring authority certain controversy was cropped up and, therefore, the subsequent inquiring authority passed the order dated 10.10.2006 (Annexure-12 to the writ petition) and arrived at a finding for re-examining Sri. Sailendra Singh (PW2) and accordingly, re-examined him. Order dated 10.10.2006, passed by the inquiring authority, has not been challenged otherwise. The petitioners had the scope to cross-examine him further, but they did not avail the scope. So, there is nothing wrong committed by the inquiring authority in re-examining PW2 since it is legally permissible. The inquiring authority in his report clearly held that PW2 previously and subsequently made similar statement having no ambiguity or controversy. I, therefore, find no merit in this argument also. 24. So, there is nothing wrong committed by the inquiring authority in re-examining PW2 since it is legally permissible. The inquiring authority in his report clearly held that PW2 previously and subsequently made similar statement having no ambiguity or controversy. I, therefore, find no merit in this argument also. 24. The next argument advanced by the learned counsel of the petitioners is that PW2, the victim of the alleged incident, lodged an FIR immediately after the alleged occurrence and the police case i.e. Dharmanagar P.S. Case No. 28/2003 under Section 353 read with Section 34 of the IPC was registered and after investigation the police filed charge sheet against the petitioners and in ultimate trial the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dharmanagar by judgment dated 15.03.2004 acquitted the petitioners from the charge of criminal offence arising out of same bundle of fact and same evidence and so, while a regular criminal Court on the same allegation recorded an order of acquittal, the disciplinary authority on the same charge wrongly punished the petitioners on the purported report of the inquiring authority. Learned counsel of the petitioners made a strenuous argument on this point and in support of his contention he relied on the following case laws: (1) G.M. Tank V. State of Gujarat & ors., reported in : (2006) 5 SCC 446 and (2) Shri Krishna Mohan Dutta V. The State of Tripura & ors. reported in (1988) 2 GLR 332. 25. Learned Government Advocate, on the contrary, has submitted that the criminal proceeding and disciplinary proceeding are independent in nature and in the criminal case the accused persons were acquitted on benefit of doubt considering the evidence on record and the delinquents since were not honourably acquitted cannot claim that the disciplinary proceeding cannot sustain against them. Acquittal of delinquent by a criminal Court cannot preclude an employer from taking action against the delinquent, if it is otherwise permissible. An acquittal in criminal case cannot ifso facto absolve the offence committed by an employee, which is punishable by the disciplinary authority. In support of his contention, learned Government Advocate relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Nag V. General Manager(PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia & ors., reported in: (2005) 7 SCC 764 . 26. A departmental proceeding and a criminal proceeding are entirely different in nature. In support of his contention, learned Government Advocate relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Nag V. General Manager(PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia & ors., reported in: (2005) 7 SCC 764 . 26. A departmental proceeding and a criminal proceeding are entirely different in nature. They operate in different field and they have different objective. The materials or the evidence in the two proceedings may or may not be the same and in some cases, at least, the materials or evidence which would be relevant or open for consideration in the departmental proceeding, may absolutely be tabooed in the criminal proceeding. The rules relating to appreciation of the evidence in the two inquiries also be different. The scope of an inquiry in a criminal trial is to determine whether an offence against the law of the land has taken place and if so, punish the person, who has been guilty of that offence. The scope of a departmental inquiry is to determine whether a public servant has committed a misconduct or delinquency and, even if the same constitutes, from one point of view, a crime, to consider the question whether the delinquent deserves to be retained in public service or to be reverted or to be reduced in rank or otherwise suitably dealt with for the delinquency concerned. In criminal trial, an incriminating statement made by an accused in certain circumstances or before certain individuals is totally inadmissible in evidence. In a departmental proceeding the inquiry officer is not bound by any such technical rule. The degree of proof which is necessary to record an order of conviction is different from the degree of proof which is necessary to record the commission of the delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not identical. In a criminal trial, the Court invariably proceeds on the presumption that accomplice evidence is suspected and shall not be acted upon without an independent corroboration in materials particulars. An inquiry officer is not bound by any such rule. Therefore, It cannot be said that holding of a departmental inquiry after an order of acquittal has been recorded by the criminal Court is not maintainable. An inquiry officer is not bound by any such rule. Therefore, It cannot be said that holding of a departmental inquiry after an order of acquittal has been recorded by the criminal Court is not maintainable. Normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges, it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor its discretion in any way fettered. Obviously no principles can be stated in any absolute or unqualified form, but a general proposition may be laid down as that where the acquittal is on technical ground or the facts are held established which would justify disciplinary action, but the criminal trial ends in an acquittal, because some necessary ingredient has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, there might, as well be a case for contending that the departmental authorities could nevertheless punish. 27. In the present case at hand, indisputably, immediately after the alleged occurrence PW2, the victim DFO, Sri. Sailendra Singh lodged an FIR before the O/C, Dharmanagar P.S. and the case was registered under Section 353 of IPC. In the trial, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class observed that the evidence on record was not sufficient to hold that the alleged informant, Sri. Sailendra Singh, was on official duty in the Range Office of the Forest Department at Dharmanagar and he also considered other pits and holes in the deposition of the witnesses and, therefore, arrived at a finding of acquittal on benefit of doubt. There is nothing in the judgment of the criminal Court that the delinquents were honourably acquitted and completely exonerated of the charges made against them. They were simply acquitted on benefit of doubt and, therefore, the disciplinary proceeding cannot be said to be out of jurisdiction. 28. In the case of G.M. Tank(supra) the appellant was charged for offence of acquisition of movable and immovable properties disproportionate to his known sources of income. After holding departmental enquiry, he was dismissed from service which was affirmed by the High Court both in the Single Bench and in the Letter Patent Appeal. 28. In the case of G.M. Tank(supra) the appellant was charged for offence of acquisition of movable and immovable properties disproportionate to his known sources of income. After holding departmental enquiry, he was dismissed from service which was affirmed by the High Court both in the Single Bench and in the Letter Patent Appeal. A criminal complaint was also filed against the appellant under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 based on same set of facts, charges, evidence and witnesses and the criminal Court honourably acquitted the appellant of the said offence by holding that the prosecution failed to prove the charges levelled against the appellant. Under that circumstances, the Apex Court has held that the punishment in the disciplinary proceeding in the circumstances of that case was erroneous and, therefore, interfered in the order of dismissal. The Court has observed that the punishment was based practically on no evidence and that there was no iota of evidence against the appellant to hold that the appellant was guilty of having illegally accumulated excess income by way of gratification. 29. The factual matrix of that reported case and the present case at hand are quite different and distinguishable. In the present case, the accused persons were acquitted on benefit of doubt and they were not completely exonerated from the charges, rather the fact that an incident occurred at Dharmanagar Forest Range Office/Forest Rest House has been well established, but the allegation that the informant, i.e. the victim, was deterred from discharging his official duties has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the acquittal was ordered in the criminal case, which cannot have any bearing in the disciplinary proceeding. The ratio of the case of G.M. Tank(Supra), therefore, cannot help the petitioners in the present case. 30. The next decision referred by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the case of Krishna Mohan Datta(supra) has no manner of application in the present case. I, therefore, find no reason to discuss the decision since the decision is completely on a different context. 31. In the case of Ajit Kumar Nag(supra), the Supreme Court has held that acquittal by a criminal Court cannot preclude the disciplinary authority from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. we may gainfully quote here para-11 of the judgment, which reads as follows: “11. 31. In the case of Ajit Kumar Nag(supra), the Supreme Court has held that acquittal by a criminal Court cannot preclude the disciplinary authority from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. we may gainfully quote here para-11 of the judgment, which reads as follows: “11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside.” 32. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside.” 32. In the case of K. Venkateshwarlu V. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in : (2012) 8 SCC 73 , the Apex Court has held that an acquittal in criminal case not on merit but on insufficiency of evidence, departmental proceeding, if pending against the appellant, the authority concerned may proceed with the same independently, uninfluenced by the judgment of the criminal Court, in accordance with law and arrive at an independent decision. The ratio of that case may be gainfully applied in the facts and circumstances of the present case since the disciplinary proceeding was pending when the criminal trial was taken up and the disciplinary proceeding ended in its logical conclusion uninfluenced by the judgment passed by the criminal Court. 33. In the case of Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial bank and others V. P.C. Kakkar, reported in : (2003) 4 SCC 364 , the Apex Court has held that the acquittal in the criminal case is not determinative of the commission of misconduct or otherwise and it is open to the authorities to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings, notwithstanding acquittal in the criminal case. It per se would not entitle the employee to claim immunity from the proceedings. At the most the factum of acquittal may be a circumstance to be considered while awarding punishment. It would depend upon the facts of each case and even that cannot have universal application. 34. In the present case, without making any comments on the findings of the criminal Court, I am constrained to observe that based on the evidence and materials collected during the disciplinary proceeding that the charges brought against the petitioners in the disciplinary proceeding were established irrespective of what is held by the criminal Court in the criminal trial. 34. In the present case, without making any comments on the findings of the criminal Court, I am constrained to observe that based on the evidence and materials collected during the disciplinary proceeding that the charges brought against the petitioners in the disciplinary proceeding were established irrespective of what is held by the criminal Court in the criminal trial. It is already observed that the criminal Court recorded an order of acquittal critically analysing the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and further arrived at a finding that the informant was on official duty or not since was doubtful, the order of acquittal was recorded and in the given facts and circumstances of this case, the order of acquittal cannot have any bearing on the disciplinary proceeding. The criminal case was based on the allegation that the informant, i.e. PW2, was on official duty and he was tortured by the delinquents from discharging his official duty, but the disciplinary proceeding has been initiated on the charges that the delinquents manhandled and physically assaulted a senior officer of the Forest Department irrespective of whether he was on official duty or not and at the time of doing so, the petitioner, Sri. Dilip datta, was intoxicated while he was on duty in office hours in the Range Office in the Forest Department at Dharmanagar. In view of the identical factual position and the evidence, I find nothing to accept the submission of the learned counsel of the petitioners and hence, I find no merit in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners. 35. The next argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners is that the disciplinary authority after receipt of the inquiry report issued a show cause notice to the petitioners proposing punishment and on receipt of that show cause notice the petitioners made an application (Annexure-16 to the writ petition) requesting the disciplinary authority to supply certain documents, but those were not supplied and hence, the petitioners have been prejudiced. On perusal of the Annexure-16, I find that by writing that letter the delinquents requested the disciplinary authority to furnish a copy of the inquiry report submitted by the former inquiry authority, Sri. K. Chakraborty. The record does not speak that Sri. On perusal of the Annexure-16, I find that by writing that letter the delinquents requested the disciplinary authority to furnish a copy of the inquiry report submitted by the former inquiry authority, Sri. K. Chakraborty. The record does not speak that Sri. K. Chakraborty submitted any inquiry report to the disciplinary authority, rather records shows that in the midst of inquiry while examination of the witnesses were going on appointment of Sri. Chakraborty as inquiry authority was cancelled and thereafter Sri. G.R. Paul was appointed as the inquiring authority and Sri. Paul after concluding the inquiry submitted the report. So, there was no question of furnishing a copy of the inquiry report submitted by Sri. K. Chakraborty. This argument is totally baseless and hence, rejected. 36. The next argument advanced by the learned counsel of the petitioners is that the preliminary inquiry report submitted by the Conservator of Forests was taken into consideration by the inquiring authority which has caused prejudice to the petitioners. This argument of the learned counsel of the petitioners also has no basis since the inquiry report makes it clear that the inquiring authority has taken into consideration Exbt.-7, a letter of the O/C, Dharmanagar P.S. addressed to the Conservator of Forests with a copy to the DFO, Kailashahar along with medical examination report of Sri. Dilip datta, Forester. Regarding the preliminary report, it is only the evidence of Sri. A.K. Roy, IFS, Conservator of Forests(PW9) was taken into consideration. That particular paragraph, for fair appreciation, is reproduced, which reads as follows: “From the statement of Sri. A.K. Roy, IFS, the then Conservator of Forests, Northern Circle, Kumarghat (PW9), it is revealed that on 3-3-03 while he was attending office he received a phone call from Shri S. Singh, IFS, DFO, Kanchanpur from Dharmanagar Range Office came to know that Sri. Singh was physically assaulted by the staff of Dharmanagar Range Office. He then informed the same to Sri. P. Bhattacharjee, DFO, Kailashahar (PW3) and then he went to Dharmanagar Range Office. On reaching Dharmanagar Range Office came to know that Sri. Singh, DFO has gone to Dharmanagar PS. He then along with Sri. Bhattacharjee, DFO, Kailashahar went to the PS, Dharmanagar. He came to know from the OC that Sri. Singh, IFS had lodged one FIR to the OC, Dharmanagar PS complaining physical assault on him by some staff of Dharmanagar Range Office. Singh, DFO has gone to Dharmanagar PS. He then along with Sri. Bhattacharjee, DFO, Kailashahar went to the PS, Dharmanagar. He came to know from the OC that Sri. Singh, IFS had lodged one FIR to the OC, Dharmanagar PS complaining physical assault on him by some staff of Dharmanagar Range Office. He also saw Sri. Dilip Dutta, Forester, Range Assistant, Dharmanagar Range at Dharmanagar Police Station under police custody in inebriated state. He also came to know from the OC, Dharmanagar PS that he had arranged medical examination of Sri. Dilip Dutta, Forester. He then submitted a preliminary report to the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, Tripura, Agartala enclosing report of OC, Dharmanagar PS, Medical examination report dated 3-3-03 of the Dharmanagar PHC. The statement of Sri. Roy IFS, CFNC further reveals that (1) “As per my preliminary inquiry supported by the medical examination report, Sri. Dilip Dutta, Forester took alcohol during office hours on 3-3-2003 while on duty and assaulted Sri. Sailendra Singh, DFO, kanchanpur with abusive language with filthy words”, (2) “Shri Makhan Lal Dey, FG and Sri. Amal Laskar, MCW both Dharmanagar Range Office staff attacked Sri. Sailendra Singh, DFO, kanchanpur on 3-3-2003.” I find nothing to arrive at a conclusion that any preliminary report was taken into consideration without making the documents as exhibits, rather I find that the inquiry authority meticulously examined the evidence of the disciplinary proceeding and arrived at a very cogent and reasonable finding holding that the charges proved against the delinquents. There is nothing to hold that anything beyond record was taken into consideration extraneously for arriving at a decision. 37. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & anr. V.G. Ganayutham, reported in : (1997) 7 SCC 463 has held - “To judge the validity of an administrative order or statutory discretion, normally the Wednesbury test is to be applied to find out if the decision was illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties or was one which no sensible decision-maker could, on the material before him and within the framework of the law, have arrived at. The Court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or whether the action was not bona fide. The Court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The Court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or whether the action was not bona fide. The Court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The Court would not however go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator amongst the various alternatives open to him. Nor could the Court substitute its decision to that of the administrator. This is the Wednesbury test.” 38. PW2, Sri. Sailendra Singh, is the victim of the alleged occurrence. At the relevant time he was working as the DFO of Kanchanpur Forest Division under the Government of Tripura. The petitioner, Sri. Dilip Datta, was working as a Forester in Dharmanagar Range Office and the petitioner, Sri. Makhan Lal Dey as a Forest Guard attached with the said Forest Office. It is an admitted position that on 03.03.2003 at about 01-30 pm Sri. Sailendra Singh with the staff of DFPP, Kanchanpur visited the Office and Rest House of Dharmanagar Forest range Office. It is also an admitted position that the delinquents were on duty in their office at Dharmanagar Forest Range Office. The allegation made by the victim, Sri. Sailendra Singh, DFO is that the delinquent, Sri. Dilip datta, was in an intoxicated condition and he severely manhandled Sri. Singh at first in the Rest House and the delinquent hurled abusive language, pulled Sri. Singh with his hand towards the room of the Rest House obviously with an ulterior motive and when Sri. Singh went to Range Office to make a phone call to the superior authority, the delinquent Sri. Datta again entered in the office room and snatched the Telephone away from the hand and threatened Sri. Singh and all the delinquents assaulted Sri. Singh in the Range Office. This allegation made by PW2 has not been shaken in any manner, rather the facts and circumstances proved the allegation with sufficient particulars. Other material witnesses supported the incident. The victim immediately went to the police station and lodged an FIR and the delinquents were arrested by the police. The DFO of Dharmanagar division and the Conservator of Forests, Northern Circle immediately enquired about the incident and they also deposed in the inquiry proceeding as PW3 and PW9. 39. Other material witnesses supported the incident. The victim immediately went to the police station and lodged an FIR and the delinquents were arrested by the police. The DFO of Dharmanagar division and the Conservator of Forests, Northern Circle immediately enquired about the incident and they also deposed in the inquiry proceeding as PW3 and PW9. 39. I have meticulously gone through the evidence and materials brought on record during inquiry and I find sufficient corroboration of the statement of PW2 about the misbehaviour and misconduct committed by the petitioners towards the superior officer of the department. The petitioner, Sri. Dilip Datta, in his defence stated that PW2, Sri. Sailendra Singh reaching the Rest House directed the delinquent Sri. Dilip datta to bring a bottle of whiskey and to make other arrangement for his entertainment at night and since the delinquent could not oblige, a false case was instituted. Other delinquent has taken the plea that they tried to resist Sri. Sailendra Singh from delting blows and, therefore, a false criminal case was instituted against them. This stand of the delinquent supports their presence in the scene of occurrence and while the evidence of PW2 is not discarded in any other manner, the inquiring authority rightly arrived at a finding that the petitioners were guilty of gross misconduct. 40. This Court is not required to sit as an appellate authority and to re-appreciate the evidence with meticulous scrutiny as is done in criminal cases. This Court is also not required to substitute its own view, over and above the views taken by the disciplinary authority unless it is found that the decision taken by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence or that the failure of justice has occasioned because of any other reason apparent on the face of the record. 41. The Supreme Court in case of State of Andhra Pradesh & ors. V.S. Sree Rama Rao, reported in : AIR 1963 SC 1723 has held that “where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 42. In the case of West Bokaro Colliery (TISCO LTD.) V. Ram Pravesh Singh, reported in : (2008) 3 SCC 729 , the Apex Court has held that standard of proof in domestic enquiry is preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. It was improper for the Tribunal to interfere with the findings of domestic enquiry on the ground that there was no independent evidence apart from Management witnesses. We may gainfully refer here para-17 of the judgment, which reads as follows:- “17. After going through the order of the Industrial Tribunal, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal has interfered with the findings recorded by the domestic tribunal as if it was the Appellate Tribunal. There was evidence present on record regarding indecent, riotous and disorderly behaviour of the respondent towards his superiors. The Management witnesses who were present at the scene of occurrence have unequivocally deposed about the misbehaviour of the respondent towards his superiors. Their evidence has been discarded by the Tribunal by observing that in the absence of independent evidence, the statements of the workmen who were present at the scene of occurrence could not be believed. The Industrial Tribunal fell in error in discarding the evidence produced by the Management only because the independent witnesses were not produced.” 43. Their evidence has been discarded by the Tribunal by observing that in the absence of independent evidence, the statements of the workmen who were present at the scene of occurrence could not be believed. The Industrial Tribunal fell in error in discarding the evidence produced by the Management only because the independent witnesses were not produced.” 43. Learned counsel of the petitioners has further submitted that punishment is excessive and harsh and so, this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction may interfere in the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority and affirmed by the appellate authority. 44. Learned Government Advocate has submitted that the punishment commensurate to the gravity of offence. It was proper for the disciplinary authority to dismiss the unruly delinquents, who assaulted and manhandled a very senior officer of the department without any rhyme and reason and the disciplinary authority rather had taken a lenient view and did not dismiss the petitioners from service. In the circumstances, no interference is called for in the punishment order of the disciplinary authority. 45. It is a settled proposition of law that the punishment must commensurate to the gravity of offence alleged to have been committed. It should not be shockingly disproportionate to the offence alleged. In the case at hand, the petitioners while were on duty in their office manhandled and assaulted a senior officer of the department without any provocation. The disciplinary authority taking into account the facts and circumstances and the evidence on record had taken a rational decision of reducing the petitioners to the lowest scale of pay and the punishment in the given facts and circumstances of the case cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate of the offence alleged and I, therefore, find no reason at all to direct the disciplinary authority to reconsider the punishment. The ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of G. Ganayutham(supra), as referred by the learned counsel of the petitioners, cannot be applied in the facts and circumstances of this case since the proportionality of the punishment cannot be questioned in the given facts of the case. 46. The power of judicial review of the decision of a domestic Tribunal is a very limited. 46. The power of judicial review of the decision of a domestic Tribunal is a very limited. Such judicial review is possible only when the principles of natural justice has been violated or the opportunities, which ought to have given to the delinquents as per rules, were not given or that the decision of the domestic Tribunal was passed on no evidence and that the punishment inflicted is shocking to the judicial conscience. If there is no glaring violation of the principles of natural justice and there is some evidence to support the decision taken by the disciplinary authority, the Court or Tribunal cannot sit as a matter of appeal to re-appreciate the evidence and to substitute the finding of the disciplinary authority with its own finding. The Supreme Court in the case of Nirmala J. Jhala V. State of Gujarat & anr., reported in : AIR 2013 SC 1513 has held that “Power of judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by re-appreciating the evidence as an Appellate Authority. An order can be set aside if it is based on extraneous grounds, or when there are no grounds at all for passing it or when the grounds are such that, no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion. The Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal but, it merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. The Court will not normally exercise its power of judicial review unless it is found that formation of belief by the statutory authority suffers from mala fides, dishonest/corrupt practice. In other words, the authority must act in good faith. Neither the question as to whether there was sufficient evidence before the authority can be raised/examined, nor the question of re-appreciating the evidence to examine the correctness of the order under challenge. If there are sufficient grounds for passing an order, then even if one of them is found to be correct, and on its basis the order impugned can be passed, there is no occasion for that Court to interfere. The Jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. The Jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. This apart, even when some defect is found in the decision making process, the Court must exercise its discretionary power with great caution keeping in mind the larger public interest and only when it comes to the conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the Court should intervene.” 47. The last argument advanced by the learned counsel of the petitioners is that the appellate authority passed a cryptic order in dismissing the appeal filed by the delinquents. The appellate authority did not follow the provisions prescribes in Rule 27 of the CCS(CCA) Rules and hence, the order of punishment cannot sustain and this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is empowered to set aside the order of punishment since no detailed order is passed by the appellate authority. In support of their contention, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Chander V. Union of India & ors., reported in : (1986) 3 SCC 103 . 48. Learned Government Advocate has submitted that the appellate authority considered the Memorandum of appeal and since there was no serious point raised in the Memo of appeal the appeal was dismissed observing that all the points raised in the Memo of appeal has been adequately dealt with by the department and, therefore, appeal has been dismissed. 49. On perusal of Annexure-20 to the writ petition, the order passed by the appellate authority, I find that it is an order passed in five paragraphs stating that the grounds taken in the Memo of appeal has been adequately dealt with by the department and so there is no merit in the appeal and hence, the order of punishment was upheld. 50. Rule 27(1)(2) of the CCS(CCA) Rules prescribe thus: “27. Consideration of appeal (1) In the case of an appeal against an order of suspension, the Appellate Authority shall consider whether in the light of the provisions of Rule 10 and having regard to the circumstances of the case, the order of suspension is justified or not and confirm or revoke the order accordingly. Consideration of appeal (1) In the case of an appeal against an order of suspension, the Appellate Authority shall consider whether in the light of the provisions of Rule 10 and having regard to the circumstances of the case, the order of suspension is justified or not and confirm or revoke the order accordingly. (2) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 11 or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said rules, the Appellate Authority shall consider - (a) whether the procedure laid down in these rules has been complied with and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice; (b) whether the findings of the Disciplinary Authority are warranted by the evidence on the record; and (c) whether the penalty or the enhanced penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe; and pass orders - (i) confirming, enhancing, reducing, or setting aside the penalty; or (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of these case.” 51. The Supreme Court in the case of Ramchander(supra) in a case of railway department has held that the appeal disposed of by the appellate authority without assigning any reason was not appreciable and hence, remanded the matter to the appellate authority for disposal of the appeal afresh. 52. In the present case, as already stated herein above, the appeal has been disposed of in five small paragraphs by the appellate authority. It is mentioned in the order that the appellate authority did not find any new facts or circumstances brought out by the appellant in his appeal and all the issues raised by him have been adequately dealt with by the department. The above observation of the appellate authority shows that the appellate authority applied its mind to the Memo of appeal and considered all the grounds taken in the Memo of appeal. There is nothing before us to show that the appellant sought a personal hearing before the appellate authority. A copy of the Memo of appeal has been annexed as Annexure-19 to the writ petition. There is nothing before us to show that the appellant sought a personal hearing before the appellate authority. A copy of the Memo of appeal has been annexed as Annexure-19 to the writ petition. On perusal of the grounds taken in the Memo of appeal, I am of the considered opinion that the appellate authority was justified in observing that all the issues raised in the Memo of appeal have been adequately dealt with by the department. It is already observed that the petitioners did not participate in the disciplinary proceeding while the second inquiring authority took up the inquiry. The Memo of appeal filed by the petitioners shows that the petitioners had taken some formal grounds against the inquiry report and the order passed by the disciplinary authority and hence, the appellate authority disposed of the appeal stating that he found no new fact or circumstance to consider the appeal. 53. The Supreme Court in the case of Ramchander(supra) has remanded the case to the appellate authority for reconsideration of the appeal. No doubt the provisions of Rule 22(2) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 and the provisions of Rule 27 of the CCS(CCA) Rules are almost pari materia. What was the order passed by the appellate authority in that reported case has not been reproduced. So, it is very difficult to ascertain as to what was the order passed by the appellate authority in that reported case to apply the ratio of that case in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the present case, the Memo of appeal was considered by the appellate authority and after considering all the grounds taken in the Memo of appeal, the appellate authority dismissed the appeal observing that the appeal merits no consideration. There is no detailed discussion point-wise which, in my considered opinion, is not required. 54. In the case of Tara Chand Khatri V. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & ors., reported in : (1977) 1 SCC 472 , a three Judges Bench of the Apex Court has observed that it cannot be said as a general rule that an order is a non-speaking order simply because it is brief and not elaborate. we may gainfully refer here para-20 of the judgment, which reads thus: “20. we may gainfully refer here para-20 of the judgment, which reads thus: “20. The second limb of the third contention raised on behalf of the appellant which also overlooks the decisions of the Constitution Bench of this Court does not commend itself to us. In this connection, we would like to make it clear that while it may be necessary for a disciplinary or administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions to state the reasons in support of its order if it differs from the conclusions arrived at and the recommendations made by the enquiring officer in view of the scheme of a particular enactment or the rules made thereunder, it would be laying down the proposition a little to broadly to say that even an order of concurrence must be supported by reasons. It cannot also, in our opinion, be laid down as a general rule that an order is a non-speaking order simply because it is brief and not elaborate. Every case, we think, has to be judged in the light of its own facts and circumstances. Reference in this connection may be made with advantage to a catena of decisions. In Bimal Kumar Pandit’s case it was categorically laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court that it was not a requirement of Article 311(2) that in every case, the punishing authority should in its order requiring the civil servant to show cause give not only the punishment proposed to be inflicted on him but also the reasons for coming to that conclusion. In that case, it was clarified that the view is not justified that the appropriate authority must state its own grounds or reasons for proposing to take any specific action against the delinquent government servant.” 55. In the case of Oriental Bank of Commerce & anr. V. R.K. Uppal, reported in : (2011) 8 SCC 695 , the Supreme Court considered a similar circumstance and held that it is not the requirement of law that an order of affirmance by the appellate authority must be elaborate and extensive. For reference, we may quote here para-27 of the judgment, which reads as follows:- “27. The High Court has faulted the order of the appellate authority also on the ground of it being a non-speaking order. Is it so? For reference, we may quote here para-27 of the judgment, which reads as follows:- “27. The High Court has faulted the order of the appellate authority also on the ground of it being a non-speaking order. Is it so? We have carefully perused the order of the appellate authority and we find that the order dated 4-6-2004 cannot be labelled as a non-speaking order. The order does not suffer from the vice of non-application of mind. The appellate authority has addressed the points raised in the appeal and critical to the decision, albeit briefly. It is true that the appellate authority must record reasons in support of its order to indicate that it has applied its mind to the grounds raised but it is not the requirement of law that an order of affirmance by the appellate authority must be elaborate and extensive. Brief reasons which indicate due application of mind in the decision making process may suffice.” 56. In the case at hand, taking into consideration of the facts and circumstances, I am of considered opinion that though the order of the appellate authority is not elaborate and extensive, but it has assigned brief reason for rejecting the appeal and I find nothing to remand the case for hearing the appeal afresh. 57. The writ petitions are found to be devoid of any merit and those are dismissed with cost.