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Uttarakhand High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 297 (UTT)

Pradeep Agarwal v. Rajeev Sharma

2014-08-07

U.C.DHYANI

body2014
Judgment : 1. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the victim alone can compound any offence alleged against the accused. It is not the prerogative of the accused to say that he is ready to compound the case against the complainant on his terms. This Court, therefore, is not in agreement with the submission of learned counsel for the accused that the complainant/victim has no role to play in compounding of an offence under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (herein after referred to as ‘the Act’). In other words, it cannot be said that the compounding under Section 147 of the Act is a matter between the accused and the Court, and the complainant has no role to play in it. 2. It will be apt to reproduce paras 81 and 82 of the Judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in JIK Industries Limited and others vs. Amarlal V. Jumani and another, (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 255 herein below: “81. In our country also when the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861 was enacted, it was silent about the compounding of offence. Subsequently, when the next Code of 1872 was introduced it mentioned about compounding in Section 188 by providing the mode of compounding. However, it did not contain any provision declaring what offences were compoundable. The decision as to what offences were compoundable was governed by reference to the exception to Section 214 of the Indian Penal Code. The subsequent Code of 1898 provided Section 345 indicating the offences which were compoundable but the said Section was only made applicable to compounding of offences defined and permissible under Indian Penal code. The present Code, which repealed the 1898 Code, contains Section 320 containing comprehensive provisions for compounding. 82. A perusal of Section 320 makes it clear that the provisions contained in Section 320 and the various sub-sections is a Code by itself relating to compounding of offence. It provides for the various parameters and procedures and guidelines in the matter of compounding. If this Court upholds the contention of the appellant that as a result of incorporation of Section 147 in the N.I. Act, the entire gamut of procedure of Section 320 of the Code are made inapplicable to compounding of an offence under the N.I. Act, in that case the compounding of offence under N.I. Act will be left totally unguided or uncontrolled. Such an interpretation apart from being an absurd or unreasonable one will also be contrary to the provisions of Section 4(2) of the Code, which has been discussed above. There is no other statutory procedure for compounding of offence under N.I. Act. Therefore, Section 147 of the N.I. Act must be reasonably construed to mean that as a result of the said Section the offences under N.I. Act are made compoundable, but the main principle of such compounding, namely, the consent of the person aggrieved or the person injured or the complainant cannot be wished away nor can the same be substituted by virtue of Section 147 of N.I. Act.” 3. Judgment of Damodar S. Prabhu vs. Sayed Babalal, reported in AIR 1010 SC 1907 was discussed and relied upon by the Hon’ble Apex Court while delivering the Judgment in JIK Industries Limited and others vs. Amarlal v. Jumani and another (supra) as follows: “58. Relying on the aforesaid non-obstante clause in Section 147 of the N.I. Act, learned counsel for the appellant argued that a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Damodar (supra), held that in view of non-obstante clause in Section 147 of N.I. Act, which is a special statute, the requirement of consent of the person compounding in Section 320 of the Code is not required in the case of compounding of an offence under N.I. Act. 59. This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid contention for various reasons which are discussed below.” 4. It is the categorical statement of learned counsel for the applicant that the applicant is not ready to compound the offence allegedly committed by the accused-respondent. 5. Since the complainant (applicant herein) is not ready to compound the offence under Section 147 of the Act, therefore it is provided that the cheque of Rs. 60500/-, which was deposited by the accused (respondent herein) before the Trial Court, be returned to him. A sum of Rs. 6050/-, which was deposited by the accused-respondent before the District Legal Services Authority, Dehradun, be also returned to him (accused-respondent). 6. Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is disposed of with the aforesaid directions. 7. Non-bailable warrant, as also the recovery certificate, issued against the accused-respondent shall remain in abeyance till the next date fixed before the Trial Court. 8. 6050/-, which was deposited by the accused-respondent before the District Legal Services Authority, Dehradun, be also returned to him (accused-respondent). 6. Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is disposed of with the aforesaid directions. 7. Non-bailable warrant, as also the recovery certificate, issued against the accused-respondent shall remain in abeyance till the next date fixed before the Trial Court. 8. Reminding learned Trial Court of the intention of the legislature while enacting the Act {Sub-Section (3) of Section 143}, it is provided that the learned Magistrate shall make an endeavour to complete the trial at an early date.