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2014 DIGILAW 298 (JHR)

Misrilall Jain & Sons v. Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Mines and Geology, Govt. of India, New Delhi

2014-02-25

R.BANUMATHI, SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR

body2014
JUDGMENT R. Banumathi, C.J. and Shree Chandrashekhar, J. - In the writ petitions, the petitioner seeks for quashing the demand notices issued by the Commercial Taxes Department in respect of recovery of Value Added Tax for the assessment year 2010-11 and 2011-12 and also to quash the order/demand dated 21.02.2013 whereby the petitioner/assessee was directed to pay the tax amount of Rs.91,59,118.94 and interest of Rs.1,05,55,540.28, totalling Rs.1,97,14,659.22 for the assessment year 201011 and for the assessment year 201112, the assessee was directed to pay tax amount of Rs.1,56,70,579.04 and the interest of Rs.7,41,909.88 totalling to Rs. 1,64,12,488.92 on difference of sale prices which has been demanded from the petitioner. 2. The petitioner is a Mines owner and is engaged in sale of the Iron Ore. The petitioner is registered under the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005 having the TIN No. 20211200323 for sale of the raw Iron Ore Lumps. It is stated that Schedule-II of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 provides the rate of royalty in respect of minerals and in terms of Section 9 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, a mining lessee has to pay royalty on consumption/removal of minerals at the rate prescribed in Schedule-II of the said Act. Entry22 of Schedule-II provides that the royalty for Iron Ore Lumps and Fines would be the sale price at ad valorem basis. The petitioner was paying royalty at the rate of 10% of the sale price. Prior to the said Notification there was fixed royalty for different quality (iron content) of Iron Ore on tonnage basis. However, basis was changed to ad valorem by the subsequent Notification. The Central Government in exercise of powers conferred by Section 13 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 amended the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 and substituted Rule 64D in the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. Rule 64D provides that the royalty shall be computed on minerals on ad valorem basis according to the formula mentioned therein. The amendment provided that the statewise sale price for different minerals as published by Indian Bureau of Mines shall be the sale price for computation of royalty in respect of any mineral produced. 3. Rule 64D provides that the royalty shall be computed on minerals on ad valorem basis according to the formula mentioned therein. The amendment provided that the statewise sale price for different minerals as published by Indian Bureau of Mines shall be the sale price for computation of royalty in respect of any mineral produced. 3. It is further stated that the Iron Ore is a decontrolled commodity and there is no law restricting or fixing the price of Iron Ore Lumps or any other form of the Iron Ore and therefore, fixing of sale price of Indian Bureau of Mines by virtue of Rule 64D is bad, arbitrary, misconceived, miscalculated and against the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and the Constitution of India. The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 does not give power to make Rule nor it gives power to any authority to fix sale price of minerals. The sale price may depend upon the quantity of the Mineral Ore and thus, a lesser quantity may fetch higher price whereas, in bulk sale the price may come down and thus, there cannot be fixed sale price in respect of decontrolled item. At no point in time either the Assessing Authority or Indian Bureau of Mines took any data from the petitioner-company to ascertain what is the sale price of the Iron Ore sold by the petitioner-company and therefore, the Indian Bureau of Mines or any authority cannot assume a sale price for the petitioner-company. Case pleaded by the Respondents 4. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of Respondent nos.3 and 4 stating thus; “At the very outset, it is submitted that the petitioner has moved this Hon'ble Court without availing the alternative remedy of Appeal available to him under the Act. On this ground alone, this writ is liable to be dismissed. Even on other grounds the writ is devoid of merit.” It is stated that the petitioner has not moved the Court with clean hands and it has indulged in tax evasion by deliberately undervaluing its products in the invoices raised by it. Section 35(7) of the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005 was introduced to curb tax evasion which the dealers were adopting by way of undervaluation or under-pricing in the sale invoices than the actual price. Section 35(7) of the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005 was introduced to curb tax evasion which the dealers were adopting by way of undervaluation or under-pricing in the sale invoices than the actual price. Section 35(7) of the Act has become an effective tool for checking tax evasion and this is in the interest of public revenue. 5. It is further stated that the Indian Bureau of Mines is a Government of India agency which determines and publishes the average sale price of minerals for each month are a wise and grade wise after taking into account the average sale price of ten big dealers of the products in that particular area and thus, the average sale value published by Indian Bureau of Mines is the most authentic and reliable and cannot be disputed. The respondents collected the figure of raising and dispatches from the Mining Office, Chaibasa which included data of dispatches per month. On perusal of data received from the Mining Office and sale details furnished in returns, it was noticed that, in comparison to prevalent market price as shown in the sale invoices by the assessee and average sale price as determined by Indian Bureau of Mines, the Iron Ores have been shown to have been sold at a much lower selling price. The matter thus, became concealment of actual sale price by under-pricing and therefore, the Respondent-Authority issued notices which were duly served upon the petitioner-company however, the petitioner did not produce books of account for verification and therefore, the answering respondent passed order on 21.02.2013, after providing sufficient opportunity to the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the petitioner neither filed any explanation nor produced any evidence which shows the malafide intention of the petitioner to evade tax by way of showing lesser sale price than the actual market price as well as the price fixed by Indian Bureau of Mines. The respondent-authority passed order on the basis of available documents and evidences on record under Section 35 and 40(2) of JVAT Act, 2005 in the interest of revenue. 6. The respondent-authority passed order on the basis of available documents and evidences on record under Section 35 and 40(2) of JVAT Act, 2005 in the interest of revenue. 6. It is also stated that in course of the proceeding, the Assessing Officer collected figures from big mines owners namely, M/s. Orissa Manganese and Mines (P) Limited and M/s. Rungta Mines Limited, Chaibasa for the different periods and different 'Fe grades' to determine the average sale price on the basis of 'Fe grades' contents in the mines which is authentic and reasonable and published in the Gazette of Government of India. Thereafter, month-wise and period-wise and average sale price-wise comparative chart was prepared. For the relevant period, the concealed sale was determined to the tune of Rs.32,63,25,891.30. 7. In para 13 of the counter-affidavit, the respondents have stated as under:- 13. “That it is humbly submitted that in this particular case, the dealer intentionally and deliberately has shown lesser sale price for the period in question that the sale price of the IBM and the other big dealers of the same territory for the same period and of the same grade of iron ore meaning thereby the petitioner (dealer) with the intention of evasion of tax has shown lesser sale price and concealed the particulars and this information was collected by the Respondents from the Mining Department as well as the other dealers and rightly exercised the power provided under the act and imposed tax and interest under the provisions of Section 40(2) of the JVAT Act, 2005.” Arguments 8. Though, in the writ petition, vires of notification dated 10.12.2009 has been challenged and a declaration has been sought that the Central Government by virtue of substitution of Rules 64-D of the Mineral Concessions Rules 1960 has got no authority to fix sale price of iron ore which is a decontrolled item, the learned counsel for the petitioner during the course of arguments submitted that the petitioner is not pressing those prayers at this stage and confined his argument only to the question of violation of principles of natural justice and prayed for remand of the matter to the Assessing Authority for a fresh decision in the matter. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ananda Sen submitted that the impugned order is vitiated on account of gross violation of principles of natural justice. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ananda Sen submitted that the impugned order is vitiated on account of gross violation of principles of natural justice. The learned counsel referred to Section 35 of the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005 which deals with ‘assessment and self assessment’ and submitted that subsection (5) of Section 35 and subsection (7) of Section 35 are two different provisions for two different purposes. It was submitted that as per Section 35(7) of the Act, the authority has to record reasons and no order shall be passed without giving proper opportunity of being heard to the assessee. It was submitted that before passing order under subsection (7) of Section 35, the Assessing Officer has to give notice under Section 35(7) as well as adequate opportunity of being heard. The learned counsel further submitted that Section 40(1) deals with turnover escaping assessment and Section 40(2) of the Act deals with payment of interest and before ordering for payment of interest, the prescribed authority has to afford an opportunity of hearing to the assessee and by an order in writing direct that the assessee shall, in addition to any tax payable which is or may be assessed under Section 35 or 36 or 38, pay by way of interest at the rate stipulated thereon. It is submitted that the proviso to Section 35(7) and Section 40(2) and the scheme of the Act do stipulate that at each and every stage there is a requirement of issuing notice and opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order. 10. It was submitted that without giving an opportunity of hearing and without issuing notice as contemplated under the proviso to Section 35(7), the Assessing Officer unilaterally passed the order under Section 35(7) and thereafter, passed an order under Section 40(2) of the Act. It was further submitted that the notice dated 14.02.2013 was issued fixing the date of hearing on 20.02.2013 and on 20.02.2013, the petitioner appeared and filed a time petition but the Assessing Authority ignored the same and passed the impugned order without giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing and therefore, there is gross violation of principles of natural justice. It was further submitted that the notice dated 14.02.2013 was issued fixing the date of hearing on 20.02.2013 and on 20.02.2013, the petitioner appeared and filed a time petition but the Assessing Authority ignored the same and passed the impugned order without giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing and therefore, there is gross violation of principles of natural justice. The learned counsel further submitted that even though Section 79 provides a provision for appeal to Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, in view of violation of principles of natural justice and since the impugned order is without jurisdiction, the same is liable to be quashed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India 11. Mr. Ajit Kumar, the learned Additional Advocate General submitted that in a pending proceeding when the Assessing Officer noticed that the value of goods has not been properly declared by the assessee, he took recourse of subSection 7 of Section 35 of the Act. The proceeding before the Assessing Officer would disclose that the Assessing Officer is entitled to call for the materials/documents to ascertain whether the assessee has disclosed the true particulars of goods in the return or not and that is what vide orders dated 05.06.2012 and 03.10.2012, the Assessing Officer has done by calling for details from the Department of Mines. 12. It is further submitted that there is no requirement for issuing a fresh notice for proceeding under Section 35(7) of the Act as it is in continuation of pending proceeding under Section 35 of the Act. The provision under Section 35(7) does not provide issuance of a fresh notice and it only uses the expression, “reasonable opportunity of being heard.” 13. Drawing out attention to the order-sheet, the learned A.A.G. submitted that it is a matter of record that sufficient opportunities were given to the petitioner and several dates were fixed and notices were duly served upon the petitioner however, the petitioner did not take steps by filing the explanation and the evidences thereof and therefore, on the basis of available documents and evidences on record, the respondent passed order under Section 35 and 40(2). The petitioner having not taken steps before the Assessing Officer and did not file the documents, cannot complain of violation of principles of natural justice. The petitioner having not taken steps before the Assessing Officer and did not file the documents, cannot complain of violation of principles of natural justice. The learned A.A.G. submitted that in view of the statutory remedy of appeal available under Section 79 of the JVAT Act, 2005, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Provisions under Sections 35 and 40 of the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005 14. With respect to applicability of the provisions under subsection (1) to (5) of Section 35 of the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005, no dispute has been raised by the counsel for both the parties and it is accepted that if the prescribed authority is satisfied that the returns or revised returns as the case may be, and self-assessment claim are prima facie correct, consistent and complete the prescribed authority accepts self-assessment as filed by the dealer and proceeds to assess the amount of tax and interest due from the dealer on the basis of such returns, after making prima facie adjustment in the nature of arithmetical error, if any, in the return and the self-assessment. 15. The relevant provisions of Sections 35 and 40 of the Jharkhand Value Added Tax, 2005 are extracted below:- Section 35. [Assessment and Self Assessment]-(1) Subject to provisions of sub-Section(2), the amount of tax due from a registered dealer or a dealer liable to be registered under this Act shall be assessed in the manner hereinafter provided, for the Tax Period during which the dealer is do liable as prescribed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Section, if a registered dealer has failed to furnish return or returns under sub-Section (1) of Section 29 in respect of any tax period or periods, the prescribed authority shall proceed to make provisional assessment under Section 36. (3) Subject to Subsection 5 of this Section if a registered dealer has filed all the returns and the annual return in respect of any tax period within the prescribed time and the return so filed are found to be in order, it shall be accepted as self-assessment in the prescribed manner, subject to adjustment of any arithmetical error; apparent on the fact of the said return(s). (4) The amount of input tax credit, exemptions and other credits or concessions claimed by the dealer in the return(s) for which no supporting declarations, certificates or evidence required under this Act or Central Sales Tax Act is furnished, self assessment shall be made accordingly without such input tax credit, exemption and other claims, treating such sales as taxable by levying appropriate rate of tax, notwithstanding the fact that the dealer may have been prevented by sufficient cause to produce such declarations, certificates or evidence in support of his claim. (5) If a dealer has furnished all the returns and the revised returns, if any, within the prescribed period and in the prescribed manner or within next fifteen days thereafter and- The prescribed authority is satisfied that the returns or the revised returns as the case may be, and self assessment claim are prima-facie correct, consistent and complete, he shall accept the self assessment as filed by the dealer and shall assess the amount of tax and interest due from the dealer on the basis of such returns, after making prima-facie adjustment in the nature of arithmetical errors, if any, in the returns and the self assessment; (7) If the prescribed authority is satisfied that goods have been sold a price higher than that shown by the dealer, he may determine value of goods at the time of the sale and proceed to assess the tax on such price. Provided before initiating such proceedings, the prescribed authority shall record his reasons for doing so and no orders shall be passed under this subsection without giving the dealer an opportunity of being heard. (8) No assessment under subsection (6) shall be made after the expiry of three years, from the end of the tax period, in respect of which or part of which the tax is assessable.” Section 40. (8) No assessment under subsection (6) shall be made after the expiry of three years, from the end of the tax period, in respect of which or part of which the tax is assessable.” Section 40. Turnover escaping Assessment.(1) where after a dealer is assessed under Section 35 or Section 36 for any year or part thereof, and the prescribed authority, upon information or otherwise has reason to believe that the whole or any part of the turnover of the dealer in respect of any period has (a) escaped assessment; or (b) been under assessed; or (c) been assessed at a rate lower than the rate on which it is assessable; or (d)been wrongly allowed any deduction therefrom; or (e) been wrongly allowed any credit therein; the prescribed authority may, serve or cause to serve a notice on the dealer and after giving the dealer reasonable opportunity of being heard and making such inquiries as he considers necessary, proceed to assess to the best of his judgment, the amount of tax due from the dealer in respect of such turnover, and the provisions of this Act shall so far as may be, apply accordingly. Provided, for clause (a), where the prescribed authority has reasons to believe that the dealer has concealed, omitted or failed to disclose willfully, the particulars of such turnover or has furnished incorrect particulars of his such turnover and thereby return figures are below the real amount, the prescribed authority shall proceed to assess or reassess the amount of tax due from the dealer in respect of such turnover and the provisions of this Act, shall so far as may apply accordingly and for this purpose, the provisions of subsection (6) of Section 37 shall apply accordingly.” “(2) If the prescribed authority in the course of any proceeding or upon any information, which has come into his possession before assessment or otherwise, under this Act, and is satisfied that any registered dealer or a dealer to whom the registration certificate has been suspended under subsection (7) of Section 25 – (a) has concealed any sales or purchases or any particulars thereof, with a view to reduce the amount tax payable by him under this Act, or (b) has furnished incorrect statement of his turnover or incorrect particulars of his sales or purchases in the return furnished under subsection (1) of Section 29; or otherwise, the prescribed authority shall, after giving such a dealer an opportunity of being heard, by an order in writing direct that he shall, in addition to any tax payable which is or may be assessed under Section 35 or 36 of 38, pay by way of interest, a sum at the rate of [five] per-centum for each month of such suppression or concealment or for furnishing incorrect particulars; on the amount of tax payable under the Act or on the suppressed turnover or on concealed turnover for furnishing incorrect particulars. The interest shall be payable before the completion of the assessment and for determining the amount of interest payable, the prescribed authority shall quantify the amount of tax payable provisionally under this Act,” “(3) Any penalty imposed or interest levied under this section shall be without prejudice to any action which is or may be taken under section 84 of this Act.] (4) No order of assessment and reassessment shall be made under sub-Section (1) after the expiry of five years from the end of the year in respect of which or part of which the tax is assessable.” 16. With respect to scope and mandate of sub-Section 7 of Section 35, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the words “before initiating such proceeding” would indicate that the proceeding under Section 35(7) of the Act is an independent proceeding and before resorting to Section 35(7) of the Act, the Assessing Officer is required to give reasons and record his satisfaction and no order under Section 35(7) can be passed without affording an opportunity of being heard to the assessee. Per contra, Mr. Ajit Kumar, the learned AAG appearing for the respondents has contended that since in a pending proceeding, the Assessing Officer has proceeded to determine the value of goods under 35(7) of the Act, there was no requirement for issuing a fresh notice to the assessee. W.P.(T) No. 2372 of 2013 17. To verify the correctness of the figures, the respondents issued notice vide notice No. 2172 dated 03.10.2012 calling upon the petitioner to appear for hearing on 17.10.2012. On 15.10.2012, a time-petition was filed seeking further time by the petitioner. Thereafter, on 10.12.2012, no action was taken by the petitioner. Then on 01.02.2013, the petitioner filed statement which reflected discrepancies in the figures and therefore, again a notice was ordered to be issued. On 12.02.2013, the notice returned un-served upon by the petitioner. On 20.02.2013, the petitioner again filed a time-petition which was rejected by the Authority. According to respondents, the 4th respondent issued notice under Section 35(7) and 40(2) of the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005 for the period 201112. After affording sufficient opportunity, the respondent passed an order on the basis of available documents and evidences on record under Section 35(7) and 40(2) of the JVAT Act, 2005 for the assessment year 201112. The Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, passed the order on 21.02.2013 levying tax amount of Rs. 1,56,70,579.04 and interest of Rs. 741909.88, totalling Rs. 1,64,12,488.92 for the assessment year 201112. W.P.(T) No. 2364 of 2013 18. The respondent-authority, issued notice on 05.06.2012 to the assessee for verification of the records and fixed the date of hearing on 27.06.2012. The petitioner sought time on 27.06.2012 and thereafter, the matter was taken up on 09.07.2012, 03.10.2012, 15.10.2012 and 10.12.2012. 741909.88, totalling Rs. 1,64,12,488.92 for the assessment year 201112. W.P.(T) No. 2364 of 2013 18. The respondent-authority, issued notice on 05.06.2012 to the assessee for verification of the records and fixed the date of hearing on 27.06.2012. The petitioner sought time on 27.06.2012 and thereafter, the matter was taken up on 09.07.2012, 03.10.2012, 15.10.2012 and 10.12.2012. Since there was variation in the statement produced by the assessee for the assessment year 20102011 and the record supplied by the Department of Mines, a notice under Section 40(2) of the Act was directed to be issued to the assessee by order dated 01.02.2013. As the notice was returned unserved, by order dated 12.02.2013, next date for hearing was fixed on 20.02.2013. Though, a time petition was filed on behalf of the assessee, the assessee was not represented at the time of the hearing. The application seeking adjournment was rejected and since no one on behalf of the assessee was present, the order dated 20.02.2013 was directed to be served upon the assessee which was duly served upon the assessee on 20.02.2013 itself. On 21.12.2013, the assessee appeared however, no evidence was produced by the assessee and therefore, Assessing Authority decided to pass order under Section 35(7) and 40(2) of the Act. The total concealed amount was assessed at Rs. 22,89,77, 973.51/and accordingly, the tax on the same was assessed at Rs. 91,59,118.94/and interest of Rs. 1,05,55,540.28/was calculated thereon. Consequently, a demand of Rs. 1,97,14,659.22/was ordered to be issued, fixing 28.02.2013, the date for payment. 19. It is not disputed by the parties that the impugned order has been passed when the regular assessment under Section 35 of the Act was in progress. On 05.0.6.2012 the Assessing Officer issued notice to the assessee for verification of the Data received from the Department of Mines for the assessment-year 201011. A similar notice was issued on 03.10.2012 for the assessment-year 201112. From the proceeding before the Assessing Officer, it appears that the Assessing Officer did not accept the self-assessment as filed by the assessee under Section 35(5) of the Act and therefore, the Assessing Officer proceeded to assess the value of goods under Section 35(7) of the Act. Proviso to Section 35(7) provides that prescribed authority is required to record reasons and afford opportunity of being heard to the dealer. Proviso to Section 35(7) provides that prescribed authority is required to record reasons and afford opportunity of being heard to the dealer. In the present case, the proceeding before the Assessing Officer discloses that when it was found that the sale price as disclosed by the assessee and the return filed with Department of Mines, Chaibasa were not in conformity and the assessee had intentionally paid less VAT by showing lesser sale price the Assessing Officer proceeded to assess the value of goods and consequently tax and penalty under Section 35(7) and 40(2) of the Act respectively. It further discloses that sufficient opportunity was afforded to the assessee; however, on several dates the assessee either did not appear or took time. We are of the view that a separate notice under sub-Section (7) of Section 35 of the Act was not required to be issued as it was in continuation to the proceeding under the regular assessment proceeding under Section 35 (5) of the Act. The proceeding before the Assessing Officer clearly demonstrates that the Assessing Officer has recorded reason and thereafter, proceeded in the matter. 20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that a requirement of issuing a fresh notice under Section 35 (7) and under Section 40(2) of the Act cannot be read into the provisions under Section 35(7) or under Section 40(2) of the Act as it mandates a requirement of affording an opportunity of hearing only. It is also well-settled that even if source of power is not referred to or a wrong provision of law has been referred while exercising power, that by itself would not vitiate the order. 21. In “J.K. Steel Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors.”, reported in AIR 1970 SC 1173 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, if the exercise of power can be traced to a legitimate source, the fact that the same was purported to have been exercised under a different power would not vitiate the exercise of the power in question. 22. In “N. Mani Vs. Sangeetha Theatre”, reported in (2004) 12 SCC 278 , a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court succinctly observed as follows:- 9. 22. In “N. Mani Vs. Sangeetha Theatre”, reported in (2004) 12 SCC 278 , a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court succinctly observed as follows:- 9. “It is well settled that if an authority has a power under the law merely because while exercising that power the source of power is not specifically referred to or a reference is made to a wrong provision of law, that by itself does not vitiate the exercise of power so long as the power does exist and can be traced to a source available in law.” 23. In “Mohd. Shahabuddin Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.”, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 653 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when an Authority passes an order which is within its competence, it cannot fail merely because it purports to be made under a wrong provision. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: 208. “........In such cases, this Court will always rely upon Section 114 illustration (e) of the Evidence Act to draw a statutory presumption that the official acts are regularly performed and if satisfied that the action in question is traceable to a statutory power, the courts will uphold such State action.” 24. In the present case, a common Form is prescribed for issuing notice. The incorrect mentioning of the provision of law or even if it is not indicated in the notice issued to the assessee that the Assessing Officer has proceeded under Section 35(7), it would not prejudice the assessee as from the materials on record it is evident that the Assessing officer has recorded reasons for proceeding against the assessee and thus, the assessee knew as to the nature of the proceeding and the demand raised by the Assessing Officer. Violation of the principles of natural justice 25. Coming to the contention of violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as, the assessee was not afforded reasonable opportunity of hearing and no proper notice was given to the assessee before the impugned order dated 21.02.2013 was passed, we find that the record produced in the present proceeding discloses that when the data with respect to raising and dispatch of the goods from the assessee company was received from Mines office, Chaibasa a notice was ordered to be issued to the assessee for producing evidence for verification of the data. 26. 26. Taking us through the orders passed by the Assessing Officer/Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, the learned Additional Advocate General, Mr. Ajit Kumar submitted that the data supplied by the District Mining Officer, Chaibasa, and the statement of the petitioner-company were verified and on such verification, difference was found and notice was issued to the petitioner on 05.06.2012 for the assessment year 201011 and on 03.10.2012 for the assessment year 201112. It is submitted that the order-sheet regarding the assessment of the petitioner for the assessment years 201011 and 201112 clearly shows that notices were issued to the petitioner informing him about the ongoing proceeding. The learned A.A.G. submitted that inspite of several opportunities the petitioner did not appear and on 12.02.2013 notice was again ordered fixing the date for hearing on 20.02.2013. The learned A.A.G. submitted that on 20.02.2013, on behalf of the dealer time-petition was filed and since the dealer was delaying the proceeding, the petition was rejected and the authorized person of the dealer was directed to be informed about rejection as, he did not appear and left without knowing the order on the time-petition. The learned A.A.G. submitted that the rejection of the time petition was communicated to the dealer on 20.02.2013 and he appeared on 21.02.2013 but did not file any document or explanation and hence the order was passed on 21.02.2013, imposing tax amount of Rs.91,59,118.94 and interest of Rs. 1,05,55,540.28/totalling Rs.1,97,14,659.22 for the assessment year 201011 and for the assessment year 201112, imposing tax amount and interest totaling Rs.1,64,12,488.92. 27. In paragraph 15 & 33 of the counter-affidavit, the respondents have stated as under: 15. “.........As far as, the opportunity of hearing is concerned, it is submitted that several opportunities have been provided to the petitioner for filing explanation and evidences but the petitioner failed to comply with the same. 33. “…........It is submitted that several opportunities were given and the several dates were fixed and notices were duly served upon the petitioner but the petitioner had taken no steps for filing the explanation and the evidences thereof in the original jurisdiction and taking shelter of writ jurisdiction is not permissible under the law. Since the several opportunities were provided to the petitioner before passing order, therefore, question of violation of the principle of natural justice does not arise.” 28. We are of the view that sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner. Since the several opportunities were provided to the petitioner before passing order, therefore, question of violation of the principle of natural justice does not arise.” 28. We are of the view that sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner. The petitioner was heard by the Assessing Officer. There is no requirement in law for issuing fresh notices under Section 35(7) and under Section 40(2) of the Act to the assessee and therefore, we are of the view that the impugned order dated 21.02.2013 has not been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Maintainability of the Writ Petition 29. In so far as, the objection taken by the respondents for maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of availability of statutory remedy of appeal, review and revision is concerned, we find that there is a complete mechanism provided under the Jharkhand Value Added Tax, Act, 2005. 30. The Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005 provides forums for appeal, review and revision of the orders passed under the said Act. Section 79 provides that against the order of assessment or penalty or both passed by the prescribed authority appeal lies to the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner especially authorised in this behalf. Sub-Section 5 of Section 79 provides that the Appellate Authority may confirm, annul, reduce, enhance or otherwise the order passed by the prescribed authority or setaside the order directing the Assessing Authority to make fresh order. Thus, there cannot be any doubt that Appellate Authority has vast powers under Section 79 of the Act. Similarly, Section 80 makes a provision for revision to the Tribunal against an order passed in the Appeal. Section 81 provides that against the order passed by the Tribunal under Section 80 of the Act, review would lie to the State Government. In the present writ petition, the petitioner has not disclosed any reason for not approaching the statutory Authority under the Act. 31. In “Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. Vs. Governor General in Council”, reported in AIR 1947 PC 78, Lord Uthwatt, J. observed that in the provenance of tax where the Act provided for a complete machinery which enable assessee to effectively raise in the Courts the question of validity of an assessment, an alternative jurisdiction to the High Court to interfere is not available. In “Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. and another, Vs. In “Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. and another, Vs. State of Orissa & Ors.”, reported in AIR 1983 SC 603 , the assessee aggrieved by the order of assessment made by the Sales Tax Officer approached the High Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that since the Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, the impugned order of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under : 11. “Under the scheme of the Act, there is a hierarchy of authorities before which the petitioners can get adequate redress against the wrongful acts complained of. The petitioners have the right to prefer an appeal before the prescribed authority under subs. (1) of S. 23 of the Act. If the petitioners are dissatisfied with the decision in the appeal, they can prefer a further appeal to the Tribunal under subs. (3) of S. 23 of the Act, and then ask for a case to be stated upon a question of law for the opinion of the High Court under S. 24 of the Act. The Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of............” 12. “Furthermore, the Act provides for an adequate safeguard against an arbitrary or unjust assessment. The petitioners have a right to prefer an appeal under subs. (1) of S. 23 of the Act subject to their payment of the admitted amount of tax as enjoined by the proviso thereto. As regards the disputed amount of tax, the petitioners have the remedy of applying for stay of recovery to the Commissioner of Sales Tax under Cl. (a) of the second proviso to subs. (1) of S. 13 of the Act..............” 32. In “Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal Vs. As regards the disputed amount of tax, the petitioners have the remedy of applying for stay of recovery to the Commissioner of Sales Tax under Cl. (a) of the second proviso to subs. (1) of S. 13 of the Act..............” 32. In “Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal Vs. Dunlop India Ltd. and others”, reported in AIR 1985 SC 330 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under : 3. “..............It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Art. 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged.” 33. The Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005 provides for statutory appeal. Section 79 provides that against the order of assessment or penalty or both passed by the prescribed authority appeal lies to the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner especially authorised in this behalf. Subsection 5 of Section 79 provides that the Appellate Authority may confirm, annul, reduce, enhance or otherwise the order passed by the prescribed authority or set-aside the order directing the Assessing Authority to make fresh order. Thus, there cannot be any doubt that Appellate Authority has vast powers under Section 79 of the Act. 34. In the background of facts noticed above, we hold that the assessee was afforded sufficient opportunity of hearing and the impugned order has not been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Thus, there cannot be any doubt that Appellate Authority has vast powers under Section 79 of the Act. 34. In the background of facts noticed above, we hold that the assessee was afforded sufficient opportunity of hearing and the impugned order has not been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Since the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005 provides an effective remedy of appeal, the writ petition cannot be entertained by the Court and both the writ petitions are dismissed. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. Since huge amount of revenue is involved, a liberty is granted to the assessee to move the appellate authority under Section 79 of JVAT Act, 2005, if so advised, within a period of four weeks from today. However, if the assessee does not move the appellate authority within the aforesaid period, the respondent no. 3 is directed to proceed against the assessee in accordance with law.