Judgment T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. This intra-court appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 13.06.2013 dismissing the W.P. (Crl) No. 4/2013 filed by the appellant/writ petitioner assailing the detention order dated 29.01.2013, order of the State Govt. dated 05.02.2013 for approving the detention order and also the order of the State Govt. dated 15.03.2013 for conforming the detention order and also for fixing the period of detention for three years w.e.f. 29.01.2013. 2. Heard Mr. VK Jindal, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. S. Dey, learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner and Mr. KS Kynjing, learned Advocate General assisted by Mr. S. Sen Gupta, learned GA appearing for the respondents No. 1 & 2. 3. The fact, sufficient for deciding the present appeal, is that the appellant/writ petitioner Shri. Champion R. Sangma is not an ordinary citizen and he was a senior Police officer of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police in the Police (Home) Department in the State of Meghalaya. The appellant/writ petitioner being the senior Police officer is not ignorant of the criminal law and other laws more particularly, the provisions under the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1995 (for short 'MPDA, 1995'). No doubt, the appellant/writ petitioner is entitled to all the rights, privileges and protections guaranteed under the Constitution of India and other laws framed there-under. On 30.07.2012, one Shri. K. Shabong, Sub-Inspector Special Cell, East Khasi Hills District lodged an ejahar with the Officer-in-Charge, Pynursla Police Station that he was deputed on 29.07.2012 to conduct Naka with the Special Cell Team at Umkrem "Pyrdiwah Axis" and at about 6:00 AM, one person who was seen suspiciously moving in the forested area was apprehended. After apprehension, he identified as Champion R. Sangma, Chairman of a dreadful terrorist organization called "Garo National Liberation Army" (GNLA) and that terrorist organization is also a banned organization under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short "U.A. (P) Act, 1967"). Based on the said ejahar, FIR i.e. Pynursla PS Case No. 25(7) 2012 under Sections 16, 38(1) and 38(2) of the U.A. (P) Act, 1967 and Section 12of the I.P. Act was registered. Based on the said ejahar, FIR i.e. Pynursla PS Case No. 25(7) 2012 under Sections 16, 38(1) and 38(2) of the U.A. (P) Act, 1967 and Section 12of the I.P. Act was registered. The appellant/writ petitioner was also arrested in connection with (i) Nongstoin Police Station Case No. 9(2) of 2012 under Sections 121A/353/307/34 IPC r/w. Section 10/13 of the U.A. (P) Act 1967 and Section 27(2) of the Arms Act and (ii) Nongstoin Police Station Case No. 10(2) of 2012 under Sections 121A/302/34 IPC r/w Section 10/12 of the U.A. (P) Act, 1967 and 27 of the Arms Act on 03.09.2012 and thereafter, the appellant/writ petitioner is facing the session trial. 4. On 30.08.2012, the Investigating officer of the said Pynursla PS Case submitted charge sheet before the court of the Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), East Khasi Hills District, Shillong. The appellant/writ petitioner also filed bail applications for the criminal cases (FIRs) against him. On 11.01.2013, in respect of two cases of Nongstoin Police Station, the bail was granted to the appellant/writ petitioner by the erstwhile Hon'ble Gauhati High Court, Shillong Bench in Bail Application No. 100(SH)2012 and Bail Application No. 101(SH)2012, which were published widely in all leading newspapers. While the appellant/writ petitioner is in judicial custody, the District Magistrate in exercise of his power under Section 3(1) of the MPDA, 1995 passed the detention order dated 29.01.2013 on being satisfied that if the appellant/writ petitioner Shri. Champion R. Sangma (Ex DSP) is allowed to remain at large, he would act in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order in the district and would contribute in consolidation of the militant organization which shall be a constant threat to the peace, prosperity and security of the law abiding and peace loving citizenry of the district and the State and unleash mayhem and unspeakable atrocities on the people by indulging in murder, criminal intimidation, extortion, kidnapping for ransom in furtherance of their treacherous designs. For easy reference, the said detention order dated 29.01.2013 is quoted hereunder:- GOVERNMENT OF MEGHALAYA OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE EAST GARO HILLS DISTRICT : WILLIAMNAGAR No. EGH/CON.189(MPDA)/2013/3, Dated Williamnagar, the 29th January, 2013 ORDER UNDER SECTION 3(1) OF THE MEGHALAYA PREVENTIVE DETENTION ACT, 1995 Whereas, a new militant outfit by the name of Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) has come into being in Garo Hills in Meghalaya of which Shri Champion R. Sangma and Shri Sohan D. Shira are the originators, mentors and founders; Whereas, this militant organization has unleashed a reign of terror on the peace loving citizenry by executing criminal activities like extortion, kidnapping for ransom, ruthless murders of businessmen and traders, criminal intimidation to create a fear psychosis to suit their nefarious designs; Whereas, this organization GNLA has been formed with the intention of waging war against the constitutionally formed and elected sovereign govt. of the day for creation of a Garo national entity and for which they are training gullible and susceptible poor, unemployed, rural youth; Whereas, it is circumstance wise proved that Shri Champion R. Sangma, S/O Late Bidonsing N. Marak of Songsak Bolsalgittim, East Garo Hills who is now in judicial custody is Chairman of GNLA who has contributed in his might in the furtherance of the devious designs of the militant organization GNLA and is of dangerous and desperate character who is an active threat to public order and public security; Whereas, his repeated commission of crimes at the instance of his superiors in the militant organization reflect his incorrigible intent to foment terror and points towards his indifference and total disregard to life, liberty of innocent citizens and their peace and security; Whereas, he has been arrested by police for his involvement in various unlawful activities and crimes like extortion, dacoity, kidnapping, murder and robbery etc. with deadly weapons for ransom, disruption of public order etc. for which police have implicated him in: 1. Williamnagar P.S. Case. 21(05) 10 U/S. 353/307/34 IPC R/W Sec 27 Arms Act and Sec 5 ES Act. 2. Williamnagar P.S. Case No. 43(09) 10 U/S. 120(B)/121/121(A)/122/364(A)/384/353/307 IPC R/W Sec. 27Arms & Sec 5 ES Act. 3. Williamnagar P.S. Case No. 09(01)11 U/S. 121/121(A)/121(B)/122/364(A)/353/307 IPC R/W Sec 27 Arms Act & Sec 5 ES Act. 4. Williamnagar P.S. Case No. 90(12)11 U/S. 120(B)/121/121(A)/122/353/307/34 IPC 5. Williamnagar P.S. Case No. 13(4)10 U/S. 365/34 IPC. 6. 2. Williamnagar P.S. Case No. 43(09) 10 U/S. 120(B)/121/121(A)/122/364(A)/384/353/307 IPC R/W Sec. 27Arms & Sec 5 ES Act. 3. Williamnagar P.S. Case No. 09(01)11 U/S. 121/121(A)/121(B)/122/364(A)/353/307 IPC R/W Sec 27 Arms Act & Sec 5 ES Act. 4. Williamnagar P.S. Case No. 90(12)11 U/S. 120(B)/121/121(A)/122/353/307/34 IPC 5. Williamnagar P.S. Case No. 13(4)10 U/S. 365/34 IPC. 6. Mendipathar P.S. Case No. 25(4)10 U/S. 395 IPC R/W Sec 25(1-a)(1-b) Arms Act. 7. Williamnagar P.S. Case No. 18(4) 10 U/S. 384/511 IPC. 8. Rongjeng P.S. Case No. 28(11)11 U/S. 120(B)/121/121(A)/122/353/326/307/302/427 IPC R/W Sec 25(1A) (1B) Arms Act. Whereas, I am satisfied that if Shri Champion R. Sangma is allowed to remain at large, he would act in a manner prejudicial to the security of the state and maintenance of public order in the district and would contribute in consolidation of the militant organization which shall be a constant threat to the peace, prosperity and security of the law abiding and peace loving citizenry of the district and the state and unleash mayhem and unspeakable atrocities on the people by indulging in murder, criminal intimidation, extortion, kidnapping for ransom in furtherance of their treacherous designs; NOW, therefore, in exercise of the power conferred upon me under section 3(1) of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1995, I, Shri Vijay Kumar Mantri, IAS, District Magistrate, East Garo Hills District, Williamnagar do hereby direct forthwith that the person of Shri Champion R. Sangma shall be taken into preventive detention with immediate effect and that the detention shall be at District Jail, Shillong, East Khasi Hills until further orders. Further, Shri Champion R. Sangma shall, in accordance with article 22(5) of the Constitution of India read with section 8(1)of MPDA, 1995 have every right to make a representation against the order of detention to the Govt. addressed to the District Magistrate, East Garo Hills, Williamnagar and the Principal Secretary in Political Department, Govt. of Meghalaya. Given under my Hand and Seal of the Court this 29th day of January, 2013. Sd/- (Vijay Kumar Mantri) District Magistrate East Garo Hills District Williamnagar 5. In compliance with Section 8 of the MPDA, 1995, the grounds of detention were furnished to the appellant/writ petitioner in order to enable him to file representation against the order of detention on the very day of issuing the detention order dated 29.01.2013. Sd/- (Vijay Kumar Mantri) District Magistrate East Garo Hills District Williamnagar 5. In compliance with Section 8 of the MPDA, 1995, the grounds of detention were furnished to the appellant/writ petitioner in order to enable him to file representation against the order of detention on the very day of issuing the detention order dated 29.01.2013. Under the grounds of detention/order dated 29.01.2013, the appellant/writ petitioner had been informed of his right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India r/w Section 8(1) of the MPDA to make representation against the detention order to the Govt. addressed to the District Magistrate, East Garo Hills, Williamnagar and the Principal Secretary in Political Department, Govt. of Meghalaya. The said grounds of detention/order dated 29.01.2013 read as follows:- GOVERNMENT OF MEGHALAYA OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE EAST GARO HILLS DISTRICT : WILLIAMNAGAR In the matter relating to Case No. EGH/CON 189 (MPDA)/2013/1, dated 29th January 2013: Detention of Shri Champion R. Sangma U/S. 3(1) of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1995. Memo No. EGH/CON.189(MPDA)/2013/1, Dated Williamnagar, the 29th January, 2013 GROUNDS OF DETENTION The principal grounds of detention of Shri Champion R. Sangma are as follows: That a new militant outfit has come into being with one Champion R. Sangma self Styled Chairman and another Sohan D Shira as its originators, mentors and founders and this militant outfit is styled and called Garo National Liberation Army; That the members of this outfit are unleashing a reign of terror upon the peace loving general citizenry of the society through such criminal activities like kidnapping for ransom, demanding money by extortion, criminal intimidation throughout the length and breadth of the state of Meghalaya in general and district of East Garo Hills in particular; That it is conclusively established and proven that Shri Champion R Sangma is an active and dangerous Chairman of GNLA seriously disrupting public order, peace and tranquility through wanton acts of terror, extortion and kidnapping for ransom and further that he is implicated in the following police cases which suggest that he is threat to public peace, tranquility and public order; 1. Williamnagar P.S. Case No. 21(05)10 U/S. 353/307/34 IPC R/W Sec 27 Arms Act and Sec 5 ES Act: On 19.5.2010 a training camp of GNLA at Meminram along the Dura Hill Range was busted by the East Garo Hills Police and in the process one Machine Gun with 244 Live Ammunitions , 1 (one) Chinese Uzzi Gun with 2 (two) Magazines and 30 (Thirty) Rounds live Ammunitions, 13 (Thirteen) Galatin sticks, 3 (three) Crude bombs, 1 (one) Canon Printer, 1 (One) Solar Plate, 2 (Two) Ammunition Box and incriminating documents of GNLA were recovered from the camp site. 2. Williamnagar P.S. Case No. 43(09)10 U/S. 120(B)/121/121(A)/122/364(A)/384/353/307 IPC R/W Sec. 27Arms & Sec 5 ES Act: On 26.09.2010, acting on source information East Garo Hills Police led by Shri. B.D. Marak, MPS, SDPO, Resubelpara conducted search operation over Adugre village and busted two camps established at Adugre and Sabok Achu and recovered one Chinese hand grenade and flags of GNLA from the camp side. 3. Williamnagar P.S. Case No. 09(01)11 U/S. 121/121(A)/121(B)/122/364(A)/353/307 IPC R/W Sec 27 Arms Act & Sec 5 ES Act: On 26.01.2011 at about 4:10 A.M. based on specific information that GNLA had established camp at Rongrekgre wherein Shri Champion R. Sangma, Chairman and Sohan D. Shira, C-in-C were present. Police team conducted operation over the area. During operation an encounter took place with GNLA militants and in the cross fire on GNLA cadre namely Washington Marak died on the spot while four others namely Shri Lathing R. Marak, Shri Patil C. Marak, Shri Milly C. Marak and Shri Paper R. Marak were arrested. Police recovered on AK rifle with four rounds of ammunitions fourteen empty cases of AK, one LMG magazine box, one pistol magazine with five rounds of ammunitions, ten gelatin sticks, one BP jacket, 45 detonators and incriminating documents from the PO. 4. Williamnagar PS Case No. 90(12)11 U/S. 120(B)/121/121(A)/122/353/307/34 IPC: Based on source information on 17/12/2011 East Garo Hills Police (SWAT) launched operation at Darimgre village and during operation an encounter took place between police team and GNLA militants. As a result, two GNLA militants died on the spot and police team recovered two 36 HE hand grenades, one pistol GNLA identity cards and other incriminating documents from the encounter site. 5. Williamnagar PS Case No. 13(4)10 U/S. 365/34 IPC: On 9/4/2010 at about 10:30 A.M. one Md. As a result, two GNLA militants died on the spot and police team recovered two 36 HE hand grenades, one pistol GNLA identity cards and other incriminating documents from the encounter site. 5. Williamnagar PS Case No. 13(4)10 U/S. 365/34 IPC: On 9/4/2010 at about 10:30 A.M. one Md. Sanwar Hussain S/O Md Abdul Sattar, a resident of Karbal; District Goalpara, Assam was abducted by the cadre from Songmagre near Mahari Gate on the direction of Shri Champion R Sangma, Chairman of GNLA. 6. Mendipathar PS Case No. 25(4)10 U/S. 395 IPC R/W Sec 25(1-a) (1-b) Arms Act: On 12.4.2010, Shri Champion R. Sangma along with 6/7 cadres travelling in a Maruti Car bearing R/No. ML-05-A-6363 (Green Colour) and forcibly collected Rs. 5,000/- each from various check gates at Rongkaminchi and Soenang area on Mendipathar-Songsak PWD road. 7. Williamnagar PS Case No. 18(4)10 U/S 384/511 IPC: On 16.4.2010 Shri Mahamsing M. Sangma, Ex-MDC of Williamnagar received a demand note of Rs. 50,00,000/-(Fifty lakhs) from GNLA. 8. Rongjeng PS Case No. 28(11)11 U/S 120(B)/121/121(A)/122/353/326/307/302/427 IPC R/W Sec 25(1A)(1B)Arms Act: On 31.10.2011 at about 4:30 P.M. while Dobu Police along with Bn personnel were on highway duty in a requisitioned Tata Sumo, about 8-12 militants ambushed their vehicle at Nengpatchi. As a result four police personnel namely UBC/164 N.R. Marak, Hav Probinson Sangma, Hav. Victor Marak, BNC/652 E. Sangma and one civil driver Lenush P. Marak died on the spot. The militants took away two AK rifles with six loaded magazines, one carbine with two loaded magazines, two SLR with three loaded magazines. As such, there is a need to take the person into preventive detention under Section 3(1) of Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1995. Further, Shri Champion R. Sangma shall, in accordance with Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India read with Section 8(1)of MPDA, 1995 have every right to make a representation against the order of detention to the Govt. addressed to the District Magistrate, East Garo Hills, Williamnagar and the Principal Secretary in Political Department Govt. of Meghalaya. Issued under my hand and seal of the Court today, the 29th January, 2013. By Order etc. Sd/- (Vijay Kumar Mantri) District Magistrate, East Garo Hills District, Williamnagar 6. addressed to the District Magistrate, East Garo Hills, Williamnagar and the Principal Secretary in Political Department Govt. of Meghalaya. Issued under my hand and seal of the Court today, the 29th January, 2013. By Order etc. Sd/- (Vijay Kumar Mantri) District Magistrate, East Garo Hills District, Williamnagar 6. The appellant/writ petitioner further had been informed under the letter of the District Magistrate, East Garo Hills, Willimanagar dated 29.01.2013 that (i) the appellant/writ petitioner has every right to claim a personal appearance before the Advisory Board, which is going to decide the validity of the detention order and (ii) that the appellant/writ petitioner has every right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India r/w Section 8(1) of the MPDA, 1995 to send a representation to the Govt. to question his detention and his representation should be addressed to the Principal Secretary, Political Department, Govt. of Meghalaya and also the appellant/writ petitioner being provided an opportunity of filing representation before the District Magistrate, East Garo Hills, Williamnagar. The appellant/writ petitioner, who was a senior Police officer filed one joint representation dated 14.02.2013 addressed to the two authorities i.e. The District Magistrate, East Garo Hills, Williamnagar and the Principal Secretary, Political Department, Govt. of Meghalaya, Shillong. In the said representation dated 14.02.2013, the appellant/writ petitioner simply stated that he had not been furnished material documents which had been relied upon by the District Magistrate while setting out the grounds of his detention and also further stated that the Police had failed to produce even iota of evidence, hence, the Hon'ble erstwhile Gauhati High Court, Shillong Bench was pleased to grant bail to the appellant/writ petitioner in the two cases i.e. Nongstoin PS Case No. 9(2) 2012 and Nongstoin PS Case No. 10(2) 2012. In his representation, the appellant/writ petitioner also stated that all the three objects (which necessitates detention) viz. "security of the State", "the maintenance of public order" and "of supplies and services essential to the community" are disjunctive and not conjunctive. The Detaining authority is under constitutional and legal obligation to read the provisions disjunctively in order to exercise the drastic power of detaining a citizen preventively without trail. In nowhere of the representation filed by the appellant/writ petitioner mentioned that what are the material documents to be furnished to him and because of non-furnishing of the material particulars, he could not file the effective representation. In nowhere of the representation filed by the appellant/writ petitioner mentioned that what are the material documents to be furnished to him and because of non-furnishing of the material particulars, he could not file the effective representation. The representation filed by the appellant/writ petitioner dated 14.02.2013 consists of six pages and had taken all the points what he desired to take against the detention order dated 29.01.2013. The said representation dated 14.02.2013 is quoted hereunder:- To, 1. The District Magistrate East Garo Hills District, Williamnagar Meghalaya 2. The Principal Secretary/Commissioner and Secretary Political Department, Government of Meghalaya, Meghalaya Secretariat, Shillong Through: The Superintendent of District Jail East Khasi Hills District, Jail Road, Shillong Subject: Representation regarding my detention under Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act 1995 Sir, I beg to state that as per order dated 29th January 2013 vide memo No. EGH/CON. 189 (MPDA)/2013/2 of the District Magistrate, East Garo Hills District, Williamnagar, I have been ordered to be detained at District jail, East Khasi Hills, Shillong Under Section 3(1) of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act 1995, hereinafter to be referred to as the Act for the sake of brevity. At page 2 of the said order, the District Magistrate, East Garo Hills District, Williamnagar has enclosed copies of the order to 9 (nine) officer/members including me. The concept of the preventive detention contemplates "Subjective" satisfaction of the District Magistrate for detuning a person under the said Act, it is a settled principle of Law that such subject satisfaction cannot be arrived at arbitrarily or whimsically. I submit that there is nothing in the order of my detention, which can satisfy a person of reasonable prudence about the imperative necessity of my detention. The order of my detention does not contain any ground to justify my detention under the said Act. Apart from the documents furnished along with the grounds for my detention, I have not been furnished with any materials/documents which have been relied upon by the District Magistrate while setting out the grounds for my detention. The documents itself is a vague and do not disclose any grounds to satisfy the District Magistrate to order my detention under the Act, moreover the documents supplied to me are not readable due to poor printing. The District Magistrate has shown my involvement in 8 (eight) cases, viz; 1. The documents itself is a vague and do not disclose any grounds to satisfy the District Magistrate to order my detention under the Act, moreover the documents supplied to me are not readable due to poor printing. The District Magistrate has shown my involvement in 8 (eight) cases, viz; 1. Williamnagar P.S. Case No. 21(05) 10 U/s. 353/307/34 IPC R/W Sec 27 Arms Act and Sec 5 ES Act 2. Williamnagar P.S. Case No. 43(09) 10 U/S. 120(B)/12/121(A)/122/364(A)/384/353/307 IPC R/W Sec 27 Arms Act and Sec 5 ES Act. 3. Williamnagar P.S. Case No. 09(01) 11 U/S. 121/121(A)/121(B)/122/364(A)/353/307 IPC R/W Sec 27 Arms Act and Sec 5 ES Act. 4. Williamnagar P.S. Case No. 90(12) 11 U/S 120(B)/121/121(A)/122/353/307/34 IPC. 5. Williamnagar P.S. Case No. 13(4) 10 U/S 365/34 IPC. 6. Mendipathar P.S. Case No. 25(4) 10 U/S 395 IPC R/W Sec 25(1-a)(1-b) Arms Act. 7. Williamnagar P.S. Case No. 18(4) 10 384/511 IPC 8. Rongjeng P.S. Case No. 28(11) 11 U/S 120(B)/121/121(A)/122/353/326/307/302/427 IPC R/W Sec 25(1A) (1B) Arms Act. The District Magistrate reach the satisfaction that my detention is necessary for the peace and tranquility and this conclusion has been reached on the bases of registration of cases mention above, surprisingly the District Magistrate did not reach the satisfaction on the bases of the Nongstoin Police Station Case No. 9(2) of 2012, and Nongstoin Police Station Case No. 10(2) of 2012. I would like to humbly mention that as the Police have failed to produce even iota of evidence, hence the Hon'ble High Court was pleased to grant me bail, and these are the (2) two cases where I would conceded that I had been arrested in those case as per the provision of Law. That the District Magistrate reached the satisfaction on the bases of those cases in which I was never arrested, even though the Police are very much aware of the fact that I am detained in judicial custody at Shillong District Jail, but till date I was not arrested in the above mentioned cases, since all the cases are factious and malifide. That the Police has shown my arrest in Pynursla Police Station Case No. 25(7) of 2012, but I was detained elsewhere in some other manner, the details of which will be available to Border Security Force (BSF) and Local authorities, from the record it will revealed that no arms or ammunition was seized from my possession, where as in the above mention cases I am charged with various section of Arms Act and Explosive Substance Act. As it is well known, our legal system, which is more or less based on English jurisprudence, lays down that every man is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established in a Court of Law. In the above cases, I had not been arrested or produced before any Magistrate as per law nor any charge sheet were filed before any Court in the above mention cases, whereas I am in judicial custody in Shillong District Jail, Shillong and I am already in detention from last six to seven months, the District Magistrate cannot validly draw the conclusion that I am ?involved in the various ant-national activities, unlawful activities and crimes like extortion, kidnapping, etc and use deadly weapons for ransom, disruption of public orders, etc." Hence, his satisfaction for the necessity of my detention under the Act is not based on any cogent and legally valid reasons. As such, it deserves to be set aside. Section 3(1) of the Act reads as follows:- The State government or the District Magistrate may, if he is satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of Public order or of supplies and service essential to the community, it is necessary so as to do, make an order directing such person be detained. A plain perusal of the provisions contained in this section makes it amply clear that all the three objects (which necessitates detention) viz "security of the State", "the maintenance of Public Order" and "of supplies and services essential to the community" are disjunctive and not conjunctive. In my detention order dated 29th January 2013 the District Magistrate has clubbed together "Security of the State" and "the maintenance of Public order" to enable him to generate his satisfaction for my detention. In my detention order dated 29th January 2013 the District Magistrate has clubbed together "Security of the State" and "the maintenance of Public order" to enable him to generate his satisfaction for my detention. I beg to submit that the District Magistrate has committed gross error of Law by reading the provisions of section 3(1) of the said Act conjunctively. The Detaining authority is under Constitutional and legal obligation to read the provisions disjunctively in order to exercise the drastic power of detaining a citizen preventively without trial. His orders stands tainted with illegality and deserved to be set aside. I further beg to states that the detention order dated 29th January, 2013 is not only vague but also made on the grounds which are irrelevant and non-existent. Even if the 8 (eight) cases referred to in the detention order are taken on their face value, they cannot, by any stretch of imagination constitute a threat to security of the State or Public order, specially when the District Magistrate has unambiguously admitted that the detainee is already in Judicial Custody. Furthermore, the District Magistrate has allowed his judicial mind to be influenced or swayed by materials which are not contemplated in section 3(1) of the Act. Thus in the order the District Magistrate has taken into consideration that "he (the detainee) is a founder members of the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) a dreadful militant outfit of Meghalaya" (this is based on no material at all, that "he is involved in various anti-national, unlawful activities and crimes like extortion, kidnapping, etc and with use of deadly weapons for ransom, disruption of public order etc" and "that if he (Shri Champion R. Sangma, detainee) is allowed to remain at large, he would act in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order in the district and would contribute in consolidation of the militant organization which shall be a constant threat to the peace, prosperity and security of the Law abiding and atrocities on the furtherance of their treacherous designs." Threat to the security of state and maintenance of public order in the district is not a ground for detention under the Act. But the District magistrate has taken his extraneous factor into consideration and therefore his satisfaction for necessity of detaining me under the Act stands vitiated. But the District magistrate has taken his extraneous factor into consideration and therefore his satisfaction for necessity of detaining me under the Act stands vitiated. Similarly, while enumerating the grounds in the order No. EGH/CON 189 (MPDA)/2013/2, dated 29th January 2013 (copy enclosed) which reads like a story (based on no material) the District Magistrate has observed that I has unleashed a reign of terror on the peace loving citizenry by executing criminal activities like extortion kidnapping for ransom, ruthless murderers of businessmen and traders, criminal intimidation to create a fear psychosis to the peace loving people. However, paragraph 5 (five) of the order dated 29th January 2013, it was also observed by the District Magistrate that 'whereas, his repeated commission of crimes at the instance of his superiors in the militant organization reflect his incorrigible intent to foment terror and point toward his indifference and total disregard to life, liberty of innocent citizens and their peace and security. It is very much clear from the above paragraph that the District Magistrate was satisfied that under the instruction of my superiors in the militant organization, the detenue is trying to create fear in the mind of peace loving people, whereas on the other hand the District Magistrate is alleging the detenue to be the Chairman of the GNLA, henceforth the satisfaction of the District Magistrate is based on so other extraneous materials, and the detention order is liable to be set aside. The above factors are the primary factors which generated subjective satisfaction in the mind of the District Magistrate for necessity of detaining me. But these are not grounds contemplated U/s. 3(1) of the Act. Hence taking the extraneous materials and those too based only on his conjectures, into consideration for passing the detention order amounts to an abuse of the process of Law. The Detention order is thus tainted with illegality and deserved to be set aside. I submit that the District Magistrate did not apply his judicial mind to the totality of the circumstances attending my case. If one set of acts/omissions constitute a threat to the security of the State, the same set of acts cannot be, at one and the same time, prejudicial to the upkeep of the public order. I submit that the District Magistrate did not apply his judicial mind to the totality of the circumstances attending my case. If one set of acts/omissions constitute a threat to the security of the State, the same set of acts cannot be, at one and the same time, prejudicial to the upkeep of the public order. The District Magistrate has clubbed both the grounds together which is not permissible in law and which consequently has rendered my order of detention legally void. That I have never involved in any unlawful activities and crime like extortion, dacoity, kidnapping, murder and robbery etc, with deadly weapons for ransom, disruption of public order etc., hence forth I denied all the allegation leveled against of me by the District Magistrate. In view of the matter, my detention order may kindly be carefully examined in the light of the Law point's outlines above, I humble pray that my detention order may be set aside. Dated, Shillong 14th February 2013 Yours sincerely Sd/- Shri Champion R. Sangma 7. The said representation dated 14.02.2013 was filed by the appellant/writ petitioner after the impugned detention order dated 29.01.2013 had already been approved by the State Govt. in exercise of the power conferred by Sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of the MPDA, 1995 vide order being No. POL.17/2013/106 dated Shillong, the 5th February, 2013. The State Govt. acting on the recommendation of the Advisory Board and also after consideration of the materials available as well as the approval order dated 05.02.2013 and the representation dated 14.02.2013 by exercising the power conferred by Sub-Section (1) of Section 13 and also Section 14 of the MPDA, 1995 confirmed the detention order i.e. the impugned detention order dated 29.01.2013 and fixed the period of detention for three years w.e.f. 29.01.2013 vide order No. POL.17/2013/205, dated, Shillong, the 15th March, 2013. Being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 29.01.2013, approval order dated 05.02.2013 and the confirmation order dated 15.03.2013, filed the writ petition being WP(Crl) No. 4/2013. 8. The respondents also filed affidavit-in-opposition categorically denying the allegations and assertions of the appellant/writ petitioner in the writ petition. It is an admitted case of the parties that the Detaining authority (District Magistrate), on receipt of the representation of the appellant/writ petitioner which was filed after the impugned detention order dated 29.01.2013 had been approved by the State Govt. 8. The respondents also filed affidavit-in-opposition categorically denying the allegations and assertions of the appellant/writ petitioner in the writ petition. It is an admitted case of the parties that the Detaining authority (District Magistrate), on receipt of the representation of the appellant/writ petitioner which was filed after the impugned detention order dated 29.01.2013 had been approved by the State Govt. vide order dated 05.02.2013, had taken the decision that it is the State Govt. who is to revoke the detention order. Accordingly, the appellant/writ petitioner had been informed. This would be the disposal of the representation of the appellant/writ petitioner by the Detaining authority. 9. The contentions of learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner before the learned Single Judge were that: (i) the detention order stating that "I am satisfied that if Shri. Champion R Sangma is allowed to remain at large he would act in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order in the district and ..........." had been arrived at without being guided by any materials on record and without recording any reason with reference to any material on record as how the appellant already in judicial custody facing trial in connection with session case No. 23 of 2012 before the Deputy Commissioner (J), East Khasi Hills District, Shillong would be at large. (ii) the appellant has never moved any bail application on those cases and no bail application was pending before any court, which would give rise to an apprehension in the mind of the Detaining Authority (respondent No. 2) that the appellant would be enlarged and would be a security hazard to the society or would act in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order. (iii) the appellant was not informed about his right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India i.e. about his right to submit his representation against his detention order to the Central Govt. which has infringed his fundamental rights under the Constitution of India. (iv) the relevant materials which had been purportedly relied upon for subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority (respondent No. 2) were not supplied to the appellant thereby preventing him from exercising his right to submit an effective representation against the Detention Order. which has infringed his fundamental rights under the Constitution of India. (iv) the relevant materials which had been purportedly relied upon for subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority (respondent No. 2) were not supplied to the appellant thereby preventing him from exercising his right to submit an effective representation against the Detention Order. (v) the appellant though submitted representation against his detention before the detaining authority (respondent No. 2) but the same was not considered and disposed. (vi) the detention order is arbitrary mechanical is not based on established procedure of law. 10. The learned Single Judge after due consideration of the respective case of the parties and also on perusal of the record passed the impugned judgment and order dated 13.06.2013; against the impugned judgment and order dated 13.06.2013 filed the present writ appeal. On perusal of the grounds taken in the present writ appeal and also hearing the submissions of the learned senior counsel appearing for the parties, it is clear that the submissions of the learned senior counsel before us are only the reiteration of the submissions made before the learned Single Judge. 11. Before entering into the merit of the submission of the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner as well as the grounds taken in the memo of appeal, this Court required to see the jurisdiction of the authorities to pass the detention order and for what purpose the detention order could be passed and also if the detention order, is an order for punishment. It is fairly settled that jurisdiction of preventive detention is "suspicious jurisdiction" based on suspicion and an action is taken with the view to preventing a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to certain activities enumerated in the detention order. Interference by a court of law at that stage must be an exception rather than a rule. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande: (2008) 3 SCC 613 held that the Court must be conscious and mindful of the fact that jurisdiction preventive detention is "suspicious jurisdiction" based on suspicion and an action is taken with the view to preventing a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to certain activities enumerated in the detention order. Interference by a court of law at that stage, must be an exception rather than a rule because the exercise can be undertaken by a writ court with extreme care, caution and circumspection. Para 63 of the SCC in Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande's case (Supra) reads as follows:- 63. From the foregoing discussion, in our judgment, the law appears to be fairly well settled and it is this. As a general rule, an order of detention passed by a detaining authority under the relevant "preventive detention" law cannot be set aside by a writ court at the pre-execution or pre-arrest stage unless the court is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances specified in Addl. Secy. to the Govt. of India v. Alka Subhash Gadia: 1992 Supp (1) SCC 496: 1992 SCC (Cri) 301. The Court must be conscious and mindful of the fact that this is a "suspicious jurisdiction" i.e. jurisdiction based on suspicion and an action is taken "with a view to preventing" a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to certain activities enumerated in the relevant detention law. Interference by a court of law at that stage must be an exception rather than a rule and such an exercise can be undertaken by a writ court with extreme care, caution and circumspection. A detenu cannot ordinarily seek a writ of mandamus if he does not surrender and is not served with an order of detention and the grounds in support of such order". 12. The Hon'ble Apex Court (3 Judges) in Rekha v. State of T.N.: 2011 4 Scale 387 also reiterated that the preventive detention is often described as jurisdiction of suspicion. Para 40 of the SCC in Rekha's case (Supra) reads as follows:- 40. It must be remembered that in case of preventive detention no offence is proved and the justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability, and there is no conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. Preventive detention is often described as a 'jurisdiction of suspicion', (Vide State of Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande: (Supra) - Para 63). The detaining authority passes the order of detention on subjective satisfaction. Since clause (3) of Article 22 specifically excludes the applicability of Clauses (1) and (2), the detenu is not entitled to a lawyer or the right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. 13. The detaining authority passes the order of detention on subjective satisfaction. Since clause (3) of Article 22 specifically excludes the applicability of Clauses (1) and (2), the detenu is not entitled to a lawyer or the right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. 13. From the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande's case (Supra) and Rekha Devi's case (Supra), it is clear that jurisdiction to order preventive detention is a suspicious jurisdiction i.e. jurisdiction based on suspicion and an action is taken with a view to preventing a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to certain activities enumerated in the relevant detention law. The interference of Court of law at that stage must be an exception rather than a rule. It is equally well settled that the suspicion should be based on materials. 14. The object of law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive. Preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence. It is resorted when the Executive is convinced that such detention is necessary in order to prevent the persons detained from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain objects which are specified by the law. The framers of the Constitution, being aware that preventive detention involves a serious encroachment on the right to personal liberty, took care to incorporate, in clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22; certain minimum safeguards for the protection of persons sought to be preventively detained. These safeguards are required to be "zealously watched and enforced by the Court". The Apex Court in Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab: (1981) 4 SCC 481 observed that: ..... May be that the detenu is a smuggler whose tribe (and how their numbers increase) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralyzed the Indian economy. But the loss of preventive detention affords only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set-up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenus....... (Ref:- Para 4 of the SCC in Rattan Singh's case (Supra). 15. But the loss of preventive detention affords only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set-up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenus....... (Ref:- Para 4 of the SCC in Rattan Singh's case (Supra). 15. No doubt, the doctrine of preventive power of the Administrative/Executive authority, is the constitutionally validate preventive process for the maintenance of public order, security of the State, national security, defence of India and relations of India with the foreign power. The Apex Court in Amir Shad Khan v. L. Hmingliana & Ors: (1991) 4 SCC 39 held that: The law of preventive detention is harsh to the person detained and, therefore, there can be no doubt that it must be strictly construed. Article 22(3) (b) denies to a person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention the protection of clauses (1) and (2) of the said article. Clause (4) thereof enjoins that the preventive detention law must conform to the limitations set out there-under. Clause (5) of Article 22 reads as under: 22(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order" (Ref:- Para 3 of the SCC in Amir Shad Khan's case (Supra). 16. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner by relying on several decisions of the Apex Court in the cases for National Security Act, 1980 and the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 more particularly (i) Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India & Ors: (1995) 4 SCC 51 (CB) and (ii) Union of India & Anr. v. Sneha Khemka & Anr.: (2004) 2 SCC 570 (Paras 14 & 16), strenuously contended that the appellant/writ petitioner had not been provided with the opportunity to file representation to the Central Govt. against the impugned detention order dated 29.01.2013 under the MPDA, 1995 and accordingly, the impugned detention order dated 29.01.2013 and its approval and confirmation orders are liable to be quashed. against the impugned detention order dated 29.01.2013 under the MPDA, 1995 and accordingly, the impugned detention order dated 29.01.2013 and its approval and confirmation orders are liable to be quashed. For deciding this point, raised by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner, it would be more profitable to quote the provision for revocation of the detention order in the National Security Act, 1980, the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 and the MPDA, 1995. Section 14 of the National Security Act, 1980, Section 11 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 and Section 15 of the MPDA, 1995 read as follows:- National Security Act, 1980 14. Revocation of detention orders.-- (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), a detention order may, at any time, be revoked or modified,-- (a) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3) of section 3, by the State Government to which that officer is subordinate or by the Central Government; (b) notwithstanding that the order has been made by a State Government, by the Central Government. [(2) The expiry or revocation of a detention order (hereafter in this sub-section referred to as the earlier detention order) shall not [whether such earlier detention order has been made before or after the commencement of the National Security (Second Amendment) Act, 1984] bar the making of another detention order (hereafter in this sub-section referred to as the subsequent detention order) under section 3 against the same person: Provided that in a case where no fresh facts have arisen after the expiry or revocation of the earlier detention order made against such person, the maximum period for which such person may be detained in pursuance of the subsequent detention order shall, in no case, extend beyond the expiry of a period of twelve months from the date of detention under the earlier detention order.] Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 11. Revocation of detention orders. Revocation of detention orders. - (1) Without prejudice to provisions of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), a detention order may, at any time, be revoked or modified- (a) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of a State Government, by that State Government or by the Central Government; (b) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of the Central Government or by a State Government, by the Central Government; (2) The revocation of a detention order shall not bar the making of another detention order under section 3against the same person. Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1995 15. Revocation of detention order. - (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 35 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1972, a detention order made by a District Magistrate or by the empowered officer, may, at any time, be revoked or modified by the State Government and, in case of a detention order made by the State Government (or) by the Central Government. (2) The revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not bar making of a fresh detention order against same person in any case where fresh facts have arisen after the date of such revocation or expiry and on which the State Government, a District Magistrate or empowered officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that such an order should be made. 17. It is the basic principle of construction of statute that the same should be read as a whole, then chapter by chapter, section by section and word by word. Recourse to construction or interpretation of statute is necessary when there is ambiguity, obscurity, or inconsistency therein and not otherwise. An effort must be made to give effect to all parts of the statute and unless absolutely necessary, no part thereof shall be rendered surplusage or redundant. True meaning of a provision of law has to be determined on the basis of what it provides by its clear language, with due regard to the scheme of law. Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. True meaning of a provision of law has to be determined on the basis of what it provides by its clear language, with due regard to the scheme of law. Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words, statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed according to their plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute. It is also well settled that a beneficent provision of legislation must be liberally construed so as to fulfill the statutory purpose and not to frustrate it. The Apex Court in Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. : (2003) 2 SCC 111 held that: 23. It is the basic principle of construction of statute that the same should be read as a whole, then chapter by chapter, section by section and words by words. Recourse to construction or interpretation of statute is necessary when there is ambiguity, obscurity, or inconsistency therein and not otherwise. An effort must be made to give effect to all parts of statute and unless absolutely necessary, no part thereof shall be rendered surplusage or redundant. 24. True meaning of a provision of law has to be determined on the basis of what it provides by its clear language, with due regard to the scheme of law. 25. Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute. 18. Under the doctrine of "Noscitur a sociis" in the interpretation of statute, the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it. 18. Under the doctrine of "Noscitur a sociis" in the interpretation of statute, the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it. The Apex Court in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha: AIR 1960 SC 610 , had considered the doctrine of "Noscitur a sociis" in the interpretation of statute and held that "associated words take their meaning from one another under the doctrine of Noscitur a sociis, the philosophy of which is that the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with such doctrine is broader than maxim ejusdem generis". The ratio laid down in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha's case (Supra) is followed by the Apex Court in Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Baroda: (1990) 3 SCC 447 . Para 12 of the SCC in Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. case (Supra) reads as follows:- 12. The principle of statutory interpretation by which a generic word receives a limited interpretation by reason of its context is well established. In the context with which we are concerned, we can legitimately draw upon the "noscitur a sociis" principle. This expression simply means that "the meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps" Gajendragadkar, J. explained the scope of the rule in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha: (1960) 2 SCR 866: AIR 1960 SC 610 : (1960) 1 LLJ 251 in the following words: (SCR pp. 873-74) This rule, according to Maxwell, means that, when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take as it were their colour from each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to a less general. The same rule is thus interpreted in "Words and Phrases" (Vol. XIV, p. 207): "Associated words take their meaning from one another under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the philosophy of which is that the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it; such doctrine is broader than the maxim ejusdem generis". In fact the latter maxim "is only an illustration or specific application of the broader maxim noscitur a sociis". In fact the latter maxim "is only an illustration or specific application of the broader maxim noscitur a sociis". The argument is that certain features of attributes are invariably associated with the words "business and trade" as understood in the popular and conventional sense, and it is the colour of these attributes which is taken by the other words used in the definition though their normal import may be much wider. We are not impressed by this argument. It must be borne in mind that noscitur a sociis is merely a rule of construction and it cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately used in order to make the scope of the defined word correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of the legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance is doubtful, or otherwise not clear that the present rule of construction can be usefully applied. It can also be applied where the meaning of the words of wider import is doubtful; but, where the object of the legislature in using wider words is clear and free of ambiguity, the rule of construction in question cannot be pressed into service. This principle has been applied in a number of contexts in judicial decisions where the court is clear in its mind that the larger meaning of the word in question could not have been intended in the context in which it has been used. The cases are too numerous to need discussion here. It should be sufficient to refer to one of them by way of illustration. In Rainbow Steels Ltd. v. CST: (1981) 2 SCC 141 : 1981 SCC (Tax) 90 this Court had to understand the meaning of the word 'old' in the context of an entry in a taxing traffic which read thus: Old, discarded, unserviceable or obsolete machinery, stores or vehicle including waste products....... Though the tariff item started with the use of the wide word 'old', the court came to the conclusion that "in order to fall within the expression 'old machinery' occurring in the entry, the machinery must be old machinery in the sense that it has become non-functional or non-usable". Though the tariff item started with the use of the wide word 'old', the court came to the conclusion that "in order to fall within the expression 'old machinery' occurring in the entry, the machinery must be old machinery in the sense that it has become non-functional or non-usable". In other words, not the mere age of the machinery, which would be relevant in the wider sense, but the condition of the machinery analogous to that indicated by the words following it, was considered relevant for the purposes of the statute. 19. The doctrine of purposive interpretation, in our opinion, would be helpful interpretation of Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 of the MPDA, 1995. Lord Smith in R(Haw) v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt. (2006) 3 All ER 428 stated that the purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by - (a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose (b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose. The construction of purposive interpretation is also followed by the Apex Court in Dilip S. Dahanukar v. Kotak Mahindra Co. Ltd. & Anr.: (2007) 6 SCC 528 in interpreting Clause (d) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 357 and Sub-Section (2) and Sub-Section (3) of Section 357 of the Cr.P.C. Paras 52, 53, 54 & 55 of the SCC in Dilip S. Dahanukar's case (Supra) read as follows:- 52. If realization of an amount of compensation payable to a victim as envisaged under Clause (d) of sub-Section (1) of Section 357 is to be stayed under sub-Section (2) thereof, there is no reason why the amount of compensation payable in terms of sub-Section (3) shall not receive the same treatment. 53. Doctrine of Purposive Interpretation in a situation of this nature, in our opinion, shall be applied. 54. In R (Haw) vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department: (2006) 3 All ER 428 Lord Smith stated-(All ER pp. 438-39, paras 42 and 44-45) 42........a passage from Bennion Statutory Interpretation (4th edn, 2002, p. 810 Section 304) entitled, 'Nature of purposive construction'. 54. In R (Haw) vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department: (2006) 3 All ER 428 Lord Smith stated-(All ER pp. 438-39, paras 42 and 44-45) 42........a passage from Bennion Statutory Interpretation (4th edn, 2002, p. 810 Section 304) entitled, 'Nature of purposive construction'. That begins with the following words: 'A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by(a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where the meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose (in this Code called a purposive-and-literal construction), or (b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code called a purposive-and-strained construction).' **** 44. The passage from Bennion continues: '........"/am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where to apply the literal meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act. But in doing so the task on which a court of justice is engaged remains one of construction, even where this involves reading into the Act words which are not expressly included in it. [Kammins Ballroom Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd.: 1971 AC 850: (1970) 3 WLR 287: (1970) 2 All ER 871(HL)], provides an instance of this; but in that case the three conditions that must be fulfilled in order to justify this course were satisfied. First, it was possible to determine from a consideration of the provisions of the Act read as a whole precisely what the mischief was that it was the purpose of the Act to remedy; secondly, it was apparent that the draftsman and Parliament had by inadvertence overlooked, and so omitted to deal with, an eventuality that required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be achieved; and thirdly, it was possible to state with certainty what were the additional words that would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by Parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill passed into law. Unless this third condition is fulfilled any attempt by a court of justice to repair the omission in the Act cannot be justified as an exercise of its jurisdiction to determine what is the meaning of a written law which Parliament has passed." 45. Unless this third condition is fulfilled any attempt by a court of justice to repair the omission in the Act cannot be justified as an exercise of its jurisdiction to determine what is the meaning of a written law which Parliament has passed." 45. The passage from Bennion continues: 'Lord Diplock's third point is, with respect, erroneous. The argument that in Jones v. Wrotham Park Settled Estates: 1980 AC 74 : (1979) 2 WLR 132 : (1979) 1 All ER 286 (HL) Lord Diplock was mistaken in saying that for a rectifying construction to be effected it must be possible to state with certainty what the missing words are, has been endorsed by the House of Lords. Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said that the court must be sure of "the substance of the provision Parliament would have made, although not necessarily the precise words Parliament would have used. [See Inco Europe Ltd. v. First Choice Distribution (a firm): (2000) 1 WLR 586: (2000) 2 All ER 109 (HL)] (See also K.L. Gupte vs. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay: AIR 1968 SC 303 : (1968) 1 SCR 274 , Maruti Udyog Ltd. vs. Ram Lal: (2005) 2 SCC 638 : 2005 SCC (L & S) 308, Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd.: (1987) 1 SCC 424 , Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer: (1990) 3 SCC 682 : 1991 SCC (L & S) 71, Balram Kumawat vs. Union of India: (2003) 7 SCC 628 and Pratap Singh vs. State of Jharkhand: (2005) 3 SCC 551 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 742). 20. Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 of the MPDA, 1995 consists of two parts, first part of Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 deals with the detention order passed by the District Magistrate or by the empowered officer, which may be revoked or modified by the State Govt. at any time and the second part of Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 deals with the detention order made by the State Govt., which may be revoked or modified by the Central Govt. at any time and the second part of Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 deals with the detention order made by the State Govt., which may be revoked or modified by the Central Govt. For interpreting the word "or" appearing in second part of Sub-Section (1) of Section 15, the principle of "noscitur a sociis" shall be applied and also "doctrine of purposive construction" shall also be applied in interpreting the Sub-Section (1) of Section 15, more particularly the second part of Sub--Section (1) of Section 15 of the MPDA, 1995, and accordingly, the meaning of the word 'or' is to be judged by the company it keeps; and Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 should also be interpreted in such a manner that the second part of Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 is prevented from being unintelligible, absurd and unworkable. After such consideration, we are of the considered view that the second part of Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 of the MPDA, 1995 is to be interpreted in such a manner that in the case of detention order made by the State Govt., may be revoked by the Central Govt. In other words, the detention order made by the State Govt. may be at any time revoked or modified by the Central Govt. 21. The Central Govt. under the order dated 20.01.2011, had informed the Govt. of Meghalaya that the Govt. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs had decided that the MPDA, 1995 does not provide right to the detenu to file representation to the Govt. of India against the detention order issued by the District Magistrate under Section 3(1) of the MPDA, 1995 as Section 15(1) of the MPDA, 1995 provides that in the case of detention order has been issued by the District Magistrate, it is for the State Govt. to consider the representation. The said letter of the Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi dated 20.01.2011 reads as follows:- No. II/15050/01/2011- NSA Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs New Delhi, dated the 20th January, 2011 To The Principal Secretary/Commissioner & Secretary, Political Department, Government of Meghalaya, Meghalaya Secretariat, Shillong. Subject-: Representation from Shri Albin Ch. Momin under Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act. Sir, I am directed to refer to letter No. DJJ-08/2004/Pt.IV/94, dated 21st December, 2010 from the Superintendent District Jail, Jowai forwarding representation of the detenue Shri Albin Ch. Subject-: Representation from Shri Albin Ch. Momin under Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act. Sir, I am directed to refer to letter No. DJJ-08/2004/Pt.IV/94, dated 21st December, 2010 from the Superintendent District Jail, Jowai forwarding representation of the detenue Shri Albin Ch. Momin under Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act and to convey that on examination it is found that in the detention order it has been mentioned that the detenue can submit his representation to Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, whereas the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1995 does not provide for the same when the detention order has been issued by the District Magistrate under Section3(1) of the Act Section 15(1) of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1995 provides that in case the detention order has been issued by the District Magistrate, it is for the State Government of Meghalaya to consider the representation. Therefore, the representation received from Shri Albin Ch. Momin is being returned herewith for appropriate action. 2. I am further directed to say that all District Magistrate in the State of Meghalaya may be suitably advised of the above provisions of the MPDA Act, 1995. 3. Kindly acknowledge receipt of the letter Yours faithfully, Sd/- (Smt. L.P. Srivastava) Under Secretary to the Government of India Tel. No. 24610467 22. It is also fairly settled law that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the presidential value of a decision [Ref-See Ram Rakhi v. Union of India: AIR 2002 Del 458 (FB), Delhi Admn. (NCT of Delhi) v. Manohar Lal: (2002) 7 SCC 222 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1670: AIR 2002 SC 3088 , Haryana Financial Corpn. V. Jagdamba Oil Mills: (2002) 3 SCC 496 : JT (2002) 1 SC 482 and Nalini Mahajan (Dr) v. Director of Income Tax (Investigation): (2002) 257 ITR 123 (Del) and also Bhavnagar University case (Supra)]. It is also equally well settled that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. The Apex Court in Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat: (1987) 1 SCC 213 (vide SCC p. 221, para 18) this Court observed: - 18. The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. The Apex Court in Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat: (1987) 1 SCC 213 (vide SCC p. 221, para 18) this Court observed: - 18. The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it 23. In Bhavnagar University case (Supra) (vide SCC p. 130, para 59), this Court observed:- 59..... It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the presidential value of a decision. (emphasis supplied) 24. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani: (2004) 8 SCC 579 : AIR 2004 SC 4778 , a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same Judgment this Court also observed:- (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 9-12) 9. Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of the context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. vs. Horton: 1951 AC 737: (1951) 2 All ER 1 (HL) (AC at p. 761), Lord Mac Dermot observed: (All ER p. 14 C-D) The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge,.... In Home Office vs. Dorset Yacht Co. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge,.... In Home Office vs. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd.: 1970 AC 1004: (1970) 2 WLR 1140: (1970) 2 All ER 294 (HL) (All ER p. 297 g-h) Lord Reid said, Lord Atkins speech..... is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances. Megarry, J. in Shepherd Home Ltd., v. Sandham (No. 2): (1971)1 WLR 1062:(1971) 2 All ER 1267 observed: (All ER p. 1274d) 'One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament.' And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board: 1972 AC 877: (1972) 2 WLR 537: (1972) 1 All ER 749 [(HL (E)] Lord Morris said: (All ER p. 761c) 'There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. 11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 12. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo, J.) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive. *** Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path of justice clear of obstructions which could impede it. (emphasis supplied) 25. *** Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path of justice clear of obstructions which could impede it. (emphasis supplied) 25. Keeping in view of the settled principle of construction of statute and also the settled principle as to how the ratio of the judgment and order must be understood, we have given our anxious consideration to the said submission made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner that "the Central Govt. is the authority having the power for revocation of the detention order passed by the District Magistrate under Section 15 of the MPDA, 1995" and are of the view that the State Govt. is the authority for revocation of the detention order passed by the District Magistrate under the MPDA, 1995 whereas, the Central Govt. is the competent authority for revocation of the detention order passed by the Detaining authority or by the empowered officer or by the State Govt. in the cases under the National Security Act, 1980 and also in the cases under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. We reiterated that in the case of detention order passed by the District Magistrate, the State Govt. has the power to revoke under first part of Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 and under second part of Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 of the MPDA, 1995, the Central Govt. is the competent authority to revoke the detention order passed by the State Govt. and the Central Govt. has nothing to do with the detention order passed by the District Magistrate or by the empowered officer under the MPDA, 1995. 26. is the competent authority to revoke the detention order passed by the State Govt. and the Central Govt. has nothing to do with the detention order passed by the District Magistrate or by the empowered officer under the MPDA, 1995. 26. In the present case in hand, the Detaining authority was fully aware of the fact that the appellant/writ petitioner was in custody at the time of passing the detention order and bail had been granted to the appellant/writ petitioner for the said two criminal cases of Nongstoin Police Station by the erstwhile Hon'ble Gauhati High Court and applied bails for other cases, and passed the detention order on being satisfied that if the appellant/writ petitioner is allowed to remain at large, he would act in a manner prejudicial to the activities of the State and maintenance of public order in the district. The Apex Court in Union of India v. Paul Manickam & Ann AIR 2003 SC 6422 laid down three conditions which are to be satisfied for detaining a detenu already in custody under the detention order. Para 12 of AIR in Paul Manickam's case (Supra) reads as follows:- 12. So far as this question relating to procedure to be adopted in case the detenue is already in custody is concerned, the matter has been dealt with in several cases. Where detention orders are passed in relation to persons who are already in Jail under some other laws, the detaining authority should apply their mind and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention, the chances of release of such persons on bail. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. Subsisting custody the detenue by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention, and decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenue from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or economic stability, etc. ordinarily, it is not needed when detenue is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenue and take that factor into account while making the order. ordinarily, it is not needed when detenue is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenue and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied on cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging such prejudicial activities the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenue was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated. (See N. Meera Rani v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu: ( AIR 1989 SC 2027 ); Dharmendra Suganchand v. Union of India: AIR 1990 SC 1196 ) The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India: ( AIR 1991 SC 1640 ) The principles were set out as follows. Even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed, (1) If the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him; (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail, and (b) that on being released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities, and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand, the order of detention and grounds of detention show awareness of custody and/or possibility of release on bail. 27. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner asserted that there is no cogent reason for passing the impugned detention order dated 29.01.2013 for detaining the appellant/writ petitioner under the MPDA, 1995. It is fairly settled law that for issuing the detention order by invoking jurisdiction of suspicious jurisdiction, which we have discussed in the aforesaid paras, there should only be a subjective satisfaction. The subjective satisfaction is a cumulative effect of all the materials placed before the Detaining authority. It is fairly settled law that for issuing the detention order by invoking jurisdiction of suspicious jurisdiction, which we have discussed in the aforesaid paras, there should only be a subjective satisfaction. The subjective satisfaction is a cumulative effect of all the materials placed before the Detaining authority. It is also equally well settled that it is not within the ambit of the discretion of the writ court to determine if the grounds of detention are sufficient or not. The Apex Court in Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi Vs. State of Manipur & Ors.: (2010) 9 SCC 618 held that there must be a reasonable basis for the detention order. There must be material to support the same and Court is entitled to scrutinize the material relied upon by the authority in coming to its conclusion only to see if there is any objective basis for the subjective satisfaction. The Hon'ble Apex Court further held that the grounds stated in the order of detention and the grounds of detention are sufficient or not is not within the ambit of the discretion of the Court. It is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority which is implied. Para 26 of the SCC in Mikoi's case (Supra) reads as follows:- 26. What emerges from these rulings is that, there must be a reasonable basis for the detention order, and there must be material to support the same. The Court is entitled to scrutinized the material relied upon by the authority in coming to its conclusion, and accordingly determine if there is an objective basis for the subjective satisfaction. The subjective satisfaction must be twofold. The detaining authority must be satisfied that the person to be detained is likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and the authority must be further satisfied that it is necessary to detain the said person in order to prevent from so acting. 28. In Lourembam Sana Singh vs. State of Manipur & Ors.: 2008(2) GLT 813, (one of us is the party) held that: 13. It is well settled law that subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority arrived at for detaining the detenu as a preventive measure under the preventive law is invalid if such satisfaction is based on non-existent or irrelevant ground only. It is well settled law that subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority arrived at for detaining the detenu as a preventive measure under the preventive law is invalid if such satisfaction is based on non-existent or irrelevant ground only. Reference in Dwarika Prasad Sahu vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in : AIR 1975 SC 134 The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority arrived at while considering the materials and records was the cumulative result of all the grounds of detention and the involvement of the detenu in different activities. Reference may be made in A.P. Saravanan vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in : (2001) 10 SCC 212 There is no set standards laid down by the NSA for arriving at subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority on the basis of all the materials placed before it by the police. In the present case as stated above, the detaining authority had arrived at on subjective satisfaction, for detaining the detenu under the NSA on the basis of the materials and the information placed by the Superintendent of Police, Imphal West. Therefore, the detention order cannot be said to be illegal on the ground of non application of mind. Reference in Gurudayal Singh vs. Union of India reported in : (2002) 1 SCC 545 . The Apex Court in Union of India vs. Paul Manikham reported in : (2003) 8 SCC 342 held that: Preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence while the criminal proceedings are to punish a person for an offence committed by him. They are not parallel proceedings. The object of the law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive. It is resorted to when the executive is convinced on the materials available and placed before it that such detention is necessary in order to prevent the person detained from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain objects which are specified by the law. The action of the executive in detaining a person being only precautionary, the matter has necessarily to be left to the discretion of the executive authorities. It is not practicable to lay down objective rules of conduct, the failure to confirm to which alone should lead to detention. 29. In Thongam (Ongbi) Sanatombi Devi vs. District Magistrate, Imphal West & Ors.: 2007(4) GLT 931 also held: 13. It is not practicable to lay down objective rules of conduct, the failure to confirm to which alone should lead to detention. 29. In Thongam (Ongbi) Sanatombi Devi vs. District Magistrate, Imphal West & Ors.: 2007(4) GLT 931 also held: 13. It is a settled position of law that the nature of satisfaction of the detaining authority in issuing the detention order under National Security Act for preventing a detenu from indulging in such activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and the security of the State is only a subjective satisfaction but subjective satisfaction should not be on no material. 14. The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority arrived at while considering the materials and records was the cumulative result of all the grounds of detention in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in : (2001) 10 SCC 212 (A.P. Saravanan Vs. State of Tamil Nadu) According to the learned counsel for the respondents no set standards have been laid down by the Act for arriving at subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The subjective satisfaction in the present case had been arrived at by the detaining authority on the basis of all the materials placed before him. Therefore, the detention order cannot be said to be illegal on the grounds of non-application of mind in view of the principles laid down in Gurdew Singh Vs. Union of India : (2002) 1 SCC 545 . 19. As we have discussed above, the satisfaction of the (sic) authority for issuing the detention order is only a subjective satisfaction. We, within the four corners of law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases discussed above, perused the materials available on record to see as to whether the relevant materials were placed before the detaining authority at the time of passing the detention order or not be effective to prevent him from the commission of further prejudicial activities. 30. We again recall the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court passed more than half a century ago in State of Bombay Vs Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya: AIR (38) 1951 SC 157 that subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority must be based on some grounds. The question whether such grounds can give rise to the subjective satisfaction required for making the order is outside the scope of the inquiry of the court. 31. The question whether such grounds can give rise to the subjective satisfaction required for making the order is outside the scope of the inquiry of the court. 31. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner also urged that the material documents are not supplied to the appellant/writ petitioner for filing representation against the detention order. We have also carefully perused the writ petition as well as the representation dated 14.02.2013 filed by the appellant/writ petitioner and on such perusal, we do not know what are the material documents inasmuch as, neither in the writ petition nor in the representation dated 14.02.2013 mentioned the particulars of material documents to be supplied with and also in nowhere of the representation dated 14.02.2013, which is appeared to be drafted by the appellant/writ petitioner in consultation with the lawyer did not mention that the appellant/writ petitioner cannot file the effective representation because of non-furnishing of the material documents. In fact, the appellant/writ petitioner had filed the representation dated 14.02.2013 consisting of six pages. 32. It is clear from the maxim "Expressum Facit Cessare Tacitum" that "when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded. More than half a century ago, the Constitution Bench in State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Shirdhar Vaidya: AIR (38) 1951 SC 157, in the context of Article 22(5) and preventive detention Act (Act No. 4 of 1950) clearly held that "what must be supplied are the grounds on which the order has been made and nothing else. And also further held that vagueness of the grounds of detention is a relative term and it is to be decided on the basis of the fact of case. In other words, as to whether there is vagueness in the grounds of detention is to be decided on the basis of the fact of that case. What is guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India to a detenu is that the petitioner-detenu should be informed the conclusion of facts which form the grounds of detention and documents which form the grounds of detention. The Apex Court (Constitution Bench) in Atma Ram Shirdhar Vaidya's case (Supra) reads as follows- ..... We think that the position will be clarified if it is appreciated in the first instance what are the rights given by article22(5). The Apex Court (Constitution Bench) in Atma Ram Shirdhar Vaidya's case (Supra) reads as follows- ..... We think that the position will be clarified if it is appreciated in the first instance what are the rights given by article22(5). 'The first part of article 22, clause (5), gives a right to the detained person to be furnished with "the grounds on which the order has been made" and that has to be done "as soon as may be." The second right given to such persons is of being afforded "the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order" It is obvious that the grounds for making the order as mentioned above, are the grounds on which the detaining authority was satisfied that it was necessary to make the order These grounds therefore must be in existence when the order is made. By their very nature the grounds are conclusions of facts and not a complete detailed recital of all the facts. The conclusions drawn from the available facts will show in which of the three categories of prejudicial acts the suspended activity of the particular person is considered to fall. These conclusions are the "grounds" and they must be supplied. No part of such "grounds" can be held back nor can any more "grounds" be added thereto. What must be supplied are the "grounds on which the order has been made" and nothing less. The second right of being afforded the "earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order" is not confined to only a physical opportunity by supplying paper and pen only. In order that a representation can be made the person detained must first have knowledge of the grounds on which the authorities conveyed that they were satisfied about the necessity of making the detention order. It is therefore clear that if the representation has to be intelligible to meet the charges contained in the grounds, the information conveyed to be detained person must be sufficient to attain that object. Ordinarily, the "grounds" in the sense of conclusions drawn by the authorities will indicate the kind of prejudicial act the detenue is suspended of being engaged in and that will be sufficient to enable him to make a representation setting out his innocent activities to dispel the suspicion against him. Ordinarily, the "grounds" in the sense of conclusions drawn by the authorities will indicate the kind of prejudicial act the detenue is suspended of being engaged in and that will be sufficient to enable him to make a representation setting out his innocent activities to dispel the suspicion against him. Of course if the detenue is told about the details of facts besides the grounds he will certainly be in a better position to deal with the same. It is significant that the clause does not say that the "grounds" as well as details of facts on which they are based must be furnished or furnished at one time. The law does not prescribe within what time after the grounds are furnished the representation could be made. The time in each case appears deliberately un-provided for expressly, because circumstances vary in each case and make it impossible to fix a particular time for the exercise of each of these two rights. 33. The Apex Court (Constitution Bench) in Naresh Chandra Ganguli for Shri Ram Prasad Das v. The State of West Bengal & Ors: AIR 1959 SC 1335 (V 46 C 188) had considered in threadbare the rights of the detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and what are to be informed to the detenu for enabling him to file effective representations, and held that what must be supplied are the grounds on which the order has been made and nothing less. 34. From the foregoing decisions of the Constitution Benches of the Apex Court, it is clear that what is to be furnished or communicated to the detneu in compliance of the mandates of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India is only the grounds of detention and nothing else and also furnishing of grounds of detention is only for enabling the detenu to file effective representation and as to whether or not the grounds of detention furnished to the detenu are sufficient for filing the effective representations. We may also recall the decision of the Apex Court in Khudi Ram Das v. State of West Bengal: (1975) 2 SCR 832 : AIR 1975 SC 550 that the constitutional right of life and personal liberty is placed on such a high pedestal by the Apex Court that it is always insisted that whenever there is any deprivation of life or personal liberty, the authority responsible for such deprivation must satisfy the court that it has acted in accordance with law. This is an area where the court has been most strict and scrupulous in ensuring observance with the requirement of law, and even where a slightest measure, the Court has not hesitated to strike down the order of detention or to direct the release of the detenu even though the detention may have been valid till the breach occurred. (See: decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in AK Roy v. Union of India: (1982) SCR 272: AIR 1982 SC 710 ). We also reiterate that the Apex Court in a catena of cases including the decisions of the Constitution Benches in the above referred cases held that what is required to see by the Court is that if the grounds of detention furnished to the detenu will be sufficient for filing effective representation and in the given case, the grounds of detention furnished to the appellant/writ petitioner are sufficient for filing the effective representation and in fact the appellant/writ petitioner had filed the representation dated 14.02.2013 which consists of more than six pages by putting up all his points and reasons for revocation of the detention order. 35. As a last chance, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner submitted that as the Police had failed to produce iota of evidence, the erstwhile Hon'ble Gauhati High Court was pleased to grant bail to the appellant/writ petitioner and also that every person is presumed to be innocent only till his guilt is established in a court of law and further argued as if the detention order is the judgment and order for conviction of the accused of an offence and the detention order is only an order relating with the law and order problem. He further argued that as the learned District Magistrate issued the detention order on the satisfaction that the appellant/writ petitioner would act in (i) a manner prejudicial to the security of the State and (ii) maintenance of public order, the Detaining authority has to prove that the said two satisfactions are valid. For deciding this point, it would be profitable to quote Section 9 of the MPDA, 1995:- 9. Ground of detention severable - where a person is detained in pursuance of detention order which has been made on two or more grounds such detention order shall be deemed to have been made separately on such grounds and accordingly - (a) Such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds are - (i) vague; (ii) non-existent; (iii) not relevant; (iv) not connected or non proximately connected with such person; or (v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not therefore, possible to hold that the authority making the order would have been satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) of section3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds for making the detention order; and (b) the authority making the order shall be deemed to have been made the detention order after being satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) of section 3, with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. In the aforementioned paras, we had clearly held that the object of law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive and detention order is not an order for convicting the appellant/writ petitioner for an offence and also that under the law of preventive detention, it is not required to prove beyond reasonable doubt the satisfaction of the Detaining authority for passing the detention order. 36. The Apex Court had considered the meaning and import of the expressions - 'law and order' and 'public order' in a catena of cases. The Apex Court in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar: 1966 SC 740 through Justice Hidayatullah (as he then was), observed that one has to imagine three concentric circles, in order to understand the meaning and import of the expression 'law and order', 'public interest' and 'security of State'. 'Law and order' represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing 'public order' and the smallest circle represents 'security of State'. 37. 'Law and order' represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing 'public order' and the smallest circle represents 'security of State'. 37. The Apex Court in State of U.P.& Anr. v. Sanjai Pratap Gupta @ Pappu & Ors.: 2004(7) Supreme 24 , held that the crucial issue is whether the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to public order. While the expression 'law and order' is wider scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order. 'Public order' has a narrower ambit, and public order could be affected by only 'such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' is one of the degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it could raise problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting 'public order' from that concerning 'law and order. The question to ask is: "Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affects merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed"? This question has to be faced in every case on its facts. 38. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered view that the present writ appeal is devoid of merit and accordingly it is dismissed.