JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—This writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has arisen from the judgment and order dated 28th July 1983 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation, Faizabad (hereinafter referred to as “DDC”) in Revision No. 1443 under Section 48 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as “Act 1953”), whereby it has allowed revision and setting aside the orders dated 21.12.1982 of Consolidation Officer (for short “C.O.”) and dated 29.1.1983 passed by Settlement Officer of Consolidation (For short “S.O.C.”), has upheld the consolidation plan prepared by Assistant Consolidation Officer (hereinafter referred to as “ACO”) in respect of plots No. 188, 164, 41, 158, 223, 71, 228, 153, 139 and 217. 2. The petitioner initially had two plots in Sector 4, one numbered as 50, area 2 Bighas 9 Biswas and 10 Biswansi and another number 30 area 2 Bighas, 2 Biswas and 4 Biswansi. It is said that plot No. 50 was adjacent to Abadi, close to main road. In consolidation proceedings, ACO alloted Chak No. 164 to petitioner which comprises of plots No. 48/M measuring 1 Biswa, 40/2M measuring 8/biswa 10 biswansi 40/2M measuring 1 Biswa 10 biswansi, 40/3M measuring 5 biswa, 46/2M measuring 10 Biswa 12 biswansi, 46/1 measuring 2 Bigha and 17 Biswa and plot No. 42/M measuring 4 Biswa 4 Biswansi. The petitioner filed objection that Chak No. 164 consists of Usar land and none of original plots formed part thereof, besides the fact that plot No. 50 of petitioner was near Abadi and adjacent to main road and all these things have been ignored. The C.O. vide order dated 21.12.1982 accepted the objection and directed to divide Sector 4 in two sub-sectors and therefrom plots No. 50 and 30 were allotted to petitioner. One Ram Saran who was originally alloted Chak No. 198 on plots No. 50 and 51 got affected by the said order which had resulted in reducing the area of Chak No. 198 and allotting original plot No. 50 therefrom to the petitioner. He however, did not prefer any appeal. Instead, petitioner filed appeal under Section 21(2) before SOC. One Ram Saran who was originally alloted Chak No. 198 on plots No. 50 and 51 got affected by the said order which had resulted in reducing the area of Chak No. 198 and allotting original plot No. 50 therefrom to the petitioner. He however, did not prefer any appeal. Instead, petitioner filed appeal under Section 21(2) before SOC. However, there came five other appeals, i.e. No. 214, Ram Udit v. Gaon Sabha; 216, Abhay Raj v. Sukhraji; 217, Smt. Sukhraji v. Abhay Raj; 219, Udai Bhan v. Saran and 221, Mati Ram v. Avtar, which included the dispute relating to plots and chaks in dispute. Therefore, all were heard together alongwith petitioner’s appeal No. 213 and decided vide order dated 29.1.1983. Appeal No. 221 was dismissed. Appeal No. 219 was partly allowed and rest were allowed. SOC made respective amendments in the light of the directions contained in the last but one penultimate paragraph of the order, which would be discussed at a later stage, if necessity so arises. 3. Aggrieved thereby, three revisions were filed, being Revision No. 1358-Ram Laut v. State and others, 1443-Udai Bhan v. Ram Udit and others and 1514 Ram Awadh v. Saran and others, before DDC. All have been collectively decided by impugned order dated 28.7.1983. 4. Revisional Court after discussing entire things and having spot inspection found that initial allotment made by ACO did satisfy almost all the parties, except one i.e. the petitioner whereas alteration made by SOC resulted in colossal dispute amongst various parties. Therefore, it would be appropriate to restore the original plan and set aside the amendment as directed by C.O. And SOC and hence, both the orders were set aside. 5. Learned counsel for petitioner contended that principles for allotment of Chaks to be followed in accordance with Section 19 of Act 1953 have not been adhered to. He has further contended that Rule 25 has not been complied with. The order by revisional authority is patently illegal as it has not considered grievance of petitioner that one of his plots was near Abadi and adjacent to main road. While allotting a Chak to petitioner, this aspect ought to have been considered. Besides, alleged chak constituted mostly Usar land which is large part, compared to what the petitioner’s land was. The order by revisional authority is patently illegal as it has not considered grievance of petitioner that one of his plots was near Abadi and adjacent to main road. While allotting a Chak to petitioner, this aspect ought to have been considered. Besides, alleged chak constituted mostly Usar land which is large part, compared to what the petitioner’s land was. He further contended that in absence of any finding recorded by DDC that there was any patent error or violation of principles of natural justice or otherwise illegality, it was not open to revisional authority to exercise jurisdiction under Section 48 and here he has committed manifest error, thereby exceeded his jurisdiction. 6. Sri A.S. Chaudhary who has put in appearance on behalf of respondent No. 14 also supported the stand taken by petitioner in respect of the grounds on which impugned order passed by DDC has been challenged. 7. Respondents No. 1 and 2 are represented by learned Standing Counsel while none has appeared on behalf of other respondents. 8. It is worthy to notice that vide order dated 20.2.1994, service of notice upon respondents No. 6, 9, 10, 11 and 13 was deemed sufficient under Chapter 8 rule 12 of High Court Rules. Rest of the respondents were already represented through their respective counsel. 9. The contentions advanced above gives rise to two issues: (i) Whether DDC rightly interfered with the impugned order and power exercised by him is within four corners of Section 48 of Act 1953 ? (ii) Whether in allotment of Chaks to the petitioner relevant principles had been followed and grievance of petitioner had been attended or not? 10. The Scheme of the statute contemplates a tentative plan, inviting objection from stake-holder, i.e. tenure holder, and, after considering the same, finalization of plan, i.e., allotment of Chaks. Thereagainst appellate power has been conferred upon SOC under Section 21(2) of Act 1953. The power which is exercised by DDC, is termed “Revision and reference” under Section 48 of Act, 1953. 11. The original Section 48, as enacted initially, read as under: “48. Thereagainst appellate power has been conferred upon SOC under Section 21(2) of Act 1953. The power which is exercised by DDC, is termed “Revision and reference” under Section 48 of Act, 1953. 11. The original Section 48, as enacted initially, read as under: “48. Revision.—Director of Consolidation may call for the record of any case if the Officer (other than the Arbitrator) by whom the case was decided appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or to have failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial irregularity and may pass such orders in the case as it thinks fit.” 12. It was amended by substitution by U.P. Act No. 24 of 1956 as under: “48. Powers of Director of Consolidation to call for records and to revise orders.—The Director of Consolidation may call for the record of any case or proceeding if the Officer (other than the Arbitrator) by whom the case was decided or proceeding taken appears to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in him by law or to have failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial irregularity and may pass such orders in the case as it thinks fit.” (amendment in bold) 13. Within a short period, it was again amended by U.P. Amendment Act No. 38 of 1958 as under: “48. Revision.—The Director of Consolidation may call for the record of any case decided or proceedings taken, where he is of opinion that a Deputy Director, Consolidation has - (i) exercised jurisdiction not vested in him in law, or (ii) failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him, or (iii) acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial irregularity, and as a result of which, substantial injustice appears to have been caused to a tenure-holder and he may4, after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned, pass such order in the case or proceeding as he thinks fit.” (amendment in bold) 14. Section 48 underwent a minor amendment vide Section 39 of U.P. (Amendment) Act No. VIII of 1963. An Explanation was added by Act No. 4 of 1969 with retrospective effect. Section 48 underwent a minor amendment vide Section 39 of U.P. (Amendment) Act No. VIII of 1963. An Explanation was added by Act No. 4 of 1969 with retrospective effect. Major amendment came to be made by U.P. Act No. 20 of 1982 inasmuch as, in sub-section(1) the words “other than an interlocutory order” were inserted w.e.f. 10.11.1980. The explanation inserted in 1969 was re-numbered as Explanation-(1) by Act No. 20 of 1982 w.e.f. 10.11.1980 and then Explanation(2) was added w.e.f. 10.11.1980. 15. Presently, Section 48 reads as under: “48. Revision and reference.—(1) The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order [other than interlocutory order] passed by such authority in the case of proceedings and may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case of proceedings as he thinks fit. (2) Powers under sub-section (1) may be exercised by the Director of Consolidation also on a reference under sub-section (3). (3) Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under sub-section (1). Explanation (1).—For the purposes of this section, Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Consolidation Officers, Assistant Consolidation Officers, Consolidator and Consolidation Lekhpals shall be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation. Explanation (2).—For the purpose of this section the expression ‘interlocutory order’ in relation to a case or proceedings, means such order deciding any matter arising in such case or proceeding or collateral thereto as does not have the effect of finally disposing of such case or proceeding. Explanation (3).—The power under this section to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order includes the power to examine any finding, whether of fact or law, recorded by any subordinate authority, and also includes the power to re-appreciate any oral or documentary evidence.” (emphasis added) 16. Section 48 as it was initially enacted came to be considered in Sher Singh (dead) v. Joint Director of Consolidation and others, (1978) 3 SCC 172 . Section 48 as it was initially enacted came to be considered in Sher Singh (dead) v. Joint Director of Consolidation and others, (1978) 3 SCC 172 . The Court observed that a bare reading show that it is pari materia with Section 115 CPC which confines revisional jurisdiction of High Court to cases of illegal or irregular exercise or non exercise or illegal assumption of jurisdiction by subordinate Courts. If a subordinate Court is found to possess the jurisdiction to decide a matter, it cannot be said to exercise it illegally or with’ material irregularity even it it decides the matter wrongly. Relying on the cases interpreting Section 115 CPC, the Court held that whatever revisional jurisdiction was available to High Court under Section 115, the same was the scope of revisional jurisdiction of DDC under Section 48 and it has no jurisdiction to go into errors of facts. The Court said that an erroneous decision on a question of fact or of law reached by subordinate Court which has no relation to question of jurisdiction of that Court, cannot be corrected by High Court under Section 115 CPC and same would apply to DDC under Section 48. The Court further observed that consolidation authorities subordinate to Joint Director possess plenary jurisdiction and competence to go into the question of correctness or otherwise of entries in revenue records. If there are concurrent findings of fact of two Courts, which do not leave any ground, as observed above, in revisional jurisdiction, interference by Joint Director of Consolidation would not be competent. In para 16 of the judgement, the Court said : “Thus the subordinate Consolidation authorities not having acted illegally in exercising their jurisdiction, the Joint Director of Consolidation was not competent to interfere with their decisions.” 17. Section 48 as amended in 1963 then came to be considered in Ramakant Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P. and others, AIR 1975 All 126 , but therein the Court while considering Section 48(1), to the question, whether Deputy Director of Consolidation, once has called for record, is it incumbent on him to decide the matter on merit or it can decline and dismiss the revision on any technical ground like lack of impleadment of proper party etc. 18. Amended Section 48 in 1963, then came to be considered in Shanti Prakash Gupta v. DDC, 1981 SCC (Suppl) 73. 18. Amended Section 48 in 1963, then came to be considered in Shanti Prakash Gupta v. DDC, 1981 SCC (Suppl) 73. Therein the Court observed that Section 48 as then stood, vide amendment of 1963, was wider than Section 115 CPC. However, it proceeded to hold that Director should not lightly interfere with discretion of C.O. unless the order sought to be reversed is palpably erroneous or likely to cause miscarriage of justice. To the same effect and imposing similar restriction, observations were made in Ram Dular v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, (1994) Supp (2) SCC 198, as under: “It is clear that the Director had power to satisfy himself as to the legality of the proceedings or as to the correctness of the proceedings or correctness, legality or propriety of any order other than interlocutory order passed by the authorities under the Act. But in considering the correctness, legality or propriety of the order or correctness of the proceedings or regularity thereof it cannot assume to itself the jurisdiction of the original authority as a fact-finding authority by appreciating for itself of those facts de novo. It has to consider whether the legally admissible evidence had not been considered by the authorities in recording a finding of fact or law or the conclusion reached by it is based on no evidence, any patent illegality or impropriety had been committed or there was any procedural irregularity, which goes to the root of the matter, had been committed in recording the order or finding.” 19. A slight different observation came to be made in Preetam Singh v. Assistant Director of Consolidation and others, (1996) 2 SCC 270 , where the Court said: “When the matter was in revision before the Assistant director (Consolidation), he had the entire matter before him and his jurisdiction was unfettered. While in seisin of the matter in his revisional jurisdiction, he was in complete control and in position to test the correctness of the order made by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) effecting remand. In other words, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction the Assistant Director (Consolidation) could examine the finding recorded by the Settlement Officer as to the abandonment of the land in dispute by those tenants who had been recorded at the crucial time in the Khasra of 1359 Fasli. In other words, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction the Assistant Director (Consolidation) could examine the finding recorded by the Settlement Officer as to the abandonment of the land in dispute by those tenants who had been recorded at the crucial time in the Khasra of 1359 Fasli. That power as a superior Court the Assistant Director (Consolidation) had, even if the remand order of the Settlement Officer had not been specifically put to challenge in separate and independent proceedings. It is noteworthy that the Court of the Assistant Director (Consolidation) is a Court of revisional jurisdiction otherwise having suo moto power to correct any order of the subordinate officer. In this situation the Assistant Director (Consolidation) should not have felt fettered in doing complete justice between the parties when the entire matter was before him. The war of legalistics fought in the High Court was of no material benefit to the appellants. A decision on merit covering the entire controversy was due from the Assistant Director (Consolidation). (para -6) (emphasis added) 20. Yet in Ram Avtar v. Ram Dhani, AIR 1997 SC 107 , the Court, in para 8, observed: “This Court has repeatedly pointed out that howsoever wide the power under statutory revision may be in contrast to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, still while exercising that power the authority concerned cannot act as a Court of appeal so as to appreciate the evidence on record for recording findings on question of fact.” 21. These observations again put the things in the shape bringing the scope of jurisdiction under Section 48 nearer to jurisdiction as contained in Section 115 CPC. 22. Section 48(1) as it stood before its amendment in 1963 and subsequent thereto, both came to be noticed in Sheshmani and another v. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, District Basti, U.P. and others, 2000(2)SCC 523. Referring to earlier decision in Sher Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation (supra) and Ram Dular v. DDC (supra) and the intervening amendment, the Court followed the observations made in Ram Dular, as noticed above and then upheld the order passed by DDC holding that orders of CO and Additional Settlement Consolidation Officer were against settled principles of law, therefore, DDC was justified in exercise of revisional power, for coming to a different conclusion. 23. 23. It is in these circumstances, Legislature intervened by inserting Explanation-3, by U.P. Act No. 3 of 2002, giving effect from 10.11.1980 but in Karan Singh v. DDC, 2003(94) RD 382, this Court said that even after addition of Explanation-3, DDC cannot substitute its own finding in place of subordinate authorities. 24. Recent decision in Jagdamba Prasad v. Kripa Shankar, (2014) 5 SCC 707 , which has also considered Section 48 as amended in 1963, in para 15, following the earlier decision in Sher Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation (supra) it has said : “15. According to the legal principle laid down by this Court in the case mentioned above, the power of the Revisional Authority under Section 48 of the Act only extends to ascertaining whether the subordinate Courts have exceeded their jurisdiction in coming to the conclusion. Therefore, if the Original and Appellate Authorities are within their jurisdiction, the Revisional Authority cannot exceed its jurisdiction to come to a contrary conclusion by admitting new facts either in the form of documents or otherwise, to come to the conclusion. Therefore, we answer point No. 1 in favour of the appellants by holding that the Revisional Authority exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 48 of the Act by admitting documents at revision stage and altering the decision of the subordinate Courts.” 25. It is thus difficult to observe that Explanation III to Section 48 has brought the scope of revision at par with the appellate jurisdiction so as to assess the evidence on pure issue of fact and recording findings de novo. Revisional power is not a power of first or second appellate Court which are final Courts of fact and findings recorded therein would be possible to be interfered under Section 48 on the ground discussed in Ram Dular (Supra), Sheshmani (Supra) and Jagdamba Prasad (supra). 26. Impugned orders in these matters are all subsequent to 1980 and, therefore, could be governed by aforesaid provision as it is. Sub-section (1) of Section 48 in effect deals revisional power while sub-sections (2) and (3) relate to reference made by an authority subordinate to Director of Consolidation. 26. Impugned orders in these matters are all subsequent to 1980 and, therefore, could be governed by aforesaid provision as it is. Sub-section (1) of Section 48 in effect deals revisional power while sub-sections (2) and (3) relate to reference made by an authority subordinate to Director of Consolidation. From a bare and plain reading of Section 48(1) it is evident that Director of Consolidation has been given power to call for and examine any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself (i) to the regularity of the proceedings and (ii) to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order. 27. Scope of reference is not under consideration before this Court, and, therefore, I find no reason to look into it. Question No. 1 is, therefore, answered accordingly. 28. Power of interference by DDC in revisional jurisdiction having been discussed above, now questions No. 1 and 2 both can be answered together to find out whether the two authorities below i.e. CO and SOC, both have considered the question of allotment of Chaks in accordance with law or not, for the reason, that if their decision was not in accordance with law, it was open for the revisional authority to interfere with and not otherwise. 29. It is not in dispute that the allotment of Chaks is to be made taking into consideration principles laid down under Section 19 of Act 1953. These principles have been considered by this Court in Bechan Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1985 AWC 604 All. In para 4 thereof, this Court has said that allotment of Chak has to be made consistent with the principles, namely, (i) every tenure holder should be allotted compact area at the place where he holds largest part of his holding (ii) the tenure holder, as far as possible, should be allotted the plot on which exists his private source of irrigation or any other improvement together with the area in the vicinity equal to valuation of the plot originally held by him and (iii) every tenure holder, as far as possible, would be allotted Chak in conformity with the process of rectangulation. The Court further held that the area held by tenture holder prior to start of consolidation proceedings, is relevant only to ascertain whether the area allotted to the tenure holder, varies by more than 25% or not, as contained in the first proviso of Section 19 of the Act, 1953. 30. In Dr. A.N. Srivastava v. DDC, 1982 LLJ 42, Hon’ble K. N. Misra J. referring to Section 19(1)(e) of Act 1953 said: “The petitioners under the provisions of Section 19 (1) (e) of the Act were entitled to get a chak at a place where they had held largest part of their original holding. The words ‘as for as possible’ used in the said sub-section do not confer any jurisdiction upon the consolidation authorities to act arbitrarily ignoring the provisions contained therein. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) while altering the chak of the petitioners should have assigned reasons for not making allotment to the petitioners on the aforesaid plots Nos. 1082 and 1087 which were admittedly largest part of their holding. In my opinion the words as far as possible used in Section 19 (1) (e) of the Act require the provisions contained therein to be followed unless their compliance cannot be made for specific reasons to be assigned for it” (emphasis added) 31. This was reiterated in Samai Lal v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh and others, 1985 LLJ 330 and the Court further said: “In the present case the Assistant Consolidation Officer appears to have acted illegally and in violation of the provisions contained in Section 19 (1) (e) of the Act which lays down that every tenure-holder, as for as possible, should be allotted a Chak at a place where he held his largest holding. The Assistant Consolidation Officer should have proposed a Chak of the petitioners on this very plot No. 1703 in accordance with the aforesaid provisions and in case it is not possible, then the reasons should have been mentioned for not allotting a Chak to the petitioners on their plot. The words “as far as possible” used in the said sub-section do not confer any jurisdiction upon the consolidation authorities to act arbitrarily, ignoring the provisions contained thereunder.” (emphasis added) 32. The words “as far as possible” used in the said sub-section do not confer any jurisdiction upon the consolidation authorities to act arbitrarily, ignoring the provisions contained thereunder.” (emphasis added) 32. In Doodh Nath v. DDC and others, 1988(6) LCD 453, the Court held, if a tenure holder has his Chak with private source of irrigation, allotment of chak must be weighed so as to keep intact private source of irrigation of such person. The Court said that there cannot be any legal justification for refusing to allot a Chak to a tenure holder at a particular place, where he had held his private source of irrigation on the ground that his sons or other relations may have been allotted a chak in its vicinity. Every tenure holder would be entitled to get allotment of chak at a place where he could be allotted chak, keeping in view the provisions contained in Section 19 of the Act. The tenure holder would be entitled to get near village Abadi so much of land which he originally held at that place and also at the place of his private source of irrigation. The Court also said that undoubtedly, while deciding objection filed by a tenure holder against proposed allotment of chaks, equities are to be adjusted taking into consideration location of original land-holding of the other tenure holders whose chaks are likely to be affected while determining the objection. But while doing so, just and appropriate claim put forth by the tenure holder cannot be rejected merely on the ground that he is a big tenure holder as compared to the opposite parties or that his son or some other relation has been allotted chak near the place where the objector claims an allotment of chak as against his original holding. The Court added a few words of caution for the consolidation authorities, in the following manner: “In the matter of allotment of chaks a care is to be taken by the authorities to allot chak to the tenure holders to which they are entitled as against their original holdings. If appropriate chak is not allotted to a tenure holder, he sustains irreparable loss and injury for all times to come. If appropriate chak is not allotted to a tenure holder, he sustains irreparable loss and injury for all times to come. Thus in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court is not to feel hesitant in interfering with the impugned orders which are found to be unwarranted in law and facts of the case, merely on the ground that the writ petition could not be taken up earlier for disposal. The impugned orders cannot be left to survive merely on the delay in disposal of the writ petition for no fault of the petitioner.” (para-11) 33. Applying the above principles of law relating to allotment of chak and also statutory provision, this Court finds that specific objection was taken by petitioner regarding nature of land that it mostly comprised of Usar and further that original plot was near Abadi and main road, yet he has been allotted a chak at different place, but for rejecting his objection and setting aside the orders passed by subordinate authorities, the DDC has not at all looked into this objection and has gone to decide the matter only on the ground that since initially objection was raised by petitioner and not by others, against the proposed allotment of Chak, therefore, scheme proposed initially should be accepted. He has followed a majoritarian way. He has failed to consider that right of objection against allotment of Chak has been conferred upon aggrieved tenure holder by the statute. If such objection has been made, raising valid and relevant issue(s), it is incumbent upon consolidation authorities to decide the same and those issues cannot be bye-passed or ignored or omitted on irrelevant considerations, as has been done by DDC in the case in hand. The location of chak, its value, are all interconnected issues. The same cannot be ignored for fanciful conjectures and unmindful whims of consolidation authorities. It shows mere arbitrary act on their part, instead of an attempt to decide the matter by doing justice in accordance with law with the poor tenure holder whose entire livelihood depends on it. The location of chak, its value, are all interconnected issues. The same cannot be ignored for fanciful conjectures and unmindful whims of consolidation authorities. It shows mere arbitrary act on their part, instead of an attempt to decide the matter by doing justice in accordance with law with the poor tenure holder whose entire livelihood depends on it. If a chak is altered by another one which is much inferior for various reasons, then what he initially held, it amounts to deprives him of his valuable property, by giving another land which is not equivalent as far as possible, but is apparently inferior in various ways and thereby he would stand deprived of his right to property affecting his constitutional right under Article 14 read with 300A of the Constitution of India. Consolidation authorities are therefore, bound to act more cautiously and objectively. 34. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order passed by DDC is hereby set aside. The matter is remanded to DDC to decide petitioner’s revision afresh, in the light of observations made above, and, in accordance with law expeditiously and, in any case, within two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before him, after giving due opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties. 35. No costs. —————