ORDER 1. Since both these applications under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. have arisen out of same FIR, therefore, they are being decided by this common judgment and order, for the sake of brevity. 2. The applicants, by means of present applications/petitions under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. seek to set aside impugned charge-sheet dated 27.08.2010, as also the proceedings of Criminal Case No. 1166 of 2010, under Sections 323, 504, 506, 120B of IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nainital. 3. An FIR was lodged by informant (respondent No. 3 herein) against two named accused persons (applicants herein) on 31.07.2010, for the offences punishable under Section 506 of IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. After investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted against the applicants for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 504, 506, 120B of IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Cognizance was taken by learned Magistrate on the said charge-sheet and the accused persons were summoned to face the trial. Feeling aggrieved against the same, present applications under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. were filed by the applicants. 4. As per FIR, on 31.07.2010, at 07:00 a.m. when the informant was going to Dhari along with one Gurpreet Singh, Kulvinder Singh alias Ijji and his younger brother Rajendra Singh alias Vikky (applicants herein) met him near the bridge. The applicants were digging the pathway with the help of tractor/cultivators. Informant (victim) requested them not to do so. Accused persons did not accede to his request. Instead, Kulvinder Singh alias Ijji used casteist remarks against the informant and asked him to flee away from the spot, or else, he would be killed. Kulvinder Singh alias Ijji took the rifle of his younger brother and threatened the informant with dire consequences. Informant made a phone call to somebody in the crusher. One Jaspreet Singh came from the crusher. When the witness came, accused persons fled away. In a nutshell, the accused persons used casteist remarks, caused insult to the informant and threatened him with dire consequences. 5. Informant made a phone call to somebody in the crusher. One Jaspreet Singh came from the crusher. When the witness came, accused persons fled away. In a nutshell, the accused persons used casteist remarks, caused insult to the informant and threatened him with dire consequences. 5. As stated earlier, charge-sheet was submitted against accused persons under Sections 323, 504, 506, 120B of IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. On a reading of the FIR and other documents filed on behalf of the prosecution, offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code were, prima facie, made out against the applicants. In other words, foundation of criminal offences under the Indian Penal Code was laid against the applicants. 6. Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that even if the contents of the FIR be conceded to be true, no ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act were prima facie made out against the applicants, in the sense that informant nowhere said that the accused persons used those words intentionally in order to humiliate him knowing it that he belonged to a community of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, as was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gorige Pentaiah vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, (2008) 12 SCC 531 : AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 634. 7. On perusal of the FIR, foundation of offences under Sections 323, 504, 506, 120B of IPC is laid against the applicants. No prima facie case under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is, however, made out against them (applicants), in view of Gorige Pentaiahs case (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 634) (supra), wherein, in paragraph No. 6, it was observed by Hon'ble Apex Court as under: In the instant case, the allegation of respondent No. 3 in the entire complaint is that on 27.05.2004, the appellant abused them with the name of their caste. According to the basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the complainant ought to have alleged that the appellant-accused was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he (respondent No. 3) was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. According to the basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the complainant ought to have alleged that the appellant-accused was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he (respondent No. 3) was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. In the entire complaint, nowhere it is mentioned that the appellant-accused was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled tribe and he intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate respondent No. 3 in a place within public view. When the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such a complaint to continue and to compel the appellant to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading to abuse of process of law. 8. Hon'ble Apex Court in Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander and Another, (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, has laid down certain principles in respect of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. One of the principle is that the Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the court may interfere. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. If the records disclose commission of a criminal offence and the ingredients of the offence are satisfied, then such criminal proceedings cannot be quashed merely because a civil wrong has also been committed. The power cannot be invoked to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The factual foundation and ingredients of an offence being satisfied, the court will not either dismiss a complaint or quash such proceeding in exercise of its original jurisdiction. 9. There appears to be no illegality in the cognizance and summoning order so far as the allegations levelled under the Indian Penal Code are concerned. No interference is called for in the same at this stage, as would be evident from the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Rajiv Thapar and Others vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 : AIR 2013 SC (Cri) 659. Paragraph No. 28 of the said ruling is reproduced herein-below for convenience: 28. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. must make a just and rightful choice. This is not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant against the accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty the defences raised on behalf of the accused is. Even if the accused is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt, in the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, it would be impermissible to discharge the accused before trial. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty the defences raised on behalf of the accused is. Even if the accused is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt, in the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, it would be impermissible to discharge the accused before trial. This is so, because it would result in giving finality to the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without allowing the prosecution or the complainant to adduce evidence to substantiate the same. The converse is, however, not true, because even if trial is proceeded with, the accused is not subjected to any irreparable consequences. The accused would still be in a position to succeed, by establishing his defences by producing evidence in accordance with law. There is an endless list of judgments rendered by this Court declaring the legal position, that in a case where the prosecution/complainant has levelled allegations bringing out all ingredients of the charges levelled and have placed material before the Court, prima facie evidencing the truthfulness of the allegations levelled, trial must be held. 10. It is settled law that the factual controversy need not be gone into by this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. Since foundation of criminal offences is laid against the accused-applicants for the offences complained of against them under the Indian Penal Code, therefore, this Court is of the opinion that, prima facie, offences under the Indian Penal Code are made out against the applicants, but the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not made out in view of Gorige Pentaiahs (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 634) ruling. 11. Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. 12. Application under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. is, therefore, partly allowed to the extent of exclusion of Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 only. In other words, the applicants will face the trial for the offences for which charge-sheet was submitted against them, but not under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Application under Section 482 of Cr. In other words, the applicants will face the trial for the offences for which charge-sheet was submitted against them, but not under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Application under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. is, therefore, dismissed so far the summoning of accused persons (applicants herein) under different Sections of the Indian Penal Code is concerned. 13. Since the offences complained of against the applicants under different Sections of the Indian Penal Code are bailable offences, therefore, it is provided that if the accused-applicants surrender before learned Magistrate and seek bail, their bail applications be decided by him on the same day. Application partly allowed.