Judgment : This is the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner Corporation (APSRTC) questioning the award, dated 24-07-2006 in ID No. 199 of 2002 passed by the second respondent/Labour Court, Ananthapur, inter alia, on the ground that the said Tribunal does not have the necessary jurisdiction to entertain the industrial dispute raised by the workman. Facts in brief are that a workman, since deceased, driving the bus of the Corporation, caused a fatal accident on 29-01-1990, resulting in the death of an old lady. After charging the workman on that count, not satisfied with the explanation submitted by him, the Corporation went ahead with domestic enquiry, which eventually resulted in the removal of the workman from service as a measure of major punishment, through an order, dated 17-07-1990, passed by the Disciplinary authority. Once the intra departmental appeal proved futile, the workman filed the revision before the Regional Manager, Cuddapah, who through his order dt. 14-06-1991, set aside the order of removal and ordered reinstatement of the workman by fixing his pay at minimum of the scale of pay, apart from treating the period of absence from the date of suspension till reporting for duty to be treated as not on duty. Having rejoined the duty on 15-08-1991, the workman eventually attained the age of superannuation on 31-05-2002, when he retired. In fact, on reinstatement, when the workman was in service, the union, however, espoused the cause of the workman and approached the Government by raising an industrial dispute. With the failure of the conciliation efforts, the Government referred the matter to the Labour Court by invoking Section 10 (1) (C) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“the Act” for brevity). On such reference, the second respondent-Labour Court passed the impugned award on 24-07-2006, further modifying the order of the Revisional authority by granting continuity of service and attendant benefits with difference of wages, including back wages, for the period he was not paid the wages. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner Corporation filed the present writ petition. As a matter of subsequent development, pending the writ petition the workman died on 03-03-2008, whereafter the legal representatives of the deceased workman, his wife and son, were brought on record as respondents three and four. The learned Standing Counsel for the petitioner Corporation, while making his submissions, has the issue of laches as the sheet anchor of his arguments. As a matter of subsequent development, pending the writ petition the workman died on 03-03-2008, whereafter the legal representatives of the deceased workman, his wife and son, were brought on record as respondents three and four. The learned Standing Counsel for the petitioner Corporation, while making his submissions, has the issue of laches as the sheet anchor of his arguments. He has further contended that, the workman initially accepted the order of the Revisional Authority and in compliance thereof joined duty. As such, raising any industrial dispute belatedly is impermissible, inasmuch as the conduct of the workman is hit by the principle of estoppel as well. According to the learned Standing Counsel, it is a case of a fatal accident and the rash and negligent driving on the part of the workman is self-evident. Despite that, the Revisional Authority has already taken a lenient view and ordered reinstatement of the workman. In the face of such a liberal approach on the part of the said authority, subsequently the Labour Court further modifying the order in revision is totally unsustainable. The learned standing counsel has also contended that the Labour Court can exercise its powers under Section 11-A of the act, only when the industrial dispute is raised under Section 2-A of the act. In his submission, once the order of removal stood modified by the Revisional Authority, the Labour Court cannot exercise its powers under Section 11-A of the Act and thereby order the continuity of service or any other benefits. Summing up his submissions, the learned standing counsel has submitted that the order of the Labour Court is not based on material but is essentially based on sympathetic considerations, which cannot be legally countenanced. Accordingly he urged this Court to allow the writ petition by setting aside the award, dated 24-07-2006 of the second respondent-Labour Court. The learned standing counsel has relied on the following decisions in support of the submissions: 1. K. DAYANAND V. THE DEPOT MANAGER, A.P.S.R.T.C, KHAMMAM AND ANOTHER ( 1993 (1) ALT 164 (DB)). 2. B. Vidyasagar v. Depot Manager, APSRTC, Karimnagar Dist., & Others (2006 (4) ALD 507 (DB) ) 3. SOUTH INDIAN CASHEW FACTORIES WORKERS’ UNION v. KERALA STATE CASHEW DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LIMITED AND OTHERS (2006) 5 SCC 201 ). Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents three and four has strenuously defended the award of the Labour Court. 2. B. Vidyasagar v. Depot Manager, APSRTC, Karimnagar Dist., & Others (2006 (4) ALD 507 (DB) ) 3. SOUTH INDIAN CASHEW FACTORIES WORKERS’ UNION v. KERALA STATE CASHEW DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LIMITED AND OTHERS (2006) 5 SCC 201 ). Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents three and four has strenuously defended the award of the Labour Court. He has further submitted that the delay that has occurred during the conciliation proceedings cannot be attributed to the workman. According to the learned counsel, once the cause survives and it has not become stale, the length of delay, if any, is of no consequence. It is the specific contention of the learned counsel that the Government, while referring the matter to the Labour Court, has taken all the issues into consideration and eventually referred it. Ipso facto, it is deemed that the Government took into account even the aspect of the alleged delay and eventually felt that the matter was fit to be referred to industrial adjudication by the Labour Court. Supporting the award of the Labour Court, the learned counsel submits that since the Government has exercised its discretion in referring the matter to it, the Labour Court has not thought it fit to further adjudicate on the same issue of delay. Accordingly, the learned counsel urges this Court to dismiss the writ petition as without any merit. The learned counsel for the respondents three and four has also taken an objection that the writ was filed by the Regional Manager, the Revisional Authority, who is a quasi judicial authority, or in other words an adjudicatory agency. He has contended that if at all any person has been affected by the award of the Labour Court, it ought to be the Depot Manager, but not the adjudicatory agency. On that ground, the learned counsel has urged the Court to dismiss the writ petition. The learned counsel has also brought to the notice of the court that the wife of the deceased workman, now afflicted with senility, has been struggling for the necessary financial support, which is denied to her. In support of his contentions the learned counsel has relied on the following decisions: 1. M/S WESTERN INDIA MATCH COMPANY LIMITED V. THE WESTERN INDIA MATCH COMPANY WORKERS UNION AND OTHERS (1970(1)SCC 225). 2. SAPAN KUMAR PANDIT V. U.P. STAE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND OTHERS (2001) 6 SCC 222 ). 3. In support of his contentions the learned counsel has relied on the following decisions: 1. M/S WESTERN INDIA MATCH COMPANY LIMITED V. THE WESTERN INDIA MATCH COMPANY WORKERS UNION AND OTHERS (1970(1)SCC 225). 2. SAPAN KUMAR PANDIT V. U.P. STAE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND OTHERS (2001) 6 SCC 222 ). 3. Divisional Manager, APSRTC, KHAMMAM V. PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, WARANGAL AND ANOTHER ( 2008 (5) ALD 745 ). Heard the learned standing counsel for the petitioner Corporation and the learned Counsel for the respondents, apart from perusing the record. If we indulge in a bit of chronology, it emerges that the deceased workman was reinstated on 14-06-1991, but joined the duty on 15-08-1991. Between the dates of his rejoining the duty and retiring from service, the workman approached the union and requested them to espouse his cause before the Government for conciliation of the issue, since he was denied continuity of service, attendant benefits and back wages. The reference made by the State Government under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Act is as follows: “Whether the action of the Regional Manager, APSRTC, Kadapa in imposing the punishment of fixing of the pay at the minimum of the scale of pay of the driver Gr.II besides treating the absence from the date of suspension till reported for duty as not on duty of the purpose of leave and wages and ordering for fresh security Deposit of Rs.500/- on reinstatement on Sri S. A. Gaffar, E.47098 driver is justified? From the record it does not clearly emerge when actually the workman approached the union, and when the said union approached the government for conciliation. The fact remains that this process of conciliation and making reference to the Labour Court on the part of the government took place when the workman was in service. I may begin the discussion by referring to the salient statutory features that come into play while considering the issues involved in the present writ petition. ‘Industrial Dispute’ is defined under Section 2 (k) of the Act as follows: Section 2 (k) “industrial dispute” means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person; Section 7 defines Labour Court, and Section 7-A defines Tribunal. Without referring to the State Amendments, if we consider Section 10 of the Act, it is as follows: “10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals.— (1) [Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time], by order in writing,— (a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or (b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry; or [(c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or (d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication:...” (emphasis supplied) Section 11-A, which has expanded the adjudicatory horizons of the Labour Court or Tribunal is to the effect: “11-A. Powers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen.—Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require: Provided that in any proceeding under this Section the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter.” Section 15 of the Act delineates the duties of the Labour Courts and Tribunals in the following manner: “15. Duties of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals.—Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication, it shall hold its proceedings expeditiously and shall, [within the period specified in the order referring such industrial dispute or the further period extended under the second proviso to sub-Section (2-A) of Section 10], submit its award to the appropriate Government.] Since the reference under Section 10 (1) (C) is confined to the enlisted disputes in Schedule II, it may be appropriate to examine what they are: “MATTERS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF LABOUR COURTS 1. The propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer under the standing orders; 2. The application and interpretation of standing orders; 3. Discharge or dismissal of workmen including reinstatement of, or grant of relief to, workmen 4. Withdrawal of any customary concession or privilege; 5. Illegality or otherwise of a strike or lock-out; and 6. All matters other than those specified in the Third Schedule.” Wrongfully dismissed: (emphasis added) It is pertinent to observe that the second respondent is not only a Labour Court but also a notified Industrial Tribunal. As such, it has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the items in Schedule III as well. Schedule III is as follows: “MATTERS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS 1. Wages, including the period and mode of payment; 2. Compensatory and other allowances; 3. Hours of work and rest intervals; 4. Leave with wages and holidays; 5. Bonus, profit sharing, provident fund and gratuity; 6. Shift working otherwise than in accordance with standing orders; 7. Classification by grades; 8. Rules of discipline; 9. Rationalisation; 10. Retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishment; and 11. Any other matter that may be prescribed.” (emphasis added) The present adjudication by the second respondent Tribunal may have been under items 1 & 3 of Schedule II and item 1 of Schedule III. In the above statutory backdrop, the learned Standing Counsel has urged two issues, namely (1) that the reference is stale, and (2) that the Labour Court ought not to have entertained the reference since it could not exercise the powers under Section 11-A of the Act, unless the original reference was under Section 2-A. Thus what fall for consideration are the following two issues: (1) Whether the reference is stale or very belated? (2) Whether the Labour Court has got the necessary jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the reference made by the State Government? In Re. Issue No.1: The Forum constituted under the act is a creature of that statute. It acquires jurisdiction on the basis of reference made to it. The tribunal has to confine itself within the scope of the subject matter of reference and cannot travel beyond the same. It is for this reason that it becomes the bounden duty of the appropriate government to make the reference appropriately which is reflective of the real/exact nature of dispute between the parties. Limited as the jurisdiction is, it can still go into the incidental questions that arise in the wake of adjudicating the principal issues under reference (See TISCO Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand (2014) 1 SCC 536 )). In fact, the real test for making a reference is whether at the time of the reference dispute exists or not; and when it is made, it is presumed that the State Government is satisfied with the ingredients of the provision. As such, the Labour Court cannot go behind the reference. The satisfaction of the appropriate authority in the matter of making reference under Section 10 (1) of the act is a subjective satisfaction. If adequate reasons are shown, the government is bound to refer the dispute for adjudication. (See Kuldeep Singh v. Instrument Design Development & Facilities Centre (2010) 14 SCC 176 )). In Govt. of Gujarat (Fisheries Terminal Dept.) v. Bhikubhai Meghajibhai Chavda (2010)1 SCC 47 ), the issue that fell for consideration was whether the delay in making the reference would be fatal to sustain the proceedings before the tribunal. In that case the reference was made by the government after eight years from the termination of services of the workmen. The Supreme Court has held that once the workman approached the Conciliation Officer, the subsequent delay in completing the conciliation efforts and then finally referring the matter to the Labour Court could not be of any consequence. The principle behind the Courts discouraging the belated claims of workman is that once the matter becomes stale, with the passage of time, it may cease to exist or it may be very difficult for the employer to prove its contentions. The principle behind the Courts discouraging the belated claims of workman is that once the matter becomes stale, with the passage of time, it may cease to exist or it may be very difficult for the employer to prove its contentions. If the issue is alive by the date of reference, and no intervening circumstances obliterate the original cause, every aspect of delay, the length of it being not very material, cannot prove fatal. Accordingly it can be held that there cannot be any universal formula to be applied to the issue of delay covering all circumstances. Even otherwise, if a very stale issue had been referred by the government to the Labour Court, the petitioner Corporation would have, in the first place, assailed the very reference, instead of letting the matter run its full course before the Labour Court, fight the matter on merits and then turn back and assail the very reference, after being unsuccessful in its fight on merits before the Labour Court. The existence of industrial dispute is a subjective satisfaction of the appropriate Government. Once for a valid reason, if the Government holds that the dispute exists and thus makes reference to the Labour Court, as it is essentially a matter of exercising discretion vested in the appropriate Government, it is not prudent for the Labour Court to revisit the issue and stymie the very reference, especially in the face of no challenge against the reference by the employer in the beginning. In M/S WESTERN INDIA MATCH COMPANY LIMITED (4 supra)the respondent workman’s services having been terminated on 29th May, 1957, the matter was taken up by the Union before the Regional Conciliation Officer. There was no conciliation and the State Government declined to make a reference for adjudication under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The workman’s Writ Petition for a mandamus was dismissed by the High Court. The Government, however, by its Order, dated 28th August, 1963, made a reference of the dispute regarding the workman’s termination of service to the Labour Court which rejected the reference on the ground that there was no industrial dispute. The Writ Petition filed by the workman and the Union in the High Court was allowed by a learned Single Judge and that Order was confirmed by the Division Bench. The Company appealed to the Supreme Court. The Writ Petition filed by the workman and the Union in the High Court was allowed by a learned Single Judge and that Order was confirmed by the Division Bench. The Company appealed to the Supreme Court. Among other issues, the following issues have also fallen for consideration: (1) Could the Government refer a dispute for adjudication after a lapse of about six years; and (2) What were the circumstances in which the Government could refer such a dispute after having refused it once. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that the mere fact that there has been a lapse of time or that a party to the dispute was, by the earlier refusal, led to believe that there would be no reference and acts upon such belief, does not affect the jurisdiction of the Government to make the reference. In the said case, though nearly four years had gone by since the date of earlier decision not to make the reference, if the Government, held the Supreme Court, was satisfied that its earlier decision had been arrived at on a misapprehension of facts and therefore required its reconsideration, neither its decision to do so nor its determination to make the reference can be challenged on the ground of want of power. It is further held in para 8 of the judgment: “8. No reference thus can be made unless at the time when the Government decides to make it an industrial dispute between the employer and his employees either exists or is apprehended. Therefore, the expression “at any time”, though seemingly without any limits, is governed by the context in which it appears. Ordinarily, the question of making a reference would arise after conciliation proceedings have been gone through and the conciliation officer has made a failure report. But the Government need not wait until such a procedure has been completed. In an urgent case, it can “at any time” i.e. even when such proceedings have not begun or are still pending, decide to refer the dispute for adjudication. The expression “at any time” thus takes in such cases as where the Government decides to make a reference without waiting for conciliation proceedings to begin or to be completed. In an urgent case, it can “at any time” i.e. even when such proceedings have not begun or are still pending, decide to refer the dispute for adjudication. The expression “at any time” thus takes in such cases as where the Government decides to make a reference without waiting for conciliation proceedings to begin or to be completed. As already stated, the expression “at any time” in the context in which it is used postulates that a reference can only be made if an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. No reference is contemplated by the Section when the dispute is not an industrial dispute, or even if it is so, it no longer exists or is not apprehended, for instance, where it is already adjudicated or in respect of which there is an agreement or a settlement between the parties or where the industry in question is no longer in existence.” If we examine SAPAN KUMAR PANDIT (5 supra), the Supreme Court has posed unto itself a question: Though no time limit is fixed for making the reference for a dispute for adjudication, could any State Government revive a dispute which had submerged in stupor by long lapse of time and re-kindled by making a reference of it to adjudication? It has proceeded to answer the question holding that the words “at any time” as used in the section are prima facie indicator to a period without boundary. But such an interpretation making the power unending would be pedantic. There is inherent evidence in this sub-Section itself to indicate that the time has some circumscription. The words “Where the Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended” have to be read in conjunction with the words “at any time”. They are, in a way, complimentary to each other. The Governments’ power to refer an industrial dispute for adjudication has thus one limitation of time and that is, it can be done only so long as the dispute exists. Having held thus, the Supreme Court has further stated: “Hence the real test is, was the industrial dispute in existence on the date of reference for adjudication? If the answer is in the negative then the Governments power to make a reference would have extinguished. Having held thus, the Supreme Court has further stated: “Hence the real test is, was the industrial dispute in existence on the date of reference for adjudication? If the answer is in the negative then the Governments power to make a reference would have extinguished. On the other hand, if the answer is in positive terms the Government could have exercised the power whatever be the range of the period which lapsed since the inception of the dispute. That apart, a decision of the government in this regard cannot be listed on the possibility of what another party would think whether any dispute existed or not. The section indicates that if in the opinion of the Government the dispute existed then the Government could make the reference. The only authority which can form such an opinion is the government. If the government decides to make the reference there is a presumption that in the opinion of the government there existed such a dispute. In considering the factual position whether the dispute did exist on the date of reference the Government could take into account factors, inter alia, such as the subsistence of conciliation proceedings. It is of no consequence that conciliation proceedings were commenced after a long period. But such conciliation proceedings are evidence of the existence of the industrial dispute. It is an admitted fact that on the date of reference in this case the conciliation proceedings were not concluded. If so, it cannot be said that the dispute did not exist on that day. There are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept the dispute alive during the long interval it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute ceased to exist after some time. But when the dispute remained alive though not galvanized by the workmen or the Union on account of other justified reasons it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse”. In fact, the Supreme Court has squarely answered this issue in Director, Food and Supplies v. Gurmit Singh (2007) 5 SCC 727 ), in which it is held: “11. The Tribunal or the Labour Court cannot invalidate the reference on the ground of delay. In fact, the Supreme Court has squarely answered this issue in Director, Food and Supplies v. Gurmit Singh (2007) 5 SCC 727 ), in which it is held: “11. The Tribunal or the Labour Court cannot invalidate the reference on the ground of delay. If the employer makes a grievance that the workman has made a stale claim then an employer can challenge the reference by way of a writ petition and contend that since the claim is belated there was no industrial dispute. The Tribunal or the Labour Court cannot strike down the reference on this ground. As observed in Sapan Kumar Pandit v. U.P. SEB [ (2001) 6 SCC 222 ] there are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept the dispute alive during the long interval, it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute ceased to exist after some time. But when the dispute remained alive though not galvanised by the workmen or the Union on account of other justified reasons it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse. The long delay for making the adjudication could be considered by the adjudicating authority while moulding the reliefs. That is a different matter altogether.” (emphasis added) Finally on the issue whether by the time of reference the issue has become stale, from the above extraction, it is evident that when the dispute remained alive though not galvanised by the workmen or the Union, it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse. If we look at the nature of the present dispute, it is a case of claiming continuity of service and back wages. After reinstatement, the workman continued to discharge his functions. Even if the workman is to retire in the interregnum, since the relief claimed by the workman is the quantification of his benefits in pecuniary terms, the issue neither becomes stale nor unavailable with the passage of time, a fortiori with his retirement as well. In Re. Issue No.2: The learned Standing Counsel has placed heavy reliance on K. DAYANAND (1 supra). In this matter the conductor of the Corporation was removed from service as a measure of major punishment imposed on him by the disciplinary authority. In Re. Issue No.2: The learned Standing Counsel has placed heavy reliance on K. DAYANAND (1 supra). In this matter the conductor of the Corporation was removed from service as a measure of major punishment imposed on him by the disciplinary authority. When the matter was appealed against, the Divisional Manager, the Appellate Authority confirmed the order of removal but directed the Corporation to appoint the workman afresh on humanitarian considerations. On approach, the State Government made a reference to the Labour Court as to whether the workman is entitled to continuity of service. Under those circumstances, the learned Division Bench of this Court has held: “The Labour Court ought to have seen that while answering the reference, it would be impinging on the domain of Section 11-A of the Act, which invests the Labour Court with the power to reduce the quantum of punishment only in cases of discharge and dismissal of workmen. In that view of the matter, the proper award to be passed by the Labour Court would have been to hold clearly that it does not have the jurisdiction to entertain the reference made to it”. In SOUTH INDIAN CASHEW FACTORIES WORKERS’ UNION (3 supra), a two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held: “If the enquiry is fair and proper then in the absence of any allegations of victimisation or unfair labour practice the Labour Court has no power to interfere with the punishment imposed. Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 gives ample power to the Labour Court to reappraise the evidence adduced in the enquiry and also sit in appeal over the decision of the employer in imposing punishment. But, that section is applicable only in the case of dismissal or discharge of a workman. Since Section 11-A was not applicable, the Labour Court had no power to reappraise the evidence to find out whether the findings of the enquiry officer were correct or not or whether the punishment imposed was adequate or not “. It may have to be further observed that B. Vidyasagar ( 2 supra)also endorses the view taken in Dayanand. Dayanand, decided by a learned Division Bench of this Court, holds that in the matters other than those referred to the Labour Court under Section 2-A of the Act, it has no jurisdiction to entertain the reference. It may have to be further observed that B. Vidyasagar ( 2 supra)also endorses the view taken in Dayanand. Dayanand, decided by a learned Division Bench of this Court, holds that in the matters other than those referred to the Labour Court under Section 2-A of the Act, it has no jurisdiction to entertain the reference. South Indian Cashew Factories Workers’ Union (3 supra), decided by the Supreme Court, holds that Section 11-A of the Act is applicable only in the case of dismissal or discharge of a workman, since once Section 11-A is not applicable, the Labour Court has no power to reappraise the evidence to find out whether the findings of the enquiry officer are correct or not or whether the punishment imposed is adequate or not. Thus, it is evident that the Supreme Court has never endorsed the view that the Labour Court’s jurisdiction has altogether been ousted; but, on the contrary, it only prescribes the limitations on the adjudicatory powers of the Labour Court if the matter before it is not referred to it under Section 2-A of the Act. With profound respect to the collective wisdom of the learned Division Bench, it can be safely concluded that Dayanand cannot be sustained in the face of South Indian Cashew Factories Workers’ Union. InWorkmen v. Williamson Magor & Co. Ltd., (1982) 1 SCC 117 )the Supreme Court, adumbrating the powers of the Labour Court or Tribunal, has held: “8. In other words, although the Tribunal categorically held that the actions of the management were unjustified, it expressed its inability to give any relief to the workmen in the case. We do not think that the Tribunal should be so powerless. The industrial tribunals are intended to adjudicate industrial disputes between the management and the workmen, settle them, and pass effective awards in such a way that industrial peace between the employers and the employees may be maintained so that there can be more production to benefit all concerned. For the above purpose, the industrial tribunals, as far as practicable, should not be constrained by the formal rules of law and should avoid inability to arrive at an effective award to meet justice in a particular dispute. For the above purpose, the industrial tribunals, as far as practicable, should not be constrained by the formal rules of law and should avoid inability to arrive at an effective award to meet justice in a particular dispute. The Tribunal in the instant case, in view of its findings, first of all should have declared that the promotions of the aforesaid 15 persons were illegal and unjustified, their promotions being the result of arbitrary action of the management which was nothing but unfair labour practice, and the promotions in question should have been cancelled. The Tribunal also, in our opinion, in consultation with the management and the Union, should have framed norms/rules of promotions and directed the management to give promotions/upgradations in accordance with those norms/rules. (emphasis added) In Divisional Manager, APSRTC (6 supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court has examined the ratio of Dayanand in the light of the Supreme Court judgments and has held: “In the ordinary course, this principle must be applied and the award must be set aside. Learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent, however, has cited certain decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in support of his contention. For example, in Jai Bhagwan v. Management, A.C. Co-op Bank Ltd. 1983 LIC 1694, the Supreme Court held that once a reference is made by the Government, a Tribunal has no jurisdiction to avoid any adjudication in pursuance of the reference.” The learned Single Judge has also examined the dicta in National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (2000) Lab. & I.C. 260) and Mahendra L. Jain v. Indore Development Authority (2005) 1 SCC 639 ). Having thus surveyed the law obtaining on the subject, his Lordship has held: “12. The judgment of this Court in Dayanand's case (supra), on the one hand, and the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments, referred to above, on the other, are clear and unambiguous. This (Court is of the considered view that had the first two judgments of the Supreme Court, referred to above, been brought to the notice of the Division Bench of this Court, the result would have been I different altogether. Single Judge of the High Court is squarely bound by the judgment rendered by a Division Bench or a Bench of higher strength. Deviation from it may, in a given case, amount to impropriety. Single Judge of the High Court is squarely bound by the judgment rendered by a Division Bench or a Bench of higher strength. Deviation from it may, in a given case, amount to impropriety. A typical situation, however, arises, where a Judge has to choose between the pronouncements of the High Court, on the one hand, and that of the Supreme Court, on the other, on the same issue. Howsoever convincing, the judgment rendered by a Bench of superior strength of High Court may be, it cannot persuade the Court to ignore the judgment of the Supreme Court. Apart from the superiority in the hierarchy of the Courts, Article 142 of the Constitution of India mandates that the view expressed by the Supreme Court must prevail. Though at one stage, it was thought of referring the matter to a Bench, of appropriate strength, the idea is given up, on account of the fact that the controversy is governed by the law clearly laid down by the Supreme Court. Hence, this Court is left' with no option, except to follow the law laid down by the Supreme Court. In that view of the matter, the ground urged by the petitioner, that the Tribunal ought not to have entertained the reference, cannot be accepted.” In the light of the above discussion, I regret my inability to persuade myself to accept the contentions of the petitioner Corporation that the reference is stale or in the alternative highly belated. By the same token, the plea of the Corporation that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the matter, since it has not been raised under Section 2-A of the Act also cannot be accepted. Even otherwise, to subject the decision of the Labour Court to judicial review, I do not see any jurisdictional error having been committed by the Labour Court, especially in the light of the above discussion. Nor can it be held that the award suffers from any error apparent on the face of record or perversity of findings. There is one more aspect to be examined: the maintainability of writ petition. In this case the writ petition was filed by the Regional Manager, a quasi-judicial authority, who exercises the power of revision. He cannot, by any stretch, be an aggrieved person. There is one more aspect to be examined: the maintainability of writ petition. In this case the writ petition was filed by the Regional Manager, a quasi-judicial authority, who exercises the power of revision. He cannot, by any stretch, be an aggrieved person. Under identical circumstances, in Divisional Manager, APSRTC, Khammam (6 supra) this Court has held: “A serious dispute arises as to the very maintainability of the writ petition, at the instance of the petitioner i.e., Divisional Manager. The Depot Manager passed an order, directing removal of the 2nd respondent. An appeal was presented before the petitioner, who, in turn, set aside the order of removal and imposed the punishment of stoppage of annual increment for a period of three years with cumulative effect. The petitioner cannot be said to be an aggrieved party, since he was only an appellate authority. If at all anyone, it was the Depot Manager, who could have maintained the writ petition. An appellate authority or review authority can never associate themselves with the proceedings, whenever the orders passed by them are challenged in any Forum or Court. The present situation appears to have arisen, on account of the fact that in the I.D., the petitioner was made a party. The Registry shall issue necessary instructions to the Sections concerned, not to array the adjudicating agencies either as petitioners or respondents, in the writ petitions.” Going by the above ratio, since the defect as to the aggrieved person to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court remains un-rectified, formal as it appears, the matter can be made to perish on the altar of technicality. In deed, those who want to flourish by technicality may have to perish to it, in the end. Accordingly, I hold that the Writ Petition is devoid of any merit and shall fail. Resultantly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. The miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this Writ Petition shall stand closed.