JUDGMENT Ranjana Pandya, J. 1. This revision has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 10.02.1988, passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Ballia acquitting the accused opposite parties under Sections 147, 148 and 302 I.P.C. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the revisionist, learned counsel for the opposite parties and learned A.G.A. 3. Opposite parties no. 1, 6 and 8 were reported to be dead as per the report of C.J.M. hence, the proceedings against opposite parties no. 1, 6 and 8 were abated. 4. Brief facts are that at about 07: 00 A.M. on 23.09.1986 the father of the complainant namely Baleshwar was doing agricultural work in his field which is situated in front of Baithak. The complainant was cleaning his teeth near the door. Suddenly, Singhasan, Nand Lal, Khedu, Virendra, Laxmi, Raj Banshi, Ram Bachan, Vinod and Dina Nath armed with Bhala, Lathi and Kudal came near the father of the complainant. Singhasan shouted that the father of the complainant should not be left. The father of the complainant tried to run towards Baithak. As soon as he reached the field where brinjal was planted. Singhasan assaulted the father of the complainant with bhala on his head. He fell down in the field. Suddenly Virendra and Vinod also assaulted the father of the complainant with Bhala. Laxmi Assaulted him with Kudal and the remaining assaulted his father with bricks and lathi. On the hue and cry of the complainant, Vansh Bahadur Singh, Pradeep Kumar, Hari Charan and other villagers came on the spot due to which the accused fled away. There is litigation between Singhasan and other and the father of the complainant regarding some field and the Chakbandi Officer decided the matter in favour of the complainant. It is due to this reason that the father of the accused was murdered. The accused lodged the report on the same day on the basis of which investigation started and charge sheet was submitted against the accused. 5. Charges were framed against the accused under Section 147 , 148 and 302 read with Section 149 I.P.C. 6. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charges and claimed trial. 7. The prosecution examined Gopal as PW-1, Bansh Bahadur as PW-2. Pradeep Kumar Singh as PW-3, Constable Tarkeshwar Rai as PW-4, Sri Ram Rai as PW-5, Dr. 5. Charges were framed against the accused under Section 147 , 148 and 302 read with Section 149 I.P.C. 6. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charges and claimed trial. 7. The prosecution examined Gopal as PW-1, Bansh Bahadur as PW-2. Pradeep Kumar Singh as PW-3, Constable Tarkeshwar Rai as PW-4, Sri Ram Rai as PW-5, Dr. H.P. Rai as PW-6, Narshingh Prasad Tiwari as PW-7 and S.O. Ram Krishna Shukla as PW-8. 8. In the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the accused denied of having committed the offence and said that they have been implicated due to enmity. 9. Learned Trial Judge after examining the material on record and perusing the evidence acquitted the accused as aforesaid. 10. Feeling aggrieved the complainant has come up in this revision. 11. Counsel for the opposite parties no. 2 to 5, 7 and 9 have argued that the scope of this court is very limited and unless there is manifest illegality committed by trial court and High court cannot interfere in the order of acquittal. 12. In this respect, learned counsel for opposite parties no. 2 to 5, 7 and 9 has placed reliance upon Bindeshwari Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar, : (2002) 6 SCC 650 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down as under: - "We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in re-appreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the informant under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (3) of Section401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid subsection, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional court, prohibiting it from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a retrial. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a retrial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. (See : AIR 1951 SC 196 : D. Stephens vs. Nosibolla; : AIR 1962 SC 1788 : K.C. Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh; : (1973) 2 SCC 583 : Akalu Ahir and other vs. Ramdeo Ram;: AIR 1975 SC 1854 : Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju and others vs. Bonapalli Peda Appadu and another and : AIR 1968 SC 707 : Mahendra Pratap Singh vs. Sarju Singh)." 13. Counsel for the opposite parties no. 2 to 5, 7 and 9 has argued that the High Court has been invested with the revisional power to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognized rules of criminal jurisprudence and that the subordinate courts do not exceed their jurisdiction or abuse the power conferred on them by law. This power usually does not contemplate interference with the conclusions of fact in the absence of serious legal infirmity and failure of justice. 14. Counsel for the revisionist has argued that the learned trial court has not appreciated the evidence properly and the high court is competent to set aside the order of acquittal even in revision. In support he has placed reliance upon K. Chinnaswamy Reddy Vs. 14. Counsel for the revisionist has argued that the learned trial court has not appreciated the evidence properly and the high court is competent to set aside the order of acquittal even in revision. In support he has placed reliance upon K. Chinnaswamy Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, : AIR 1962 SC 1788 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under: - "It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of S. 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial, when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may, however, indicate some cases of this kind, which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce, or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence. which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; and in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S. 439(4). We have, therefore, to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles." 15. Thus, it would not be proper to re-appreciate the evidence which has been appreciated by the trial court. 16. The prosecution witnesses have admitted that there is enmity between the deceased and the accused persons due to land. Enmity is a double edged weapon which on one side instigates the accused to commit the offence and on the other side instigate the complainant to falsely implicate the accused. 17. In the present case, although the complainant PW-1 Gopal has said that he does not know whether witness Bansh Bahadur was also a witness in another case lodged by his father. He has admitted that his father lodged a case against one of the accused in which Bansh Bahadur was a witness. He has also admitted that his father had also lodged a case against accused Laxmi and others but he could not say whether Bansh Bahadur was also a witness in that case of theft. He has also admitted that witness Pradeep Singh is the nephew of Bansh Bahadur who is also witness in this case. 18. Thus, PW-2 Bansh Bahadur and PW-3 Pradeep Singh are the pocket witnesses of the complainant Gopal and the deceased who was the father of the complainant. Bansh Bahadur PW-2 has admitted that the witness Pradeep who is PW-3 in this case is son of his real brother Tej Bahadur. He has also admitted that he is named as witness in four cases filed by the deceased. 19. Bansh Bahadur PW-2 has admitted that the witness Pradeep who is PW-3 in this case is son of his real brother Tej Bahadur. He has also admitted that he is named as witness in four cases filed by the deceased. 19. PW-3 Pradeep Singh has admitted that he had given his evidence in a case under Section 440 I.P.C. from the side of the deceased. In that case, Accused Singhasan, Virendra and Nand Lal were accused. These witnesses are said to be a chance witness. But the enmity of PW-2 Bansh Bahadur and PW-3 Pradeep Singh against the accused stands proved. 20. Learned counsel for opposite parties no. 2 to 5, 7 and 9 has placed reliance upon Paras Nath Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and others,: 2012 (77) ACC 414 in which it has been held that in D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, 1951 AIR (SC) 196 has observed as under: - "The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under S. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not to be lightly exercised when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Government has a right of appeal under S. 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower Court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on record." 21. He has further placed reliance upon Savitri Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Others, : 2014 (84) ACC 81 in which it has been held as under: - "In the case of Akalu Ahir and others vs. Ramdeo Ram, : 1973 Cr.L.J. 1404, the Hon'ble Apex Court lays down following categories of cases in which the High Court in the revisional jurisdiction can interfere with the findings of acquittal: i. Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; ii. Where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; iii. Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible; iv. Where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; iii. Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible; iv. Where the material evidence has been over-looked only (either?) by the trial Court or by the appellate Court; and v. Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law." 22. According to the prosecution case, one Bhala and one lathi on which there was stain of blood like substance were recovered from accused Ram Bachan. But according to the first information report, Virendra, Vinod and Singhasan were armed with Bhala, Laxmi was armed with Kudal and other accused were armed with bricks and lathi. 23. Thus, either the submissions of the first information report and prosecution evidence are incorrect or the alleged recovery at the pointing out of the accused Ram Bachan is incorrect. Thus, there is no corroboration between the prosecution case and the alleged recovery. 24. It is proved on record that father of accused Laxmi has moved a complainant against the deceased which is Exhibit Ka-19 was also handed over to the I.O. 25. Thus, the learned lower court has rightly disbelieved the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and has not committed any error in acquitting the accused and the order under revision has no illegality, irregularity or impropriety. 26. The revision has no force and is liable to be dismissed. 27. Accordingly the revision is dismissed.