Order The petitioners are granite quarry lease-holders as lease deeds were entered into between the District Collector, Madurai/the respondent and the petitioners granting lease to quarry granite in the lands mentioned therein. 2.0. Show-cause notices were issued by the District Collector, Madurai, alleging that the petitioners involved in illegal transport of granite from the lease-hold area without transport permit/illicit quarrying and transportation in non-lease hold area and thereby caused huge loss to the exchequer of the Government. It was stated in the show-cause notices that on receipt of several complaints about the illicit quarrying, the District Collector, Madurai, constituted special teams to carry out a comprehensive, systematic and scientific survey. It was also stated that the show-cause notices were issued based on the inspection-cum-evaluation reports submitted by the special teams. 2.1. Based on the said reports, the show-cause notices were issued under Section 21(5) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The said evaluation reports were enclosed along with the show-cause notices. The petitioners were directed to appear for personal hearing on different dates before the respondent – District Collector, Madurai, and to show-cause as to why the reports of the said special teams should not be accepted and action should not be taken under Section 21(5) of the Act. 2.2. On receipt of show-cause notices, the petitioners, at the show-cause notices stage itself, filed these writ petitions and on 20.03.2013, this Court ordered notice of motion in W.P.Nos.2677 of 2013 etc. batch and granted interim orders not to proceed further with the show-cause notices. Thereafter, other writ petitions were tagged with those writ petitions, when came up for admission. 3. The crux of the averments made in the affidavits filed in support of these writ petitions, as culled out from W.P.No.2677 of 2013, is that (i) the special inspection teams constituted by the District Collector, Madurai, conducted the inspection of the quarry sites in the absence of the petitioners without giving notice about their inspection and therefore, the same shall not be the basis for the show-cause notices ; and (ii) the show-cause notices reveal that the respondent predetermined the issues and came to the conclusion with foreclosed mind and therefore, the show-cause notices are not real show-cause notices. The petitioners sought to quash the impugned show-cause notices on the above said two grounds. The petitioners sought to quash the impugned show-cause notices on the above said two grounds. Similar averments are made in other writ petitions also. 4.0. The respondent filed a detailed common counter-affidavit dated 07.03.2013. It is stated that several complaints have been received by the Government on the illegal granite quarry operations in Melur Taluk in Madurai District. On receiving a direction from the Government, the then District Collector conducted an inspection and submitted a preliminary report that illegal quarrying has caused loss to the Government over an extent of Rs.16,000/- Crores. Thereafter, the Government have instructed the District Collector to take appropriate action in accordance with law. 4.1. Pursuant to such direction, the District Collector took action and constituted special teams to inspect the mines and to submit their reports. Accordingly, those special teams carried out inspections. The respondent asserted that Sections 21(4), 22, 23-B, 24 and 21(5) of the Act have empowered the officials to inspect the quarry sites and also to conduct search and seize and to take appropriate action. No notice of inspection is required for surprise inspection of the quarry sites. Apart from the show-cause notices, that are impugned in these writ petitions, the administration also took various other actions against those quarries, which are involved in illicit quarrying and transportation. 4.2. The counter-affidavit relied on the order of this Court dated 26.03.2012 in W.P.No.1015 of 2011 etc. batch (P. Mariadoss V. District Collector, Kancheepuram) in support of the inspection conducted by the officials without notice. In fact, a passage from the said judgment is extracted in the counter-affidavit in this regard. 4.3. It is averred that the writ petitions are not maintainable against the show-cause notices. In the counter-affidavit, in this regard, the decision of the Apex Court in Union of India and another V. Kunisetty Satyanarayana reported in 2006 12 SCC 28 was relied on by the respondent and the relevant passage from the said judgment was also extracted. It is further averred that if the petitioners are in need of any relevant documents, the Assistant Director (Geology and Mining) would furnish the same to them. It is also averred that it is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notices or after holding the enquiry, the authority concerned may drop the proceedings. 4.4. Thus, the respondent sought for dismissal of these writ petitions. 5. Heard both sides. 6.0. It is also averred that it is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notices or after holding the enquiry, the authority concerned may drop the proceedings. 4.4. Thus, the respondent sought for dismissal of these writ petitions. 5. Heard both sides. 6.0. The learned Senior Counsel for some of the petitioners and the learned counsels for the other petitioners reiterated the averments made in the affidavits filed in support of the writ petitions. They made the following two submissions, viz., the show-causes notices were issued based on the inspections conducted by the Special Teams in the absence of the petitioners and according to them, the reports submitted by the Special Teams are all ex-parte inspection reports, without issuing prior notices to them about the inspection. It was contended that the impugned show-cause notices based on such inspection reports are bad and illegal. 6.1. Secondly, the show-cause notices are not real one, as the respondent pre-determined the issues. The respondent had issued show-cause notices with a pre-determined mind and therefore, no purpose would be served in submitting their reply and participating in the enquiry. According to them, the quantification of the alleged illegally mined granites mentioned in the impugned show-cause notices and quantification of the alleged amount of loss said to have been caused in the show-cause notices would establish the allegation of the petitioners that the respondent already came to the conclusions on the issues. It was strenuously contended that it was a mere empty formality. 6.2. The learned Senior Counsel and the learned counsels, who appeared for the petitioners, relied on the following decisions : (i) Siemens Ltd. V. State of Maharashtra reported in (2006) 12 SCC 33 ; (ii) V.S.O. Balakrishnan V. District Collector reported in (2009) 2 MLJ 577 ; (iii) Oryx Fisheries (P) Ltd. V. Union of India reported in (2010) 13 SCC 427 ; (iv) A Division Bench judgment of this Court dated 13.12.2011 in W.A.(MD)No.488 of 2010 ; and (v) An order of a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 28.09.2012 in W.P.(MD)Nos.5820, 8507, 8508 of 2010 and 8942 of 2012 ; 7.0. On the other hand, the learned Special Government Pleader took me through the detailed counter-affidavit. He submitted that the very purpose of surprise inspection would be defeated, if notice of inspection is given prior to inspection to the petitioners. On the other hand, the learned Special Government Pleader took me through the detailed counter-affidavit. He submitted that the very purpose of surprise inspection would be defeated, if notice of inspection is given prior to inspection to the petitioners. He sought to sustain the action of the respondents in carrying surprise inspection in the absence of the petitioners, since the same was done in accordance with law. He relied on Sections 23-B and 24 of the Act in support of his submission for the surprise inspection without notice. He heavily relied on the judgment of this Court dated 26.03.2012 in P. Mariadoss V. District Collector, Kancheepuram, (W.P.No.1015 of 2011 and 1030 of 2011 etc. batch). 7.1. He sought to take judicial notice of the daily news in the medias that illegal mining/quarrying are taking place in a very large scale. He brought to my notice the averments made in paragraph 10 of the counter-affidavit filed by the District Collector that there has been collusion between the officials and the quarry owners in carrying out the illegal activities. He also brought to my notice that in the same paragraph, it is stated that some of the honest officials, who are carrying our their duties, are threatened by the quarry owners. 7.2. The learned Special Government Pleader also submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable against the show-cause notice. It is submitted that the evaluation reports submitted by the Special Inspection Teams were enclosed along with the show-cause notices. He categorically stated that the respondent is willing to provide the copies of documents, if any, required by the petitioners. He submitted that the petitioners were directed to appear in person and they could very well appear in person and give their explanation and they could also produce the documents, if any, in support of their contentions and they could also seek for the supply of any documents that are in possession of the Department. He submitted that the respondent would give all reasonable opportunities in compliance with the principle of natural justice and thereafter only would decide the issues on merits and based on materials. But according to him, the petitioners rushed to this Court on receipt of the show-cause notices and obtained interim orders. He submitted that the respondent would give all reasonable opportunities in compliance with the principle of natural justice and thereafter only would decide the issues on merits and based on materials. But according to him, the petitioners rushed to this Court on receipt of the show-cause notices and obtained interim orders. He heavily relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India and another V. Kunisetty Satyanarayana reported in 2006 (12) SCC 28 in support of his contention that writ petition is not maintainable against show-cause notice. 7.3. The learned Special Government Pleader distinguished the judgments relied on by the learned counsels for the petitioners. He submitted that those judgments arose, wherein, the show-cause notices pre-judged the issues. It was submitted that whenever there was pre-determination in the show-cause notice, the Department never hesitated to admit such a mistake before this Court and to withdraw the same. He brought to my notice, in this regard, paragraphs 10 and 11 of the judgment of this Court dated 28.09.2012 in W.P.(MD)Nos.5820, 8507, 8508 of 2010 and 8942 of 2012 that is relied on by the learned counsels for the petitioners. According to him, there is no pre-determination on any issue in the impugned show-cause notices. The quantification of the illegally quarried granite and the quantification of the consequent loss that were mentioned in the show-cause notices are based on the evaluation report submitted by the Special Inspection Teams and the same were not the conclusions arrived at by the respondent. It was contended that if no details of the illegally quarried granite and the consequential loss to the exchequer are given in the show-cause notices, it could be attacked on the ground of vagueness. The petitioners were only asked to show-cause as to why the respondent shall not act based on the report of the special inspection teams. According to him, the petitioners could very well urge the respondent not to accept the said inspection reports giving reasons, which are now contended in these writ petitions and also other reasons, if any. Even if the respondent is not agreeable to their pleas, the petitioners are not left without any remedy and there is a statutory appeal remedy available to the petitioners. Hence, the writ petitions are premature one. 8. I have carefully considered the submissions made by either side. 9. Even if the respondent is not agreeable to their pleas, the petitioners are not left without any remedy and there is a statutory appeal remedy available to the petitioners. Hence, the writ petitions are premature one. 8. I have carefully considered the submissions made by either side. 9. The first submission of the learned Senior Counsel and the learned counsel for the petitioners is questioning the correctness of the show-cause notices in placing reliance on the inspection reports of the quarry sites, that was made by the officials without issuing notice to the petitioners and conducting the inspection in the absence of the petitioners. 10. It is relevant to extract Section 23-B and 24(1) of the Act in this regard. “23-B. Power to search – If any Gazetted Officer of the Central or a State Government authorised by the Central Government or a State Government, as the case may be, in this behalf by general or special order has reason to believe that any mineral has been raised in contravention of the provisions of this Act or rules made thereunder or any document or thing in relation to such mineral is secreted in any place or vehicle, he may search for such mineral, document or thing and the provisions of section 100 of the Code of Criminal Prcoedure, 1973 shall apply to every such search. 24. Power of entry and inspection – (1) For the purpose of ascertaining the position of the working, actual or prospective, of any mine or abandoned mine or for any other purpose connected with this Act or the rules made thereunder, any person authorised by the Central Government or a State Government in this behalf, by general order, may – (a) enter and inspect any mine ; (b) survey and take measurements in any such mine ; © weight, measure or take measurements of the stocks of minerals lying at any mine ; (d) examine any document, book, register, or record in the possession or power of any person having the control of, or connected with, any mine and place marks of identification thereon, and take extracts from or make copies of such document, book, register or record ; (e) order the production of any such document, book, register, record, as is referred to in clause (d) ; and (f) examine any person having the control of, or connected with, any mine.” 11. Section 24(1) of the Act vests power on the State Government to issue notification notifying the persons to inspect any mines. The Tamil Nadu Government issued a notification under Section 24(1) of the Act notifying the officers to enter and inspect the quarry sites. The said notification issued by the Tamil Nadu Government is extracted in paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit and the relevant passage from paragraph 7 at page 11 of the counter-affidavit is reproduced hereinbelow : “NOTIFICATION Under sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation Act, 1957 (Central Act 67 of 1957), the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby authorises the following for the purpose of the said section of the said Act, namely :- (1) all the District Collectors including Chennai District within their jurisdiction. (2) all the District Revenue Officers, Revenue Divisional Officers and Tahsildars within their jurisdiction. (3) Deputy Director (Geology and Mining), Assistant Director (Geology and Mining), Assistant Geologist (Geology and Mining), and Special Tahsildar (Mines) of the Department of Geology and Mining in the respective districts within their jurisdiction. (4) Director of Geology and Mining, Additional Director of Geology and Mining, Joint Directors, Deputy Directors, Assistant Directors of Geology and Mining and Assistant Geologists functioning in the Head Office of the Department of Geology and Mining, at Chennai shall have the jurisdiction for the whole of Tamil Nadu.” 12.0. I am in entire agreement with the submission made by the learned Special Government Pleader that the very purpose of inspection would be defeated, if a prior notice is given to the quarry lease-holders. It is for the concerned officials to decide as to issue prior notice or to make a surprise inspection. If the concerned official has decided to make a surprise inspection, I am of the considered view that the same cannot be described as an illegal act. Neither Section 23-B nor Section 24(1) of the Act provides for issuance of notice prior to inspection. In fact, the same issue came for consideration before the First Bench of this Court in P. Mariadoss V. District Collector, Kancheepuram, (W.P.No.1015 of 2011 and 1030 of 2011 etc. batch). 12.1. Paragraph 21 of the judgment of the First Bench in P. Mariadoss case is extracted hereunder, in this regard : 21. …. In fact, the same issue came for consideration before the First Bench of this Court in P. Mariadoss V. District Collector, Kancheepuram, (W.P.No.1015 of 2011 and 1030 of 2011 etc. batch). 12.1. Paragraph 21 of the judgment of the First Bench in P. Mariadoss case is extracted hereunder, in this regard : 21. …. We fail to understand as to what purpose would be served if notice is issued prior to a surprise inspection, when there has been an allegation that illicit mining is being carried on. The authorities being empowered to enter into the quarry by virtue of the power under Section 24(1) of the Central Act, the petitioners cannot insist that they should be put on prior notice before conducting the surprise inspection as in these cases. Therefore, this is not a case of denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioners, but it is seen that the petitioner has been given show cause notice and thereafter on his request, the copy of the inspection report was also furnished and even in the impugned order as well as in the counter affidavit, there is a specific averment that the inspection was carried out in the presence of the lessee/employee. Therefore, we do not agree with the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there has been violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore, we find no justification for the petitioners to by-pass the appellate remedy. More so, when the issue involves serious disputed questions of fact which cannot be adjudicated in a writ petition. The allegation against the petitioners is that they exceeded their boundary limit and carried out illicit mining in Government Poromboke land. This aspect is essentially a pure question of fact and this Court cannot, based on affidavits decide whether the petitioners crossed the boundary line and did mining operations beyond the demarcated leasehold area. This is all the more a reason that the petitioner should file an appeal.” 12.2. In fact, the same was also extracted in the counter-affidavit of the respondent. 12.3. In view of the aforesaid decision of the First Bench of this Court, I am of the view that the complaint of the petitioners that no prior notice was given about the inspection before carrying out the inspection has no substance and the same deserves to be rejected. 12.3. In view of the aforesaid decision of the First Bench of this Court, I am of the view that the complaint of the petitioners that no prior notice was given about the inspection before carrying out the inspection has no substance and the same deserves to be rejected. Further, as held by the First Bench of this Court in Mariadoss case, whether the petitioners illegally quarried in a non-lease area and illegally transported the granites, involve purely questions of fact and the same cannot be adjudicated in a writ petition and on the other hand, the same can be agitated before the competent authority, namely, the District Collector and thereafter, before the appellate authority, if the District Collector decides against the petitioners. 13. The other submission of the learned counsels for the petitioners is that the show-cause notices prejudged the issues by quantifying the illegal quarried mineral and quantifying the loss. 14. I have gone through the show-cause notices. The show-cause notices simply produced the contents of the reports of the special inspection teams. The show-cause notices merely quoted the reports of the special inspection teams and the respondent did not arrive at the conclusion on the allegation made by the special inspection teams relating to the illegal quarrying and illegal transportation by the petitioners. The show-cause notices simply extracted the reports of the special inspection teams. In my considered view, the same could not be described as predetermination of the issues. As rightly contended by the learned Special Government Pleader, if nothing is stated in the show-cause notices, it could be attacked on the ground of vagueness. 15. The respondent directed the petitioner only to show-cause as to why the reports of the special teams could not be acted upon and action should not be taken under Section 21(5) of the Act. The petitioners could very well urge the respondent to reject the inspection reports pointing out the reasons for the same. Without undertaking the aforesaid exercise, the petitioners approached this Court at the stage of show-cause notices itself. 16. It is a different matter if the respondent came to any conclusion on the allegations, then this Court could entertain the writ petitions even against the show-cause notices, as held by the Apex Court. But no such pre-determination was made. Without undertaking the aforesaid exercise, the petitioners approached this Court at the stage of show-cause notices itself. 16. It is a different matter if the respondent came to any conclusion on the allegations, then this Court could entertain the writ petitions even against the show-cause notices, as held by the Apex Court. But no such pre-determination was made. As rightly contended by the learned Special Government Pleader, in W.P.(MD)Nos.5820, 8507, 8508 of 2010 and 8942 of 2012, the learned Special Government Pleader accepted the mistake of pre-determination in the show-cause notices and agreed to withdraw the same. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the order of this Court dated 28.09.2012 in those writ petitions are extracted, in this regard, as hereunder : “10. The learned Special Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the State is unable to support the show cause notices, as the District Collector, who is the competent authority to pass an order, is shown to have made up his mind, to impose penalty and recover other charges, as is clear from reading of impugned show cause notices. 11. The learned Special Government Pleader states, that the impugned show cause notices will be withdrawn within a week, and fresh notices will be issued for taking action against violations strictly in accordance with law.” Therefore that judgment cannot be of any use to the petitioners. 17.0. The petitioners placed heavy reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Siemens Ltd. V. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2006 (12) SCC 33 . 17.1. The appellant therein is a multi location company, which has a factory and godown at Kelwe, within the jurisdiction of Bombay Municipal Corporation. 17.2. It pays cess for the goods supplied from the said factory in terms of the provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949. The appellant therein also owns a factory at Aurangabad and an office at Kharghar. Admittedly, the factory at Aurangabad and the office at Kharghar are not within the jurisdictional limit of Bombay Municipal Corporation. But for the supply made from Aurangabad and Kharghar, a demand for payment of Cess was made by way of notice. The same was questioned before the Bombay High Court. 17.3. The Bombay High Court refused to entertain the same on the ground that the writ petitions against show-cause notices were not maintainable. 17.4. But for the supply made from Aurangabad and Kharghar, a demand for payment of Cess was made by way of notice. The same was questioned before the Bombay High Court. 17.3. The Bombay High Court refused to entertain the same on the ground that the writ petitions against show-cause notices were not maintainable. 17.4. The Apex Court reversed the said view on the ground that the show-cause notice was issued without jurisdiction and also on the ground that the respondent already determined the liability of the appellant and the only question remains was the quantification thereafter. Paragraphs 9 and 11 of the judgments of the Apex Court in Siemens's case are extracted hereunder : “9. Although ordinarily a writ court may not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in entertaining a writ petition questioning a notice to show cause unless the same inter alia appears to have been without jurisdiction as has been held by this Court in some decisions including State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma (1987) 2 SCC 179 , Special Director V. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, (2004) 3 SCC 440 , and Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 SCC 28 , but the question herein has to be considered from a different angle, viz. When a notice is issued with premeditation, a writ petition would be maintainable. In such an event, even if the court directs the statutory authority to hear the matter afresh, ordinarily such hearing would not yield any fruitful purpose. (See K.I. Shephard V. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 431 ). It is evident in the instant case that the respondent has clearly made up its mind. It explicitly said so both in the counter-affidavit as also in its purported show-cause notice. 10. …. 11. A bare perusal of the order impugned before the High Court as also the statements made before us in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents, we are satisfied that the statutory authority has already applied its mind and has formed an opinion as regards the liability or otherwise of the appellant. If in passing the order the respondent has already determined the liability of the appellant and the only question which remains for its consideration is quantification thereof, the same does not remain in the realm of a show-cause notice. The writ petition, in our opinion, was maintainable.” 17.5. If in passing the order the respondent has already determined the liability of the appellant and the only question which remains for its consideration is quantification thereof, the same does not remain in the realm of a show-cause notice. The writ petition, in our opinion, was maintainable.” 17.5. The aforesaid paragraphs 9 and 11 make it very clear that the Apex Court came to the conclusion that the show-cause notices as well as counter-affidavit filed in that case made it amply clear that the there was premeditation of the liability of the appellant. But this is not so in this case. Therefore, that judgment cannot be applied to this case. 17.6. Further, paragraph 9 of the judgment in Siemens's case makes it clear that the writ court may not normally exercise jurisdiction in entertaining a writ petition questioning a notice to show-cause. Therefore, there is a heavy burden placed on the writ petitioners to establish their case that the show-cause notices were issued without jurisdiction and the show-cause notices were issued with premeditation and no purpose would be served in participating in the enquiry. The petitioners miserably failed to discharge the burden. Hence, no interference at the show-cause notice stage is warranted. 18.0. The next judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is V.S.O. Balakrishnan V. District Collector, (2009) 2 MLJ 577 . 18.1. In (2009) 2 MLJ 577 , three writ petitions, namely, W.P.Nos.26650 of 2005, 7324 of 2006 and 7325 of 2006 were disposed of by a common order. The writ petitioners therein were directed to pay a sum of Rs.17,98,300/-, 2,84,04,000/- and 1,97,25,000/- respectively towards the silica sand and granite blocks allegedly quarried from lease-hold and non-leasehold area. The writ petitions challenged those final orders directing to remit the amount. 18.2. Thus, it was not a case, wherein, show-cause notice was not put to challenge. In that case, show-cause notice was issued. But no personal hearing was given. Further no inspection report was furnished, when the same was relied on to pass the final order imposing penalty. Apart from finding those infirmities, this Court found that there was pre-determination in the show-cause notice itself also. In this regard, the following passage in paragraph 12 of the judgment is extracted hereunder : “12. …. Further no inspection report was furnished, when the same was relied on to pass the final order imposing penalty. Apart from finding those infirmities, this Court found that there was pre-determination in the show-cause notice itself also. In this regard, the following passage in paragraph 12 of the judgment is extracted hereunder : “12. …. A reference to the impugned orders make it clear that there was no personal hearing or any enquiry conducted in these cases. …… It is not even the case of the respondents that copy of inspection report has been furnished to the petitioners while issuing the show-cause notice. Therefore, there are two patent errors in the decision making process, viz., show-cause notice has been issued not only with pre-determination, but also without furnishing copy of inspection report and secondly, the very impugned orders have been passed without conducting any enquiry in the manner known to law.” 18.3. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, this Court set aside the final orders passed by the authority. 18.4. In these writ petitions, show-cause notices were issued, inspection reports were furnished, the petitioners were asked to appear before the authority for personal hearing to give objections on the reports and the learned Special Government Pleader also made a statement before this Court that all reasonable opportunity would be given and relevant documents, if any, required by the petitioners would be furnished, if those documents are in the possession of the Department. The petitioners approached this Court at the stage of show-cause notice itself before passing the final orders by the respondent. Hence, I am of the view that the said judgment cannot be applied to these cases and it is premature to approach this Court. 19.0. In Oryx Fisheries Private Limited V. Union of India, 2010(13) SCC 427 , the appellant therein was a private limited Indian company engaged in the production, procurement, processing and export of sea foods and other related products. The appellant therein entered into a contract dated 26.09.2006 with one Cascade Marine Foods, incorporated under the relevant laws of U.A.E. at Sharjah, for the supply of pealed and undeveined (for short “PUD”) shrimps. 19.1. Prior to the despatch of the consignment, on 18.10.2006 an inspection was carried out by the local agent of Cascade and it was found that there is no bad odour. 19.2. 19.1. Prior to the despatch of the consignment, on 18.10.2006 an inspection was carried out by the local agent of Cascade and it was found that there is no bad odour. 19.2. On 25.10.2006, the consignment was despatched from Mumbai. The same arrived at Sharjah port on 02.11.2006 via delivery order dated 06.11.2006. 19.3. The Director of Customs, Sharjah, was requested to authorise the delivery of shrimps to Cascade. Following this, on 07.11.2006, the Sharjah Customs vide its Customs Declaration Form stated that the consignment was not to be released before health inspection. Accordingly, the customs and health authorities of U.A.E. inspected the quality of PUD shrimps and they were satisfied that it was fit for human consumption. 19.4. Thereafter, the health authorities resealed the consignment. 19.5. On 12.11.2006, the Cascade took possession of the consignment. 19.6. After a lapse of more than 10 days, Cascade alleged that the PUD shrimps was of very poor quality based on their analysis report dated 21.11.2006. 19.7. The appellant held a meeting with the Cascade officials and agreed to compensate the Cascade to the extent of value of the defective goods. 19.8. While it was the case of the Cascade that as requested by the appellant, on 21.12.2006, the Cascade delivered several samples to Mr. Celestine of M/s. Starfish Trading FZE, for analysis report, the same was disputed by the appellant that Cascade failed to handover samples to the said M/s. Starfish Trading FZE. 19.9. While so, the Municipality Audit in U.A.E. found out that the validity of PUD shrimp packages had expired and thus the authorities compulsorily destroyed the entire consignment of shrimps and the destruction cost was debited to Cascade. 19.10. The Cascade made a huge claim of $86,104.00, which represented the material cost and destruction charges, from the appellant. 19.11. On 03.09.2007, Cascade sent a letter to the Charmian, Marine Products Export Development Authority (for short MPEDA) making a quality complaint on the shipment effected by the appellant and the resultant loss caused to them. The Cascade also alleged that the appellant intentionally cheated them by delivering the decomposed shrimps, which is unfit for human consumption. 19.12. The third respondent in that case, namely, the Deputy Director, MPEDA, forwarded the aforesaid complaint dated 03.09.2007 to the appellant through its letter dated 12.09.2007 and sought clarification from the appellant regarding the same. 19.13. The Cascade also alleged that the appellant intentionally cheated them by delivering the decomposed shrimps, which is unfit for human consumption. 19.12. The third respondent in that case, namely, the Deputy Director, MPEDA, forwarded the aforesaid complaint dated 03.09.2007 to the appellant through its letter dated 12.09.2007 and sought clarification from the appellant regarding the same. 19.13. The appellant gave the explanation dated 18.09.2007 stating that they sent the standard quality shrimps and that the appellant doubted the analysis report dated 21.11.2006 of the Cascade. 19.14. Thereafter, the third respondent therein sent a letter dated 25.10.2007 to the appellant directing to settle the dispute with Cascade urgently by 10.11.2007. The appellant sent a negative reply dated 11.11.2007 to the aforesaid letter. 19.15. After a series of correspondence between the appellant and the third respondent, the third respondent decided on 20.11.2007 to convene a joint meeting on 05.12.2007 between the appellant and Cascade to find out an amicable settlement. 19.16. The appellant, in order to amicably settle the dispute, came with a proposal to offer 25% of the value of the goods exported, by way of deferred payment against adjustment. However, Cascade refused to accede to the same. 19.17. In the said circumstances, the third respondent issued a show-cause notice dated 23.01.2008 calling upon the appellant to show-cause as to why the certificate of registration of the appellant should not be cancelled. 19.18. The appellant replied to the show-cause notice by its letter dated 04.02.2008. 19.19. While so, the third respondent without giving any reason and without giving any personal hearing, passed the order dated 19.03.2008 cancelling the registration certificate of the appellant. 19.20. The appellant filed an appeal against the order dated 19.03.2008 of the third respondent therein before the second respondent/appellate authority under the Statutory rule, namely, Rule 44 of the Marine Products Export Development Authority Rule, 1972. 19.21. The second respondent passed the order dated 19.08.2008 confirming the cancellation of Registration certificate of the appellant. 19.22. The appellant therein filed writ petition before the High Court of Bombay questioning the order of the original authority dated 19.03.2008 and the order of the appellate authority dated 19.08.2008. The High Court dismissed the writ petition by an order dated 16.10.2008. The appellant thereafter approached the Apex Court. 19.23. 19.22. The appellant therein filed writ petition before the High Court of Bombay questioning the order of the original authority dated 19.03.2008 and the order of the appellate authority dated 19.08.2008. The High Court dismissed the writ petition by an order dated 16.10.2008. The appellant thereafter approached the Apex Court. 19.23. Before going into the finding recorded by the Apex Court, I am of the view that the aforesaid narration of facts makes it very clear that the appellant therein filed a statutory appeal and thereafter only questioned the final order of the original authority and the appellate authority before the High Court. While assailing those orders, one of the contentions of the appellant therein was that the third respondent completely made up his mind at the show-cause notice stage itself and reached a definite conclusion about the alleged guilt of the appellant. That was found, on facts, acceptable to the Apex Court. 19.24. The Apex Court in this judgment referred to the unanimous Constitution Bench judgment in Khem Chand V. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300 , and extracted a passage from the said judgment in paragraph 26 of its judgment. Paragraph 26 of the judgment in Oryx Fisheries case is extracted hereunder : “26. S.R. Das, C.J., speaking for the unanimous Constitution Bench in Khem Chand Vs. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300 , held that the concept of “reasonable opportunity” includes various safeguards and one of them, in the words of the learned Chief Justice, is : (AIR p.307, para 19) : “(a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based;”” 19.25. That is, the reasonable opportunity requires that the person, who was issued with a charge sheet, should be put on notice about the charges levelled against him and the allegations on which the charges are based. 19.26. Instead of telling the charges, if the person is confronted with definite conclusion of his alleged guilt in the show-cause notice itself, then the entire proceeding would get vitiated, as held by the Apex Court in paragraph 27 of the judgment in Oryx Fisheries case. Paragraph 27 of the judgment in that case is extracted hereunder : “27. 19.26. Instead of telling the charges, if the person is confronted with definite conclusion of his alleged guilt in the show-cause notice itself, then the entire proceeding would get vitiated, as held by the Apex Court in paragraph 27 of the judgment in Oryx Fisheries case. Paragraph 27 of the judgment in that case is extracted hereunder : “27. It is not doubt true that at the stage of show cause, the person proceeded against must be told the charges against him so that he can take his defence and prove his innocence. It is obvious that at that stage the authority issuing the charge-sheet, cannot, instead of telling him the charges, confront him with definite conclusions of his alleged guilt. If that is done, as has been done in this instant case, the entire proceeding initiated by the show-cause notice gets vitiated by unfairness and bias and the subsequent proceedings become an idle ceremony.” 19.27. Before paragraph 27 of the judgment, the show-cause notice was extracted in paragraph 22 of the said judgment and certain portions of the show-cause notice were underlined by the Apex Court and those underlined portions make it clear that the third respondent therein made up his mind at the stage of show-cause notice itself. Those portions in the show-cause notice, as underlined by the Apex Court, are extracted from paragraph 22 of the judgment in Oryx Fisheries case as hereunder: “22. …. At the meeting, it was convincingly proved that the cargo shipped by you to the abovementioned buyer was defective and you have not so far settled the complaint. …… 1. It has been proved beyond doubt that you have sent sub-standard material to M/s. Cascade Marine Foods, LLC, Sharjah, ….” 19.28. Thereafter, only the Apex Court recorded in paragraph 27, as stated above, that the entire proceeding got vitiated due to the pre-determined mind expressed in that show-cause notice. 19.29. In paragraph 31 of its judgment, the Apex Court held that the show-cause notice cannot be read hyper-technically and the same has to be read reasonably. It is also held that if on a reasonable reading of a show-cause notice, a person of ordinary prudence comes to the conclusion that the issues are prejudged in the show-cause notice, such a show-cause notice does not commence a fair procedure. Paragraph 31 of the judgment in Oryx Fisheries is extracted hereunder : “31. It is also held that if on a reasonable reading of a show-cause notice, a person of ordinary prudence comes to the conclusion that the issues are prejudged in the show-cause notice, such a show-cause notice does not commence a fair procedure. Paragraph 31 of the judgment in Oryx Fisheries is extracted hereunder : “31. It is of course true that the show-cause notice cannot be read hyper-technically and it is well settled that it is to be read reasonably. But one thing is clear that while reading a show-cause notice the person who is subject to it must get an impression that he will get an effective opportunity to rebut the allegations contained in the show-cause notice and prove his innocence. If on a reasonable reading of a show-cause notice a person of ordinary prudence gets the feeling that his reply to the show-cause notice will be an empty ceremony and he will merely knock his head against the impenetrable wall of prejudged opinion, such a show-cause notice does not commence a fair procedure especially when it is issued in a quasi-judicial proceeding under a statutory regulation which promises to give the person proceeded against a reasonable opportunity of defence.” 19.30. Apart from holding that the show-cause notice was a pre-determined one, the Apex Court also held that the final order of cancellation of registration certificate passed by the third respondent is totally a non-speaking order and also extracted the final order of the third respondent in paragraph 36. The following passage in paragraph 36 of the judgment in Oryx Fisheries case, is extracted, in this regard, as hereunder : “36. The appellant gave a reply to the show-cause notice but in the order of the third respondent by which registration certificate of the appellant was cancelled, no reference was made to the reply of the appellant, except saying that it is not satisfactory. The cancellation order is totally a non-speaking one. ….. 19.31. Thereafter, in paragraph 37, it is held that the final cancellation order is a non-speaking order and is virtually no order in the eye of the law. 19.32. The Apex Court in paragraph 40 of its judgments set out certain principles formulated in Kranti Associates V. (2010) 9 SCC 496, holding that both the quasi-judicial and the administrative authorities shall record reasons for its conclusions. 19.33. 19.32. The Apex Court in paragraph 40 of its judgments set out certain principles formulated in Kranti Associates V. (2010) 9 SCC 496, holding that both the quasi-judicial and the administrative authorities shall record reasons for its conclusions. 19.33. That is, the Apex Court interfered with the order of cancellation of registration on the ground that it was a non-speaking order also. 19.34. The aforesaid analysis of the judgment in Oryx Fisheries case makes it very clear that the said judgment is not applicable to the facts of these cases. 19.35. I am of the view that on a reasonable reading of the impugned show-cause notices, a person of ordinary prudence would not come to a conclusion that the authority made up his mind and came to a definite conclusion on the guilt of the petitioners. On the other hand, it only directed the petitioners to show-cause as to why the reports of the special inspection teams should not be acted upon. 20.0. The next judgment, relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners, dated 13.12.2011 in W.A.(MD)No.488 of 2010 (V. Kottaiveeran V. The District Collector, Madurai District, Madurai) also would not render any assistance to the petitioners. 20.1. In that case, the appellant therein was imposed with a penalty by the District Collector on the ground that he illicitly quarried granite blocks in Madurai District. The writ petition questioning the order of the Collector was dismissed. The Writ Appeal was allowed accepting the case of the appellant. In that case, no show-cause notice was issued and the inspection reports were not furnished and he was not even given opportunity to put forth his objections, as found in paragraph 3 of the said judgment. The relevant passage from paragraph 3 of the judgment dated 13.12.2011 in W.A.No.488 of 2010 is extracted hereunder : “3. …. The appellant was not served with any show cause notice and only as per the provision under the Right to Information Act, he has got a copy of the show cause notice. It is submitted that they sent the show cause notice to the old address without finding out the correct and new address of the appellant. …… the appellant was also not furnished with inspection reports and he has not given an opportunity to put forth his objections and contentions before passing the impugned order.” 20.2. It is submitted that they sent the show cause notice to the old address without finding out the correct and new address of the appellant. …… the appellant was also not furnished with inspection reports and he has not given an opportunity to put forth his objections and contentions before passing the impugned order.” 20.2. In those circumstances, a Division Bench of this Court also found that the perusal of the show-cause notice makes it clear that the authority pre-determined the issue. The following passage from paragraph 8 of the judgment is extracted hereunder : “8. Be that as it may, the appellant has obtained a copy of the said show-cause notice, as per the provision under the Right to Information Act and also produced before this Court. A perusal of the same makes it abundantly clear that the authority concerned already had a predetermined mind, as if the appellant/petitioner is responsible for carrying out the illegal quarry in the adjacent area.” 20.3. Applying the judgment of the Apex Court in Siemens case, the writ appeal was allowed by the Division Bench. 20.4. In these writ petitions under consideration, show-cause notices were issued, inspection reports were furnished, the petitioners were asked to appear for personal hearing to give objections on the reports and the learned Special Government Pleader also made a statement before this Court that all reasonable opportunity would be given and relevant documents, if any, required by the petitioners would be furnished, if those documents are in the possession of the Department. Hence, I am of the view that the said judgment cannot be applied to these cases. 21. On the other hand, the judgment of the Apex Court, relied on by the learned Special Government Pleader, in Union of India and another Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, reported in 2006 (12) SCC 28 , holding that the writ petition is not maintainable against a show-cause notice, squarely applies to the facts of these cases and the following passage in paragraph 14 of the said judgment is extracted in this regard : “14. …. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. …. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance.” 22. In fact, the said principle is also stated in Siemens case and Oryx Fisheries case. But the Apex Court, on the facts of those cases, held that the show-cause notices itself were predetermined one and therefore, interfered in favour of the appellants therein. But in these writ petitions, I have come to the conclusion that the show-cause notices do not reveal the predetermination of mind and hence, these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. 23. For the aforesaid reasons, these writ petitions are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed.11