Judgment : S. Manikumar, J. 1. Though Mr. A.Vadivel, learned counsel representing the counsel on record, sought for an adjournment on the ground that Mr. K.S.Sankhar Murali, learned counsel for the petitioner could not appear, when the matter is taken up for hearing, the other two counsels viz., Mr. S.Vithya Shankar and Mr. Prasanna Vinodh on record, have not appeared. 2. The impugned order dated 21.08.2014 reads as follows: (“Tamil”) 3. Vide notice, dated 21.08.2014, the Member Secretary, Town and Country Planning, Thanjavur Local Planning Authority, Thanjavur, respondent herein, has only stated that proper application should be submitted within fifteen days, otherwise, action would be taken under Sections 56 and 57 of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971. Prima facie, the impugned notice does not lack in jurisdiction. The present Writ Petition has been filed after a delay of one year. It is hit by delay and laches. 4. Laches or reasonable time are not defined under any Statute or Rules. "Laches" or "Lashes" is an old french word for slackness or negligence or not doing. In general sense, it means neglect to do what in the law should have been done for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time. What could be the latches in one case might not constitute in another. The latches to non-suit, an aggrieved person person from challenging the acquisition proceedings should be inferred from the conduct of the land owner or an interested person and that there should be a passive inaction for a reasonable length of time. What is reasonable time has not been explained in any of the enactment. Reasonable time depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 5. The words "reasonable time", as explained in Veerayeeammal v. Seeniammal reported in 2002 (1) SCC 134 , at Paragraph 13, is as follows: "13. The word “reasonable” has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the person concerned is called upon to act reasonably knows or ought to know as to what was reasonable. It may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. The reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks. It may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. The reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks. The dictionary meaning of the “reasonable time” is to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. In other words it means, as soon as circumstances permit. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s The Law Lexicon it is defined to mean: “A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than ‘directly’; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea.” 6. The statement of law has also been summarized in Halsbury's Laws of England, Para 911, pg. 395 as follows: "In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches." 7. In State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai reported in AIR 1964 SC 1006 , the Supreme Court held that it is not either unreasonable delay denies to the petitioner the discretionary extraordinary remedy of mandamus, certiorari or any other relief. 8. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches." 7. In State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai reported in AIR 1964 SC 1006 , the Supreme Court held that it is not either unreasonable delay denies to the petitioner the discretionary extraordinary remedy of mandamus, certiorari or any other relief. 8. In State of M.P., v. Nandlal Jaismal reported in 1986 (4) SCC 566 , the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 24, held as follows: "24. Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. We do not think it necessary to burden this judgment with reference to various decisions of this Court where it has been emphasised time and again that where there is inordinate and unexplained delay and third party rights are created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline to interfere, even if the State action complained of is unconstitutional or illegal. .........Of course, this rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a strait jacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third party rights the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the petitioner. But, such cases where the demand of justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay or creation of third party rights would by their very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a matter within the discretion of the court; ex hypothesi every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it." (emphasis supplied) 9. M/s. Rup Diamonds and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in (1989) 2 SCC 356 , wherein their Lordships observed that those people who were sitting on the fence till somebody else took up the matter to the court for refund of duty, cannot be given the benefit. In that context, Their Lordships held as follows: "Petitioners are re-agitating claims which they had not pursued for several years. Petitioners were not vigilant but were content to be dormant and chose to sit on the fence till somebody else's case came to be decided. Their case cannot be considered on the analogy of one where a law had been declared unconstitutional and void by a court, so as to enable persons to recover monies paid under the compulsion of a law later so declared void. There is also an unexplained, inordinate delay in preferring the present writ petition which is brought after a year after the first rejection. As observed by the Court in Durga Prashad case, the exchange position of this country and the policy of the government regarding international trade varies from year to year. In these matters it is essential that persons who are aggrieved by orders of the government should approach the High Court after exhausting the remedies provided by law, rule or order with utmost expedition. Therefore, these delays are sufficient to persuade the Court to decline to interfere. If a right of appeal is available, this order rejecting the writ petition shall not prejudice petitioners' case in any such appeal." 10. Therefore, these delays are sufficient to persuade the Court to decline to interfere. If a right of appeal is available, this order rejecting the writ petition shall not prejudice petitioners' case in any such appeal." 10. In State of Maharastra v. Digambar reported in AIR 1995 SC 1991 , the Supreme Court, considered a case, where compensation for the acquired land was claimed belatedly and at Paragraphs 12, 18 and 21, held as follows: "12. How a person who alleges against the State of deprivation of his legal right, can get relief of compensation from the State invoking writ jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution even though, he is guilty of laches or undue delay is difficult to comprehend, when it is well settled by decision of this Court that no person, be he a citizen or otherwise, is entitled to obtain the equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution if his conduct is blame-worthy because of laches, undue delay, acquiescence, waiver and the like. Moreover, how a citizen claiming discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution against a State, could be relieved of his obligation to establish his unblame worthy conduct for getting such relief, where the State against which relief is sought is a welfare State, is also difficult to comprehend. Where the relief sought under Article 226 of the Constitution by a person against the welfare State is founded on its alleged illegal or wrongful executive action, the need to explain laches or undue delay on his part to obtain such relief, should, if anything, be more stringent than in other cases, for the reason that the State due to laches or undue delay on the part of the person seeking relief, may not be able to show that the executive action complained of was legal or correct for want of records pertaining to the action or for the officers who were responsible for such action not being available later on. Further, where granting of relief is claimed against the State on alleged unwarranted executive action, is bound to result in loss to the public exchequer of the State or in damage to other public interest, the High Court before granting such relief is required to satisfy itself that the delay or laches on the part of a citizen or any other person in approaching for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution on the alleged violation of his legal right, was wholly justified in the facts and circumstances, instead of ignoring the same or leniently considering it. Thus, in our view, persons seeking relief against the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, be they citizens or otherwise, cannot get discretionary relief obtainable thereunder unless they fully satisfy the High Court that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justified the laches or undue delay on their part in approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief. Therefore, where a High Court grants relief to a citizen or any other person under Article 226 of the Constitution against any person including the State without considering his blameworthy conduct, such as laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the State. 18. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, long ago, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong (1874) 5 PC 221) thus : "Now the doctrine of latches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy." 21. Therefore, where a High Court in exercise of its power vested under Article 226 of the Constitution issues a direction, order or writ for granting relief to a person including a citizen without considering his disentitlement of such relief due to his blameworthy conduct of undue delay or laches in claiming the same, such a direction, order or writ becomes unsustainable as that not made judiciously and reasonably in exercise of its sound judicial discretion, but as that made arbitrarily." 11. In State of Rajasthan v. D.R.Laxmi reported in 1996 (6) SCC 445 , the Supreme Court observed that though the order may be void, if the party does not approach the Court within a reasonable time, which is always a question of fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. 12. In Jagdish Lal and Ors., v. State of Haryana and Ors., reported in (1997) 6 SCC 538 : AIR 1997 SC 2366 , this Court reaffirmed the rule if a person choses to sit over the matter and then woke up after the decision of the Court, then such person cannot stand to benefit. In that case it was observed as follows: "The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus from Vir Pal Singh Chauhan case. The appellants' desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage." 13. The appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus from Vir Pal Singh Chauhan case. The appellants' desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage." 13. In Larsen and Toubro Ltd., v. State of Gujarat reported in 1998 (4) SCC 387 , the Supreme Court held that a writ petition challenging the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Central Act is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, if the challenge is not made within a reasonable time. 14. In the case of Government of W.B., v. Tarun K.Roy and Ors., reported in (2004) 1 SCC 347 , Their Lordships considered delay as serious factor and have not granted relief. It was observed as follows: "The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar. The plea of delay, which Mr. Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others there from who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law." 15. In Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam and another v. Jaswant Singh reported in AIR 2007 SC 924, the Supreme Court, after considering a catena of decisions on the aspect of delay, at Paragraph 13, held as follows: "13. In Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam and another v. Jaswant Singh reported in AIR 2007 SC 924, the Supreme Court, after considering a catena of decisions on the aspect of delay, at Paragraph 13, held as follows: "13. .......Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or while away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the Court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted." 16. In Virender Chaudhary v. Bharat Petroleum Corpn., reported in 2009 (1) SCC 297 , the Supreme Court, held as follows: "14........The court exercises its jurisdiction only upon satisfying itself that it would be equitable to do so. Delay and/or latches, indisputably, are the relevant factors. 15. The Superior Courts, times without number, applied the equitable principles for not granting a relief and/or a limited relief in favour of the applicant in a case of this nature. While doing so, the court although not oblivious of the fact that no period of limitation is provided for filing a writ petition but emphasize is laid that it should be filed within a reasonable time. A discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India need not be exercised if the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches. 17. Some of the decisions considered by the Apex Court in Virender Chaudhary's case (cited supra), are reiterated as follows: "16. In Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation and Anr. v. Jabar Singh and Ors. [(2007) 2 SCC 112], this Court held: "It is not in dispute that the effective alternative remedy was not availed of by many of the workmen as detailed in paragraphs supra. The termination order was made in the year 1995 and the writ petitions were admittedly field in the year 2005 after a delay of 10 years. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been filed after a delay of 10 years and that the writ petitions should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of latches." 17. In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and Ors. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been filed after a delay of 10 years and that the writ petitions should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of latches." 17. In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and Ors. [ (2007) 9 SCC 278 ], this Court held: "16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy [ (2004) 1 SCC 347 ], U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh [ (2006) 11 SCC 464 ] and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd., v. K.Thangappan [(2006) 4 SCC 332]) 18. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1994) 6 SCC 524 ] and M.R.Gupta v. Union of India [ (1995) 5 SCC 628 ]) 19. We do not find any illegality in the impugned order. Hence, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.