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2014 DIGILAW 308 (KER)

Silvy George v. Anna Joseph

2014-04-04

B.KEMAL PASHA, T.R.RAMACHANDRAN NAIR

body2014
Judgment : Kemal Pasha, J. 1. This appeal unfurls certain interesting questions regarding the proof of genuineness of a Will, when none of the attesting witnesses are alive, and even if it is proved, whether the legacy in favour of one of the legatees to the Will lapses and the same reverts back to the estate of the testator, when such legatee predeceases the testator? 2. Aggrieved by the dismissal of a suit for partition filed as O.S. No.453/2006 of the Principal Subordinate Judge's Court, Ernakulam through judgment and decree dated 31.03.2008, the plaintiff has come up in appeal. 3. The case of the appellant/plaintiff is that plaint 'A' schedule property was the property acquired by late Vareed and plaint 'B' schedule properties were the properties acquired by late Chummar. Vareed executed Ext.B1 Will registered as document No.7 of 1095 ME of the Ernakulam Sub Registry, thereby bequeathing his properties in favour of his only two sons namely, Thummi and Chummar. Thummi died in the year 1933 and Chummar died in the year 1967. Chummar died issueless. Thummi had 8 children, namely, Augustine, Joseph, Mariyam alias Kochu Mariyam, Monica, Plamena, Elo, Kochanno and Thressia, in his first marriage. After the death of his first wife, Thummi married one Rosa in whom he had a son namely, Varuthu alias George and three daughters, namely, Prestina, Rosakutty and Mary. According to the appellant, respondents 1 to 62 and the appellant are the legal heirs of the children of Thummi. 4. It is the case of the appellant that Thummi, in his capacity as one of the two sons of Vareed, was entitled to one half share in 'A' schedule property. As Thummi had 12 children, the appellant and respondents 53 to 60, who are the children of Rosakutty, are entitled to get 1/12 share in the said one half share of Thummi in plaint 'A' schedule property. 5. Plaint 'B' schedule properties were acquired by Chummar. He had also one half share in plaint 'A' schedule property in his capacity as the legal heir and legatee of Vareed. According to the appellant, Chummar died intestate without any wife or children and, therefore, his legal heirs are the 12 children of Thummi and their legal heirs. 5. Plaint 'B' schedule properties were acquired by Chummar. He had also one half share in plaint 'A' schedule property in his capacity as the legal heir and legatee of Vareed. According to the appellant, Chummar died intestate without any wife or children and, therefore, his legal heirs are the 12 children of Thummi and their legal heirs. Therefore, the appellant and respondents 53 to 60 are entitled to get 1/12 shares over plaint 'B' schedule properties as well as in the one half share of plaint 'A' schedule property belonged to Chummar. Respondents 1 to 6 are managing the plaint schedule properties. Respondents 41 to 47 had instituted O.S. No.610/2005 seeking partition of the properties belonged to late Thummi and Chummar. However, in that suit, only the legal heirs of the 8 children in Thummi's first marriage and the legal heirs of the son in Thummi's second marriage alone were arrayed as parties. On coming to know about the said suit, the appellant's mother Rosakutty filed an application for getting herself impleaded in that suit. But, before the consideration of the said application, Rosakutty died. A portion of the plaint schedule properties having an extent of 4 acres was conveyed by respondents 2, 5 and 6 to the 63rd respondent, through Ext.A2 sale deed dated 29.03.2005. Respondents 2, 5 and 6 being only some of the co-owners of the plaint schedule properties, the said sale deed is not binding on the other co-owners, including the appellant. It has been claimed in Ext.A2 sale deed that Chummar had executed and registered a Will. The said claim is false. According to the appellant, the plaint schedule properties including the property conveyed through Ext.A2 are partible. 6. Respondents 1 and 2 had filed a joint written statement contending that Thummi had only one wife named Mariyam and the claim of the appellant that he had married after her death is incorrect. It is contended that George, Prestina, Rosakutty and Mary are not the children of Thummi. The averment that plaint 'A' schedule property was acquired by Vareed, is denied. Vareed had only 2.68 acres of property. He executed Ext.B1 Will thereby bequeathing the said property to his sons Thummi and Chummar. Later, the properties allotted to the share of Thummi were auctioned by the Divan Peshkar of Cochin for arrears of 'Pattakudishika'. The averment that plaint 'A' schedule property was acquired by Vareed, is denied. Vareed had only 2.68 acres of property. He executed Ext.B1 Will thereby bequeathing the said property to his sons Thummi and Chummar. Later, the properties allotted to the share of Thummi were auctioned by the Divan Peshkar of Cochin for arrears of 'Pattakudishika'. Late Augustine, who is the elder son of Thummi, purchased the said property in auction. Augustine got sale sannath of the said property and thereby he was holding the property as its absolute owner. Augustine had also acquired a large extent of property during his lifetime. Augustine had no issues. He executed Ext.B11 Will No.41/1977 of the Ernakulam Sub Registry, thereby bequeathing his assets to his wife Elizabath. On the death of Augustine, the said properties devolved on Elizabeth. Elizabeth executed Ext.B13 Will No.61/1995 of the Ernakulam Sub Registry bequeathing her entire assets including her self acquired properties in favour of the 2nd respondent and late George, the husband of the 5th respondent. On the death of Elizabeth, the 2nd respondent and the husband of the 5th respondent were holding all the said properties as its absolute owners. The averment that Chummar died intestate is incorrect. Respondents 2, 5 and 6 are the absolute owners in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the properties and they have every right to use and alienate the said properties. The allegation that Ext.A2 sale deed is fraudulent, is incorrect. Thressia, daughter of Thummi, had filed O.S. No.225/1972 before the Subordinate Judge's Court, Ernakulam, claiming partition of the said properties. The said suit was withdrawn without obtaining leave to file any fresh suit on the same subject matter and, therefore, the suit is barred under Order 23 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Daughters of Thummi were married after giving dowry and, therefore, they are not entitled to get any share. The 2nd respondent has been holding the properties for the last more than 40 years as its absolute owner and, therefore, if at all the appellant or any other person had any right over the properties, the same has been lost by adverse possession and limitation. 7. On the side of the plaintiff, PWs1 and 2 were examined, and Exts.A1 to A5 were marked. On the side of the defendants, DWs1 to 6 were examined and EXts.B1 to B26 were marked. 7. On the side of the plaintiff, PWs1 and 2 were examined, and Exts.A1 to A5 were marked. On the side of the defendants, DWs1 to 6 were examined and EXts.B1 to B26 were marked. After hearing both sides, the court below dismissed the suit with costs, through the impugned judgment and decree, and hence this RFA. 8. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Smt. Sumathi Dandapani for the appellant, learned Senior Counsel Sri. S.Sreekumar appearing for some of the respondents travelling with the appellant and learned Senior Counsel Sri. S.V.Balakrishna Iyer appearing for respondents 5 and 6 and additional respondents 67 to 69. 9. The learned Senior Counsel Smt. Sumathi Dandapani and Sri. S.Sreekumar have argued that late Chummar died intestate and Ext.B3 Will propounded by defendants 2, 5, and 6 is false and the same was not executed by late Chummar. Alternatively it was argued that if at all Ext.B3 Will is found to be genuine, the bequest through it in deceased Joseph had lapsed on account of the death of Joseph, as the said Joseph did not survive the testator Chummar. It is argued that Chummar died in the year 1967 and Joseph, one of the alleged legatees in Ext.B3 died in the year 1960. 10. The case of the appellant is that Chummar died intestate and, therefore, all his legal heirs are entitled to succeed his properties. It is the admitted case in the plaint that defendants 1 to 6, who are the legal heirs of Joseph, are “now in management of the plaint schedule property”. In paragraph 15 of the plaint, it is further averred that defendants 1 to 6 are in possession of the plaint schedule properties on behalf of all the legal heirs of late Thummi and Chummar. According to the plaintiff, defendants 2, 5 and 6 have executed sale deed No.3091/05 of the Sub Registry Office, Ernakulam in favour of the 63rd defendant, and that defendants 2, 5 and 6, being only some of the co-owners of the properties, have no right to convey the portion of the plaint schedule property without the junction of all the co-owners. It is also contended that the Will allegedly executed by Chummar is false. It is pertinent to note that the documents executed subsequent to the execution of Ext.B3, except Ext.A2 sale deed in favour of the 63rd defendant, are not in challenge. 11. It is also contended that the Will allegedly executed by Chummar is false. It is pertinent to note that the documents executed subsequent to the execution of Ext.B3, except Ext.A2 sale deed in favour of the 63rd defendant, are not in challenge. 11. The argument of the appellant and those respondents travelling along with the appellant is that Ext.B3 is false. They have forwarded another argument that even if Ext.B3 is found genuine, the bequest in favour of deceased Joseph had lapsed as he did not survive the testator Chummar as per Section 107 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. It is also argued that Ext.B13 Will is also false. 12. The 5th defendant, who is the wife of deceased George P.J., was examined as DW1. She has filed the affidavit in lieu of chief examination for her and also for and on behalf of the 2nd defendant, and also her son, who is the 6th defendant. According to her, the properties bequeathed to Thommi through Ext.B1 Will was sold in auction by the then Divan Peshkar of Cochin Government for the realisation of arrears of taxes and pattom. Augustine purchased the said property in auction and he obtained Ext.B2 Lela Sannath. Chummar executed Ext.B3 Will in favour of the 2nd defendant Paily @ Antony, and her (DW1's) husband George @ Varuth. The B schedule properties in Ext.B3 were bequeathed to Augustine. Chummar died in the year 1967. 13. According to DW1, over and above the properties devolved on him through the bequest in Ext.B3 and the purchase through Ext.B2, Augustine had acquired several other properties also through Exts.B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, B9 and B10 Sale deeds. Out of the properties devolved on Augustine through Ext.B3 Will and acquired by him through the aforesaid various Sale deeds and Sale Sannath, 7 acres and 36 cents of properties were taken by the Government as excess land on the coming into force of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. In respect of the remaining properties, Augustine executed Ext.B11 Will thereby bequeathing the said properties to his wife deceased Elizabeth. On the death of Augustine on 11.02.1989, Ext.B11 Will came into force and thereby all the said properties devolved on Elizabeth, she was in absolute possession and enjoyment of the same. Over and above it, through Ext.B12 Sale deed, Elizabeth had purchased two acres and 66 cents of properties also. On the death of Augustine on 11.02.1989, Ext.B11 Will came into force and thereby all the said properties devolved on Elizabeth, she was in absolute possession and enjoyment of the same. Over and above it, through Ext.B12 Sale deed, Elizabeth had purchased two acres and 66 cents of properties also. Thereafter, through Ext.B13 Will No.61 of 1995 Elizabeth bequeathed all the said properties devolved on her as per Ext.B11 Will and Ext.B12 sale deed, to the 2nd defendant Paily and the said late George, who is the husband of DW1. On the death of George on 23.01.2004, the said properties devolved on his wife DW1, and their son, the 6th defendant. 14. According to DW1, defendants 7 to 47 and 2 to 4 along with her husband and Augustine as parties, a civil suit was pending before the court below as O.S.No.224/1972. The matters in controversy in the said suit are the same as contained in this suit. Later, O.S.No.225/1972 was dismissed as not pressed. Ext.B14 is the copy of the plaint in O.S.225/1972 and Ext.B15 is the certified copy of the judgment of the said suit. Out of the 22 acres and 65 cents of property of the 2nd defendant along with DW1 and her son, the 6th defendant, they sold 4 acres of property to the 63rd defendant through Ext.A2 sale deed. Ext.B16 is the tax receipt in respect of the properties in favour of Defendants 2, 5, and 6. 15. Ext.B15 shows that on 16.03.1976, when O.S.No.225/1972 came up in the special list for trial, the plaintiff did not press the suit vide endorsement on the plaint and thereby the court below dismissed the said suit with costs on 16.03.1976. It has to be noted that the present suit has been filed in the year 2006. It has come out in the cross examination of DW1 that the 2nd defendant is a chronic diabetic patient, and one of his legs was amputated and, therefore, he could not appear before the court below. It has come out that the attestors in Ext.B3 are not alive. One Rokky, S/o.Ouseph is one of the attestors. One Rokky, S/o.Mani is the other attestor. According to DW1, the said Rokky S/o.Mani was a resident of Vallarpadam and his children are alive. DW4 Antony Marvin is the son of deceased Rokky, S/o.Mani. It has come out that the attestors in Ext.B3 are not alive. One Rokky, S/o.Ouseph is one of the attestors. One Rokky, S/o.Mani is the other attestor. According to DW1, the said Rokky S/o.Mani was a resident of Vallarpadam and his children are alive. DW4 Antony Marvin is the son of deceased Rokky, S/o.Mani. According to DW1, they have been paying tax for the property from the year 2005 onwards. Ext.B16 tax receipt is dated 03.01.2006 and it has come out that the properties were mutated in favour of defendants 2, 5 and 6. From the cross examination of DW1, it can be seen that what was challenged is Ext.B3. 16. Antony Marvin was examined as DW4. He is residing at Vallarpadam. According to him, the name of his father is C.M.Rokky i.e., Rokky, S/o.Mani. The said Rokky was a Doctor. According to him, he can identify the signature of his father. He identified the signature of his father, Rokky in Ext.B3. In cross examination, he stated that his father died in the year 1982. When the signature portion of Ext.B3 was again shown to DW4, he clearly identified the signature of his father in Ext.B3. According to him, he does not know the other signatures contained in Ext.B3. 17. The Sub Registrar of Ernakulam was examined as DW5 and he produced Volumes 12, 27 and 140 of Book No.3 of the Ernakulam Sub Registry. According to him, pages 70 to 77 in Volume No.12 contain Will No.16/59 executed by Chummar. He proved Ext.B3(a) copy of the said Will, the marking of the same was not objected. Further, according to DW5, pages 45 to 50 in Volume No.22 contain Will No.4/77 executed by Augustine, a copy of which is marked as Ext.B11(a) without objection. Pages 49 to 51 in Volume No.140 contain Will No.61/95 executed by Elizabeth, wife of Augustine, a copy of which is marked as Ext.B13(a) without objection. 18. By inviting our attention to the decision in M.B.Ramesh Vs. K.M.Veeraje Urs and Others [ (2013) 7 SCC 490 ], in which the decision in Bharpur Singh Vs. Shamsher Singh [ (2009) 3 SCC 687 has been relied on, the learned Senior counsel Sri.S.Sreekumar has argued that the presumption under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act is not available to a Will. K.M.Veeraje Urs and Others [ (2013) 7 SCC 490 ], in which the decision in Bharpur Singh Vs. Shamsher Singh [ (2009) 3 SCC 687 has been relied on, the learned Senior counsel Sri.S.Sreekumar has argued that the presumption under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act is not available to a Will. In M.B.Ramesh (supra), it was held: “At the same time we cannot accept the submission on behalf of the respondents as well that merely because the will was more than 30 years old, a presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (“the Evidence Act”, for short) ought to be drawn that the document has been duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to have been executed and attested. As held by this Court in Bharpur Singh Vs. Shamsher Singh, a presumption regarding documents 30 years old does not apply to a will. A will has to be proved in terms of Section 63(c) of the Succession Act read with Section 68 of the Evidence Act.” 19. Regarding the evidence of DW5, the learned Senior counsel Sri.S.Sreekumar has invited our attention to the decision in Benga Behera and another Vs. Braja Kishore Nanda and others [ (2007) 9 SCC 728 ], wherein it was held in paragraphs 34 to 36 as follows:- “34. A question has also been raised as to whether a certificate by Sub-Registrar at the time of registration proves attestation. A Sub-Registrar in the matter of registration of a document acts under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 (the 1908 Act). Section 52 of the 1908 Act prescribes the duty of Registering Officer when a document is presented in terms thereof. The signature of every person presenting a document for registration is required to be endorsed on every such document at the time of presentation. Section 58 prescribes the particulars to be endorsed on documents admitted for registration, such as: (a) signature of the person admitting the execution of the document; (b) any payment of money or delivery of goods made in presence of Regisering Officer in reference to the execution of the document shall be endorsed by the Registering Officer in the document presented for registration. Therefore this is the only duty cast on the registering authority to endorse on the will i.e. To endorse only the admission or execution by the person who presented the document for registration. The compliance with this provision leads to the legal presumption that the document was registered and nothing else. 35. If an authority in performance of a statutory duty signs a document, he does not become an attesting witness within the meaning of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 63 of the Succession Act. The terms “attestation” means: to “attest” is to bear witness to a fact. The essential conditions of valid attestation are (i) two or more witnesses have seen the executant sign the instrument; (ii) each of them has signed the instrument in presence of the executant. 36. “Animus attestandi” is a necessary ingredient for proving the attestation. If a person puts his signature in a document only in discharge of his statutory duty, he may not be treated to be an attesting witness.” 20. Regarding the standard of evidence required to prove a Will, our attention has been invited to the decision in Jaswant Kaur Vs. Amrit Kaur and others [ (1977) 1 SCC 369 ], which followed the decision in R.Venkatachala Iyengar Vs. B.N.Thimmajamma [ AIR 1959 SC 443 ]. In Jaswant Kaur (supra), it was held: “There is a long line of decisions bearing on the nature and standard of evidence required to prove a will. Those decisions have been reviewed in an elaborate judgment of this Court in R.Venkatachala Iyengar Vs. B.N.Thimmajamma. The Court, speaking through Gajendragadkar, J., laid down in that case the following propositions: 1. Stated generally, a will has to be proved like any other document, the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. As in the case of proof of other documents, so in the case of proof of wills, one cannot insist on proof with mathematical certainty. 2. Since Section 63 of the Succession Act requires a will to be attested, it cannot be used as evidence until, as required by Section 68 of the Evidence Act, one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. 3. Unlike other documents, the will speaks from the death of the testator and therefore the maker of the will is never available for deposing as to the circumstacnes in which the will came to be executed. This aspect introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the testator. Normally, the onus whichlies on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of the will. 4. Cases in which the execution of the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stand on a different footing. A shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit and such other circumstances raise suspicion about the execution of the will. That suspicion cannot be removed by the mere assertion of the propounder that the will bears the signature of the testator or that the testator was in a sound and disposing state of mind and memory at the time when the will was made, or that those like the wife and children of the testator who would normally receive their due share in his estate were disinherited because the testator might have had his own reasons for excluding them. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the will excite the suspicion of the court, the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last will of the testator. 5. It is in connection with wills, the execution of which is surrounded by suspicious circumstances that the test of satisfaction of the judicial conscience has been evolved. That test emphasises that in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is called upon to decide a solemn question and by reason of suspicious circumstances the court has to be satisfied fully that the will has been validly executed by the testator. 6. If a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. 6. If a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. in regard to the execution of the will, such pleas have to be proved by him, but even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances surrounding the execution of the will may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will. And then it is a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter.” 21. Another Division Bench of this Court in Natarajan Vs. Sree Narayana D.S.Trust [ 1995 (2) KLT 862 ] held in paragraph 16, “Thus the legal factors concerning the proof of execution of a will are: (1) The testator must have attained the age of majority and should be of sound mind and had the capacity to understand the effect of disposition at the time of the execution of the will as envisaged in section 59 of the Act. It must have been executed of free will. A will, the making of which has been caused by undue influence, fraud, coercion or by such importunity as takes away the free agency of the testator is void (Section 61 of the Act). (2) The will should be signed or marked by the testator and it should be attested by at least two witnesses, that is to say, the witnesses saw the testator sign the will and they signed the will in the presence of the testator. (Section 63 of the Act). (3) At least one attesting witness should be called for the purpose of satisfactorily proving its execution if there be an attesting witness alive. If no such witness can be found, it must be proved that the attestation of one attesting witness at least is in his handwriting. (Sections 67, 68 and 69 of the Indian Evidence Act). (4) The will in question should be the last will, that is to say, it was not revoked or cancelled by executing another will or codicil or destroyed by the testator later with the intention of revoking or cancelling the same as envisaged in section 70 of the Act. (5) The onus of proving the genuineness of the will lies on the propounder. (5) The onus of proving the genuineness of the will lies on the propounder. However, where it is pleaded that the will was the result of undue influence, fraud, coercion, importunity or collusion perpetrated by the legatee and the propounder, the burden of proving such a fact is upon the person who alleges it. Registration of a will is optional (Section 18 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908). A will may, however, be deposited with any Registrar by the testator by keeping it in a sealed cover as envisaged in sections 42 to 46 of the Indian Registration Act.” 22. The learned Senior counsel Sri.S.V.Balakrishna Iyer has argued that Ext.B3 clearly stands proved in view of Sections 67, 68 and 69 of the Indian Evidence Act. As per Section 67, if a document is alleged to have been signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting. As per Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, if a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. As per Section 69 of the Indian Evidence Act, if no such attesting witness can be found, it must be proved that the attestation of one attesting witness at least is in his handwriting, and that the signature of the person executing the document is in the handwriting of that person. 23. According to the learned Senior counsel, the evidence of DW4 clearly proves that the attestation by one of the attesting witness to Ext.B3 is in the handwriting of the said attesting witness, who is the father of DW4. Chummar died in the year 1967. Ext.B3 was executed in the year 1959. The evidence of DW5 shows that the said Will was duly registered at the Ernakulam Sub Registry. Chummar died in the year 1967. Ext.B3 was executed in the year 1959. The evidence of DW5 shows that the said Will was duly registered at the Ernakulam Sub Registry. According to the learned Senior counsel, there are two direct methods of proving the handwriting of a person, namely, (1) by an admission of the person who wrote it, and (2) by the evidence of some witness who saw it written. There are three other modes of proof of the handwriting by opinion, as contained in Sections 45, 47 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. The handwriting can be proved through opinion evidence of the handwriting expert as per Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act. The handwriting can be proved as per Section 47 of the Indian Evidence Act by evidence of a witness, who is acquainted of the handwriting of the person who is said to have written the writing in question and further, the same can also be proved under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act on an opinion formed by the court on comparison made by itself. Our attention has been invited to the decision in State(Delhi Administration) Vs. Pali Ram [ AIR 1979 SC 14 ], wherein it was held: “Just as in English Law, the Indian Evidence Act recognises two direct methods of proving the handwriting of a person: (1) By an admission of the person who wrote it, (2) By the evidence of some witness who saw it written. These are the best methods of proof. These apart, there are three other modes of proof by opinion. They are: (i) By the evidence of a handwriting expert. (ii) By the evidence of a witness acquainted with the handwriting of the person who is said to have written the writing in question. (iii) Opinion formed by the Court on comparison made by itself. All these three cognate modes of proof involve a process of comparison. In mode (i), the comparison is made by the expert of the disputed writing with the admitted or proved writing of the person who is said to have written the questioned document. In (ii), the comparison takes the form of a belief which the witness entertains upon comparing the writing in question, with an exemplar formed in his mind from some previous knowledge or repetitive observance of the handwriting of the person concerned. In (ii), the comparison takes the form of a belief which the witness entertains upon comparing the writing in question, with an exemplar formed in his mind from some previous knowledge or repetitive observance of the handwriting of the person concerned. In the case of (iii), the comparison is made by the Court with the sample writing or exemplar obtained by it from the person concerned.” 24. Applying the aforesaid legal propositions, the evidence of DW4 is sufficient within the meaning of Section 47 read with Section 69 of the Indian Evidence Act to prove the signature of one of the attesting witness in Ext.B3. It cannot be said that DW4 being the son of the said attestor was not acquainted with the handwriting or the signature of his father. As per Section 47 of the Indian Evidence Act, when the court has to form an opinion as to the person by whom any document was signed, the opinion of any person acquainted with the handwriting of the person by whom it is signed that it was signed by that person, is a relevant fact. As per Section 69 of the Indian Evidence Act, when no attesting witness can be found, it must be proved that the attestation of one attesting witness at least is in his handwriting. Through DW4, it stands proved that one attesting witness has signed the document. As per Section 69 of the Indian Evidence Act, there is a further burden to prove that the signature of the person executing the document is in the handwriting of that person. Chummar, who allegedly executed Ext.B2, died in the year 1967. Ext.B17 is a document signed by the said Chummar, which is not disputed or challenged. On a comparison of the signature of Chummar in Ext.B3 as well as the admitted signature of Chummar in Ext.B17, it could be seen that the signatures were affixed by the very same person. A comparison of such signature is possible within the meaning of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act in order to ascertain whether the signatures were affixed by the very same person. 25. Apart from all the above, Ext.B3 is a registered document as is proved by DW5. The learned Senior counsel Sri.S.V.Balakrishna Iyer has placed reliance on the decision rendered by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Janaki Devi Vs. 25. Apart from all the above, Ext.B3 is a registered document as is proved by DW5. The learned Senior counsel Sri.S.V.Balakrishna Iyer has placed reliance on the decision rendered by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Janaki Devi Vs. R.Vasanthi and others [ 2005 (1) MLJ 357 ], wherein it was held as follows:- “The above view is further strengthened by a Division Bench of the Privy Council in Gopal Das Vs. Sri Thakurji (AIR (3) 1943 Privy Council 43), wherein Their Lordships have held that the endorsement showing presentation and execution, admitted by the testator before the Registrar are sufficient to certain extent to prove the execution of the Will itself, provided it is not shown that the testator, who had admitted the execution of the document, is not an impostor. In Irudayammal Vs. Salayath Mary ( 1972 (2) MLJ 508 ), a Division Bench of this Court has held that certificate of registration under Section 60 of the Registration Act is relevant for proving the execution, wherein it is observed as follows: “It is true that registration, it itself, in all cases, is not proof of execution, but if no other evidence is available, the certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of its execution and the certificate of the registration officer under Section 60 of the Registration Act is relevant for proving execution.” In Hutchegowda Vs. Chennigegowda (AIR 1953 Mysore 49) the following view was taken by a Division Bench: “Evidence that a document was duly registered is some evidence of its execution by the person by whom it purports to have been executed.” ” In paragraph 41 of the decision noted supra, it was held: “We have already given a finding regarding the genuineness of the execution and its registration on the basis of the unchallenged evidence given by PW1 and considering these proved facts supported by the above rulings, it should be further held, in view of Sections 52(1) (a), 58 & 60 of the Registration Act, the certificate issued by the Registrar would certainly, constitute sufficient evidence to prove the document, its execution also to some extent. For the foregoing reasons, we are fully satisfied, that the requirements of conditions in proving a Will, as mentioned supra are well established, and the burden of proof also discharged by the plaintiff, deserving her, to receive the order, for letters of administration.” 26. Considering all the aforesaid circumstances, it can be concluded that Ext.B3 stands proved through the evidence of DW1, DW4 and DW5 with the aid of Sections 47, 69, and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. Any further proof cannot be expected in respect of Ext.B3 which was executed in the year 1959 by Chummar, who died in the year 1967. Based on Ext.B3, several other subsequent documents including Ext.B11, Ext.B13 and Ext.A2 were executed. The propounder of Ext.B3 could, within all constraints, prove the genuineness of Ext.B3. 27. Regarding Ext.B13, there is evidence of DW2, DW3 and DW5. DW2 is an Advocate, who prepared Ext.B13. He knew the testatrix Elizabeth. According to him, the testatrix had affixed her signature in Ext.B13 in his presence. The second attestor in Ext.B13 is Advocate M.J.Dixon, who was a practicing lawyer at Ernakulam. In cross examination, he has stated in evidence that Ext.B13 was prepared by him on 10.05.1995 and the same was registered on 12.05.1995. According to him, the same was prepared as directed by the testatrix Elizabeth. The testimony of DW2 stands unchallenged. 28. DW3 is residing at Vallarpadam. According to him, he knew Elizabeth, wife of Augustine, and that she was a teacher. She had prepared Ext.B13 Will in which he affixed his signature as an attestor. According to him, he saw Elizabeth affixing her signature in the document and also the second witness affixing his signature in it. He went to the Registrar's office and affixed his signature. He identified his signature in Ext.B13. He was subjected to cross examination for the plaintiff. Apart from asking some questions regarding the relatives of Thummi, no other questions were put to him regarding the execution of Ext.B13. With regard to the execution of Ext.B13 and attestation of Ext.B13, his evidence stands unchallenged. Over and above it, there is the evidence of DW5, which shows that Ext.B13 was also registered. Our attention was invited to the decision in M.B.Ramesh Vs. With regard to the execution of Ext.B13 and attestation of Ext.B13, his evidence stands unchallenged. Over and above it, there is the evidence of DW5, which shows that Ext.B13 was also registered. Our attention was invited to the decision in M.B.Ramesh Vs. K.M.Veeraje Urs and Others [ (2013) 7 SCC 490 ], wherein it was held in paragraph 21: “The issue of validity of the will in the present case will have to be considered in the context of these facts. It is true that in the case at hand, there is no specific statement by PW2 that he had seen the other attesting witness sign the will in the presence of the testator, but he has stated that the other witness had also signed the document. He has proved his signature, and on the top of it he has also stated in the Cross examination that the other witness (Mr.Mallaraje Urs), Smt.Nagammani, himself and one Sampat Iyanger and the writer of the will were all [resent while writing the will on 24.10.1943 which was registered on the very next day. This statement by implication and inference will have to be held as proving the required attestation by the other witness. This statement along with the attendant circumstances placed on record would certainly constitute proving of the will by other evidence as permitted by Section 71 of the Evidence Act.” 29. From all the discussions made above, we find that the genuineness of Exts.B3 and B13 clearly stand proved. As far as Ext. B11 is concerned, it is of no consequence at all, as far as the appellant as well as the respondents travelling along with the appellant are concerned. 30. The learned Senior Counsel Smt. Sumathi Dandapani and Sri. S.Sreekumar have forwarded an argument that if at all Ext.B3 is found to be genuine, on the death of Joseph in the year 1960, the said Joseph, who is one of the legatees in the Will, had not survived the testator and therefore, the legacy in favour of Joseph cannot take effect and shall lapse and the same form part of the residue of the testator's property as per Section 105 of the Indian Succession Act. Therefore, the question to be considered is whether the bequest made in the name of the said Joseph could be considered as a legacy in his favour. 31. Therefore, the question to be considered is whether the bequest made in the name of the said Joseph could be considered as a legacy in his favour. 31. The crux of the matter is with regard to the validity of Ext.B3 Will executed by late Chummar and the nature of the right created on deceased Joseph, son of late Thummi. The questions to be considered are; whether late Joseph had acquired any independent right or title by the bequest made through Ext.B3, or whether late Joseph was made merely as a trustee only, in respect of the properties allotted to the 2nd defendant P.J. Paily and George.P.J, the husband of the 5th defendant. The further questions to be considered are, whether the legacy created through Ext.B3 Will in favour of the aforesaid 2nd defendant and George.P.J through deceased Joseph, had lapsed on account of the death of Joseph, as the said Joseph did not survive the testator Chummar. 32. Section 105 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 reads as follows: “105. In what case legacy lapses – (1) If the legatee does not survive the testator, the legacy cannot take effect, but shall lapse and form part of the residue of the testator's property, unless it appears by the Will that the testator intended that it should go to some other person. 2) In order to entitle the representatives of the legatee to receive the legacy, it must be proved that he survived the testator.” (Emphasis supplied). Therefore, in a case wherein the legatee does not survive the testator, the legacy cannot take effect, but shall lapse and form part of the residue of the testator's property, unless it appears by the Will that the testator intended that it should go to some other person. 33. The main argument forwarded by them is based on illustration (ii) to Section 105 of the Indian Succession Act. Illustration (ii) says: “A bequest is made to 'A' and his children. 'A' dies before the testator, or happens to be dead when the Will is made. The legacy to 'A' and his children lapses.” In answer to the claim, the learned Senior Counsel Sri. S.V. Balakrishna Iyer has relied on illustration (iv) which says: “A sum of money is bequeathed to 'A' for life, and after his death to 'B'. 'A' dies in the life time of the testator, 'B' survives the testator. The legacy to 'A' and his children lapses.” In answer to the claim, the learned Senior Counsel Sri. S.V. Balakrishna Iyer has relied on illustration (iv) which says: “A sum of money is bequeathed to 'A' for life, and after his death to 'B'. 'A' dies in the life time of the testator, 'B' survives the testator. The bequest to 'B' takes effect.” 34. Therefore, if the bequest in favour of deceased Joseph is for life, and after his death, to defendants 2 and 5, if defendants 2 and 5 survive the testator; even when the said Joseph does not survive the testator, the bequest in favour of defendants 2 and 5 shall take effect. Hence, the nature of the bequest created in favour of deceased Joseph and defendants 2 and 5 has to be analysed. Ext.B3 was executed on 14.08.1959. Ext.B3 is in respect of the properties devolved on late Chummar through Ext.B1 Will and also the properties acquired by him through Ext.B24 and Ext.B25 sale deeds and sale deed No.11104 of Ernakulam Sub Registry. 35. The learned Senior Counsel Sri. S.V. Balakrishna Iyer has pointed out that the properties allotted to late Thummi through the bequest in Ext.B1 was attached and subsequently sold in auction by the then Diwan Peshkar of Cochin Government towards arrears of pattom and tax through Ext.B2 'Lela sannath'. Augustine, S/o Cummar, born in Mariyam, purchased the said property for an amount of Rs.350/- in the said auction. Therefore, the properties bequeathed to Thummi through Ext.B1 has subsequently devolved on late Augustine through Ext.B2 'Lela sannath'. As it was a purchase made by late Augustine, late Thummi had no subsisting interest in the said properties, after the execution of Ext.B2 in favour of Augustine. 36. As per Ext.B3, the properties scheduled in 'A' schedule along with the building in 'A' schedule item No.1 and some of the movable properties scheduled therein were allotted to Joseph. The 'B' schedule therein and certain movable properties were bequeathed to Augustine. Regarding the said bequests, it has been mentioned that after the death of the testator, they should take possession of it and should enjoy it. Some liability has been created on Joseph and Augustine to pay some amounts to the daughters of Thummi. 37. Stringent conditions are seen made with regard to the bequest created in the name of Joseph. Regarding the said bequests, it has been mentioned that after the death of the testator, they should take possession of it and should enjoy it. Some liability has been created on Joseph and Augustine to pay some amounts to the daughters of Thummi. 37. Stringent conditions are seen made with regard to the bequest created in the name of Joseph. The following are the said conditions: “(i) In 'A' schedule bequeathed in favour of Joseph, he has only a right to take yield from that property and the limited right to encumber the said properties for an amount not more than Rs.1,500/-(Rupees one thousand five hundred only) and that 'A' schedule properties are entrusted with the said Joseph for and on behalf of the minors namely, the 2nd defendant and George P.J.” It is further noted, (ii) Joseph shall possess the said 'A' schedule properties and take income therefrom and to pay its pattam, tax etc. till the said minors (Paily P.J and George P.J) attain the age of majority and only after the said minors attain the age of majority, Joseph shall have the right to transfer the said property. It is further stated, (iii) Only after the death of Joseph and Augustine, the minors (Paily P.J and George P.J) shall have absolute possession and enjoyment of 'A' schedule properties.” At the end of the recitals, it has been clearly stated, (iv) The term 'minors', who are entitled to take 'A' schedule properties as aforesaid, are the minor children of Joseph, except Mary and Mariya Jessintha. Admittedly, Joseph had only four children, viz., two sons, P.J. George and P.J. Paily and two daughters, viz., Mariya Jessintha and P.J. Mary.” 38. Therefore, it is evident that the minors to whom 'A' schedule properties were entitled to be bequeathed are Paily P.J and George P.J, who were minors at the time when Ext.B3 was executed. Both the learned Senior Counsel Smt. Sumathi Dandapani and Sri. S. Sreekumar have argued that the bequest in respect of 'A' schedule properties could only be considered as a bequest in favour of Joseph and therefore, the bequest in respect of 'A' schedule properties had lapsed and it formed part of the residue of the testator's property, since Joseph, the legatee, died in the year 1960 and did not survive the testator Chummar. The learned Senior Counsel Sri.S.V. Balakrishna Iyer has argued that the said Joseph was only a trustee in respect of 'A' schedule properties and the testator had intended to appoint the said Joseph only as a trustee in respect of 'A' schedule properties, which were actually bequeathed to Paily P.J and George P.J, who were the minor sons of Joseph. It was also argued that the so called bequest in favour of Joseph could only be considered as a bequest till Paily P.J and George P.J attain their age of majority. 39. It has been pointed out that as per Section 82 of the Indian Succession Act, the meaning of any clause in a Will has to be collected from the entire instrument, and all its parts are to be construed with reference to each other. Illustration (ii) to Section 82 says: “Where a testator having an estate, one part of which is called Black Acre, bequeaths the whole of his estate to A, and in another part of his will bequeaths Black Acre to B, the latter bequest is to be read as an exception out of the first as if he had said "I give Black Acre to B, and all the rest of my estate to A". 40. As per Section 87 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the intention of the testator shall not be set aside because it cannot take effect to the full extent, but effect is to be given to it as far as possible. As per Section 88, where two clauses of gifts in a Will are irreconcilable so that they cannot possibly stand together, the last one shall prevail. As per Section 105 of the Act, if the legatee does not survive the testator, the legacy shall lapse and form part of the residue of the testator's property, unless it appears by the Will that the testator intended that it should go to some other person. 41. Here, in this particular case on construing the provisions of the Indian Succession Act as aforesaid, it can clearly be stated that the testator had intended that 'A' schedule properties therein should go to the aforesaid Paily P.J and George P.J who are respectively the the 2nd defendant and the husband of the 5th defendant, who were minors at the time when Ext.B3 was executed. 42. 42. Even though in the beginning portion of Ext.B3 showing the bequest of 'A' schedule properties, it is stated that 'A' schedule properties along with the house in schedule No.1 of 'A' schedule and the movables except four large vessels should go to Joseph on the death of the testator, the subsequent clauses noted above restricts the said bequest. Clause No.(i) noted above clearly shows that Joseph has the right only to take the yield from 'A' schedule properties and also to create any encumbrance on the same for not more than Rs.1,500/-, and that Paily P.J and George P.J, who are his sons being minors, 'A' schedule properties are entrusted to Joseph for and on behalf of the said minors. Therefore, clause No.(i) being a subsequent clause to the bequest, clearly restricts the right of Joseph over 'A' schedule properties to the extend of taking yield from it and also to create encumbrances for not more than Rs.1,500/- in total. Further, it has been specifically stated therein that 'A' schedule properties are entrusted to Joseph for and on behalf of his two sons namely Paily P.J and George P.J, as they being minors. Matters being so, it is evident that the said Joseph was merely appointed as a trustee to hold the property and to preserve the same with his limited enjoyment as aforesaid, till the said minors attain their majority. 43. Clause No.(ii) again makes it clear that Joseph has to take yield from the property and to possess the same and to pay the pattom and taxes etc., till the aforesaid minors attain their age of majority and only on their attaining the age of majority Joseph shall have the right to transfer the properties. Clause NO.(iii) further makes it clear that after the death of Joseph and Augustine, the said minors namely Paily P.J and George P.J shall freely possess and enjoy the plaint 'A' schedule properties. Any further discussions is not required to conclude that the testator Chummar had clearly intended to bequeath the 'A' schedule properties to Paily P.J and George P.J. He clearly intended that Paily P.J and George P.J shall have the absolute possession and enjoyment of the 'A' schedule properties, after the death of Joseph and Augustine. Any further discussions is not required to conclude that the testator Chummar had clearly intended to bequeath the 'A' schedule properties to Paily P.J and George P.J. He clearly intended that Paily P.J and George P.J shall have the absolute possession and enjoyment of the 'A' schedule properties, after the death of Joseph and Augustine. The bequest cannot be regarded as a bequest in favour of Joseph as a legatee; the bequest in favour of Joseph can only be treated as the bequest by appointing him as the trustee in respect of 'A' schedule properties for maintaining it in 'trust' till his two minor sons attain their age of majority, with a limited right to the said Joseph to take yield from the property and to create encumbrances for not more than Rs.1,500/- in total. 44. Matters being so, the said bequest will clearly come within the meaning of illustration (iv) to Section 105 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The legacy cannot be brought within the purview of illustration (ii) of Section 105. The bequest in respect of 'A' schedule properties through Ext.B3 Will did not lapse on the death of Joseph during the lifetime of the testator, as Ext.B3 clearly reveals the intention of the testator that 'A' schedule properties should go to Paily P.J and George P.J. The bequest in respect of 'A' schedule properties initially made in favour of Joseph is for the benefit of his two minor sons, Paily P.J and George P.J and therefore, the bequest did not lapse by the death of Joseph during the lifetime of the testator, as per Section 110 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Section 110 of the Indian Succession Act reads as follows: “Bequest to A for benefit of B does not lapse by A's death: Where a bequest is made to one person for the benefit of another, the legacy does not lapse by the death, in the testator's lifetime, of the person to whom the bequest is made.” 45. The provisions contained in Section 110 can be treated as another exception to the general rule applicable to lapses, where the legacy is given to a trustee for another person or persons. The provisions contained in Section 110 can be treated as another exception to the general rule applicable to lapses, where the legacy is given to a trustee for another person or persons. If the bequest is made to B in trust for 'C' and B dies before testator, leaving 'C' who survives the testator, the trustee's death would not be permitted to prejudice 'C', but 'C' would be entitled to the legacy. The equity is the same, although the trust be not distinctly expressed, but is created by construction of law. 46. In Eales v. England, Pre.Ch.200, in a case wherein, “The testatrix bequeathed to B $3,000 with a declaration of her Will, “B should give the $3,000 to his daughter C at his death or sooner, if there were occasion for the better preferment.” B died before the testatrix, whom C survived; and the question was, whether the legacy lapsed.” The court declared that by the effect of the above form of bequest, B was a trustee for C whose interest could not be affected by the death of the former during the life of the testatrix, and the bequest was compared to one made in the following terms : viz. to B for life, then to C in which case C's title could not be disputed. 47. Lewin on Trust, 14th Edition, Chapter III page 721 reveals the force of the maxim, 'A' trust shall not fail for want of a trustee.” It states: “Thus, if a devisor or settlor appoints a trustee, who either dies in the testator's lifetime(a), or disclaims (b), or is incapable of taking the estate(c), or if the trustee otherwise fail(d), the trust is not thereby defeated, but fastens on the conscience of the person upon whom the legal estate has devolved. “I take it,” said Lord Chief Justice Wilmot, “to be a first and fundamental principle in equity, that the trust follows the legal estate whatsoever it goes, except it comes into the hands of a purchaser for valuable consideration without notice. A Court Equity considers devices of trusts as distinct substantive devises, standing on their own basis, independent of the legal estate or of one another; and the legal estate is nothing but the shadow which always follows the trust estate in the eye of a Court of Equity.(e)” 48. A Court Equity considers devices of trusts as distinct substantive devises, standing on their own basis, independent of the legal estate or of one another; and the legal estate is nothing but the shadow which always follows the trust estate in the eye of a Court of Equity.(e)” 48. Therefore, the death of Joseph being a trustee in respect of 'A' schedule properties in Ext.B3 during the lifetime of its testator, has no impact on the bequest granted in favour of the sons of Joseph. 49. From the evidence discussed above, it seems that the properties in question are the properties covered by Ext.B3, B11 and B13 Wills, on which defendants 2, 5, and 6 have absolute and marketable title. It cannot be said that late Chummar died intestate in respect of these properties, and therefore, the properties are not available for partition. There is absolutely nothing to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree. This RFA is devoid of merits and is only to be dismissed, and we do so. In the result, this RFA is dismissed. In the nature of this RFA, there is no order as to costs.