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2014 DIGILAW 31 (MEG)

Bidhan Chandra Chakma v. State Bank of India

2014-03-14

PRAFULLA C.PANT, T.NANDAKUMAR SINGH

body2014
Judgment T. Nandakumar Singh, J. This intra-court appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 06.11.2012 for dismissing the Writ Petition No. 370(SH)2010 filed by the appellant assailing the order dated 23.02.2010 passed by the Appointing & General Manager (NW-I), State Bank of India, Local Head Office, N.E. Circle, Dispur, Guwahati, for imposing major penalty of dismissal from service and also order of the appellate authority dated 25.08.2010 for rejecting the appeal of the appellant against the dismissal order dated 23.02.2010. Heard Mr. A.S. Siddiqui, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. S.S. Sharma, learned senior counsel assisted by Mrs. T. Yangi, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. Factual Matrix:- The appellant joined his service as Probationary Officer in the year 1987 and in the year 2004, the appellant was transferred as Branch Manager of Mawkyrwat Branch in the District of West Khasi Hills, Meghalaya w.e.f. 22.06.2004 and continued to served in that capacity up to 09.12.2006. The appellant was issued with a show cause notice dated 12.10.2007 for 21 serious gross irregularities committed by him during his tenure as Branch Manager, Mawkyrwat Branch i.e. (w.e.f. 22.06.2004 to 09.12.2006) asking him to submit his explanation/show cause statement as to why disciplinary action should not be initiated against him for committing 21 serious gross irregularities. In response to the show cause notice, the appellant filed his show cause statement dated 11.12.2007. After due consideration of the show cause statement of the appellant and as well as the alleged 21 gross irregularities committed by the appellant during his tenure as Branch Manager, Mawkyrwat Branch from 22.06.2004 to 09.12.2006, the General Manager & Disciplinary Authority under his letter dated 16.09.2008, informed the appellant that disciplinary proceeding will be initiated against the appellant in accordance with the provisions of State Bank of India Officers Service Rules, which are applicable to the appellant, for serious charges basing on the 21 statements of imputation of lapses against the appellant. 3. The appellant filed his written statement of defence dated 08.11.2008 and also an application for allowing him to visit and to obtain or to inspect the Branch documents. 3. The appellant filed his written statement of defence dated 08.11.2008 and also an application for allowing him to visit and to obtain or to inspect the Branch documents. Under the letter of the Chief Manager (Admin), Administrative Office, Region-IV, Shillong dated 03.12.2008, communicated to the appellant that the appropriate authority had accorded permission for examination of the documents in the un-interrupted presence of the Branch Manager there at and also allowed to visit the said Branch on any working day for the purpose. Even after allowing the appellant to inspect the documents in the concerned Branch i.e. Mawkyrwat Branch, the appellant again filed an application dated 12.05.2009, for furnishing copies of documents mentioned in the said application. In response to that, the appellant had been furnished all the documents except few documents which cannot be located at the concerned Branch under the letter of the Branch Manager dated 09.06.2009. 4. The appellant had filed his written statement of defence dated 24.10.2009 against the said 21 gross irregularities or 21 charges; and in his written statement of defence dated 24.10.2009, the appellant did not make even a whisper that because of non-furnishing of some documents, much prejudice had caused to the appellant in putting up his case of defence. It would be worth to mention that permission had been granted by the concerned authority to the appellant to inspect the record and to visit the concerned Branch i.e. Mawkyrwat Branch. On bare perusal of 21 serious gross irregularities or 21 charges i.e. 21 statements of imputation against the appellant, it is crystal clear that the appellant had been charged that because of gross irregularities committed by the appellant during his tenure as Branch Manager, Mawkyrwat Branch i.e. w.e.f. 22.06.2004 to 09.12.2006, there was a huge financial loss in the tune of several lacs for the Bank and also charges were so serious that the appellant who was a Class-I Officer of the Bank had indulged irregularities in gross violation of the rules and procedures of the Bank for financial transactions. 5. After full length Departmental Enquiry, the inquiry officer submitted his report dated 02.09.2009 that the charges leveled against the appellant had been proved. Copy of the enquiry report dated 02.09.2009 is available at annexure to the writ petition. 5. After full length Departmental Enquiry, the inquiry officer submitted his report dated 02.09.2009 that the charges leveled against the appellant had been proved. Copy of the enquiry report dated 02.09.2009 is available at annexure to the writ petition. On bare perusal of the enquiry report dated 02.09.2009, it is clear that the enquiry officer, after appreciation of the evidence, mentioned the reasons for coming to his findings that the charges leveled against the appellant had been proved and separate reasons are given for coming to his findings for each of the charges against the appellant. The appellant had been asked to submit his defence against the report and findings of the enquiry officer dated 02.09.2009 by furnishing a copy of the enquiry report to the appellant. The appellant submitted his written statement of defence or objections dated 24.10.2009 to the Disciplinary Authority & General Manager NW-II, State Bank of India, Local Head Office, North Eastern Circle, Guwahati. 6. In his written statement of defence dated 24.10.2009, the appellant had not taken any ground for objecting the inquiry report that the principle of natural justice had been denied to him in the Departmental Proceeding. What had been taken as the grounds for objecting the enquiry report are that the findings of the enquiry officer are not correct as the enquiry officer did not rightly appreciate the evidence produced by the prosecution/department in the Departmental Proceeding. The appointing authority, after careful appreciation of the documents and evidences placed in the departmental enquiry and also the enquiry report, had passed the order dated 23.02.2010 for imposing major penalty of dismissal from service to the appellant in terms of Rule 67(j) of the State Bank of India Officers' Service Rule and the period of suspension will be treated as "not on duty". Being aggrieved by the order of dismissal dated 23.02.2010, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority & Chief General Manager, State bank of India, Local Head Office, North Eastern Circle, Guwahati. The appellate authority had dismissed the appeal by a reasoned order dated 25.08.2010. Consequently, Writ Petition No. 370(SH)2010 was filed which was also dismissed. Hence, the present writ appeal. 7. The appellate authority had dismissed the appeal by a reasoned order dated 25.08.2010. Consequently, Writ Petition No. 370(SH)2010 was filed which was also dismissed. Hence, the present writ appeal. 7. Learned Single Judge by impugned judgment and order dated 06.11.2012 had dismissed the writ petition with a findings that the statement of imputation or allegation No. 6 which had been admitted by the appellant will be sufficient enough for imposing major penalty of dismissal from service. The findings of the enquiry officer in his report dated 02.09.2009 that the allegation No. 6 or statement of imputation had been proved was never challenged by the appellant. The learned Single Judge in his impugned judgment and order dated 06.11.2012 had discussed the effect of admission made by the delinquent official in a departmental enquiry and made a findings that the admission is the best piece of evidence against the delinquent official. The learned Single Judge for coming to the said findings had based on the decisions of the Apex Court and the relevant portion of the findings of the learned Single Judge in his impugned judgment and order dated 06.11.2012 are quoted hereunder:- 2. ............On the basis of such findings, the Inquiry Officer held allegation No. 6 to be proved. The petitioner never challenged the correctness of those findings. That apart, those findings are based on the admission made by the petitioner. What is the effect of admission made by a delinquent official in a departmental enquiry was considered by the Apex Court in Delhi Transport Corpn. V. Shyam Lal (2004) 8 SCC 88 . This is what the Apex Court said: (SCC p. 89, para 7) 7. We find that the Tribunal's conclusions are prima facie not correct. The statement made by the passenger who had paid excess money to the checking officer is not in the nature of hearsay evidence. Additionally, the effect of admission regarding guilt as contained in the letters dated 13.1.1989 and 24.2.1989 have not been considered in the proper perspective. It is a fairly settled position in law that admission is the best piece of evidence against the person making the admission. It is, however, open to the person making the admission to show why the admission is not to be acted upon. 3. It is a fairly settled position in law that admission is the best piece of evidence against the person making the admission. It is, however, open to the person making the admission to show why the admission is not to be acted upon. 3. The question as to whether detailed enquiry is to be held or not after admission of charges by a delinquent official again came up for consideration before the Apex Court in VSP v. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu (2008) 5 SCC 569 , and it was held thus: 16. Indisputably, the respondent was a habitual absentee. He in his explanation, in answer to the charge sheet pleaded guilty admitting the charges. In terms of Section 58 of the Evidence Act, charges having been admitted were not required to be proved. It was on that premise that the enquiry proceeding was closed. Before the enquiry officer, he did not submit the explanation of his mother being ill. He, despite opportunities granted to report to duty, did not do it. He failed to explain even his prior conduct. 17. In Sangramsingh P. Gaekwad v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad, this Court noticing Section 58 of the Evidence Act held: (SCC p. 380, para 214). 214. In terms of the aforementioned provision, things admitted need not be proved. In view of the admission of respondent 1 alone, the issue as regard allotment of 6475 shares should have been answered in favour of the appellants. The company petitioner at a much later stage could not be permitted to take a stand which was contrary to or inconsistent with the original pleadings nor could she be permitted to resile from her admissions contained therein. 18. It was observed that judicial admissions can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. 19. A subsequent explanation before another authority, which had not been pleaded in the departmental proceedings, cannot by itself be a ground to hold that the principles of natural justice had not been complied with the disciplinary proceedings. 20. The jurisdiction of the High Court in this regard is rather limited. Its power to interfere with disciplinary matters is circumscribed by well-known factors. It cannot set aside a well-reasoned order only on sympathy or sentiments. (See Maruti Udyog Ltd., State of Bihar v. Amrendra Kumar Mishra, SBI v. Sanjay Kumar Pathak and Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitram Nigam v. Surji Devi). Its power to interfere with disciplinary matters is circumscribed by well-known factors. It cannot set aside a well-reasoned order only on sympathy or sentiments. (See Maruti Udyog Ltd., State of Bihar v. Amrendra Kumar Mishra, SBI v. Sanjay Kumar Pathak and Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitram Nigam v. Surji Devi). On the quantum of penalty, the Apex Court in the same judgment held: 21. Once it found that all procedural requirements have been complied with, the Courts would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon the delinquent employee. The superior courts only in some cases may invoke the doctrine of proportionality. If the decision of an employer is found to be within the legal parameters, the jurisdiction would ordinarily not be invoked when misconduct stands proved. (See Sangfroid Remedies Ltd. v. Union of India). 4. This case also reminds me of the decision of the Apex court in Chairman & Managing Director, United Commercial Bank v. P.C. Kakkar (2003) 4 SCC wherein it was held as follows: (SCC Pp. 376-7 and para 14) 14. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with the money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interest of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, it is no defence available to say that there was not loss or profit resulted in cash, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court.......... 8. The appellant reiterated before us the same arguments made before the learned Single Judge. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court.......... 8. The appellant reiterated before us the same arguments made before the learned Single Judge. It appears that the main grounds for assailing the impugned dismissal order dated 23.02.2010 which was based on the reasoned enquiry report are that (i) some of the documents asked for by the appellant had not been furnished to him. But it is clear from the fact that the appellant never took the ground in the written statement of defence or memo of appeal that because of non-furnishing of some documents much prejudice had been caused to him in putting up his case for defence and; (ii) neither the enquiry officer nor disciplinary authority had properly appreciated the evidence produced in the disciplinary proceeding for bringing home the 21 serious gross irregularities alleged to have been committed by the appellant and as a result, the findings of the enquiry officer in his report dated 02.9.2009 are not correct. 9. It is fairly settled law that the High Court under Article 226 or the Supreme Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the findings recorded in the Departmental Enquiry by the Disciplinary Authority or by the Enquiry Officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the appellate authority. The power of judicial review available to the High Court under the constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusion reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictate of the superior authority. Paras 8 & 9 of the AIR in Kuldeep Singh's case (Supra) read as follows:- 8. The findings, recorded in a domestic enquiry, can be characterized as perverse if it is shown that such a finding is not supported by any evidence on record or is not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable person could have come to those findings on the basis of that evidence. The findings, recorded in a domestic enquiry, can be characterized as perverse if it is shown that such a finding is not supported by any evidence on record or is not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable person could have come to those findings on the basis of that evidence. This principle was laid down by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao, (1964) 2 Lab. LJ 150 : AIR 1963 SC 1723 : 1964 (3) SCR 25 , in which the question was whether the High Court, under Article 226, could interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry. This decision was followed in Central Bank of India v. Prakash Chand Jain, (1969) 2 Lab LJ 377 (SC) : AIR 1969 SC 983 and Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel, 1976 Lab IC 4 (SC) : AIR 1976 SC 98 : (1976) 2 SCR 280 : (1976) 1 SCC 518 . In Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration through Secretary (Labour), AIR 1984 SC 1805 : (1985) 1 SCR 866 : (1984) 4 SCC 635 , it was laid down that where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man could come, the findings can be rejected as perverse. It was also laid down that where a quasi-judicial Tribunal records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are his mere ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated. 9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. 9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. The judicial review of the findings of the Enquiry Officer is seldom invoked and normally there shall be judicial review of the findings of the Enquiry Officer when the findings is based on no evidence or one that no reasonable person would arrive at and it is fairly settled law that there cannot be judicial review of the findings of the Enquiry Officer on the ground that some relevant facts had not been considered or that certain inadmissible material has been taken into consideration inasmuch as that the finding cannot be said to be perverse. The Apex Court in General Manager (P) Punjab & Sind Bank & Ors. vs. Daya Singh reported in 2010 11 SCC 233 held that: 24. Absence of reasons in a disciplinary order would amount to denial of natural justice to the charge-sheeted employee. But the present case was certainly not one of that category. Once the charges were found to have been established, the High Court had no reason to interfere in the decision. Even though there was sufficient documentary evidence on record, the High Court has chosen to hold that the findings of the enquiry officer were perverse. A perverse findings is one which is based on no evidence or one that no reasonable person would arrive at. This has been held by this Court long back in Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE 1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341 . Unless it is found that some relevant evidence has not been considered or that certain inadmissible material has been taken into consideration the finding cannot be said to be perverse. The legal position in this behalf has been recently reiterated in Arulvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288. The decision of the High Court cannot therefore be sustained. 25. As held in T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Meerabai (2006) 2 SCC 255 : 2006 SCC (L & S) 265 the scope of judicial review for the High Court in departmental disciplinary matters is limited. The decision of the High Court cannot therefore be sustained. 25. As held in T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Meerabai (2006) 2 SCC 255 : 2006 SCC (L & S) 265 the scope of judicial review for the High Court in departmental disciplinary matters is limited. The observations of this Court in Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (L & S) 1036 are quite instructive: (SCC pp. 768-69, para 11). 11. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. The only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent officer must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravamen of the charge against the delinquent officer. Mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in departmental enquiry proceedings. The court exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that finding. The court cannot embark upon reappreciating the evidence or weighing the same like an appellate authority. So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 4 SCR 718 the Constitution Bench has held: (AIR p. 370, para 23) 23........the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. 11. The Apex Court in State Bank of India & Ors. vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde reported in (2006) 7 SCC 212 held that: 9. This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. 11. The Apex Court in State Bank of India & Ors. vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde reported in (2006) 7 SCC 212 held that: 9. It is impermissible for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence which had been considered by the Inquiry Officer, a disciplinary authority and the Appellate Authority. The finding of the High Court, on facts, runs to the teeth of the evidence on record. 16. In Union of India (appellant) v. Parma Nanda (1989) 2 SCC 177 : 1989 SCC (L & S) 303 (1989) 10 ATC 30, it is held at SCC p. 189 para 27 as under: 27. We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the Inquiry Officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to concern itself with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer or the competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter. 17. In Union Bank of India (Appellant) v. Vishwa Mohan (1998) 4 SCC 310 : 1998 SCC (L & S) 1129, this Court held at SCC p. 315 para 12 as under: 12. 17. In Union Bank of India (Appellant) v. Vishwa Mohan (1998) 4 SCC 310 : 1998 SCC (L & S) 1129, this Court held at SCC p. 315 para 12 as under: 12. After hearing the rival contentions, we are of the firm view that all the four charge sheets which were inquired into relate to serious misconduct. The respondent was unable to demonstrate before us how prejudice was caused to him due to non-supply of the enquiry authority's report/findings in the present case. It needs to be emphasized that in the banking business absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every bank employee and in particular the bank officer. If this is not observed, the confidence of the public/depositors would be impaired. It is for this reason, we are of the opinion that the High Court had committed an error while setting aside the order of dismissal of the respondent on the ground of prejudice on account of non-furnishing of the inquiry report/findings to him. 18. In Chairman and MD, United Commercial Bank v. P.C. Kakkar (2003) 4 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (L & S) 468, this Court held at SCC pp. 376-77 para 14 as under: 14. A Bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (1996) 9 SCC 69 : 1996 SCC (L & S) 1194, it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a Bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a Bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court. 19. In Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC, v. Hoti Lal (2003) 3 SCC 605 : 2003 SCC (L & S) 363, it was pointed out as under: (SCC p. 614, para 10) If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. 20. In Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G. Thirugnanasambandam (2005) 3 SCC 241 : 2005 SCC (L & S) 395, this Court at SCC p. 247 para 15 held: It is now a well-settled principle of law that the principles of the Evidence Act have no application in a domestic inquiry. 12. Keeping in view of the decisions of the Apex Court discussed above and also the settled principle of law regarding the limited jurisdiction for judicial review of the findings of the Enquiry Officer, this Court has given anxious consideration to the findings of the Enquiry Officer dated 02.09.2009 as to whether the findings of the Enquiry Officer are based on no evidence or perverse and after such consideration, this Court is of the considered view that the findings of the Enquiry Officer by giving reasons which comprise of 50 pages are based on evidence and not perverse. This Court is not sitting as appellate court of the findings of the Enquiry Officer and accordingly, this Court is not re-appreciating the evidence to come to the different findings. Hence, this Court is of the view that grounds for assailing the Enquiry Report dated 02.09.2009 and the impugned order dated 23.02.2010 basing on the enquiry report as well as the impugned order of the appellate authority dated 25.08.2010 are not sustainable. 13. Hence, this Court is of the view that grounds for assailing the Enquiry Report dated 02.09.2009 and the impugned order dated 23.02.2010 basing on the enquiry report as well as the impugned order of the appellate authority dated 25.08.2010 are not sustainable. 13. It is fairly settled law that non-supply of documents would not ipso facto vitiate the order of punishment in the absence of prejudice to the delinquent. Paras 27 & 28 of the Scale in Sarv U.P. Gramin Bank's case (Supra) read as follows:- 27. At the time when the plea was raised before the High Court that the impugned orders are vitiated on account of the non-supply of enquiry report, it would have been appropriate for the High Court to examine the averments made in the writ petition. A perusal of the writ petition would show that the petitioner has failed to lay any foundation to establish that any prejudice has been caused by the non-supply of the enquiry report. In the case of ECIL (supra) a constitution bench of this Court reiterated the ratio of law in Mohd. Ramzan Khan case (supra) as follows: As held by this Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, when the inquiring authority and the disciplinary authority are not one and the same and the disciplinary authority appoints an inquiring authority to inquire into charges leveled against a delinquent officer who holds inquiry, finds him guilty and submits a report to that effect to the disciplinary authority, a copy of such report is required to be supplied by the disciplinary authority to the delinquent employee before an order of punishment is imposed on him. It was also held that non-supply of report of the inquiry officer to a delinquent employee would be violative of principles of natural justice. The Court observed that after the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, second opportunity contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution had been abolished, but principles natural justice and fair play required supply of adverse material to the delinquent who was likely to be affected by such material. Non-supply of report of the inquiry officer to the delinquent would constitute infringement of the doctrine of natural justice. 28. Non-supply of report of the inquiry officer to the delinquent would constitute infringement of the doctrine of natural justice. 28. The ECIL matter was placed before the Constitution Bench as the attention of the Court was invited to a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Kailash Chandra Asthana v. State of U.P., 1988 (3) SCC 600 wherein it was held that non-supply of the report would not ipso facto vitiate the order of punishment in the absence of prejudice to the delinquent. Upon a detailed consideration of the entire case law this court laid down certain principles which are as follows: 18. In this view of the matter, the Court dismissed the writ petition. It would thus be dear that the contention before this Court in that case was that the copy of the report of the inquiring authority was necessary to show cause at the second stage, i.e., against the penalty proposed. That was also how the contention was understood by this Court. The contention was not at least it was not understood to mean by this Court, that a copy of the report was necessary to prove the innocence of the employee before the disciplinary authority arrived at its conclusion with regard to the guild or otherwise on the basis of the said report. Hence, we read nothing in this decision which has taken a view contrary to the view expressed in E. Bashyan case by a Bench of two learned Judges or to the view taken by three learned Judges in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan. 14. The Apex Court in Burdwan Central Cooperative Bank Limited case (Supra) held that: 18. The decision of this Court in S. Govinda Menon's case AIR 1967 SC 1274 : (1967) 2 SCR 566 cited by Mr. Ray, also has a direct bearing on the facts of this case, where, although the Respondent No. 1 was not under the administrative control of the Appellant-Bank, prior to his service with the Bank, his previous conduct was a blot on his integrity and devotion to duty as a member of the service. Ray, also has a direct bearing on the facts of this case, where, although the Respondent No. 1 was not under the administrative control of the Appellant-Bank, prior to his service with the Bank, his previous conduct was a blot on his integrity and devotion to duty as a member of the service. Since no prejudice had been caused to the Respondent No. 1 by the non-supply of the Enquiry Officer's report or the second show-cause notice under Article 311(2) of the Constitution, the Respondent No. 1 had little scope to contend that the principles of natural justice had been violated which had vitiated the proceedings. 19. However, there is one aspect of the matter which cannot be ignored. In B. Karunakar's case (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L & S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704 despite holding that non-supply of a copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer to the employee facing a disciplinary proceeding, amounts to denial of natural justice, in the later part of the judgment it was observed that whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee on account of non-furnishing of a copy of the inquiry report has to be considered in the facts of each case. It was observed that where the furnishing of the inquiry report would not make any difference to the ultimate outcome of the matter, it would be a perversion of justice to allow the concerned employee to resume his duties and to get all consequential benefits. 20. It was also observed in B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L & S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704 that in the event the Inquiry Officer's report had not been furnished to the employee in the disciplinary proceedings, a copy of the same should be made available to him to enable him to explain as to what prejudice had been caused to him on account of non-supply of the report. It was held that the order of punishment should not be set aside mechanically on the ground that the copy of the inquiry report had not been supplied to the employee. For the foregoing reasons, we are not interfering with the judgment and order dated 06.11.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge and accordingly, this writ appeal is dismissed.