Srinivas Marine Exports (India) Pvt. v. Orissa Shrimp Seed Production, Supply and Research Centre
2014-05-08
RAGHUBIR DASH
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT R. DASH, J. - This Appeal is in challenge of the order dated 11.9.2000 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Berhampur in M.J.C. No. 261 of 1998 arising out of M.S. No. 122 of 1996. Vide the impugned order the learned lower Court has dismissed the M.J.C. rejecting a petition under Order 9, Rule 13 C.P.C. read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 2. The appellants are the petitioners-defendants before the learned trial Court. The respondent herein had filed M.S. No. 122 of 1996 against the appellants-defendants for realization of Rs. 5,99,500/- with interest and cost. Impugned order reflects that D.1 is a Private Limited Company represented by its Chairman Sri C.S.Raju. D.2 is Sri C.S.Raju who is the Chairman of D.1 Company. Summons was issued to each of the defendants through the Court as well as by registered post. Summons sent to the petitioners through Court process was returned unserved due to the absence of the defendants. But postal A.Ds. were received by the Court showing that the summons sent by registered post was received in the office of the petitioners. The service of summons by registered post was held to be sufficient. Since the defendants did not turn up they were set ex parte. The learned trial Court proceeded to record evidence in the absence of the defendants and ultimately decreed the suit ex parte vide judgment dated 23.12.1997. Consequently, decree was sealed and signed on 9.1.1998. 3. On 28.11.1998 the defendants filed the petition under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. along with a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act alleging that summons was not duly served on either of the defendants. It was only on 27.11.1998 the defendants came to know about the ex parte decree when they had come to the plaintiff's office to know about the loan outstanding. Immediately thereafter they contacted their Advocate and filed the petition to set aside the ex parte decree and to allow them to take part in the suit. The plaintiff resisted the petition contending that in the suit notice was duly served on the plaintiffs through Court as well as post. It was also contended that the petition was grossly barred by limitation. 4. Manager of D.1 was examined as a witness. The plaintiff did not adduce any evidence.
The plaintiff resisted the petition contending that in the suit notice was duly served on the plaintiffs through Court as well as post. It was also contended that the petition was grossly barred by limitation. 4. Manager of D.1 was examined as a witness. The plaintiff did not adduce any evidence. Analyzing the evidence and on verification of the record, the learned Court below held that summons sent to the defendants by post was received in their office by one of the security staff. Therefore, the learned Court concluded that the summons was duly served on the defendants. So far the prayer for condonation of delay is concerned, the learned Court below simply observed that the plea taken by the defendants was neither believable nor acceptable. 5. On behalf of the defendants-appellants it is argued that there was no due service of summons on the appellants and therefore, the ex parte decree is liable to be set aside. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent argues in support of the impugned order and submits that the order is not liable to be interfered with. 6. It is observed by the lower Court that summons sent to the appellants through Court process was returned unserved with a report that the Chairman and the Manager of Srinivas Marine Exports (India) Private Limited were absent from the headquarters, but the summons sent by registered post was received by one security staff employed in the office of appellant No.1. Therefore, it is to be considered as to whether the summons sent by post which was received by a security staff can be said to be duly served on the appellants. 7. As already stated the appellant-defendant No.1 is a Private Limited Company represented by its Chairman Sri C.S.Raju and appellant-defendant No.2 is Sri C.S.Raju himself. Summonses on both the defendants were to be served on Sri C.S.Raju at Village-Revekutturu, P.O./P.S.Gopalpur-on-Sea, District-Ganjam where the office of Hatchery Division of M/s. Srinivas Marine Exports (India) Pvt. Ltd. (Defendant No.1) situates. It is not in dispute that summons to be served through the Court Process Server were returned unserved with the report that neither the Manager nor the Chairman of the Private Limited Company was present in the office. It is also not dispute that the summonses sent by Registered Post were served on one of the security staff of the said office.
It is also not dispute that the summonses sent by Registered Post were served on one of the security staff of the said office. It is not the case of the respondent that the security itself was the agent of the Private Limited Company authorized to receive summonses on behalf of the Company. Order-5 Rule 11 clearly lays down that wherever it is practicable, service shall be made on the defendant in person, unless he has an agent empowered to accept service in which case service on such agent shall be sufficient. Thus, it can be said that a service on the agent which is empowered to accept service is valid but service on a servant, who is not authorized to accept service cannot be said to be sufficient. Order dated 14.08.1997 by the learned Trial Court in M.S.No. 122 of 1996 reflects that on that date the learned trial Court held the postal service to be sufficient. But it does not reflect that before accepting the postal service to be sufficient, the learned trial Court made any effort to ascertain whether the service was made in accordance with the provisions contained in Order 5 of the C.P.C. Even while dealing with the petition under Order 9 Rule 13 of the C.P.C., the learned Court below did not make any probe to ascertain whether the service was duly made on the defendants. In this regard, the impugned order does not reflect that even the learned counsel for the appellants-defendants before the learned lower Court had pointed out that the service was not effected in accordance with the provisions contained in Order 5 of C.P.C. But, when the question as to whether there has been due service of notice on a party is under consideration, it is the duty of the Court to make a thorough examination to find out if the service made reported is in accordance with the provisions contained in Order 5 of the C.P.C. 8.
Having noticed that the service of summons on the appellants-defendants was not duly made it is to be now considered as to whether the appellants had properly explained the delay in filing the petition under Order 9 Rule 13 of the C.P.C. P.W.1 stated before the learned trial Court that on 27.11.1998 when he had paid visit to the office of the plaintiff-opposite party to enquire about the loan dues (in respect of which the suit has been filed) he came to know that the suit had already been decreed ex parte against the defendants. In cross-examination he admitted that there was no document to show that he had paid visit to the plaintiff's office on 27.11.1998. Save and except this, there is no other material to counter the statement made by the witness in his examination-in-chief. The learned Court below has made a strong observation that in view of the endorsement made by one of the employee of the Private Limited Company on the postal A.D., the petitioners plea that only on 27.11.1998 they came to know about the ex parte decree cannot be believed. Such an observation is completely erroneous. The defendants-petitioners plea of absence of prior knowledge on the existence of the ex parte decree was also negatived by the learned Trial Court with the observation that in the petition under Order 9 Rule 13, C. P .C. it is stated that on 27.11.1998 the defendants had gone to the plaintiff's office to, ascertain the truthfulness of the ex parte decree which pre-supposes that the defendants had prior knowledge about the ex parte decree. A bare perusal of the petition under Order 9 Rule 13, C.P.C. does not reveal that the defendants-petitioners had made such a statement therein. Rather it is clearly stated that the petitioners heard about the ex parte decree on 27.11.1998 from the officials of the plaintiff-opposite party when they had gone to that office to know about the loan outstanding. Thus, it appears the learned lower Court had made careless remarks while dealing with a very important petition for setting aside an ex parte decree. There is no material showing that the defendants-petitioners had knowledge about the passing of the ex parte decree prior to the date of their knowledge as stated in their petition. Therefore, the delay stands duly explained. 9.
There is no material showing that the defendants-petitioners had knowledge about the passing of the ex parte decree prior to the date of their knowledge as stated in their petition. Therefore, the delay stands duly explained. 9. In the result, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the Misc. Appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances, parties shall bear their own cost. The ex parte judgment and decree dated 23.12.1997 and 09.01.1998 are set aside. The suit is restored to file. Since the money suit is of the year 1996, learned Court below is directed to dispose of the suit on priority basis, preferably by the end of the year 2014. Parties are directed to appear before the learned lower Court on 23.06.2014 to receive further instructions. LCR along with a copy of this judgment be sent to the learned lower Court immediately. Appeal allowed.