Hon'ble RAFIQ, J.—This writ petition has been preferred by Phool Singh challenging three orders, namely, order dated 18.12.1989 by which he was dismissed from service, order dated 23.08.1990 by which his appeal filed against that order was dismissed, and the order dated 03.06.1994 by which his review petition was dismissed. 2. Facts of the case briefly stated are that petitioner was inducted in service of the respondent Department as Constable in October, 1987. He was posted with the Police Station Mania, District Dholpur at the relevant time. It is alleged that on 15.10.1987 petitioner intercepted one Mukesh Kumar, who was riding Rajdoot motorcycle and demanded his driving license and registration papers of the motorcycle. Mukesh Kumar told him that he was a mechanic and motorcycle was given to him for only repair whereas according to petitioner he had no workshop. As per petitioner, he asked Mukesh to take the motorcycle to police station which he resisted. He shouted for help and one Shivram came there with a gun. According to petitioner, Shivram tried to snatch the motorcycle from him. It is alleged that Shivram had no license for the gun therefore petitioner snatched his gun as well and came to the police station. It is alleged that a mob of people assembled there and proceeded towards police station Mania. Mob attacked residential quarter of the petitioner and caused injuries to his mother, wife and children. After intervention of the police, the mob disbursed. Petitioner made a complaint to the then Station House Officer, who, according to petitioner, did not register his complaint due to some enmity. However, one Mahesh Kumar lodged a complaint against petitioner and on that basis, the police registered FIR for offence under Section 307 and 392 IPC, Section 34 of the Police Act and Section 3/25 of the Arms Act. After investigation, challan was filed against the petitioner in the court of Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Dholpur, who vide his order dated 31.03.1994 convicted and sentenced the petitioner. Petitioner then preferred an appeal before the Court of Sessions Judge, Dholpur. His appeal was allowed by learned Sessions Judge vide judgment dated 26.11.1994 and he was acquitted of the charges. Simultaneously, the petitioner was also served with the charge-sheet by the Department under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 on the same charges vide Memorandum dated 07.04.1988. His appeal was allowed by learned Sessions Judge vide judgment dated 26.11.1994 and he was acquitted of the charges. Simultaneously, the petitioner was also served with the charge-sheet by the Department under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 on the same charges vide Memorandum dated 07.04.1988. Petitioner submitted his reply/ explanation thereto on 27.04.1988 and denied the charges. Deputy Superintendent of Police, Dholpur, was appointed Enquiry Officer in the matter. Department examined 14 witnesses in support of its case, most of whom did not support the department. Some of them partially supported the department, to prove the charges against petitioner. 3. The enquiry officer submitted the enquiry report to the disciplinary authority, who after considering the same, passed the order of dismissal dated 18.12.1989. Subsequently, the appeal as well as review petition filed by petitioner, were dismissed respectively by orders dated 23.08.1990 and 03.06.1994. All these three orders are assailed in the present writ petition. 4. Shri Sandeep Bhagwati, learned counsel for petitioner, has argued that most of the prosecution witnesses such as Kamruddin (PW-1), Ramesh Chandra (PW-2), both residents of Mania, Omvrat (PW-3), Bhura (PW-4), Ramdayal (PW-5) and Vijay Kumar (PW-6), did not support the case of the Department. Even testimony of those, who partially supported the Department, did not prove allegation against petitioner that he forcibly snatched the motorcycle or the gun. It has been proved on record and admitted by complainant Mahesh Kumar that Phool Singh was having his service gun which was snatched by the mob and it as on his intervention that the gun was returned to the petitioner. In fact, Mahesh Kumar has supported the case of the petitioner that the mob gathered there had mishandled with the petitioner. 5. Learned counsel argued that the District Superintendent of Police was not competent to impose penalty of dismissal against petitioner as he was neither head of the department nor the appointing authority of the petitioner. The Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 did not empower him to impose penalty of dismissal. According to Rule 12 of the said Rules, the head of the department is appointing authority in respect of a constable. Inspector General of Police thus being the head of department is the appointing authority of constable. The Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 did not empower him to impose penalty of dismissal. According to Rule 12 of the said Rules, the head of the department is appointing authority in respect of a constable. Inspector General of Police thus being the head of department is the appointing authority of constable. Head of the department could delegate the powers to his subordinate officer only with the approval of the government for imposing penalty other than the penalty of dismissal or removal as provided under Rule 14 of the Rules of 1958. 6. Shri Sandeep Bhagwati, learned counsel further argued that the principles of natural justice were completely violated inasmuch as copy of the enquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner prior to passing the order of dismissal. Learned counsel in support of his argument has relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan – (1991) 1 SCC 588 and judgment of this Court in Sardar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan and Others – 2009 (5) WLC (Raj.) 48. 7. Learned counsel for petitioner further argued that had the enquiry report been supplied to petitioner before passing the impugned order, petitioner would have in all probabilities convinced the disciplinary authority that conclusion drawn by the enquiry officer was erroneous. The appellate authority has also failed to consider this aspect of the matter that non-supply of enquiry report has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner. 8. It was argued that petitioner was denied reasonable opportunity to cross-examine witnesses inasmuch as he was not given opportunity to cross-examine Bhura (PW-4), Ramdayal (PW-5), Vijay Kumar (PW-6), Ramdayal II (PW-10), Thansingh (PW-11), Girraj (PW-13) and Dr. N.S. Sarin (PW-14). Their statements therefore should not be read against the petitioner. Learned counsel argued that the charges against petitioner were framed on the basis of complaint submitted by Mukesh Kumar and F.I.R. was also registered on the basis of same complaint, and ultimately the challan was filed against him in the court. Petitioner had to undergo trial for offence u/Secs. 392/307 IPC, Sec. 34 of the Police Act and Sec. 3/25 of the Arms Act. The witnesses, who were examined in the departmental enquiry were also examined as prosecution witnesses during trial. The charges both in the departmental enquiry and in the trial were substantially same. Petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal trial. 392/307 IPC, Sec. 34 of the Police Act and Sec. 3/25 of the Arms Act. The witnesses, who were examined in the departmental enquiry were also examined as prosecution witnesses during trial. The charges both in the departmental enquiry and in the trial were substantially same. Petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal trial. The finding of guilt recorded against petitioner in the disciplinary enquiry on the same charges is therefore liable to be set aside. Learned counsel in support of his argument relied on judgments of the Supreme Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Limited – (1999) 3 SCC 679 , G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat and Others – (2006) 5 SCC 446 = RLW 2006(3) SC 2480 and judgment of this court in Khawaju Khan vs. The State of Rajasthan and Others – 2007 (4) WLC (Raj.) 252 = RLW 2007(3) Raj. 2615. 9. Per contra, Shri B.S. Rajawat, learned Deputy Government Counsel, opposed the writ petition and submitted that the charges against the petitioner in the criminal trial were not exactly the same as they were in the departmental enquiry. Learned counsel has referred to order of the penalty at Annexure-2 dated 18.12.1989, and argued that the prosecution witnesses especially Krishna Kumar (PW-9) has supported the charges against the petitioner. He has stated that he saw the crowed and Mahesh Mistri running after petitioner Phool Singh and his companion Constable Lokman. He also saw a motorcycle lying there. Mahesh was stating that they would go and lodge a report against them. Entire crowed went to the police station. Shivram (PW-12) has also supported the allegation against the petitioner that petitioner had snatched his licensee gun and that he lodged the report with the Station House Officer, Police Station Mania. Learned Deputy Government Counsel therefore argued that judgment of the Supreme Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony and G.M. Tank, supra, would not apply to the facts of the present case. 10. As regards the contention that the Superintendent of Police was not competent to award penalty of dismissal, learned counsel argued that this issue has been decided against the petitioner by a Larger Bench of this Court in Prem Singh vs. State of Rajasthan and Others – 2012 (4) WLN 264 : 2013(3) RLW 2505 (Raj.). 11. 10. As regards the contention that the Superintendent of Police was not competent to award penalty of dismissal, learned counsel argued that this issue has been decided against the petitioner by a Larger Bench of this Court in Prem Singh vs. State of Rajasthan and Others – 2012 (4) WLN 264 : 2013(3) RLW 2505 (Raj.). 11. Regarding non-supply of enquiry report, learned Deputy Government Counsel argued that a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others vs. B. Karunakar and Others – AIR 1994 SC 1074 , held the aforesaid judgment in Mohd. Ramzan Khan, supra, to be prospective, which means that it would apply only in respect of cases in which penalty is imposed on or after 20.11.1990. In the present case, the order of dismissal has been passed on 23.08.1990. 12. I have given our anxious consideration to rival submissions and perused the material on record. 13. First of all dealing with the argument that the Superintendent of Police is not competent to award penalty of dismissal to a Constable, this issue has already been considered and decided by a Larger Bench in Prem Singh, supra, wherein it has been held that the Superintendent of Police/Commandant or officer of equivalent rank is fully empowered and competent to impose the penalties of removal and dismissal from service on Head Constables/Constables as envisaged under clauses (vi) and (vii) of Rule 14 of the Rules of 1958. It has been held therein that Superintendent of Police being Appointing Authority is competent to impose penalty of dismissal or removal in terms of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 14. Coming now to the argument of non-supply of enquiry-report, learned Deputy Government Counsel is right in submitting that the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL vs. B. Karunakar, supra, held the three-Judge bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Others vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, supra, as prospective. Their Lordships held that the law whether after 42nd Constitution Amendment the delinquent was entitled to copy of Inquiry Officer's report was in an unsettled condition till 20.11.1990 on which day Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case, supra, was decided by the Supreme Court hold that the delinquent is entitled to copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer so as to enable him to make representation to the Disciplinary Authority against it. Ramzan Khan's case, supra, was decided by the Supreme Court hold that the delinquent is entitled to copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer so as to enable him to make representation to the Disciplinary Authority against it. Since the said decision made the law expressly prospective in operation, the law laid down therein will apply only to those orders of punishment which are passed by the disciplinary authority after 20.11.1990. Admittedly, the order of penalty in the present case was passed on 18.12.1989, therefore this argument may not be available to the petitioner. 15. Adverting now to the contention that petitioner was not permitted to cross-examine Bhura (PW-4), Ramdayal (PW-5), Vijay Kumar (PW-6), Ramdayal II (PW-10), Thansingh (PW-11), Girraj (PW-13) and Dr. N.S. Sarin (PW-14), suffice it to say that not sufficient foundation has been laid for supporting this argument. Neither petitioner has placed on record copies of such statements nor has he produced any application submitted by him either to the enquiry officer or if he did not accede to his prayer to the disciplinary authority or any other higher authority. This fact though has been pleaded in ground (j) of the writ petition but it has not been substantiated. Moreover, when according to petitioner PW-1 to PW-6 did not support the case of the department, this argument cannot be accepted. Even if this argument is accepted, this court may examine the matter from the standpoint whether the charges against the petitioner in the disciplinary enquiry and the criminal trial were the same and were ought to be proved by the same set of witnesses and what is the effect of his acquittal in criminal trial, on the disciplinary proceedings. 16. That this brings me to the next argument. The enquiry report has not been placed on record by the petitioner because a copy whereof was not supplied to him, but the same has also not been produced even by the respondents, though they very much had the same in their possession. What is produced, is the order of penalty dated 18.12.1989 (Annexure-2) and that order runs into 11 pages. The charges and the gist of statements of departmental witnesses are reproduced therein. The matter can therefore be considered on that basis. What is produced, is the order of penalty dated 18.12.1989 (Annexure-2) and that order runs into 11 pages. The charges and the gist of statements of departmental witnesses are reproduced therein. The matter can therefore be considered on that basis. Petitioner has also produced on record copy of judgment dated 26.11.1994 of learned District & Sessions Judge, Dholpur in Criminal Appeal No.5/1994 – Phool Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, the issue can be examined on comparison of two to find out whether the charges therein were same and evidence was led by the same witnesses and whether the same witnesses were produced in both the proceedings to prove such charges. The first charge in disciplinary proceeding was that the petitioner on 15.10.1987, while posted at Police Station Mania, after his duty hours, was found roaming in Mania town at about 3.00 PM and snatched licensee gun of Shivram Kachhi? The second charge was that on that date petitioner accompanied by Lokman Gurjar, in uniform went to Bedia Mohallah of the Mania town, and demanded the papers of Rajdoot motorcycle from one Mahesh Kumar S/o Shivhare of Village Patpara, Dholpur, and abused him and demanded Rs.100/- as illegal gratification. He then forcibly snatched the motorcycle having registration No.RJD-7722. The third charge is that petitioner entered his residential quarter situated in the premise of police station and opened fire from gun of Shivram in defence, which accidentally hit the projection of the house and thereby projection of the house was broken into pieces and fell down on the members of his family causing injuries to them. 17. Perusal of penalty order indicates that it was Mahesh Kumar (PW-7), on whose complaint the proceedings were initiated against petitioner. Now at the same time, judgment of the District & Sessions Judge, Dholpur dated 26.11.1994 also indicates that the FIR against the petitioner was registered at the instance of Mahesh Kumar, which was submitted to SHO, Police Station Mania, on 15.10.1987 containing all the three charges of the disciplinary proceedings, namely, (1) petitioner snatched the licensee gun of Shivram in the state of intoxication, (2) petitioner demanded from Mahesh Kumar the papers of the motorcycle and illegal gratification and then he forcibly snatched his motorcycle, and (3) the petitioner opened fire from licensee gun of Shivram, which accidentally turned to cause injuries to his family members. On that basis, FIR No.146/1987 was registered against him for offence under Sections 392, 387 of the IPC, Section 34 of the Police Act and Section 3/25 of the Arms Act and he was arrested on 15.10.1987. 18. Thus, if not exactly the same, allegations sought to be proved against the petitioner in the shape of charges under Sections 392, 387 of the IPC, Section 34 of the Police Act and Section 3/25 of the Arms Act, were substantially the same as are in disciplinary proceedings. What is more, not only the charges are the same but the witnesses produced by the prosecution to prove them, were also same. Witnesses, namely, Omi (PW-1), Kamruddin (PW-2), Girraj (PW-3), Vijay Kumar (PW-4), Ramesh (PW-5), Radheyshyam (PW-6), Mahesh (PW-7), Krishan Kumar (PW-8), Shivram (PW-9), Ramdayal Singh ASI (PW-10), Radayal Constable (PW-11), Ishwari Prasad (PW-12), S.N. Sarin (PW-13) and Bhura (PW-14) have been produced to prove the charges in the criminal trial. In the departmental proceedings, Omi (PW-1) was produced as PW-8, Kamruddin (PW-2) was produced as PW-1, Girraj (PW-3) was produced as PW-13, Vijay Kumar (PW-4) was produced as PW-6, Ramesh (PW-5) was produced as PW-2, Mahesh (PW-7) was produced as PW-7, Krishan Kumar (PW-8) was produced as PW-9, Shivram (PW-9) was produced as PW-12, Ramdayal Singh ASI (PW-10) was produced as PW-5, Ramdayal Constable (PW-11) was produced as PW-10, Dr. S.N. Sarin (PW-13) was produced as PW-14 and Bhura (PW-14) was produced as PW-4. In the departmental enquiry, the department had produced documents Exhibit P-1 to Exhibit P-16, i.e. written-report, copy of FIR, entry of rojnamcha, site plan, seizure memo of gun, seizure memo of motorcycle, memo of arrest of petitioner, seizure memo of stones, medical report re condition of intoxication, and injury-reports of family members of petitioner. All those documents were produced in the criminal trial as well, though the prosecution has produced certain additional documents also, which is evident from the fact that total 43 documents were produced in the criminal trial. In those facts, even if some of the witnesses have not supported the case of the department in the disciplinary proceedings, some have indeed supported the case of the department/ prosecution in both the proceedings. In those facts, even if some of the witnesses have not supported the case of the department in the disciplinary proceedings, some have indeed supported the case of the department/ prosecution in both the proceedings. This is thus a stark reality that while petitioner has been dismissed from service relying on the same set of evidence, on which he has been acquitted of the charges by the trial court. 19. What now remains to be seen in these facts is whether the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony, supra, would apply to the present case. The Supreme Court in that case held that when proceedings are based on same set of facts, which were sought to be proved by the same witnesses and the court had already acquitted the accused by rejecting the prosecution story, then the findings recorded against him proving the charges against him in departmental enquiry, cannot be sustained. The Supreme Court further held that in such facts it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in departmental enquiry, to stand. It would be instructive to reproduce paras 34 and 35 of the report, which are as under:- 34. There is yet another reason for discarding the whole of the case of the respondents. As pointed out earlier, the criminal case as also the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts, namely, 'the raid conducted at the appellant's residence and recovery of incriminating articles therefrom.' The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to be proved by Police Officers and Panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. They were the only witnesses examined by the Inquiry Officer and the Inquiry Officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the appellant was acquitted. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, where the appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the "raid and recovery" at the residence of the appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex- parte departmental proceedings, to stand. 35. Since the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the instant case. 20. The Supreme Court in G.M. Tank, supra, again had occasion to consider similar question and their Lordships in para 31 of the report, held as under:- “31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the department as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the Courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony's case (supra) will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed.” 21. In Krishnakali Tea Estate vs. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh – (2004) 8 SCC 200 , it was held by the Supreme Court that the acquittal by the criminal court was 'honorable' as it was based on the fact that the prosecution did not produce sufficient material to establish its charge which was clear from the findings recorded by the criminal court. Similar view has been expressed by a coordinate bench of this court in Khawaju Khan, supra. 22. Similar view has been expressed by a coordinate bench of this court in Khawaju Khan, supra. 22. Law laid down by the Supreme Court thus fully covers the fact situation of the case in hand. In the light of this view, therefore, impugned orders cannot be sustained in law. 23. In view of above discussion, present writ petition succeeds and the same is allowed. The impugned orders dated 18.12.1989 (Annexure-2), 23.08.1990 (Annexure-4) and 03.06.1994 (Annexure-4) are quashed. Considering however that the order of dismissal was passed on 18.12.1989 (Annexure-2) and the petitioner was acquitted of the charges by the Court of District & Sessions Judge, Dholpur, in Criminal Appeal No.5/94, vide judgment dated 26.11.1994, and that the petitioner has not physically discharged his duties, ends of justice would be met if only 50% of the actual benefits by way of arrears of salary are ordered to be paid to him. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits, including revision of pay made applicable from time to time and consequential promotion, if in the meantime any of his junior has been promoted. However, petitioner shall be entitled to only 50% of the monetary benefits for the intervening period. 24. Writ petition accordingly stands disposed of with no order as to costs.