Judgment The complainant in C.C.No.17 of 2003 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukottai is the petitioner in the present Criminal Revision Case. The said Calender Case came to be instituted on complaint for an alleged offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukottai (Trial Court), after trial held the respondent herein/accused guilty of the offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, convicted him and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-and also incorporated a direction that in case of default in payment of fine, he should undergo simple imprisonment for 3 months. 2. As against the said judgment of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukottai dated 21.02.2006 made in C.C.No.17 of 2003, the respondent herein/accused preferred an appeal before the Court of Session, Pudukottai in C.A.No.8 of 2007. The appeal came to be assigned to the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Pudukottai and the learned appellate Judge, after hearing the appeal, allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and acquitted the respondent herein/accused of the offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for which he was prosecuted before the Trial Court. 3. As against the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Pudukottai dated 07.11.2007 made in C.A.No.8 of 2007, the petitioner herein/complainant has chosen to prefer the present revision under Sections 397 r/w. 401 Cr.P.C. 4. Though this Criminal Revision Case came to be admitted and it stands listed today for final hearing, a doubt has arisen regarding the maintainability of the revision in view of Section 401(4) Cr.P.C. Hence, the arguments of the learned counsel appearing for both parties regarding the maintainability of the revision are heard. In this regard, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner made the following contentions: (i) Section 378 Cr.P.C. does not provide for an appeal against an order of acquittal passed by an appellate Court in a Criminal Appeal and hence, the challenge made to the judgment of the appellate Court by way of revision is fully competent. In this regard, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner made the following contentions: (i) Section 378 Cr.P.C. does not provide for an appeal against an order of acquittal passed by an appellate Court in a Criminal Appeal and hence, the challenge made to the judgment of the appellate Court by way of revision is fully competent. (ii) Even if it is assumed that Sub-section (4) of Section 378 Cr.P.C. would apply to an order of acquittal passed by the appellate Court in a criminal appeal which arose out of a case instituted on complaint, Section 401(5) can be applied and the revision petition can be treated as an appeal. 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent would contend that both the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner are untenable in so for as there is clear indication in Sub-section (1) of Section 378 itself that the order of acquittal dealt with in the entire section is not confined to the order of acquittal passed by the Court of original jurisdiction, but would include an order passed by the appellate Court in an appeal and that only an order of revision passed by the Sessions Court was excluded from the category of appealable orders of acquittal dealt with in Section 378 Cr.P.C. Regarding the other contention that the revision came to be preferred on a wrong belief that no appeal would lie and hence, using the discretion of the Court, the revision can be treated as an appeal petition, the learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the said argument may have some substance, if an appeal, as referred to in Sub-section (5) of Section 401 is an appeal in exercise of a right of appeal or where no condition is prescribed for preferring such an appeal. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that wherever a condition has been prescribed for preferring an appeal, unless and until the condition is complied with, there shall be no question of entertaining an appeal or as treating a revision as an appeal petition. 6. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that wherever a condition has been prescribed for preferring an appeal, unless and until the condition is complied with, there shall be no question of entertaining an appeal or as treating a revision as an appeal petition. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent, drawing the attention of this Court to Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 378 Cr.P.C., has submitted that an appeal against an order of acquittal in a case instituted on complaint can be filed only with the Special Leave of the High Court and that such a Special Leave should have been sought for by filing an application for the said purpose within the time stipulated in Sub-section (5) of Section 378 Cr.P.C. When an application seeking such Special Leave has not been filed, there will be no question of converting the revision into an appeal or treating the revision as an appeal petition. It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the problem of limitations would also arise in case of treating such revision as appeal petition; that if the contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner for conversion of the revision into an appeal petition is accepted, it would amount to granting a license to byepass the condition contemplated under Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 378 Cr.P.C. for preferring an appeal. 7. The above said contentions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties are taken into consideration. 8. There can be no dispute that the criminal case was instituted on a complaint preferred by the petitioner. Of course, it ended in conviction before the trial Court and on appeal, the Sessions Court reversed the conviction and acquitted the accused (respondent herein). Section 378 Cr.P.C. is reproduced hereunder for better appreciation. 378. 8. There can be no dispute that the criminal case was instituted on a complaint preferred by the petitioner. Of course, it ended in conviction before the trial Court and on appeal, the Sessions Court reversed the conviction and acquitted the accused (respondent herein). Section 378 Cr.P.C. is reproduced hereunder for better appreciation. 378. Appeal in case of acquittal.-[(1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), and subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5),- (a) the District Magistrate may, in any case, direct the public prosecutor to present an appeal to the Court of Session from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable offence; (b) the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of an acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court [not being an order under clause (a)] or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.] (2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946) or by any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code, [the Central Government may, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal- (a) to the Court of Session, from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable offence; (b) to the High Court from an original or appellate order of an acquittal passed by any Court other then a High Court [not being an order under clause (a) or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision]. (3) [No appeal to the High Court] under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. (4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. (4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. (5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months, where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days in every other case, computed from the date of that order of acquittal. (6) If in any case, the application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special leave, to appeal from an order of acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under subsection (1) or under sub-section (2). Sub-sections 1 to 3 deal with the appeal by the State (State appeal against the acquittal). Subsection (4) alone deals with an appeal against acquittal in a case instituted upon complaint. Suppose the case in the trial Court ends in acquittal, there shall be no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that Sub-section (4) of Section 378 gets attracted and the appeal against such order of acquittal shall lie only to the trial Court. Difficulty arises when the trial Court convicts the accused and the appellate Court viz., the Sessions Court reverses the conviction and acquit the accused. 9. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no provision enabling an appeal to be filed against the order of acquittal passed by a Sessions Court in an appeal and hence, a revision alone shall be competent. This Court is not in a position to accept the above contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. If at all, the order of conviction made by the trial Court is confirmed by the appellate Court which is subordinate to the High Court, there is no provision for a further appeal by the accused and Section 374 provides only one appeal as a right of appeal and there is no provision for second appeal similar to the one provided in Section 100 of C.P.C. 10. On the other hand, Section 378 Cr.P.C. deals with the appeal against the orders of acquittal. On the other hand, Section 378 Cr.P.C. deals with the appeal against the orders of acquittal. It deals with the orders of acquittal passed both in a case instituted on police report and in a case instituted on complaint. Of course, there is no direct indication in sub-section (4) that the appeal by the complainant can be made only against the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court or that it can be filed against the order of acquittal passed by appellate Court also. Sub-section (4) appears in the said Section subsequent to Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3). Sub-section (1) has been couched in general terms. It reads, "save as otherwise provided in Sub-section (2), and subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (3) and (5)". The use of the said language shows that cases that fall under Sub-section (5) also are dealt with in Sub-section (1). Sub Section (1) states that the State Government may in any case direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court, not being an order under Clause (a) or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision. 11. A proper understanding of the said clause will make it clear that when cases covered by Subsection (a) of Section 378(1) Cr.P.C. or cases instituted on police report regarding cognizable and non-bailable offences tried by a Magistrate, end in acquittal, the power of directing the public Prosecutor to prefer an appeal is given to the District Magistrate. Those cases covered by Sub-section (1)(a) are excluded from sub-section (1)(b). A case in which an order of acquittal is passed by the Court of Session in a Criminal revision case is also excluded from the category of appealable orders under Section 378. An acquittal of the Court of Session in revision, normally will take place when an order of acquittal is passed by the trial Court and a revision is filed before the Sessions Court challenging the order of acquittal. Besides those clauses excluding those particular orders from the category of appealable orders, it specifically provides that an appeal will lie to the High Court from an original or appeal order of acquittal passed by any Court other than the high Court. Besides those clauses excluding those particular orders from the category of appealable orders, it specifically provides that an appeal will lie to the High Court from an original or appeal order of acquittal passed by any Court other than the high Court. By a conjoint reading of sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 378 and sub-section 4 of the said section, we can justify reading the above said clause into sub-section (4) to hold that the order to be appealed from may be an order of acquittal either by the Court of original jurisdiction or by a Court of appeal. If such a harmonious construction of the provisions are made, then it shall be quite clear that sub-section (4) of Section 378, applies to the orders of acquittal irrespective of the fact whether it is passed in the original proceedings by the trial Court or in the appeal by the appellate Court, which is not being the High Court. 12. When an appeal in such a case covered by sub-section (4), is to be filed, the complainant shall seek a "special leave" to appeal from the order of acquittal as distinguished from the "leave" contemplated in sub-section (3) of Section 378 in respect of appeals preferred by the State Government or Central Government, as the case may be Sub-section (5) of Section 378 provides that such an application seeking "special leave" shall be filed within six months, in case the complainant happens to be a public servant and within 60 days if the complainant happens to be any person other than a public servant. The sub-section provides that no application under sub-Section 4 for the grant of "special leave" shall be entertained by the High Court, if it is not preferred within the period stipulated in Sub-section (5) as detailed above. Therefore, it can be conveniently said that the period of six months and 60 days respectively referred to in subsection (5) provides a condition precedent for preferring an application for the grant of "special leave". This can be clearly understood if a comparative study of the above provisions viz., Subsection (3) and (5) of Section 378 and the absence of any period prescribed for seeking "leave" by the Government under sub-section (3) of Section 378 read with Article 114 of the Limitation Act. 13. This can be clearly understood if a comparative study of the above provisions viz., Subsection (3) and (5) of Section 378 and the absence of any period prescribed for seeking "leave" by the Government under sub-section (3) of Section 378 read with Article 114 of the Limitation Act. 13. Article 114 (a) of Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a period of 90 days as the limitation for preferring an appeal from an order of acquittal under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 417 of the old Code, corresponding to Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 378 of the New Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. As it is a period of limitation is to be counted from the date of order of acquittal and such limitation has been prescribed in general law of limitation the other provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 are attracted. So far as an appeal contemplated under Sub Section (4) of Section 378 is concerned, Article 114 (b) is the relevant provision in the Limitation Act. Of course, it refers to Sub Section (3) of Section 417 of the Old Code. The said provision corresponds to sub-section (4) of Section 378 of Cr.P.C, 1973. The limitation for preferring such an appeal under Sub-section (4) of Section 378, as per the Article 114(b) is only 30 days. But the starting point of the limitation is the date of grant of "special leave" contemplated under Sub Section (4) of Section 378 Cr.P.C. If the special leave is not granted, there shall be no question of preferring an appeal and that is the reason why the limitation is stated to run from the date of grant of "special leave". For filing an application for the grant of "special leave" under subsection (4) of Section 378, Sub-section (5) prescribes a period of six months in case complainant is a public servant and 60 days in case of any other person being the complainant. The said period cannot be taken as a limitation, since the legislature would not have intended to grant two spells of limitation for one and the same appeal. 14. The said period cannot be taken as a limitation, since the legislature would not have intended to grant two spells of limitation for one and the same appeal. 14. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner has made an attempt to convince this Court, by referring to the procedure adopted by the High Court in converting an appeal filed under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. into a revision which is found in the order pronounced in Crl.A.No.1257 of 2002 converted into Criminal Revision Case No.393 of 2009. The said order came to be passed by myself while sitting in the Principal Bench of the Madras High Court, wherein the trial Court convicted the accused and the same was confirmed by the appellate Court, as against the judgment of the appellate Court. 15. Of course, it is true that when a revision is filed by a person with a belief that no appeal lies, the High Court under Section 401(5) Cr.P.C. can treat the revision as an appeal petition and dispose of the same. The above said general provision shall be applicable in all cases wherein there is no condition precedent is prescribed for preferring the appeal. Moreover, sub-section 5 of Section 401 does not make it mandatory on the High Court to treat the revision as an appeal and it gives a discretion (of course, a judicial discretion) to the High Court to treat the revision as an appeal petition. In a case wherein the presentation of the appeal itself is made contingent on the grant of "special leave", an application seeking special leave for filing appeal is to be preferred within the time stipulated under sub-section (5) of Section 378 Cr.P.C. converting a revision when no "special leave" was obtained, that too after the period stipulated in Sub-section (5) of Section 378 Cr.P.C. will amount to improper exercise of the discretion. Conversion of such revision into appeal which shall have a drastic effect of making the provisions found in Subsections (4) and (5) of Section 378 Cr.P.C. a dead letter in statute book so far as that particular case is concerned. Conversion of such revision into appeal which shall have a drastic effect of making the provisions found in Subsections (4) and (5) of Section 378 Cr.P.C. a dead letter in statute book so far as that particular case is concerned. The proper exercise of such discretion shall be to reject the prayer for conversion of the revision into an appeal, if such a request is not made within the time prescribed under sub-section 5 of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and no such application seeking special leave contemplated under Section 4 of Section 378 is filed within that time. If the time stipulated in sub-section (5) of 378 Cr.P.C. is allowed to expire, thereafter, the prayer for conversion of the revision into an appeal cannot be entertained and the exercise of the discretion in favour of such conversion shall be an improper exercise of the judicial discretion. Hence, this Court comes to the conclusion that the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the revision can be treated as an appeal petition and the same can be heard and disposed of as an appeal, is bound to be rejected. 16. For all the reasons stated, this Court comes to the conclusion that the revision is not maintainable and that using the discretion of the High Court under Sub-Section (5) of Section 401 also the revision cannot be converted into an appeal in this case, because such a prayer for conversion was not accompanied with an application seeking "special leave" under sub-section (4) of Section 378 Cr.P.C. filed within the time stipulated in sub-section 5 of Section 378 Cr.P.C. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed as not maintainable.