JUDGMENT Mr. Rakesh Kumar Jain, J.: - This appeal is filed by defendant no.1 in a suit for declaration filed by the plaintiffs that they along with defendants no.5 to 10 are owners in possession of the land in dispute, situated in village Rojhka, Tehsil and District Rewari. Defendants no.1 to 4 (hereinafter referred as the “contesting defendants”) had been using the northern killa line of rectangle no.12, killa nos.24, 23, 22 to reach their land, which was shortest rasta to reach their land. Defendant no.1 moved an application under Section 21(2) of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (here-in-after referred to as the “Act”), which was allowed by the Consolidation Officer on 16.11.1988 with a link passage to the land of the contesting defendants which passes through rectangle no.12, killa no.11/3 belonging to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had filed the present suit to challenge the aforesaid order on the ground that the said order has been passed without affording any opportunity of hearing and is, thus, liable to be ignored as not binding on them. 2. The contesting defendants filed a joint written statement. They averred that they are not the owner of the entire land shown in the green colour in the site plan and are owners only of the land comprising in khewat no.19, khatauni no.22, rectangle no.11, killa nos.16, 17, 24, 20/2 and rectangle no.12, killa no.25. The disputed rasta had already been in existence between killa no.11/2 and 11/3 and being used by the contesting defendants to reach their land. It is also averred that the Consolidation Officer had issued summons and even got pasted a copy thereof on the house belonging to the plaintiffs and proforma defendants but they did not turn up to join the proceedings. It was, thus, pleaded that the impugned order has been rightly passed by the Consolidation Officer and the suit was resisted on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. 3. The plaintiffs filed replication and reiterated their stand taken in the plaint. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, issues were framed and both the parties led their oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their case. 5. 3. The plaintiffs filed replication and reiterated their stand taken in the plaint. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, issues were framed and both the parties led their oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their case. 5. The Trial Court had found that the impugned order was passed by the Consolidation Officer ex-parte on the basis of a report of the Process Server on the summons stating that Roop Chand son of Tulsi Ram (proforma defendant no.6) was not available and that a copy of the summons had been affixed at his house in the presence of Lambardar, though there is no report that Roop Chand had evaded service or refused to accept the service. It was found that there was no reference in the impugned order that any attempt was made to effect service on any of the plaintiffs or the proforma defendants except Roop Chand and insofar as affixation is concerned, no direction was obtained before effecting substituted service. The plaintiffs also produced Lal Singh Lambardar (PW1) who had stated that no notice was affixed on the house of Roop Chand in his presence, which vitiates the report of the Process Server on the basis of which the impugned order had been passed. It was, thus, observed by the learned Trial Court that the impugned order was passed without observing the principles of natural justice and decreed the suit while dealing with Section 44 of the Act on the ground that the Consolidation Officer was required to issue notices to all the interested persons before passing the impugned order and has relied upon the judgment reported as Punjab State and other v. Bhagwan Singh and others, 1983 PLJ 40. 6. Defendants no.1 to 4 challenged the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. It was observed by the lower Appellate Court that the consolidation took place in the village in the year 1988 when Sube Singh defendant no.1 filed the application under Section 21(2) of the Act for, providing 2 karam wide passage in the land of the plaintiffs and proforma defendants. The Consolidation Officer, while following the provisions of Section 42 of the Act, passed the impugned order. In this regard, reference could be made to Section 42 of the Act, which reads as under:- “42. The Consolidation Officer, while following the provisions of Section 42 of the Act, passed the impugned order. In this regard, reference could be made to Section 42 of the Act, which reads as under:- “42. Power of State Government to call for proceedings:- The State Government may at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made by any officer under this Act, call for and examine the record of any case pending before or disposed of by such officer and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit; Provided that no order or scheme or repartition shall be varied or reversed without giving the parties interested notice to appear and opportunity to be heard except in cases where the State Government is satisfied that the proceedings have been vitiated by unlawful consideration.” 7. The lower Appellate Court also found that no notice was ever issued to the plaintiffs and proforma defendants except Roop Chand that too by way of substituted service without having any order from the Court in that regard, which has not been supported by PW1 Lal Singh Lambardar, who had unequivocally deposed that no affixation of any summons on the house of Roop Chand was ever made by a public servant in his presence nor any report has been produced on record by the Process Server that Roop Chand had tried to evade service, which necessitated the affixation of summons on the outer door of his house. The Appellate Court, while relying upon the judgments reported as Dholposh Sharma Shastri v. Richhpal Singh and others, 1991 PLJ 337, Gurbax Singh v. The Financial Commissioner and another, 1991 PLJ 192 (SC) and the State of Haryana and others v. Vinod Kumar and others, 1986 PLJ 161 (Full Bench), dismissed the appeal filed by defendants no.1 to 4. 8. In the present appeal preferred only by defendant no.1, counsel for the appellant has submitted that service upon one of the co-sharers was sufficient as service upon all the other cosharers and ultimately argued that the suit by itself was not maintainable in view of Section 44 of the Act. 8. In the present appeal preferred only by defendant no.1, counsel for the appellant has submitted that service upon one of the co-sharers was sufficient as service upon all the other cosharers and ultimately argued that the suit by itself was not maintainable in view of Section 44 of the Act. In support of his contention, he has relied upon two judgments of this Court in the cases of Joban Singh v. Thakar Singh, 1983 PLR 636 and Ranbir Singh v. Gram Panchayat, Village Bandhwari and others, [2012(2) Law Herald (P&H) 1258] : 2012(2) PLR 202. 9. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents has submitted that the impugned order dated 16.11.1988 passed by the Consolidation Officer was against the principles of natural justice because no notice was given to the plaintiffs and proforma defendants except for Roop Chand which has also not been found to be in accordance with law inasmuch as the factum of affixation has been denied by PW1. It is further submitted that in such a situation, where a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction passes an order without issuing notice, the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of State of Haryana’s case (supra) would come into play to their rescue. He also relied upon two Single Bench judgment of this Court in Dholposh Sharma Shastri’s case (supra) and Sudagar Singh and others v. Punjab State and others, 1981 PLJ 166. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the available record. 11. The moot question raised by the counsel for the appellant is regarding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to maintain the suit against the order of the Consolidation Officer passed under the Act. 12. Before I proceed further, I would like to refer to Section 44 of the Act, which reads as under:- “44. No civil court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made, to obtain a decision or order in respect of any matter which the State Government or any officer is, by this Act, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of.” 13. No civil court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made, to obtain a decision or order in respect of any matter which the State Government or any officer is, by this Act, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of.” 13. A bare look of the aforesaid provisions would definitely suggest that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be barred if the order is passed by the Government or any Officer under the Act but the question would be “whether an order passed by an authority under the Act in violation of principles of natural justice would be open to challenge if the Statute bars jurisdiction of the Civil Court”? 14. Insofar as the judgments relied upon by the counsel for the appellants are concerned, in Ranbir Singh’s case (supra), the facts were that the plaintiff filed the suit for declaration with consequential relief challenging the order passed by the competent authority in consolidation proceedings under Section 21(3) of the Act on the plea that less land was allotted to him. In such a situation, the order was amenable to appeal under Section 21(3) of the Act. 15. In Joban Singh’s case (supra), the Consolidation Officer, on the direction of the Additional Director, allotted 01 Kanal 05 Marlas of land to Joban Singh out of Khasra No.15/22/4, though earlier the aforesaid khasra number as a whole measuring 02 Kanals 04 Marlas was allotted to Thakar Singh, which allotment was changed by the aforesaid order. Thakar Singh filed a suit for declaration that he is owner of land measuring 2 Kanals 4 Marlas comprising of Khasra No.15//22/4 and Joban Singh had no right, title or interest in the same as he had been allotted the Khasra Number in repartition made during consolidation proceedings in the year 1960 and the impugned order passed by the Consolidation Officer after a lapse of ten years is illegal and without jurisdiction. This suit was contested on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction under Section 44 of the Act. The Trial Court decreed the suit holding that before passing the impugned order by the Consolidation Officer, the plaintiff was in possession of the entire Khasra number and the order of the Consolidation Officer was without jurisdiction as the Consolidation Department became functus officio and after a lapse of ten years could not order dispossession of the plaintiff by passing the impugned order. It was held that Section 44 of the Act, would not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The said decree was upheld by the lower Appellate Court while relying upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Ajit Singh v. Smt. Subhagan and others, 1969 Cur. L.J. 471, holding that on a question of title, Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. However, it was held in the aforesaid case by this Court that the facts of Ajit Singh’s case (supra) were totally distinguishable because it was held therein that if there is some dispute between the co-sharers on a question of title, that could be gone into by the Civil Court, the operation of section 16-A(2) of the Act, would be subject to the decision of the Civil Court and the Consolidation Authorities will have to pass fresh orders in view of the decision of question of title was not agitated upon by the plaintiff. All that he had asserted was that whole of Khasra number in dispute was allotted to him in 1960 and the change made after ten years, was without jurisdiction. It was further recorded that if there had been a dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant as to the share in the joint land held by them and if the plaintiff was claiming certain share and the Consolidation Officer had allowed him less than that share, then certainly, he could come to the Civil Court to establish his title and had the Civil Court upheld his contention on the question of his share, then on the basis of declaration granted by the Civil Court, the Consolidation Authorities would have been duty bound to make fresh partition to make good the share of the plaintiff, but in the set of circumstances of that case, it was held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. 16. The aforesaid 2 judgments cited by counsel for the appellant are totally inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case because the defendant has been relying upon a decision of the Consolidation Officer dated 16.11.1988 by which 2 karam passage was provided to him through the land of the plaintiffs without issuing any notice to the plaintiffs and the proforma defendants. In these circumstances, the judgment of the Full Bench in State of Haryana’s case (supra) would be squarely applicable. In these circumstances, the judgment of the Full Bench in State of Haryana’s case (supra) would be squarely applicable. In that case, the question referred to the Larger Bench was “whether an order of a Collector declaring land as surplus without affording the concerned land owner an opportunity of being heard, as envisaged by rule 6 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, 1956, is a nullity and whether a suit to challenge the validity of such an order, is maintainable in view of the clear language of section 25 of the Act excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court?” It was held by this Court that if an order is passed by a tribunal of limited jurisdiction without issuing a notice to the concerned party, the order would be a nullity and open to challenge in the Civil Court even if the statute expressly bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit to challenge the validity or legality of the order passed by such a tribunal. 17. In Dholposh Sharma Shastri’s case (supra), a similar situation was there where path was provided under Section 42 of the Act in the absence of the affected party and it has been held that opportunity of hearing is a must. 18. In the case of Sudagar Singh and others’ case (supra), it was held that if there was a procedural defect in passing orders by authorities under the Pepsu tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, such orders can be challenged before the Civil Court and Section 47 has no bar. 19. The sum and substance of the aforesaid discussion is that if the statutory tribunal is acting in violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch without issuing any notice to the affected party and passing the impugned order, the Civil Court still would have the jurisdiction to set aside such an order dehors the express exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under the Act. 20. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any merit in the present appeal as no question of law much-less substantial is involved therein. Dismissed. ---------0.B.S.0------------ —————————