Hon'ble Surya Prakash Kesarwani,J. 1- Heard Ms Rashmi Tripathi, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri B.K. Pandey, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent. Both the above noted revisions were admitted on 12.8.2014 on the following questions of law : i.Whether Gambier is catechu liable to tax at the rate of 4% or it is an unclassified item liable to tax at the rate of 12.5% ? ii.Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned order of the Tribunal is based on irrelevant material ?" 2- Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant is engaged in purchase and sale of Gambier and certain other commodities. He deposited tax @ 4% treating Gambier as KATTHA (Catechu). However, the assessing authority vide order dated 19.10.2012 for the Assessment Year 2009-10 assessed the sale turnover of Gambier as an classified item and accordingly levied tax @ 12.5% for the period 1.4.2009 to 31.5.2009 and @ 13.5% for the period from 1.6.2009 to 31.3.2010. She submits that Gambier is KATTHA. She submits that KATTHA is specified in Entry-68 of Part-A of Schedule-II to the U.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') liable to tax @ 4% and, therefore, sale turnover of Gambier is also liable to tax @ 4%. 3- In support of her submission she relied upon some literature of a book namely, "Indian Forester" wherein it is mentioned that Catechu may be prepared from Gambier. She also relied upon a book of Chemistry and Technology in which it is mentioned that Gambier is obtained from leaves and twigs of uncaria plant. It is used in dyeing compound shed, for preservation of fishing nets and for tanning purposes. It may be used as an alternative raw-material to meet the demand for Catechu. On the basis of these materials, she submits that Catechu and Gambier both are one and the same commodity and, therefore, the Tribunal has committed as manifest error of fact to hold that the Gambier is not KATTHA and, therefore, is liable to tax as an unclassified item. 4- Sri B.K. Pandey, learned Standing Counsel submits that Gambier and Catechu both are entirely different commodities. Gambier is a non edible commodity, while Catechu is an edible commodity. He submits that both the commodities are different in nature and are differently known in common parlance. 4- Sri B.K. Pandey, learned Standing Counsel submits that Gambier and Catechu both are entirely different commodities. Gambier is a non edible commodity, while Catechu is an edible commodity. He submits that both the commodities are different in nature and are differently known in common parlance. If anyone asks for Catechu, he shall not give Gambier and vise-versa. 5- I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. 6- Briefly stated the facts of the present case are that undisputedly, the applicant deals in Gambier, which is a non-edible commodity. Catechu is an edible commodity, which is specified in Entry-68 of Part-A of Schedule ?II to the Act. The assessing authority assessed to tax the sale turnover of Gambier as an unclassified item vide assessment order dated 19.10.2012 for the Assessment Year 2009-10. 7- Aggrieved with the assessment order, the applicant filed First Appeal No.325 of 2013, which was dismissed by the Appellate authority vide order dated 13.9.2013. 8- Aggrieved with this order, the applicant file Second Appeal No.205 of 2013 before the Member, Commercial Tax Tribunal, Varanasi Bench-I, Varanasi, which was dismissed by the impugned order dated 24.6.2014. 9- Aggrieved with this order, the applicant has preferred the present revision. 10- In the impugned order, the Tribunal has relied upon a Full Bench decision of the Tribunal. The said Full Bench decision of the Tribunal was passed in Appeal No.1 of 2012 on 3.5.2012, whereby the appeal of one M/s R.B.Trading Company, Varanasi, filed against the decision of the Commissioner dated 15.11.2011, under Section 59 of the Act, was rejected. A copy of the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal has been filed as Annexure-12 to the affidavit. In this decision, the Tribunal has well discussed in detail the commodities namely, Gambier and Catechu and held that as per report of the Chief Public Analyst, U.P., Lucknow dated 19.1.2011 given under the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and the Rules framed thereunder, Gambier is a non- edible commodity which is injurious to health. KATTHA is manufactured out of Khairwood and is used in Betel, Pan Masala and medicine etc. as per "Unani Dravya Gunadarsh. Gambier" is entirely different from KATTHA. Gambier is mainly used for tanning and dyeing purposes. The above noted facts have not been disputed by the applicant, as is evident from the pleadings in the revision. KATTHA is manufactured out of Khairwood and is used in Betel, Pan Masala and medicine etc. as per "Unani Dravya Gunadarsh. Gambier" is entirely different from KATTHA. Gambier is mainly used for tanning and dyeing purposes. The above noted facts have not been disputed by the applicant, as is evident from the pleadings in the revision. 11- In para-19 of the revision, the applicant has stated that 'Catechu' and 'Gambier' both are different articles but are used for the same purpose. In pragrph-22 of the revision, the applicant has stated that Catechu and Gambier are different but the ingredients and purpose are same except the percentage/quantity of ingredients. Thus, according to own case of the applicant Gambier and Catechu both are different commodities. The case of the applicant is that both are used for the same purpose and, therefore, the Gambier should also be taxed at the rate specified for Catechu. Thus, once it is found that Gambier and Catechu are two different commodities, the rate of tax as specified for Catechu cannot be applied on the sale turnover of Gambier. 12- It is well settled that in interpreting items in Taxation Statute like the Value Added Tax Act, Sales Tax Act or Excise Act, primary object of which is to raise revenue and for which purpose diverse products, articles and substances are classified, resort should be had not to the scientific or technical meanings of the term or expression used but to their popular meaning, that is to say, the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. If any term or expression has been defined in the enactment then it must be understood in the sense in which it is defined. In the absence of any definition of such term or expression in the enactment, the meaning of the term in common parlance or commercial parlance has to be adopted. If a person goes to a shopkeeper and ask for Gambier, he shall not be given KATTHA. Likewise, if anyone goes to a shopkeeper and ask for KATTHA, he shall not be given Gambier. When a consumer requires KATTHA he would not be satisfied with Gambier. Similarly, when a person requires Gambier he would not be satisfied with KATTHA. As per his own admitted case of the applicant, Gambier and Kattha are different commodities. Likewise, if anyone goes to a shopkeeper and ask for KATTHA, he shall not be given Gambier. When a consumer requires KATTHA he would not be satisfied with Gambier. Similarly, when a person requires Gambier he would not be satisfied with KATTHA. As per his own admitted case of the applicant, Gambier and Kattha are different commodities. The literature filed by the applicant along the revision also supports the above position.Merely because Gambier may be used to obtain Catechu or after applying certain process of manufacture it may be used as an alternate for Catechu, it cannot be called as Kattha, as understood in common parlance in India. The main use of Gambier and KATTHA are also different. While the general use of Gambier is in dyeing and tanning, the use of KATTHA commonly known to Indian people is its consumption with betel for chewing and also for some medicinal purposes. 13- In view of the above discussion, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order of the Tribunal, that Gambier and KATTHA are not one and the same commodity and Gambier is an unclassified item under the Act. 14- Since, the Act does not define the word 'Kattha', therefore, the entry 'Kattha' has to be constituted according to common parlance understanding or common parlance test. The application of common parlance test is an extension of general principles of interpretation of Statute for deciphering the mind of the law-maker. In the absence of a statutory definition in precise term; words, entries and items in physical Statute must be construed in terms of their commercial or trade understanding or according to their popular meaning. In other words they have to be constructed in the sense that the people conversant with the subject matter of the Statute would attribute to it. Resort to rigid interpretation in terms of artificial and technical meaning should be avoided in such circumstances. However, this rule shall not be applicable when the legislature has expressed a contrary intention, such as by providing a statutory definition of the particular entry, word or item in specific, scientific or technical terms, then interpretation ought to be in accordance with scientific and technical meaning and not according to common parlance understanding. 15- In the case of Mamta Surgical Cotton Industries Rajasthan Versus Assistant Commissioner (Anti Evasion), Bhilwara, Rajasthan, 2014 (4) SCC 87 ( paragraph Nos. 15- In the case of Mamta Surgical Cotton Industries Rajasthan Versus Assistant Commissioner (Anti Evasion), Bhilwara, Rajasthan, 2014 (4) SCC 87 ( paragraph Nos. 32 to 34 ), Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under :- "32.The aforesaid view is further fortified by the common parlance test. It can be said that when a consumer requires surgical cotton, he would not be satisfied with cotton being provided to him and the same principle would reversibly apply that a customer of cotton would not use surgical cotton as a substitute. Further the purpose for which cotton and surgical cotton are used are diametrically opposite. While surgical cotton finds utility primarily for medical purposes in households, dispensaries, hospitals, etc. raw cotton being, inter alia, non-sterilised and riddled with organic impurities cannot be used as such at all. 33.For both these commodities operational territories are different and both have a different consumer segment. For medical and pharmaceutical purposes, use of ordinary cotton is not permissible. The fixed medical standards for the quality of surgical cotton are definite and definable such that ordinary cotton would not suffice the purpose. Surgical cotton is only used in form of medicine or pharmaceutical produce, thus it cannot be said that use of commodity is interchangeable and in that view of the matter, surgical cotton is a different commodity. It is a commodity which is used with a completely distinct identity in itself. As what is used for medical purpose is perfectly sterilised disinfected purified cotton. If raw cotton is used for surgical purposes, it would be counterproductive. Surgical cotton is extensively used for making napkins, sanitary pads and filters, etc. The surgical cotton is exclusively consumed in medical field while ordinary cotton has so many uses. The main chemical properties desired in a surgical dressing are inertness and lack of irritation in use, which is provided by the surgical cotton only if manufactured as per the standards specified. Raw cotton is purified by a series of processes and rendered hydrophilic in character and free from other external organic impurities for use in surgical dressings. Surgical cotton is, thus, completely different from ordinary cotton. 34. The surgical cotton is made sterile and fit for surgical use and it is not put to the same use to which the unmanufactured cotton is put and vice versa. Surgical cotton is, thus, completely different from ordinary cotton. 34. The surgical cotton is made sterile and fit for surgical use and it is not put to the same use to which the unmanufactured cotton is put and vice versa. Therefore, when unmanufactured cotton undergoes a manufacturing process, a new product saleable into the market which is having a distinct identity, comes into existdence which is known in the commercial market by a different name and use. Surgical cotton possesses higher utility than the cotton in its unmanufactured state." 16- In the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi Vs. Connaught Plaza Restaurant Private Limited, New Delhi, (2012) 13 SCC 639 (Paragraph Nos. 20 to 33), Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under : "20. Time and again, the principle of common parlance as the standard for interpreting terms in the taxing statutes, albeit subject to certain exceptions, where the statutory context runs to the contrary, has been reiterated. The application of the common parlance test is an extension of the general principle of interpretation of statutes for deciphering the mind of the law maker; "[i] it is an attempt to discover the intention of the legislature from the language used by it, keeping always in mind, that the language is at best an imperfect instrument for the expression of actual human thoughts." [(See :Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. v. CCE, 1993 Supp(3) SCC 16." 21. A classic example on the concept of common parlance is the decision of the Exchequer Court of Canada in R. v. Planter Nut and Chocolate Co. Ltd. The question involved in the said decision was whether salted peanuts and cashew nuts could be considered to be "fruit" or "vegetable" within the meaning of the Excise Tax Act. Cameron J., delivering the judgment, posed the question as follows: "...would a householder when asked to bring home fruit or vegetables for the evening meal bring home salted peanuts, cashew or nuts of any sort? The answer is obviously `no'." Applying the test, the Court held that the words "fruit" and "vegetable"are not defined in the Act or any of the Acts in pari materia. They are ordinary words in every-day use and are therefore, to be construed according to their popular sense. The answer is obviously `no'." Applying the test, the Court held that the words "fruit" and "vegetable"are not defined in the Act or any of the Acts in pari materia. They are ordinary words in every-day use and are therefore, to be construed according to their popular sense. 22.In Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. STO the issue before this Court was whether betel leaves could be considered as "vegetables" in the Schedule of the C.P. & Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 for availing the benefit of exemption. While construing the import of the word "vegetables" and holding that betel leaves could not be held to be "vegetables", the Court observed thus : "But this word must be construed not in any technical sense nor from the botanical point of view but as understood in common parlance. It has not been defined in the Act and being a word of every day use it must be construed in its popular sense meaning "that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it. 23." In CST v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh, the Court had to decide whether "charcoal" could be classified as "coal" under Entry I of Part III of Schedule II of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958. Answering the question in the affirmative, it was observed as follows :(AIR pp.1456-57, paras 4 & 6) "4. Now, there can be no dispute that while coal is technically understood as a mineral product, charcoal is manufactured by human agency from products like wood and other things. But it is now well- settled that while interpreting items in statutes like the Sales Tax Acts, resort should be had not to the scientific or the technical meaning of such terms but to their popular meaning or the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them, that is to say, to their commercial sense" 6. The result emerging from these decisions is that while construing the word 'coal' in Entry I of Part III of Schedule II, the test that would be applied is what would be the meaning which persons dealing with coal and consumers purchasing it as fuel would give to that word. The result emerging from these decisions is that while construing the word 'coal' in Entry I of Part III of Schedule II, the test that would be applied is what would be the meaning which persons dealing with coal and consumers purchasing it as fuel would give to that word. A sales tax statute is being one levying a tax on goods must in the absence of a technical term or a term of science or art, be presumed to have used an ordinary term as coal according to the meaning ascribed to it in common parlance. Viewed from that angle both a merchant dealing in coal and a consumer wanting to purchase it would regard coal not in its geological sense but in the sense as ordinarily understood and would include 'charcoal' in the term 'coal'. It is only when the question of the kind or variety of coal would arise that a distinction would be made between coal and charcoal; otherwise, both of them would in ordinary parlance as also in their commercial sense be spoken as coal. 24."In Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India, at p. 251, while holding that VP Latex was to be classified as "raw rubber" under Item 39 of the Indian Tariff Act, 1934, this Court observed:(SCC pp.252-54, paras 29 & 34) "29. It is well established that in interpreting the meaning of words in a taxing statute, the acceptation of a particular word by the trade and its popular meaning should commend itself to the authority. "34. We are, however, unable to accept the submission. It is clear that meanings given to articles in a fiscal statute must be as people in trade and commerce, conversant with the subject, generally treat and understand them in the usual course. But once an article is classified and put under a distinct entry, the basis of the classification is not open to question. Technical and scientific tests offer guidance only within limits. Once the articles are in circulation and come to be described and known in common parlance, we then see no difficulty for statutory classification under a particular entry." 25."In Shri Bharuch Coconut Trading Co. v. Municipal Corpn. Technical and scientific tests offer guidance only within limits. Once the articles are in circulation and come to be described and known in common parlance, we then see no difficulty for statutory classification under a particular entry." 25."In Shri Bharuch Coconut Trading Co. v. Municipal Corpn. of the City of Ahmedabad, this Court applied the test as "would a householder when asked to bring some fresh fruits or some vegetable for the evening meal, bring coconut too as vegetable (sic)?" The Court held that when a person goes to a commercial market to ask for coconuts, "5........no one will consider brown coconut to be vegetable or fresh fruit much less a green fruit. No householder would purchase it as a fruit." Therefore, the meaning of the word 'brown coconut', and whether it was a green fruit, had to be "understood in its ordinary commercial parlance." Accordingly it was held that brown coconut would not be considered as green fruit. 26.In Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. Vs. Union of India, this Court observed the following: (SCC p. 290, para 12) "12.....This Court has consistently taken the view that, in determining the meaning or connotation of words and expressions describing an article in a tariff schedule, one principle which is fairly well-settled is that those words and expressions should be construed in the sense in which they are understood in the trade, by the dealer and the consumer. The reason is that it is they who are concerned with it and, it is the sense in which they understand it which constitutes the definitive index of the legislative intention". 27.In CCE v. Kanpur Vs. Krishna Carbon Paper Co., this Court has opined thus : "12. It is a well settled principle of construction, as mentioned before, that where the word has a scientific or technical meaning and also an ordinary meaning according to common parlance, it is in the latter sense that in a taxing statute the word must be held to have been used, unless contrary intention is clearly expressed by the legislature. It is a well settled principle of construction, as mentioned before, that where the word has a scientific or technical meaning and also an ordinary meaning according to common parlance, it is in the latter sense that in a taxing statute the word must be held to have been used, unless contrary intention is clearly expressed by the legislature. But there is a word of caution that has to be borne in mind in this connection, the words must be understood in popular sense, that is to say, these must be confined to the words used in a particular statute and then if in respect of that particular items, as artificial definition is given in the sense that a special meaning is attached to particular words in the statute then the ordinary sense or dictionary meaning would not be applicable but the meaning of that type of goods dealt with by that type of goods in that type of market, should be searched." 28."In Reliance Cellulose Products Ltd. v. CCE, it was observed : "20. In other words, if the word used in a fiscal statute is understood in common parlance or in the commercial world in a particular sense, it must be taken that the Excise Act has used that word in the commonly understood sense. That sense cannot be taken away by attributing a technical meaning to the word. But if the legislature itself has adopted a technical term, then that technical term has to be understood in the technical sense. In other words, if in the fiscal statute, the article in question falls within the ambit of a technical term used under a particular entry, then that article cannot be taken away from that entry and placed under the residuary entry on the pretext that the article, even though it comes within the ambit of the technical term used in a particular entry, has acquired some other meaning in market parlance. For example, if a type of explosive (RDX) is known in the market as Kala Sabun by a section of the people who uses these explosives, the manufacturer or importer of these explosives cannot claim that the explosives must be classified as soap and not as explosive." 29. For example, if a type of explosive (RDX) is known in the market as Kala Sabun by a section of the people who uses these explosives, the manufacturer or importer of these explosives cannot claim that the explosives must be classified as soap and not as explosive." 29. "There is a catena of decisions that has dealt with the classification of Ayurvedic products between the categories of medicaments and cosmetics and in the process made significant pronouncements on the common parlance test. 30.In Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhavan Ltd. v. CCE ,at page 404 this Court while applying the common parlance test held that the appellant's product "Dant Lal Manjan" could not qualify as a medicament and held as follows: "3.....The Tribunal rightly points out that in interpreting statutes like the Excise Act the primary object of which is to raise revenue and for which purpose various products are differently classified, resort should not be had to the scientific and technical meaning of the terms and expressions used but to their popular meaning, that is to say the meaning attached to them by those using the product. It is for this reason that the Tribunal came to the conclusion that scientific and technical meanings would not advance the case of the appellants if the same runs counter to how the product is understood in popular parlance. 31. "In Naturalle Health Products (P) Ltd.v.CCE, two appeals were under consideration. One was with respect to Vicks Vapo Rub and Vicks Cough Drops while the other was with respect to Sloan's Balm and Sloan's Rub. It was observed that when there is no definition of any kind in the relevant taxing statute, the articles enumerated in the tariff schedules must be construed as far as possible in their ordinary or popular sense, that is, how the common man and persons dealing with it understand it. The Court held that in both the cases the customers, the practitioners in Ayurvedic medicine, the dealers and the licensing officials treated the products in question as Ayurvedic medicines and not as Allopathic medicines, which gave an indication that they were exclusively Ayurvedic medicines or that they were used in the Ayurvedic system of medicine, though they were patented medicines. Consequently, it was held that the said products had to be classified under the Chapter dealing with medicaments. 32. Consequently, it was held that the said products had to be classified under the Chapter dealing with medicaments. 32. B.P.L. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. CCE, was a case in which product "Selsun Shampoo" was under consideration for the purpose of classification under the Tariff Act. According to the manufacturers this shampoo was a medicated shampoo meant to treat dandruff which is a disease of the hair. This Court held that having regard to the preparation, label, literature, character, common and commercial parlance, the product was liable to be classified as a medicament. It was not an ordinary shampoo which could be of common use by common people. The shampoo was meant to cure a particular disease of hair and after the cure it was not meant to be used in the ordinary course. 33.Therefore, what flows from a reading of the afore-mentioned decisions is that in the absence of a statutory definition in precise terms; words, entries and items in taxing statutes must be construed in terms of their commercial or trade understanding, or according to their popular meaning. In other words they have to be constructed in the sense that the people conversant with the subject-matter of the statute, would attribute to it. Resort to rigid interpretation in terms of scientific and technical meanings should be avoided in such circumstances. This, however, is by no means an absolute rule. When the legislature has expressed a contrary intention, such as by providing a statutory definition of the particular entry, word or item in specific, scientific or technical terms, then, interpretation ought to be in accordance with the scientific and technical meaning and not according to common parlance understanding." 17- In the case of Commissioner of Central Excise Versus Wockhardt Life Sciences Limited, 2012(5) SCC 585 (Paragraph Nos.33,34,35,36,37, 38 and 39), Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- "33. There is no fixed test for classification of a taxable commodity. This is probably the reason why the `common parlance test' or the `commercial usage test' are the most common [see A. Nagaraju Bors. v. State of A.P., 1994 Supp (3) SCC 122]. Whether a particular article will fall within a particular Tariff heading or not has to be decided on the basis of the tangible material or evidence to determine how such an article is understood in `common parlance' or in `commercial world' or in `trade circle' or in its popular sense meaning. v. State of A.P., 1994 Supp (3) SCC 122]. Whether a particular article will fall within a particular Tariff heading or not has to be decided on the basis of the tangible material or evidence to determine how such an article is understood in `common parlance' or in `commercial world' or in `trade circle' or in its popular sense meaning. It is they who are concerned with it and it is the sense in which they understand it that constitutes the definitive index of the legislative intention, when the statute was enacted [see Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan," 34.One of the essential factors for determining whether a product falls within Chapter 30 or not is whether the product is understood as a pharmaceutical product in common parlance [see CCE v. Shree Baidyanath Ayurved, (2009) 12 SCC 413 ; Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi v. Ishaan Research Lab (P) Ltd. (2008) 13 SCC 349 ]. Further, the quantity of medicament used in a particular product will also not be a relevant factor for, normally, the extent of use of medicinal ingredients is very low because a larger use may be harmful for the human body. [Puma Ayurvedic Herbal (P) Ltd. v. CEE, Nagpur (2006) 3 SCC 266 ; State of Goa v. Colfoax Laboratories (2004) 9 SCC 83 ; B.P.L Pharmaceuticals v. CCE, 1995 Supp (3) SCC1] : 35. However, there cannot be a static parameter for the correct classification of a commodity. This Court in the case of Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 3 SCC 284 , has culled out this principle in the following words: "13. To sum up the true position, the process of manufacture of a product and the end use to which it is put, cannot necessarily be determinative of the classification of that product under a fiscal schedule like the Central Excise Tariff. What is more important is whether the broad description of the article fits in with the expression used in the Tariff..." 36. Moreover, the functional utility and predominant or primary usage of the commodity which is being classified must be taken into account, apart from the understanding in common parlance [see O.K. Play (India) Ltd. v. CCE, (2005) 2 SCC 460 ; Alpine Industries v. CEE, New Delhi (1995) Supp. Moreover, the functional utility and predominant or primary usage of the commodity which is being classified must be taken into account, apart from the understanding in common parlance [see O.K. Play (India) Ltd. v. CCE, (2005) 2 SCC 460 ; Alpine Industries v. CEE, New Delhi (1995) Supp. (3) SCC 1; Sujanil Chemo Industries v. CEE & Customs (2005) 4 SCC 189 ; ICPA Health Products (P) Ltd (supra) v. CEE (2004) 4 SCC 481 ; Puma Ayurvedic Herbal (Supra); Ishaan Research Lab (P) Ltd.(Supra) ; CCE v. Uni Products India Ltd., (2009) 9 SCC 295 ]. 37. A commodity cannot be classified in a residuary entry, in the presence of a specific entry, even if such specific entry requires the product to be understood in the technical sense [see Akbar Badrudin v. Collector of Customs, (1990) 2 SCC 203 ; Commissioner of Customs v. G.C. Jain, (2011) 12 SCC 713 ]. A residuary entry can be taken refuge of only in the absence of a specific entry; that is to say, the latter will always prevail over the former [see CCE v. Jayant Oil Mills, (1989) 3 SCC 343 ; HPL Chemicals v. CCE, (2006) 5 SCC 208 ; Western India Plywoods v. Collector of Customs, (2005) 12 SCC 731; CCE v. Carrier Aircon, (2006) 5 SCC 596 ]. 38. In CCE v. Carrier Aircon, (2006) 5 SCC 596 , this Court held: "14... There are a number of factors which have to be taken into consideration for determining the classification of a product. For the purposes of classification, the relevant factors inter alia are statutory fiscal entry, the basic character, function and use of the goods. When a commodity falls within a tariff entry by virtue of the purpose for which it is put to (sic. produced), the end use to which the product is put to, cannot determine the classification of that product." 39. In our view, as we have already stated, the combined factor that requires to be taken note of for the purpose of the classification of the goods are the composition, the product literature, the label, the character of the product and the user to which the product is put. However, the miniscule quantity of the prophylactic ingredient is not a relevant factor. However, the miniscule quantity of the prophylactic ingredient is not a relevant factor. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that this is used by the surgeons for the purpose of cleaning or degerming their hands and scrubbing the surface of the skin of the patient before that portion is operated upon. The purpose is to prevent the infection or disease. Therefore, the product in question can be safely classified as a "medicament" which would fall under chapter sub-heading 3003 which is a specific entry and not under chapter sub-heading 3402.90 which is a residuary entry." 18- In the case of Commissioner of Trade Tax, U.P. v. Cartos International and others 2011 (6) SCC 705 , Hon'ble Supreme Court held that classification of commodity cannot be made on its scientific and technical meaning. It is only common parlance meaning of the term which should be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the tax liability. Application of common parlance test for interpretation of a commodity in Taxing Statute has always been recognized by Hon'ble Supreme Court as aforenoted. Reference in this regard may also be had to the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise v. Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. 2009(12) SCC 419 , B.O.C. India Ltd v. State of Jharkhand 2009 (15) SCC 590 (Pararaph-24), Godrej Industries Ltd. v. CCE 2008 (8) SCC-600, Ponds India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Trade Tax 2008(8) SCC 369 , U.P. State Agro Industrial Corporation Ltd. v. Kisan Upbhokta Parishad, 2007 (13) SCC 246 , Trutuf Safety Coal Industries CST 2007 (8) SCC 242 (paragraph 13), Craft Interiors (P) Ltd. v. CCE 2006(12) SCC 250 (paragraph 18 and 20 ), Parley Biscuits Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 2005 (9) SCC 669 , Associated Cement Company Ltd. v. State of M.P. 2004 (9) SCC 72, Alpine Industries v. CCE 2003(3) SCC 111 , S. Samuel MD, Harrisons Malyalam v. Union of India 2004(1) 256 (Paragraph 13), Union Of India v. Harjeet Singh Sandhu 2001(5) SCC 593 , Collector of Custom and Central Excise v. Surendra Cotton Oil Mill Company 2001(1) SCC 578 , Pappu Sweets and Biscuits V. Commissioner of Trade Tax, U.P., 1998 (7) SCC 228 , Metagraphs (P) Ltd. v.CCE 1997(1) SCC 262 , Purewal Associate Ltd. v. CCE, 1996(10) SCC 752 , Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. CCE, 1994(6) SCC 610 , Novapan India Ltd. v. CCE 1994 (Suppl.)(3) SCC 606, CCE v. Ballarpur Industries Ltd. , 1989 (4) SCC 566 , CCE Vs. Krishna Carbon Paper Company, 1989 (1) SCC 150 , Filterco v. CST, 1986(2) SCC 103 , Chiranjeet Lal Upendra v. State of Assam, 1985(Suppl.) SCC 392, Indo International Industries v. CST, 1981 (2) SCC 528 (Paragraphs 4 and 5 ), Union of India v. Gujrat Woolen Felt Mills, 1977 (2) SCC 870 , State of U.P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., 1977 (2) SCC 724 , Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India, 1976(2) SCC 241 , Ganesh Trading Company v. State of Haryana, 1974(3) SCC 620 and in CST v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh and Ram Avtar Budhai Prasad v. Assistant STO, AIR 1961 SC 1325 . 19- In view of the above noted discussions and the principles laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the view that Gambier is not Kattha. It is not a specified item in the Schedule II. Gambier is an unclassified item. The impugned order of the Tribunal does not suffer from any infirmity. The revision lacks merit and, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 20- The question of law No.(i) is answered in affirmative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The question of law No.(ii) is answered in negative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. 21- In result both the revisions fail and are hereby dismissed. ——————