JUDGMENT RAGHUBIR DASH, J. 1. This appeal is against the order of remand dated 16.2.2002 passed by the learned District Judge, Keonjhar in T.A. No. 20 of 1998 arising out of judgment and decree dated 28.3.1998 and 7.4.1998, respectively, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Champua in T.S. No. 28 of 1996. 2. It is unnecessary to state the pleadings of the parties in the suit. The present appellants are the L.Rs. of the original plaintiff who filed the suit for declaration of right, title and interest and confirmation of possession over the suit schedule ‘A’ land appertaining to Plot No. 86/835 under Khata No. 60 corresponding to Sabik Plot No. 399/1/911 under Sabik Khata No. 52/41 of Mouza Joda as well as suit schedule ‘B’ land in Hal Khata No. 60, Plot No. 88 corresponding to Sabik Khata No. 19, Plot No. 115 of the same mouza, with further relief that in case of dispossession during pendency of the suit, recovery of possession should be made through the process of court. Respondent No.1 who is defendant No.3 in the suit contested the case and others were set ex parte. Learned trial court framed issues, recorded evidence adduced by the contesting parties and assessing the evidence placed before it decreed the suit. Respondent No.1 herein preferred the First Appeal before the learned District Judge. During pendency of the First Appeal a petition under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC was filed by the appellant in the First Appeal which was allowed by the learned lower appellate court vide order dated 4.2.2002. Certified copy of some public documents were marked as Exts. L, M and N. On the same date argument was heard and on 16.2.2002 the impugned judgment/ order of remand was passed. Learned appellate court has remanded the suit for disposal afresh, mostly on the ground that the identity of the suit land being under challenge the dispute would have been resolved by demarcation of the suit land by Civil Court Amin Commissioner, and the learned trial court ought to have framed an issue as to whether the Sabik and Hal Plot numbers given in the plaint schedule ‘A’ land correlates with each other. For that reason the learned lower appellate court while remanding the suit for fresh disposal has directed the learned trial court to frame a specific issue as to whether suit ‘A’ schedule land correlates to the Sabik and Hal plot numbers given in plaint ‘A’ schedule with further direction to take additional evidence on that issue. It is also observed by the learned appellate court that either of the party may apply to the trial court for demarcation/identification of the suit ‘A’ schedule land. 3. This order of remand is under challenge in this appeal on the following grounds: (i) The procedure prescribed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC have not been complied with while allowing the additional evidence to be taken in the First Appeal. Allowing defendant No.3 to file fresh evidence which was beyond the pleadings amounts to filling the lacunae in D.3’s evidence. (ii) The order of remand amounts to negating the findings of the learned trial court without setting aside these findings and it gives further opportunity to the defendants to make out a new case and giving evidence on such new case. 4. Coming to the first ground, it may be stated at the outset that production of additional evidence in appellate court shall have to be in accordance with the provisions contained in Order 41 Rule 27 CPC which runs as follows: “27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court – (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court, But if – (a) The Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted. (aa) The party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligences, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed. (b) The Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (b) The Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.” Order dated 4.2.2002 passed by the learned lower appellate court allowing D.3’s petition under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC reflects that the learned appellate court has not referred the reason for the admission of the additional evidence. In Pushpa Bai Stalin vs. Dhaya Poomkamazh, AIR 2003 Madras 54 which is cited by the learned counsel for the appellants it is observed that it is not open to any of the parties at the stage of appeal to make fresh allegations of facts and call upon other side to admit or deny the same. It is further observed that additional evidence cannot be permitted in appellate stage in order to enable one of parties to remove certain lacuna in presenting their case. The true test, it is observed, that is to be applied in dealing with the application of additional evidence is whether the appellate court is able to pronounce the judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be admitted. The order dated 4.2.2002 passed by the learned lower appellate court while admitting the additional evidence does not reflect as to whether the learned trial court had refused to admit the additional evidence which ought to have been admitted or, the party seeking to produce additional evidence had exercised due diligence but could not produce the additional evidence before the learned trial court. Nor did the learned lower appellate court record its satisfaction that the documents marked Exts. L, M and N were necessary to enable it to pronounce judgment or, for any other substantial cause it considered the documents necessary to be exhibited. Under such circumstances, allowing the documents marked Exts. L, M and N as additional evidence on the day the argument in the appeal was heard without giving opportunity to the plaintiff to rebut the additional evidence is not sustainable in the eye of law. 5. Under such circumstances, allowing the documents marked Exts. L, M and N as additional evidence on the day the argument in the appeal was heard without giving opportunity to the plaintiff to rebut the additional evidence is not sustainable in the eye of law. 5. Now, coming to the second ground, remand of a case by appellate court is contemplated under Order 41 Rules 23 and 23-A of CPC. Rule 23 operates only when one of the preliminary issues has been tried by the court of first instance and has disposed of the suit upon such preliminary issue. In the case on hand, the learned trial court has not disposed of the suit upon a preliminary point. Therefore, the impugned order of remand is not covered under Order 41 Rule 23 CPC. Rule 23-A comes to operate where the court of first instance has disposed of the case otherwise than on a preliminary point. In such a case, if the appellate court reverses the decree and considers that a retrial is necessary it shall remand the case to the court of first instance. However, resort to Rule 23-A should not be taken if Order 41 Rule 25 is considered adequate to meet the exigency. Rule 25 lays down that where the court of first instance has omitted to frame or try any issue, or to determine any question of fact, which appears to the Appellate Court essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits, the Appellate Court may frame issues, and refer the same for trial to the Court of first instance with a direction to take additional evidence as required. It is well settled that Rule 23-A is to be exercised sparingly. Because, public policy demands that a litigation should be concluded finally as far as possible. Under Rule 23-A, the appellate court cannot make order of remand without coming to a conclusion that the decision of the trial court is wrong and that it is necessary to reverse or set aside the judgment and decree. This can be done only after consideration of the evidence on record and upon arriving at a conclusion that the finding recorded by the trial court cannot be supported on evidence on record. This can be done only after consideration of the evidence on record and upon arriving at a conclusion that the finding recorded by the trial court cannot be supported on evidence on record. In the case on hand, the learned appellate court has not considered the evidence on record to arrive at a conclusion that the decision of the learned trial court on different issues was wrong and it is necessary to reverse or set aside the judgment and decree. Therefore, the order of open remand is not coming within the scope of Order 41 Rule 23-A CPC. Neither, does it come within the purview of Order 41 Rule 25 CPC. However, in the facts and circumstances under which the impugned order of remand has been passed, it would have been appropriate on the part of the learned lower appellate court to pass an order in consonance with the provisions contained in Rule 25. As already stated, the learned lower appellate court has remanded the case merely on the ground that the real dispute between the parties being over the identity of the ‘A’ schedule land, a specific issue on that score should have been framed by the learned trial court so as to give the parties opportunity to adduce evidence. But that purpose could have been achieved if the learned lower appellate court had framed the issue and referred the same for trial to the trial court with direction to take the additional evidence required and to return the evidence to the appellate court together with the trial court’s findings on the issue within such time as fixed by the appellate court or extended by it from time to time. 6. Thus, it is found that the impugned order does not come within the purview of Order 41 Rule 23 or Rule 23-A or Rule 25 of CPC. In the fitness of things, the learned lower appellate court could have dealt with the matter in terms of Order 41 Rule 25 CPC. Therefore, the impugned judgment/order is liable to be set aside. Also the order dated 4.2.2002 admitting additional evidence is liable to be set aside. The matter be sent back to the learned lower appellate court to further proceed with the First Appeal. Therefore, the impugned judgment/order is liable to be set aside. Also the order dated 4.2.2002 admitting additional evidence is liable to be set aside. The matter be sent back to the learned lower appellate court to further proceed with the First Appeal. If the learned appellate court forms an opinion that the trial court has omitted to frame or try any issue which appears to the appellate court essential to the right decision of the suit on its merit then it may follow the procedure laid down under Order 41 Rule 25 CPC. It is also open to the learned appellate court to remand the case under Order 41 Rule 23-A CPC. If neither of the recourse is considered to be necessary, then it may dispose of the appeal on merit. So far as production of additional evidence is concerned, the learned lower appellate court shall deal with D.3’s application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC afresh in accordance with the provisions contained therein. However, if the learned lower appellate court decides to proceed under Order 41 Rule 23-A or Rule 25 CPC then D.3 may be directed to approach the trial court to prove the documents in question by adducing additional evidence. 7. With these observations the Misc. Appeal is disposed of. The impugned judgment so also the order dated 4.2.2002 passed in T.A. No. 20 of 1998 is set aside. Send back the L.C.R. to the learned lower Appellate Court.