Judgment : 1. Arulmighu Pachaivazhi Amman Thirukoil, Mundiampakkam represented by its Nirvaki Umapathy has brought these two second appeals challenging the common judgment and decree dated 29.11.2006 passed in A.S.Nos.53 and 54 of 2005, wherein the learned Principal District Judge, Villupuram has dismissed the appeals, confirming the judgments and decrees dated 15.12.2003 passed in O.S.Nos.81 of 2011 and 178 of 1997 respectively by the learned Additional District Munsif, Villupuram, making it clear that the remedy open to the appellant herein is to move the lower Court itself and no appeal is maintainable, on the basis of the amended provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure against a consent decree under Section 96(3) of the Code, against the order of the Court recording the compromise or refusing to record a compromise in view of the deletion of clause (m) Rule 1 Order 43 of the Code. The first appellate Court also further held that a consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the Court which passed the consent decree by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code. 2. Mr. O.R. Abul Kalaam, learned counsel for the appellant, heavily criticising the approach adopted by both the Courts below in recording the compromise against the consent of the appellant/plaintiff, emphatically contended before this Court that when the appellant never made any application prior to passing of the compromise decree praying the trial Court to make note of the endorsement, the first respondent/first defendant and his men procured the endorsement and compelled the appellant to sign the papers, the trial Court also failed to make an enquiry as to whether the appellant signed the endorsement knowing fully well of its implication and consequences, on this basis, the trial Court ought not to have decreed the suit. Adding further, he has stated that the first appellate Court, after taking note of the grievance made by the appellant, ought to have remanded the matter to the trial Court with a direction to the trial Court to record the evidence of both sides and pass a decree on merits. As the first appellate Court has miserably overlooked this vital issue, the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below, he pleaded, are required to be set aside. As the first appellate Court has miserably overlooked this vital issue, the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below, he pleaded, are required to be set aside. Adding further, he has stated that now in view of the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below, the appellant is not even able to maintain any independent suit by virtue of Rule 3A of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which clearly says that no suit shall lie to set aside the decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree was passed was not lawful. In support of his submissions, he has also heavily relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Banwari Lal v. Smt. Chando Devi (through L.R.) and another reported in AIR 1993 SC 1139 , for the proposition that a party, who is aggrieved by the compromise decree, can maintain an appeal by questioning the validity of the compromise, in view of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code. On this basis, restating the inability of the appellant in filing a fresh suit, in view of a specific bar under Rule 3A of Order 23 of the Code, sought for interference with the impugned judgments. He has also requested this Court to frame the substantial question of law as to whether it is open to the appellant to test the decree passed in the suit after recording the compromise, on the ground that the compromise should not have been recorded, since a fraud was played upon the appellant, despite the provision under Section 96(3) of the Civil Procedure Code. 3. In reply, Mr. A.K. Kumarasamy, learned counsel for the first respondent/first defendant, vehemently opposing the above request to admit the second appeals, urged this Court to dismiss the same on the ground that the second appeals which are directed against a consent decree are not legally maintainable under the amended provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Adding further, he has stated that when no appeal is maintainable against the consent decree under Section 96(3) of the Code, certainly no appeal is maintainable against an order recording the compromise or refusing to record a compromise in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 of Order 43 of the Code. Adding further, he has stated that when no appeal is maintainable against the consent decree under Section 96(3) of the Code, certainly no appeal is maintainable against an order recording the compromise or refusing to record a compromise in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 of Order 43 of the Code. When the consent decree is operating as an estoppel and is valid and moreover binding unless it is set aside by the Court which passed the consent decree by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code, the present second appeals, he pleaded, are not legally maintainable. Drawing the attention of this Court to the reasoning given by the first appellate court as mentioned in paragraph-19 of the impugned judgment, the learned counsel further stated that when the appellant filed the suits for permanent injunction against the first respondent on the ground that the first respondent has put up construction of a temple, during the pendency of the suits, however, when the suits were taken up for trial, both parties agreed not to put up any more construction and equally further agreed not to trespass into either of the temples. Since both the temples maintained by the appellant and the first respondent are situated in the poramboke land, the trial Court, after recording the written compromise signed by the parties and also the counsel on record for the parties, rightly recorded the compromise. As against that, the appellant preferred appeals. The first appellate Court also, by virtue of the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 read with Section 96(3) of the Code, rightly pointed out that the approach adopted by the appellant was not legally sustainable, as the remedy if at all lies only before the trial Court. As the appellant brought the appeals, the first appellate Court, after considering the validity of the written consent given by both the parties and also keeping in view the agreement reached between them that they would not trespass into either of the temples and also would not alienate the property, finding no more infirmity in the consent decree passed by the trial Court, dismissed the appeals. As against that, no appeal shall lie, he pleaded. 4. As against that, no appeal shall lie, he pleaded. 4. This Court also, after seeing the prayer made by the appellant in the suits and subsequently both the parties had reached a compromise, is of the considered view that the reasoning and the conclusions reached by the first appellate Court firmly holding that no independent suit can be filed for setting aside the compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3 of Order 23 and the consent decree operates as an estoppel, since it is valid and binding upon the parties, cannot be found fault with, for the reason that unless it is set aside by the Court which passed the consent decree on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code, no appeal, as rightly held by the first appellate Court, is maintainable against the order of the Court recording the compromise. No doubt, although the learned counsel for the appellant, relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Banwari Lal's case (supra), stated before this Court that the present second appeals are maintainable, but the facts of the case in the second appeals brought before this Court are completely and totally different from the one assessed and adjudged by the Apex Court in Banwari Lal's case. 5. As highlighted above, the suit was filed in O.S.No.178 of 1997 by Arulmighu Pachaivazhiamman Koil, Mundiampakkam represented by its hereditary poojari one Umapathy against Arulmighu Valliamman Koil represented by its Manager one Venkatesa Pillai. Both the temples are situated in one and the same place at Mundiampakkam village. When both the temples are facing east and there is 13 feet open space in between the two temples, they are bounded on the east by a compound wall. Therefore, when an arrangement was made by the first respondent to construct a Ramar temple in the 13 feet space, which is marked as ''C'' in the plaint of the said suit, that construction was considered as a hindrance to the devotees visiting the Arulmighu Pachaivazhiamman Koil to go round the appellant's temple. Therefore, the suit for injunction was filed. Therefore, when an arrangement was made by the first respondent to construct a Ramar temple in the 13 feet space, which is marked as ''C'' in the plaint of the said suit, that construction was considered as a hindrance to the devotees visiting the Arulmighu Pachaivazhiamman Koil to go round the appellant's temple. Therefore, the suit for injunction was filed. Subsequently, during the pendency of the suit, in spite of the injunction order not to put up any construction in the ''C'' portion on the 13 feet space, the first respondent has managed to put up a Ramar temple with Gopuram and also decoration arch and thereby caused interference. In the meanwhile, it is also pertinent to mention that the same appellant had also filed another suit in O.S.No.81 of 2001 seeking a decree for permanent injunction against the same first respondent. The trial Court, accepting the compromise reached between the parties as per the endorsement made by both parties in the compromise agreement, decreed the suit in O.S.No.178 of 1997 as follows:- ''(i) that the plaintiff and defendant's temple shall be maintained and managed by the respective hereditary pusaries from their own income without any interference or hindrance by the pusaries of the other temple. (ii) that any permanent and temporary construction or demolition shall be made in such a manner that it shall not interfere with the construction and worshipping of the other temple. (iii) that the plaintiff and defendant shall not make any constructions or demolition in the 13 feet space between both the temples.'' 6. It is also more pertinent to mention something about the other suit in O.S.No.81 of 2001. In view of the earlier compromise reached between the parties in the suit O.S.No.178 of 1997, the trial Court, during the cross examination of both the appellant and the first respondent, accepting the admission made by them that the parties to the suit have entered into an amicable compromise not to interfere with the Muniswarar idols which was in issue, keeping in mind that the first respondent had deposed that he had no objection in granting the decree in favour of the appellant, passed the decree holding that neither the appellant nor the first respondent has got any right to remove or demolish the said idols with regard to the maintenance of peace in the vicinity. It has further concluded that they can only act for the better worshipping of the said idols. On this basis, the suit was decreed without any costs. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant has filed the appeals in A.S.Nos.53 and 54 of 2005 taking a sole ground that when the suits were heard by the trial Court, all of a sudden, outside the Court room, in the absence of the Presiding Officer, the first respondent and his men procured the endorsement and thereupon compelled the appellant to sign the compromise deed. The appellant also, out of compulsion, signed not knowing the contents therein. It was the further case of the appellant that the first appellate Court ought to have entertained the appeals. But the reasoning and the foundation made by the appellant in assailing the judgment and the decree passed by the first appellate court, in my considered opinion, is opposed to the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Even if it is presumed that the appellant was compelled to put his signature outside the Court hall, it is not known why the appellant did not raise his voice before the trial Court while recording the compromise. Atleast after the compromise decree was passed, it is not known why the appellant has not moved any application before the same Court mentioning the so called fraud played upon him. As a matter of fact, when the first respondent is said to have put up construction within 13 feet lying between both the appellant and the first respondent temples, both the parties agreed unanimously that they would not put up any more construction causing any hindrance to either of the temples. It was also further agreed that it was not necessary to remove the construction put up by the first respondent. Therefore, this Court is not able to see any infirmity or error in the approach adopted by both the Courts below. In view of that, this Court, finding no substantial question of law involved in the second appeals, is not inclined to interfere with the concurrent findings of both the Courts below. Accordingly, the second appeals fail and they are dismissed. Consequently, M.P.Nos.1 of 2013 and 1 of 2014 are also dismissed. No costs.