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2014 DIGILAW 3182 (MAD)

V. Mani v. M. M. Ramasamy

2014-09-09

PUSHPA SATHYANARAYANA

body2014
Judgment : 1. Defendants, who suffered a decree in a suit for specific performance, have projected this instant appeal against the judgment and decree dated 24.12.2008 passed by the Additional District Judge, Fast Tract Court No. IV, Coimbatore at Tiruppur in O.S. No. 405 of 2006. 2. The necessary summation of the case of respondent / plaintiff are as follows: 2.1 The suit properties are landed properties in Masagoundan Chettipalayam Village, Avinashi Taluk, Coimbatore District. Defendants 1 and 2 are husband and wife and defendants 3 and 4 are their daughter and son respectively. The suit properties originally belonged to the defendants. According to the plaintiff, the defendants 1 and 2 entered into an agreement of sale on 12.11.2005 with him agreeing to convey an extent of 4.74= Acres. As per the sale agreement, the properties were agreed to be purchased at a price of Rs. 1,90,000/-per Acre which means the total consideration comes to Rs. 9,01,550/-and an advance of Rs. 2 Lakhs was paid. The period agreed for the performance of sale was three months. According to the plaintiff, he has been ready and willing to perform his part of contract keeping the balance of the sale price ready throughout. But, however, the defendants have been postponing the execution of sale. Hence, the plaintiff issued a legal notice on 04.02.2006 calling upon the defendants 1 and 2 to execute the sale deed with regard to the suit properties within the period stipulated in the agreement on receipt of notice. Nevertheless, the defendants evaded the service of notice and the same was returned as 'unclaimed'. In view of the conduct of the defendants, the plaintiff had to file the suit for specific performance. 2.2. It is further contended by the plaintiff that on coming to know that the plaintiff had issued the legal notice, the defendants 1 and 2, on 07.02.2006, had executed a settlement deed in favour of the defendants 3 and 4, who are their children. The said fact was known to the plaintiff on applying copy of the encumbrance certificate. As the settlement deed executed by the defendants 1 and 2 is to circumvent the interest of the plaintiff under the sale agreement, according to him, the said settlement is not binding on him. The said fact was known to the plaintiff on applying copy of the encumbrance certificate. As the settlement deed executed by the defendants 1 and 2 is to circumvent the interest of the plaintiff under the sale agreement, according to him, the said settlement is not binding on him. As the defendants further attempted to encumber and alienate the plaintiff's properties, he plaintiff sought for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from alienating or encumbering the suit properties. 3. Resisting the suit, the first defendant filed a written statement which was adopted by the other defendants, wherein the execution of the agreement dated 12.11.2005 is admitted. The contents of the agreement are also not disputed. According to the defendants, the plaintiff did not come forward to pay the balance of amount and get the sale executed. The defendants contended that the time was the essence of the contract and the delay in filing the suit was only to gain time to mobilize funds for paying the the sale consideration to the defendants. The defendants further contended that the plaintiff has come forward with a suit in view of the escalation of the price of the suit properties. The plaintiff having failed to deposit the balance of the sale consideration at the time of filing of the suit for specific performance of the contract, the defendants alleged that there is no bona fide in his claim. Hence, prayed for dismissal of the suit. 4. Before the trial Court, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 besides examining one Marudhachalam as P.W. 2 and marked Exs. A.1 to A.6. To nullify the evidence of the plaintiff, the first defendant examined himself as D.W.1 besides examining one Ponnusamy as D.W.2 but no document was marked. 5. The trial Court, after analysing the oral and documentary evidence available on record, decreed the suit directing the defendants 1 to 4 to receive the balance of sale consideration and execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and directed delivery of vacant possession of the properties within one month and granted a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from in any manner alienating or encumbering the suit property. Aggrieved by the same, the above appeal is filed by the defendants. 6. Aggrieved by the same, the above appeal is filed by the defendants. 6. The points that arises for determination in this appeal are:- (i) Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract as per Ex. A.1 dated 12.11.2005?; (ii) Whether the time is essence of contract?; and (iii) Whether the judgment of the trial Court granting decree in favour of the plaintiff is sustainable? 7. From the materials available on record, it is seen that the sale agreement marked as Ex. A.1 was executed on 12.11.2005 as per which defendants 1 and 2 had agreed to sell the suit properties at the rate of Rs. 1,90,000/-per Acre and paid a sum of Rs. 2 Lakhs as advance. The agreement stipulated a time frame of three months for execution of the sale deed. Therefore, the plaintiff was to purchase the stamp papers and pay the balance of sale consideration to the defendants 1 and 2 and get the sale registered in his name at his expenses. The agreement Ex. A.1 further stipulated that if the plaintiff was not willing to pay the balance of sale consideration when the defendants were ready to perform their part of contract, the advance paid will be forfeited by the defendants. Conversely, if the plaintiff was willing to perform his part of the contract and defendants 1 and 2 defaulted in executing the sale deed and delivering possession, it is open to the plaintiff to get the same executed through Court. The basis of the claim of the plaintiff is the said agreement in Ex. A.1 dated 12.11.2005. 8. Learned counsel who appeared for the appellants / defendants pointed out that the plaintiff was (a) to purchase the stamp papers; (b) to pay the balance of sale consideration to the defendants 1 and 2; and (c) to get the sale executed at his own expenses. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the plaintiff had not performed not even one of the above conditions as per Ex. A.1 and hence, he is not entitled to the relief of specific performance. 9. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the plaintiff had not performed not even one of the above conditions as per Ex. A.1 and hence, he is not entitled to the relief of specific performance. 9. Continuing further, learned counsel for the appellants contended that mere existence of a valid agreement of sale is no reason for the Court to grant an equitable relief of specific performance and the continuous readiness and willingness on the part of respondent / plaintiff is a condition precedent to the grant of relief and moreover, Court of law has to look into the conduct of the respondent / plaintiff before and subsequent to the filing of the suit besides taking note of the other surrounding circumstances of the case. He contended that though in paragraph 5 of the plaint it was alleged that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement by keeping the balance of sale price ready, the same was not mentioned in the Ex. A.2 notice. 10. Attacking the said contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, learned counsel for the respondent / plaintiff, relying on Ex. A.2 notice dated 04.02.2006, which specifically mentions that the plaintiff was ready to perform his part of the contract and he was having the balance of sale price ready with him, submitted that the said Ex. A.2 notice sent by the plaintiff was not served on the defendants and it was returned to him with an endorsement ‘not claimed returned’. He also submitted that in the meanwhile, defendants 1 and 2 had settled the suit properties in favour of defendants 3 and 4 on 07.02.2006. According to the learned counsel, the said settlement deed is only sham and nominal to circumvent the sale to be executed in favour of the plaintiff. 11. From a perusal of Ex. A.2 notice dated 04.02.2006, it can be seen that the plaintiff was said to be ready to perform his part of the agreement and he was keeping the balance sale price ready. Therefore, the contention of the appellants is not correct and the plaintiff had been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 12. A.2 notice dated 04.02.2006, it can be seen that the plaintiff was said to be ready to perform his part of the agreement and he was keeping the balance sale price ready. Therefore, the contention of the appellants is not correct and the plaintiff had been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 12. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that there was a delay in filing the suit for which there was no explanation from the side of the plaintiff. He further contended that the readiness and willingness should be continuous and the plaintiff should have sufficient money throughout till the execution of the sale deed. According to him, the plaintiff never had money on the date of the agreement and on subsequent dates. 13. To assail the said contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, learned counsel for the respondent / plaintiff had produced the bank statement Ex. A.5 to show that the plaintiff was ready throughout for performing his part of agreement. 14. A scrutiny of Ex. A.5 bank statement reveals that on the date of execution of the sale agreement, the plaintiff seemed to have had Rs.2,53,630/-in his account held in Indian Overseas Bank, Mahalinganagar, Coimbatore and from thereon, the plaintiff seemed to have had sufficient funds till he filed the suit. The bank statement also would go to show that on the date of filing of the suit, viz., 23.8.2006, the plaintiff had Rs. 30 Lakhs to his credit whereas the balance of sale consideration is only Rs.7,02,000/. Therefore, the question that the plaintiff was not ready and willing as he had no sufficient funds to complete the sale, is incorrect. 15. Indisputably, Ex. A.1 agreement is dated 12.11.2005 and the plaintiff had issued notice on 04.02.2006 under Ex. A.2 and the suit was filed on 23.8.2006. In the meanwhile, sensing the suit notice Ex. A.2, the defendants 1 and 2 have executed a settlement deed in favour of their children defendants 3 and 4 on 07.02.2006. It is pertinent to mention here that though the settlement deed is not marked as Exhibit, it is not disputed by the defendants / appellants. 16. In the meanwhile, sensing the suit notice Ex. A.2, the defendants 1 and 2 have executed a settlement deed in favour of their children defendants 3 and 4 on 07.02.2006. It is pertinent to mention here that though the settlement deed is not marked as Exhibit, it is not disputed by the defendants / appellants. 16. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants relied on the decision of this Court in Vasantha and others v. M. Senguttuvan 1998 (1) CTC 186 wherein in paragraph 15, it is laid down as follows:- "Even if for a single day, plaintiff-agreement holder is not ready to take the sale deed, the equitable remedy should not be granted. Readiness and willingness must be there continuously from the date of agreement upto the date of hearing. In this case, the concurrent finding is that the appellant was not ready to take the sale deed and that is proved by Ex. A-3.” Learned counsel also referred to paragraph 18 of the judgment wherein this Court regarding willingness, has held as under:- “.... 'Willingness” must be to implement the contract in accordance with the terms within the stipulated period or within a reasonable time thereafter. If he had the necessary funds, he has to explain why he did not offer or tender the balance sale consideration and got the sale deed. That was not the conduct of the appellant. In spite of putting up a construction, he was not prepared to take a sale deed. It shows the conduct of the appellant, namely, that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract....” 17. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants also brought to the notice of this Court the decision in N.P. Thirugnanam (dead) by LRs. vs. Dr.R. Jagan Mohan Rao and others [ (1995) 5 SCC 115 ] wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:- “It is settled law that remedy for specific performance is an equitable remedy and is in the discreation of the court, which discretion requires to be exercised according to settled principles of law and not arbitrarily as adumbrated under S. 20 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 (for short, the Act). Under S. 20, the court is not bound to grant the relief just because there was valid agreement of sale. Under S. 20, the court is not bound to grant the relief just because there was valid agreement of sale. Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than those terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances....” 18. Learned counsel for the appellants also seeks in aid of the decision of this Court in Bama vs. Rukiyal Bivi [ 2004 (1) CTC 109 ] and more particularly, placed reliance in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment which read as follows:- “11. The doctrine of 'readiness and willingness to perform' means, the word 'readiness' implies that the plaintiff has money at his disposal to pay the sale consideration and the word 'willingness' implies that he is inclined to do that was required. 12. Under Section 102 of the Indian Evidence Act, the burden of proof rests on the party, who would fail, if no evidence at all were given on either side.” 19. In the instant case, as stated in the above decisions, the plaintiff had been ready and willing to perform his part of contract. There is no evidence on the side of the defendants to show that the plaintiff has not come to Court with clean hands and that he has not been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 20. Further, from a perusal of Ex. A.5, Bank statement, it is clear that the plaintiff had sufficient amount to satisfy payment of balance of sale consideration. The plaintiff also had expressed his willingness by issuing a notice much before the time stipulated under Ex. A.1. 20. Further, from a perusal of Ex. A.5, Bank statement, it is clear that the plaintiff had sufficient amount to satisfy payment of balance of sale consideration. The plaintiff also had expressed his willingness by issuing a notice much before the time stipulated under Ex. A.1. On the contrary, it is the defendants 1 and 2 who had executed the settlement deed in favour of their children to avoid performance of their part of agreement. When it is clearly demonstrated by the plaintiff that the available sum in deposit in his account was adequate to satisfy or to meet the sale price and having issued the notice under Ex. A.2, I have no hesitation to hold that the plaintiff has satisfied the requirement for the equitable remedy to grant of relief of specific performance. 21. The next question that needs to be considered is regarding time. The Hon'ble Apex Court as well this Court, in a catena of judgments, have time and again held that the rigour of the rule is that time is the essence of the contract insofar as the immovable properties are concerned. 22. In the instant case, the time stipulated was three months as per Ex. A.1 within which the transaction should be completed. The said time limit may not amount to making time essence of the agreement. But it must have some meaning. If time is not made the essence of contract, all stipulations of time provided in the agreements, will have no significance. A specific time stipulated in any contract is only for taking steps by one or the other party. Therefore, the time stipulated cannot be ignored altogether on the ground that time has not been made the essence of the contract. In the case on hand, from the date of Ex. A.1, three months time was provided for the performance of the contract within which the plaintiff was expected to purchase the stamp papers, tender the balance amount and call upon the vendor to execute the sale deed and delivery of the property. Therefore, if there is a delay and if the delay was coupled with substantial rise in prices from the date of agreement till the date of suit notice, and such delay has brought about a situation where relief of specific performance if granted will be inequitable, a decree cannot be sustained. Therefore, if there is a delay and if the delay was coupled with substantial rise in prices from the date of agreement till the date of suit notice, and such delay has brought about a situation where relief of specific performance if granted will be inequitable, a decree cannot be sustained. Though the learned counsel for the appellants contended that there was a delay and the delay was deliberate, they could not establish the same. 23. However, learned counsel for the appellants / defendants cites the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.S. Vidyanadam and Others v. Vairavan 1997 3 SCC 1 at page 3 wherein it is held as follows:- "In the present case, the case of the defendants is acceptable. In the agreement of sale there is no reference to the existence of any tenant in the building. No letter or notice was issued by the plaintiff to the defendants calling upon them to get the tenant vacated and get the sale deed executed until he issued the suit notice on 11.07.1981. From 15.12.1978 till 11.07.1981, i.e., for a period of more than 2 = years, the plaintiff was sitting quiet without taking any steps to perform his part of the contract under the agreement. It is thus not a case of mere delay. It is a case of total inaction on the part of the plaintiff for 2 = years in clear violation of the terms of agreement which required him to pay the balance, purchase the stamp papers and then ask for execution of sale deed within six months. Further, the delay is coupled with substantial rise in prices according to the defendants, three times between the date of agreement and the date of suit notice. The delay has brought about a situation where it would be inequitable to give the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff" Learned counsel contends that in the present case, the circumstances are against the exercise of discretion for grant of specific performance relief in favour of the plaintiff by the Court and therefore, the respondent / plaintiff is disentitled to the reliefs prayed for by him because of the latches on his part. 24. learned counsel for the appellants referred to the evidence of P.W.2, one of the attestors in Ex. A.1, who has stated in his cross-examination as under:- “TAMIL” 25. 24. learned counsel for the appellants referred to the evidence of P.W.2, one of the attestors in Ex. A.1, who has stated in his cross-examination as under:- “TAMIL” 25. Even presuming that the plaintiff had laid suit only on 23.8.2006, he had issued the notice calling upon the defendants to execute the sale deed as early as on 04.02.2006 which is within the period stipulated under Ex. A.1. It is pertinent to note that it is the defendants who had not received the notice and returned it with an endorsement “not claimed”. In this regard, it would be relevant to advert to the evidence of D.W.1, who has deposed to the following effect:- “TAMIL” 26. From the above admission of the first defendant, it is clear that the defendants had deliberately avoided the receipt of notice. Ex. A.1 also specifically stipulates that if the purchaser was willing to perform his part of the agreement and the vendors, viz., the defendants, default in executing the sale deed and handing over possession of the property, it is open to the plaintiff to get the same executed through Court. The defendants instead of honouring Ex. A.1 by performing their part of agreement, had deliberately settled the property in favour of their children, which settlement is only sham and nominal and not binding on the plaintiff. The said execution of the settlement deed indisputably was on 07.02.2006 which is also before the period of expiry of three months as stated in Ex. A.1. Therefore, the appellants cannot claim that there was a delay in bringing about the suit when time is the essence of the contract. 27. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent / plaintiff relied on the following decisions:- (i) Balasaheb Dayandeo Naik (Dead) through LRs. and others v. Appasaheb Dattatraya Pawar [2008 (1) CTC 530] (ii) Motilal Jain v. Ramdasi Devi (Smt.) and others [ AIR 2000 SC 2408 (1)] (iii) Mademsetty Satyanarayana vs. G.Yelloji Rao and others [ AIR 1965 SC 1405 (1)] (iv) Rathinam Chettiar vs. Embar Naidu and another [ 1999 (III) CTC 394 ] and v) K.M. Rajendran vs. Arul Prakasam and another [1998 (III) CTC 25] 28. In all the above cases, it has been held that in sale of immovable properties, there is no presumption as the time being the essence of contract. In all the above cases, it has been held that in sale of immovable properties, there is no presumption as the time being the essence of contract. Even if the parties have expressly provided that time is the essence of contract, such stipulation has to be read along with other provisions of the contract. 29. It would not be out of place for this Court to make a pertinent mention that considering the views expressed in all the above cases, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mrs. Saradamani Kandappan vs. Mrs.S.Rajalakshmi & Ors. [ 2011 (12) SCC 18 ] has considered whether time is the essence of the contract and whether the said time prescribed is for the payment of the purchase price or for the execution of the sale deed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 23, 42 and 43 of the judgment has held as follows:- Para 23: “The above section deals with the effect of failure to perform at a fixed time, in contracts in which time is essential. The question whether time is the essence of the contract, with reference to the performance of a contract, what generally may arise for consideration either with reference to the contract as a whole or with reference to a particular term or condition of the contract which is breached. In a contract relating to sale of immovable property if time is specified for payment of the sale price but not in regard to the execution of the sale deed, time will become the essence only with reference to payment of sale price but not in regard to execution of the sale deed. Normally in regard to contracts relating to sale of immovable properties, time is not considered to be the essence of the contract unless such an intention can be gathered either from the express terms of the contract or impliedly from the intention of the parties as expressed by the terms of the contract.” Para 42: “Therefore there is an urgent need to revisit the principle that time is not of the essence in contracts relating to immovable properties and also explain the current position of law with regard to contracts relating to immovable property made after 1975, in view of the changed circumstances arising from inflation and steep increase in prices. We do not propose to undertake that exercise in this case, nor referring the matter to larger bench as we have held on facts in this case that time is the essence of the contract, even with reference to the principles in Chand Rani and other cases. Be that as it may. Para 43: Till the issue is considered in an appropriate case, we can only reiterate what has been suggested in K.S.Vidyanadam (supra) : (i) Courts, while exercising discretion in suits for specific performance, should bear in mind that when the parties prescribe a time/period, for taking certain steps or for completion of the transaction, that must have some significance and therefore time/period prescribed cannot be ignored. (ii) Courts will apply greater scrutiny and strictness when considering whether the purchaser was “ready and willing” to perform his part of the contract. (iii) Every suit for specific performance need not be decreed merely because it is filed within the period of limitation by ignoring the time-limits stipulated in the agreement. Courts will also “frown” upon suits which are not filed immediately after the breach/refusal. The fact that limitation is three years does not mean a purchaser can wait for 1 or 2 years to file a suit and obtain specific performance. The three year period is intended to assist purchasers in special cases, as for example, where the major part of the consideration has been paid to the vendor and possession has been delivered in part performance, where equity shifts in favour of the purchaser.” 30. The principles enunciated in K.S. Vidyanadam's case (cited supra) are reiterated in Mrs. Saradamani Kandappan's case (cited supra). Even applying the above principles to the facts on hand, it could be easily inferred that the plaintiff has come to Court not only within the period of limitation as prescribed by law but within the time stipulated in the agreement. The suit notice being given within the period prescribed in the agreement and, thereafter, there was a delay of six months in filing the suit, will not disentitle the plaintiff from getting a decree. 31. In deciding the above factum of time being the essence of an agreement, the conduct of the parties have to be considered. The suit notice being given within the period prescribed in the agreement and, thereafter, there was a delay of six months in filing the suit, will not disentitle the plaintiff from getting a decree. 31. In deciding the above factum of time being the essence of an agreement, the conduct of the parties have to be considered. The plaintiff has come to Court seeking the equitable remedy of specific performance and has complied with all the required ingredients whereas the defendants had not been honest in their conduct. They have not taken any steps to perform their part of agreement as stated in Ex. A.1. Secondly, deliberately they have avoided the receipt of suit notice though admittedly the same had been sent to the correct address. Thirdly, even before the expiry of the prescribed period in the agreement, the defendants had encumbered the property by settling the same in favour of their children. The above conduct of the defendants collectively would go to show that they were not willing to perform their part of the contract which has driven the plaintiff to move the Court of law. 32. On a careful consideration of respective contentions and in view of the qualitative and quantitative discussions mentioned supra and on assessment of the entire facts and circumstances of the case in a cumulative manner, this Court comes to the inevitable conclusion that though the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of agreement, the defendants were not willing to perform their part of the agreement, which has driven the plaintiff to move the Court of law. In that view of the matter, the respondent / plaintiff is entitled to the relief of specific performance as claimed in the suit and resultantly, the appeal fails and the decree granted in favour of the plaintiff decreeing the suit requires no interference. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and stands dismissed. Consequently, the judgment and decree dated 24.12.2008 passed by the Additional District Judge (Fast Tract Court No. IV), Coimbatore at Tiruppur, in O.S. No. 405 of 2006 are affirmed for the reasons assigned by this Court in this appeal. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.