JUDGMENT 1. Challenge in this petition is addressed to judgment and award dated 04.10.2004 passed by Labour Court, Jamnagar in Reference (LCJ) No. 2027 of 1990, whereby the Labour Court directed reinstatement of the respondent-workman with 20% backwages. 2. The relevant facts may be noted. The petitioner herein is the Gujarat Electricity Board, a statutory body, under which, the respondent-workman was engaged as Work Charge Junior Assistant-cum-Typist. The first appointment given to the workman was on 28.02.1989. The said order of his engagement, which is on record at page-27, Annexure-B in compilation of the petition, shows that it was a temporary appointment for a period of fifty eight days. The salary payable was a fixed salary of Rs.1050/-plus D.A. admissible. In conditions of engagement, it was provided that the appointment was on temporary basis and was terminable at any time. The period of his engagement was limited to fifty eight days. 2.1 The engagement of the workman thereafter continued from time to time. The orders dated 29.04.1989, 07.06.1989, 17/18.08.1989 are reflective of extended engagement in service of the workman. The last order engaging the respondent-workman was of 17/18.08.1989 which was for the period from 01.11.1989 to 31.12.1989. After the said period, his engagement was not continued by the petitioner-employer and the services of the respondent stood terminated. 3. The workman invoked the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and filed his statement of claim at Exh.4. It was the case of the workman that the appointment given to him on 28.02.1989, for the first time continued, and thereafter, with effect from 31.12.1989, his services came to be terminated. It was contended that he had put in continuous service of 240 days as required under section 25B read with section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was contended that despite that without giving any notice, his services were terminated which was in breach of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” for the sake of brevity). It was also the case of the workman that he was a handicapped person and therefore, he was entitled to age relaxation for ten years. Thus, it was his case that he was required to be continued in service. 3.1 By filing reply at Exh.10, the petitioner-first party employer contested the reference. It was also the case of the workman that he was a handicapped person and therefore, he was entitled to age relaxation for ten years. Thus, it was his case that he was required to be continued in service. 3.1 By filing reply at Exh.10, the petitioner-first party employer contested the reference. It was the say of the employer that the engagement of the workman was for a fixed period. It was the contention that since the period fixed for his service was over, he was not continued in service. It was contended that the work, for which the respondent was engaged, was also of a temporary kind. Therefore, at the end of the period fixed in the order of appointment itself, the services of the workman came to be terminated, in which, there was no breach of any of the provisions of the Act. It was contended that since the engagement was for a fixed period, the case of the workman would fall within the purview of section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act. 4. Learned advocate Mr. Premal Joshi for the petitioner emphasized on the aspect of termination of the workman and submitted that since the workman was engaged only for a fixed period, on each occasion, when his services was not continued at the end of such fixed period, it did not amount to retrenchment and section 2(oo)(bb) would apply. In support of his contention, he relied on the decisions in Kishore Chandra Samal vs. Orissa State Cashew Development Corpn. Ltd. [ 2006(1) SCC 253 ], Punjab State Electricity Board vs. Darbara Singh [ 2006(1) SCC 121 ] and Batala Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Sowaran Singh [ 2005(8) SCC 481 ]. It was submitted that therefore, the findings of the Labour Court that there was a breach of section 25F and the resultant award directing reinstatement etc. were not sustainable and required to be set aside. 4.1 On the other hand, learned advocate Mrs. Vasavdatta Bhatt for the respondent-workman vehemently contended that even though the initial engagement of the workman was for a limited period, the fact remained that his services was extended from time to time and the fresh orders of appointment were issued at the end of each occasion. She submitted that hence, it could not be said that the engagement was for a fixed period. Section 2(oo)(bb), therefore, would not apply, it was submitted. She submitted that hence, it could not be said that the engagement was for a fixed period. Section 2(oo)(bb), therefore, would not apply, it was submitted. It was submitted further that the extension of service of the respondent-workman beyond initial engagement showed that it was a permanent kind of engagement under the clock of fixed term appointment. It was submitted that the extension was given without any break. She next submitted that the workman being a handicapped person, he ought to have been continued in service, giving age relaxation. It was submitted that the termination of service of the respondent was bad on that count also. Learned advocate for the respondent, in order to buttress her contentions, relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Anoop Sharma vs. Public Health Division, Haryana [ (2010) 5 SCC 497 : 2010(2) SCC (L & S) 63] that non-compliance of section 25F renders termination void ab initio and entitles the workman to relief of reinstatement with backwages. Learned advocate for the respondent also relied on the decision in Surendra Kumar Verma vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi [ AIR 1981 SC 422 ]. 5. From the controversy involved and the contentions canvassed, the issue that emerges is whether the termination of the respondent was a “retrenchment” so as to attract the provisions of section 25F or it fell within the exception and purview of section 2(oo)(bb) so as not to be treated as “retrenchment”. 5.1 Section 2(oo)(bb) reads as under:- “2(oo) “retrenchment” means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include- (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein;” 5.2 In Karnataka Handloom Development Corporation Ltd. vs. Sri Mahadeva Laxman Raval [(2006) 13 SCC 15], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the termination of contractual employee would not attract section 25F. In that case, the letter of appointment produced on record categorically stated, as in the present case, that the respondent's appointment with the Corporation was purely contractual for a fixed period. The Court observed that it is not as if no period was indicated and the only indication was the temporary nature of engagement. Therefore, the position of law highlighted that once the terms and conditions of the appointment reflected from the appointment order indicates specific period, then the employee would not be working for the purpose of section 25F, but, one employed on contract basis only. Section 2(oo) of the Act is not attracted as soon after the expiry of specific period. The services would be liable to be discontinued. The appointee would lose his right to continue beyond the period contemplated in this contractual appointment. The case would fall under section 2(oo)(bb). In Gangadhar Pillai vs. Siemens Ltd. [ (2007) 1 SCC 533 ], it was observed by the Apex Court that the termination of service, in case falling under section 2(oo)(bb), would not unnecessarily lead to any inference that it was actuated by malice. 5.3 In Punjab State Electricity Board (supra), the facts before the Supreme Court were that the respondent was appointed as peon on daily-wage and his appointment was shown to be of temporary character and it was from 08.01.1988 upto 29.02.1988. On 07.03.1988, his appointment was extended on the same terms and conditions. Similar extensions were thrice granted thereafter. The Supreme Court held that the employment being specific/fixed term and the engagement of the workman being conditional and for specific period, which was indicated in the appointment order, his case was squarely covered by section 2(oo)(bb) and section 25F would be inapplicable. Also in Kishore Chandra Samal (supra), the facts were akin to the facts of the present case. In that case, the appellant was appointed as Junior Typist and was engaged for various spells of fixed periods from July, 1982 to August 1986. In all orders of engagement, specific period was mentioned. It was held that the case was covered by section 2(oo)(bb). The Apex Court affirmed the order of the High Court, quashing the reinstatement. 6. In the present case, the orders of appointment of the respondent-workman (pages 27-32, Annexure-B) were demonstrative that his engagement was temporary and time-bound. In all orders of engagement, specific period was mentioned. It was held that the case was covered by section 2(oo)(bb). The Apex Court affirmed the order of the High Court, quashing the reinstatement. 6. In the present case, the orders of appointment of the respondent-workman (pages 27-32, Annexure-B) were demonstrative that his engagement was temporary and time-bound. It may be true that the engagement of the respondent was repeated, but on each occasion, it was the appointment for fixed period. As already noted, the first order dated 28.02.1989 specified temporary engagement for a period of fifty eight days and subsequent orders too provided for a date upto which, the engagement was to last. In other words, fixed period was indicated. The last order was dated 17/18.08.1989, in which, it was stipulated that it was upto 31.12.1989. Hence, on every occasion of appointment, period was indicated. After the said last order and the period provided thereunder having expired, the services of the workman was not retained and were not continued. 6.1 Each order of appointment reflected contract of employment, wherein there was a stipulation about expiry of the contract. The services were terminable at the end of specified period. This being the position manifested from the orders of appointment, it was clearly established from the said materials on record that the engagement of the workman was for a specific period. When his services were not continued at the end of the period specified in the last appointment order, it did not constitute retrenchment within the meaning of section 25F and his case stood covered under exception as contemplated in section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act. It was clear that the completion of 240 days of service or otherwise was an aspect rendered irrelevant. 6.2 The decisions relied upon by learned advocate for the respondent may be adverted to. In Surendra Kumar Verma (supra), it was emphasized that the labour law should be given broad interpretation. It was held that for the purpose of continuous service, the workman must have worked for at least 240 days in one year and it is not necessary that he has been in continuous service for one year. This decision hardly applies to the point involved in the present case. It was held that for the purpose of continuous service, the workman must have worked for at least 240 days in one year and it is not necessary that he has been in continuous service for one year. This decision hardly applies to the point involved in the present case. Similarly, in a decision in Anoop Sharma (supra) was relied upon by learned advocate for the respondent to the effect of non-compliance of clauses (a) and (b) of section 25F, the Supreme Court held that non-compliance of the said provisions would render retrenchment nullity. The Supreme Court restored the award of the Labour Court and directed reinstatement with payment of backwages. At the cost of repetition, it may be stated that in the instant case, on facts, once it was found that the case fell under section 2(oo)(bb), the question of breach of section 25F did not arise. The decision in Anoop Sharma (supra) has, therefore, no applicability. 6.3 Learned advocate for the respondent tried to contend that since the appointments were extended in repeat, it could not be viewed as fixed time so as to attract section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act. As already noted, each order of appointment was capable of being viewed as independent contract of service specifying the fixed term for engagement. The fact remained that the orders of such nature were passed more than once by itself could not lead to a conclusion that the employer wanted the workman to continue permanently. There was nothing to indicate that even term appointment was given as a clock, whereas the engagement was of a permanent kind. It was open to the employer to issue such orders contracting with the workman for appointing him for a specific period. It was not that the workman continued for long years in the guise of fixed term appointment, in which event, in a given case, the inference of section 2(oo)(bb) may be drawn by the Court. The facts of the case does not reflect such a situation. 6.4 Merely because the engagement of the workman was extended, it could not robe off the character of fixed term appointment. The services of the workman was not continued beyond 31.12.1989 which was non-renewal of contract of service and was already specified upto that date in the order of appointment. 6.4 Merely because the engagement of the workman was extended, it could not robe off the character of fixed term appointment. The services of the workman was not continued beyond 31.12.1989 which was non-renewal of contract of service and was already specified upto that date in the order of appointment. The contention that the workman was entitled to relaxation in the age, therefore also, is of no avail in view of above factual premise of the case and the legal position discussed above. 7. For the foregoing reasons, when the termination of the services of the workman found to be falling within the umbrella of section 2(oo)(bb), the findings of the Labour Court regarding breach of section 25F was not well conceived in law. It was an erroneous finding in eye of law and could not be sustained. Therefore, the judgment and award dated 04.10.2004 passed by Labour Court, Jamnagar in Reference(LCJ) No. 2027 of 1990, is required to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly, the same is quashed and set aside. Petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute.