JUDGMENT Deepak Gupta, C.J.:- This appeal by the claimants for enhancement of compensation is directed against the award dated 09-03-2005 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, West Tripura, Agartala in T.S. (MAC) 665 of 2002 whereby the learned Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 4,35,688/- in favour of the claimants. The only question raised in this appeal is with regard to quantum of compensation. 2. The undisputed facts are that the deceased was aged 46 years and 6 months. His salary was Rs. 8,482/- per month. The learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that after deducting the amount of family pension, the claimant would have got Rs. 4,122/- per month and by taking this figure, the compensation has been calculated as aforesaid. 3. In my view, the approach of the learned Tribunal is totally wrong. Family pension is paid to an employee because of a contract entered into between him and the employer. Pension is granted to an employee as a reward for the service rendered by the employee. The tortfeasor cannot take any benefit of the pension which the legal heirs of the deceased may get on account of the death of the deceased. 4. Under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a person who has sustained injury; or the person who is the owner of the property which is damaged; or the legal representatives of the deceased may file a claim for compensation to the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 5. Section 168 of the Act provides that the Tribunal should make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to be just. Therefore, what has to be awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act is just compensation. The issue as to what is just compensation has been the subject matter of a number of legal decisions. 6. In Gobald Motor Service Ltd. and another v. R.M.K. Veluswami and others, [1958-65 ACJ 179(SC)], the Apex Court held as follows:-- 7. xxxx Shortly stated, the general principle is that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on the one hand the loss to the claimants of the future pecuniary benefit and on the other any pecuniary advantage which from whatever source comes to them by reason of the death, that is, the balance of loss and gain to a dependent by the death must be ascertained. 7. In Sheikhupura Transport Co. 7. In Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transporters' Insurance Co. Ltd., [1971 ACJ 206(SC)], the Apex Court in para 6 observed as follows:-- 6. Under section 110B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 the tribunal is required to fix such compensation which appears to it to be just. The power given to the tribunal in the matter of fixing compensation under that provision is wide. Even if we assume (we do not propose to decide that question in this case) that compensation under that provision has to be fixed on the same basis as is required to be done under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (Act 13 of 1855), the pecuniary loss to the aggrieved party would depend upon data which cannot be ascertained accurately but must necessarily be an estimate or even partly a conjecture. The general principle is that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on the one hand the loss to the claimants of the future pecuniary benefit and on the other any pecuniary advantage which from whatever sources come to them by reason of the death that is, the balance of loss and gain to a dependent by the death must be ascertained--See Gobald Motor Service Ltd. and Anr. V. R.M.K. Veluswami and Ors. [1958-65 ACJ 179 (SC)]. 8. These observations themselves gave rise to a number of questions and one of the questions was whether pension or insurance money which is received by the heirs of the deceased is to be set off against the amount to be awarded to them. 9. It was a settled legal position under common law that the proceeds of insurance and sums coming by reason of benevolence are to be disregarded. These are considered to be collateral benefits which could not be deducted from the assessed damages. The wrongdoer cannot take the benefit of the philanthropy or munificence of others. To give an example, supposing a person belonging to a particular village dies and keeping into consideration his poor financial condition, the remaining villagers collect money and paid to the widow. Can it be argued that such amount is to be deducted from the award to be made to the claimant? Obviously, the answer has to be "no" because the tortfeasor cannot take the benefit of something which is gratuitously done by others. Can it be argued that such amount is to be deducted from the award to be made to the claimant? Obviously, the answer has to be "no" because the tortfeasor cannot take the benefit of something which is gratuitously done by others. If any other view is taken, then people will be hesitant in giving gratuitously in cases involving motor accident claims. 10. The House of Lords in Perry v. Cleaver [1969 ACJ 363] extended this principle and held that even disablement or ill-health pension payable to the employee by the employer could not be taken into consideration while assessing the compensation paid. 11. The Court of Appeal in Cunningham v. Harrison and another [1974 ACJ 218] held that the annual ex-gratia payment for life made by the employer to the injured employee were non-deductible in an action for damages under common law. 12. A Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bhagat Singh Sohan Singh v. Om Sharma and others [ 1983 ACJ 203 ] after discussing the entire English and Indian precedents held that the receipt of insurance, provident fund, pension or gratuity benefits by the dependents of the victim must be altogether excluded from consideration in the award of compensation under Section 110B of the Motor Vehicles Act. 13. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Rita Arora & Others v. Salig Ram and Others [1975 ACJ 420] and H.P. Road Transport Corporation v. Pandit Jai Ram and others [1980 ACJ 1] also held that benefits received by the heirs towards gratuity, provident fund, family pension and insurance amount were not deductible. To the similar effect are the judgments of the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Kashiram Mathur and others v. Sardar Rajendra Singh and another [ 1983 ACJ 152 ] and the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Krishna Sehgal and others v. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and others [1983 ACJ 619]. Similar view has been taken by the Rajasthan High Court, Gujarat High Court, Delhi High Court etc. 14. Similar view has been taken by the Rajasthan High Court, Gujarat High Court, Delhi High Court etc. 14. A Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in HRTC v. Arvind Singh Mann and others [1991 ACJ 825] also took the same view and held that the amount paid as ex-gratia by the Road Transport Corporation may be deducted, but the amount paid by the Himachal Road Transport Corporation by way of insurance money which insurance money was raised by collecting contribution from the passengers could not be deducted from the final compensation payable. 15. In Helen C. Rebello and others v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and another [1999 ACJ 10], the Apex Court after discussing the entire law held as follows:-- 33. Submission by the learned counsel for the appellants is, the insurance money is by virtue of a contractual relationship between the deceased and the insurance company and is payable to the legal heirs of the deceased in terms of the contract. Such money cannot be said to have been received by the heirs only on account of the death of the deceased, but truly it is a fruit of the premium paid by the deceased during his life time. The deceased bought this insurance policy as an act of his prudence, to confer benefit either to himself or to his heirs in case of death. This amount is receivable by the claimant irrespective of the accidental death, even if he would have died the natural death. He further submits that the interpretation given by the High Court confers benefit to the tortfeasor for his negligence and wrong leading to the untimely death without any contribution by him. It permits him to escape from the liability cast by the stature. Thus, his submission is, any amount payable under any contract of social assurance or any insurance, ought not to be deducted as the same is payable to the heirs because of the contract and not on account of the death of the insured person. Referring to the dictionary meaning of the word 'compensation', he submits it would mean anything given to make things equal in value. Referring to the dictionary meaning of the word 'compensation', he submits it would mean anything given to make things equal in value. He submits that in this case the death of the deceased husband of the claimant was due to the negligence of the respondents has to be offset by a just equivalent; where claimants are put back in position where they would have been but for such death. On this, he draws the conclusion, the benefits of insurance policy cannot be deducted while awarding the compensation. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents, restricted the argument as was advanced before the High Court and submitted, the High Court, after considering all aspects including English decisions and the decisions of this court, rightly concluded to deduct the life insurance money out of the compensation payable to the claimant. 34. So far as the general principle of estimating damages under the common law is concerned, it is settled that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on one hand, the loss to the claimant of the future pecuniary benefits that would have accrued to him but for the death with the 'pecuniary advantage' which from whatever source comes to him by reason of the death. In other words, it is the balancing of loss and gain of the claimant occasioned by the death. But this has to change its colour to the extent a statute intends to do. Thus, this has to be interpreted in the light of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It is very clear, to which there could be no doubt that this Act delivers compensation to the claimant only on account of accidental injury or death, not on account of any other death. Thus, the pecuniary advantage accruing under this Act has to be deciphered, correlating with the accidental death. The compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is on account of the pecuniary loss to the claimant by accidental injury or death and not other forms of death. If there is natural death or death by suicide, serious illness, including even death by accident, through train, air flight not involving motor vehicle, would not be covered under the Motor Vehicles Act. If there is natural death or death by suicide, serious illness, including even death by accident, through train, air flight not involving motor vehicle, would not be covered under the Motor Vehicles Act. Thus, the application of general principle under the common law of loss and gain for the computation of compensation under this Act must correlate to this type of injury or death viz., accidental. If the words 'pecuniary advantage' from whatever source are to be interpreted to mean any form of death under this Act it would dilute all possible benefits conferred on the claimant and would be contrary to the spirit of the law. If the 'pecuniary advantage' resulting from death means pecuniary advantage coming under all forms of death then it will include all the assets movable, immovable, shares, bank accounts, cash and every amount receivable under any contract. In other words, all heritable assets including what is willed by the deceased, etc. This would obliterate both, all possible conferment of economic security to the claimant by the deceased and the intentions of the legislature. By such an interpretation the tortfeasor in spite of his wrongful act or negligence, which contributes to the death, would have in many cases no liability or meager liability. In our considered opinion, the general principle of loss and gain takes colour of this statute, viz., the gain has to be interpreted which is as a result of the accidental death and the loss on account of the accidental death. Thus, under the present Act whatever pecuniary advantage is received by the claimant, from whatever source, would only mean which comes to the claimant on account of the accidental death and not other form of death. The constitution of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal itself under section 110 is as the section states: ...for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to.... 35. Thus, it would not include that which claimant receives on account of other forms of death, which he would have received even apart from accidental death. Thus, such pecuniary advantage would have no correlation to the accidental death for which compensation is computed. 35. Thus, it would not include that which claimant receives on account of other forms of death, which he would have received even apart from accidental death. Thus, such pecuniary advantage would have no correlation to the accidental death for which compensation is computed. Any amount received or receivable not only on account of the accidental death but that would have come to the claimant even otherwise, could not be construed to be the 'pecuniary advantage', liable for deduction. However, where the employer insures his employee, as against injury or death arising out of an accident, any amount received (sic) out of such insurance on the happening of such incidence may be an amount liable for deduction. However, our legislature has taken note of such contingency, through the proviso of section 95. Under it, the liability of the insurer is excluded in respect of injury or death, arising out of and in the course of employment of an employee. 36. This is based on the principle that the claimant for the happening of the same incidence may not gain twice from two sources. This, it is excluded thus, either through the wisdom of the legislature or through the principle of loss and gain through deduction not to give gain to the claimant twice arising from the same transaction, viz., same accident. It is significant to record here in both the sources, viz., either under the Motor Vehicles Act or from the employer, the compensation receivable by the claimant is either statutory or through the security of the employer securing for his employee but in both cases he receives the amount without his contribution. How thus an amount earned out of one's labour or contribution towards one's wealth, savings, etc., either for himself or for his family, which such person knows, under the law, has to go to his heirs after his death either by succession or under a will could be said to be the 'pecuniary gain' only on account of one's accidental death. This of course, is a pecuniary gain but how this is equitable or could be balanced out of the amount to be received as compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. There is no correlation between the two amounts. Not even remotely. How can an amount of loss and gain of one contract could be made applicable to the loss and gain of another contract. There is no correlation between the two amounts. Not even remotely. How can an amount of loss and gain of one contract could be made applicable to the loss and gain of another contract. Similarly, how an amount receivable under a stature has any correlation with an amount earned by an individual. Principle of loss and gain has to be on the same place within the same sphere, of course, subject to the contract to the contrary or, any provisions of law. 16. The Apex Court in Lal Dei and others v. Himachal Road Transport [ (2007) 8 SCC 319 ] specifically held that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Rebello's case, the amount of family pension given to the family could not be deducted while calculating the dependency of the claimants. 17. Mr. P. Gautam, learned counsel for the respondents, relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Kanta Aggarwal and others [ (2008) 11 SCC 366 ]. In the said case, the Apex Court was dealing with the matter where the wife had been provided job on compassionate ground and the Apex Court held that this factor should have been taken into consideration. It would, however, be pertinent to mention that the Apex Court quoted with approval the decision in Helen C. Rebello's case (supra). In Rebello's case, the Apex Court clearly held that if a person would get some benefit if the deceased had died by any other cause, then that benefit which the heirs of the deceased get does not arise out of the motor vehicle accident. The claimants in this case would have got pension even if the deceased had died due to natural causes or had died due to another cause not relatable to a motor accident. Therefore, the amount of family pension being received by the widow cannot be taken into consideration. 18. In view of the above decisions of the Apex Court, I am clearly of the opinion that the tortfeasor should not be given any benefit for any amount(s) which may come into the hands of the claimant on account of the death of a near and dear one, unless it is the tortfeasor himself who has paid such amount. 18. In view of the above decisions of the Apex Court, I am clearly of the opinion that the tortfeasor should not be given any benefit for any amount(s) which may come into the hands of the claimant on account of the death of a near and dear one, unless it is the tortfeasor himself who has paid such amount. The proper approach would be to deny to the tortfeasor the right to claim a set off from the financial loss caused by his rash and negligent act. 19. Therefore, I am of the view that the entire salary of the deceased, i.e. Rs. 8,422/- has to be taken into consideration. 20. The Apex Court in Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation [ (2009) 6 SCC 121 ] has held that in the case of a person in organized employment, in case the deceased is aged between 40 to 50 years, 30% should be added to his income. Adding 30% to Rs. 8,422/-, the total figure comes to Rs. 10,948.60/-, which is rounded off to Rs. 10,950/-. Out of this, 1/3rd is deducted for the personal expenses of the deceased and the amount works out to Rs. 7,300/- per month or Rs. 87,600/- per year. 21. The Apex Court in Sarla Verma's case (supra) also held that the multiplier in the case of a person aged between 46 to 50 years would be 13 and, therefore, the total compensation works out to Rs. 11,38,800/-. A sum of Rs. 10,000/- is awarded to the widow as loss of consortium. Rs. 10,000/- is awarded to the claimant for funeral expenses and Rs. 10,000/- as conventional damages. The total compensation, therefore, works out to Rs. 11,68,800/-, which is rounded off to Rs. 11,70,000/-. This amount is apportioned as follows:-- Widow :- Rs. 6,70,000/-; Child :- Rs. 5,00,000/-. 22. In view of the above discussion, the appeal is allowed. The award of the learned Tribunal is modified and the compensation is enhanced from Rs. 4,35,688/- to Rs. 11,70,000/-. The Insurance Company has already paid the awarded amount and it is, therefore, directed to deposit the enhanced amount of compensation, i.e. Rs. 7,34,312/-, along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till deposit of the amount in the Registry of this Court on or before 31-05-2014. 4,35,688/- to Rs. 11,70,000/-. The Insurance Company has already paid the awarded amount and it is, therefore, directed to deposit the enhanced amount of compensation, i.e. Rs. 7,34,312/-, along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till deposit of the amount in the Registry of this Court on or before 31-05-2014. On the enhanced amount being deposited, it shall be apportioned in the same proportion and a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- each shall be paid to the widow and the daughter and the balance amount shall be kept in fixed deposit for a period of 5(five) years at the first instance and shall not be released without orders of this Court. 23. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. No order as to costs. Send down the lower court records forthwith.