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2014 DIGILAW 321 (RAJ)

Man Singh v. State of Rajasthan

2014-01-30

BANWARI LAL SHARMA

body2014
JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner has preferred this revision petition against the judgment dated 11.10.1995 passed by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act Cases, Jodhpur (for short, 'the learned appellate Court') whereby the appeal preferred against the judgment and order dated 26.08.1995 passed by the learned Civil Judge (JD) and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Pipar City (for short 'the learned trial Court') was dismissed and affirmed the conviction and sentence awarded by the learned trial Court, which was as under:- Under Section 279 I.P.C. Six months' rigorous imprisonment together with fine of L 500/- in default whereof to further undergo one months imprisonment. Under Section 304-A I.P.C. One year's rigorous imprisonment together with fine of L 1,000/- in default whereof to further undergo one months imprisonment. 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 04.11.1994, deceased Amar Singh and petitioner were travelling on a Motor-vehicle and the petitioner was driving the same. While driving the Motor vehicle in rash and negligent manner, dashed it with a wall due to which deceased Amar Singh, who was pillion rider on the said vehicle, fell down and sustained serious injuries and thereafter succumbed to the injuries. The learned trial Court framed charges against the petitioner and he accepted the charge and admitted that he drove the vehicle negligently due to which, accident occurred and deceased died. Considering this fact, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced him as aforesaid. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the learned trial Court, the petitioner preferred appeal before the learned appellate Court, which was dismissed and the judgment and order of the learned trial Court was affirmed. Hence, this revision petition. 3. Heard Mr. S.R. Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. K.K. Rawal, learned Public Prosecutor. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the charges were framed against the petitioner in absence of his counsel before the learned trial Court which petitioner accepted. Thus, both the Courts below have committed illegality while passing the impugned orders and prayed that the petitioner be discharged from the offences. In alternate, learned counsel submitted that the petitioner is the sole bread earner in his family. There is no previous conviction of petitioner, therefore , he should have been given the benefit of probation for which both the Courts below wrongly denied. 5. In alternate, learned counsel submitted that the petitioner is the sole bread earner in his family. There is no previous conviction of petitioner, therefore , he should have been given the benefit of probation for which both the Courts below wrongly denied. 5. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor supported the impugned judgment and has submitted that the petitioner himself admitted his guilt of negligence. 6. I have considered the arguments advanced at the Bar and perused the impugned judgments and record of the case. 7. The learned trial Court, while convicting and sentencing the petitioner, considered the fact that the petitioner himself accepted the charge levelled against him. Therefore, appeal against the conviction is not maintainable in view of Section 375 of Cr.P.C. Learned Appellate Court also dismissed the appeal in view of this provision. Thus, the learned Courts below have not committed any illegality while convicting the petitioner warranting any interference by this Court. 8. The law on the point as to whether the benefit of Probation under the Act of 1958 should be granted to the accused-convict for the offence under Section 304-A IPC has been settled by Hon'ble Apex Court in Dalbir Singh v. State of Harayana, by observing that the Court should not as a normal rule invoke the provisions of the Probation of the Offenders Act, 1958 when the accused is convicted of the offence under Section 304-A IPC in causing death of human beings by rash or negligent driving. Relevant paragraphs Nos. 12 and 13 of the judgment read as under: "12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju, (1987) 1 SCC 538 : AIR 1987 SC 861 : 1987 Crl.L.J. 776 , this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under Section 304-A IPC to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing death of a human being. In that case this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposed a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the P.O. Act. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the P.O. Act. While considering the quantum of sentence, to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly informs himself that he cannot afford to have a single movement of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that a rash driving need not necessarily cause any accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being; or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted for the offence, and lastly that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing death of a human being due to his callous driving of vehicle he cannot escape from jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly, at the level of trial Courts for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of automobiles." 9. This judgment was subsequently followed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in B. Nagabhuslumam v. State of Karnataka and the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 was denied to the accused for commission of offence punishable under Section 304-A IPC. 10. In the present case, petitioner-accused has himself admitted his negligence and due to his negligent life of an innocent person was lost. Hence in view of these facts and in view of legal preposition settled by Hon'ble Apex Court in B. Nagabhushanam v. State of Karnataka, the petitioner accused does not deserve the benefit of the Act of 1958. 11. The accident took place on 04.11.1994 which is about 19 years ago. Hence in view of these facts and in view of legal preposition settled by Hon'ble Apex Court in B. Nagabhushanam v. State of Karnataka, the petitioner accused does not deserve the benefit of the Act of 1958. 11. The accident took place on 04.11.1994 which is about 19 years ago. In the case of Puttaswamy v. State of Karnataka & Anr., reported in 2009 (1) WLC (SC) Criminal 623 , the offence punishable under Section 279 and 304-A IPC, the sentence was reduced to already undergone and enhance the fine to Rs. 20,000/- where the accused caused death of 7 years old girl. In the present case, due to negligent driving of vehicle by the petitioner, the deceased died. The accident took place on 04.11.1995 which is more than 19 years ago and as such indisputedly, the petitioner has undergone protracted trial for more than 19 years. He has suffered persistent agony and trauma of protracted trial. 12. Thus, looking to the over-all circumstances, specially the fact that the petitioner suffered persistent agony and trauma of protracted trial for the last more than 19 years, the petitioner's conviction under Section 279 and 304-A IPC is maintained and to meet the ends of justice, I deem it proper to increase the amount of fine from Rs. 1,500/- to Rs. 50,000/- to be paid by the petitioner to the widow of deceased or legal representatives of deceased and reduce the sentence to the period already undergone subject to payment of fine. The aforesaid fine is to be deposited by the petitioner in the trial Court within three months from the date of the order and on such deposit the said amount shall be made available to the widow of deceased or legal representatives of the deceased. In default of such deposit, this revision petition shall be treated as dismissed and the petitioner convict will be taken in custody to serve the remaining sentence.The revision petition stands disposed of accordingly.Petition disposed of.