JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri Vivek Shandilya, learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Sri Ramesh Pundir, learned counsel for the respondent. Since all the special appeals have been directed against a common judgment dated 26.8.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge in a bunch of petitions, against which the above noted seven appeals have been filed, therefore, the same are being decided by a common judgement. None of the counsel for the parties have any objection to the same. However, for the purpose of deciding these appeals we have taken into consideration the record of Special Appeal No. 976 of 2014 (State of U.P. v. Rakesh). By means of this appeal, the appellants have challenged the order dated 26.8.2012 passed by learned Single Judge, whereby a cost of Rs. 5000.- has been imposed on the appellants. 2. Brief facts of the case are that by the order passed in September, 2013, the fire-arm licence of the petitioner was placed under suspension. This order was challenged in a writ petition in which on 8.8.2014 the learned single Judge has passed the following order: “Let District Magistrate, Saharanpur shall file a personal affidavit giving following facts: (I) How many fire-arm licence have been issued in the area under Police Station Deoband. (II) How many suspension orders have been passed after the riots took place on 09.09.2013, till date. A list of such cases shall be appended. (III) Whether all those suspension orders are continuing or some have resulted in cancellation or withdrawal, as the case may be. These details, separately, shall be provided. (IV) What was the police report? Whether it is in respect of an individual licensee or in general. (V) The report submitted by police, pursuant whereto impugned orders have been passed, shall also be produced before this Court on the next date. The information above shall be produced before this Court on 26.08.2014 through an officer not below the rank of Additional District Magistrate.” Immediately thereafter on 11.8.2014, the District Magistrate passed the order revoking the suspension of the fire-arm licence of the writ petitioner after it found that there was no justification for suspending the fire-arm licence of the petitioner. The learned single Judge recorded that in normal course, the writ petition would have been rendered infructuous after the order dated 11.8.2014 was passed. The learned single Judge recorded that in normal course, the writ petition would have been rendered infructuous after the order dated 11.8.2014 was passed. However, learned counsel for the writ petitioner requested that cost should be imposed because of the harassment which the writ petitioner had to undergo and was forced to file the writ petition as the suspension of fire-arm licence remained operative for one year till the District Magistrate concerned looked into the matter and passed appropriate final orders. It was only after the petitioner filed this writ petition and the order dated 8.8.2014 was passed, that within 3-days thereafter, the order of suspension was revoked on 11.8.2014. 3. On perusal of the record and the counter-affidavit filed by the District Magistrate, the learned single Judge arrived at the finding, which is reproduced as under: “In respect of these 72 persons, stark similarity/identical language, except of difference of names, is very evident from a bare reading of these notices which the Incharge Inspector Deoband has given, recommending suspension of fire-arm licence of all these persons”. Further finding has been recorded that the District Magistrate could not dispute the fact that the police reports in all cases were in identical language. The writ Court has also observed: “Learned Standing Counsel could not explain and give any reason whatsoever as to why fire-arm licences of only one section of society were selected for suspension. In any riot, there are two parties. It is admitted and also evident from record that the alleged riot involved members of two sections/communities of society. None else but those of only one sections of society gave an occasion for similar action is difficult to believe and beyond apprehension. In fact the affidavit is totally silent on this aspect. Sri O.P. Verma, Additional District Magistrate, Saharanpur is also present before this Court alongwith record but neither he could give any reason as to why all 72 cases of suspension of fire-arm licence relates to only one section of society nor from record any reason could discern. “The executive must understand, when statutory power has been conferred upon them by legislature, it has deposed a heavy confidence upon them that statutory power shall be exercised without fear, favour and/or ill-will, to any individual or group of individuals of common identity. “The executive must understand, when statutory power has been conferred upon them by legislature, it has deposed a heavy confidence upon them that statutory power shall be exercised without fear, favour and/or ill-will, to any individual or group of individuals of common identity. The executive shall govern all persons alike and would apply rule of law with open mind to all, equally and at par. “In these cases, unfortunately, this objectivity, independence and impartiality is lacking. I have no doubt in my mind that power of suspension of fire-arm licence was not exercised legally and it was for reason other than bona fide. It travels in the realm of malice in law. “These facts apparently fortify the contention advanced by learned counsel for petitioners that suspension of fire-arm licences of only one section of society was for reasons other than bona fide. This is nothing but a selective executive action, patently arbitrary and discriminatory. It seriously disturbs string of communal harmony in the society. The confidence of a large section of society shakes looking to execution action of this nature.” 4. After relying on the following various decisions of the Apex Court, namely (Smt.) S.R. Venkatraman v. Union of India and another, AIR 1979 SC 49 ; Mukesh Kumar Agrawal v. State of U.P. and others, JT 2009 (13) SC 643; Somesh Tiwari v. Union of India and others, 2009 (2) SCC 592 ; HMT Ltd. and another v. Mudappa and others, JT 2007(3) SC 112, the Writ Court held that the order of suspension of fire-arm licence travels in the realm of malice in law and thereafter imposed a cost of Rs. , 5000/- in each writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that in similar circumstances, after filing of the writ petition, where the suspension of fire-arm licence was withdrawn, another bench dismissed the writ petition as infructuous and did not impose any cost. 6. We have perused the order dated 16.12.2013 passed by a learned single Judge in WP No. 56564 of 2013; Rajendra Singh and another v. State of U.P., and other connected writ petitions, dismissing them as infructuous on the ground that during pendency of the writ petitions, the suspension of licence were withdrawn. 6. We have perused the order dated 16.12.2013 passed by a learned single Judge in WP No. 56564 of 2013; Rajendra Singh and another v. State of U.P., and other connected writ petitions, dismissing them as infructuous on the ground that during pendency of the writ petitions, the suspension of licence were withdrawn. At the same time, we have also noticed that all these matters related to district Muzaffarnagar and the order suspending the arms licence were passed under almost similar circumstances prevailing in that district. Noticing that 1744 licences had been suspended, a detailed order dated 27.11.2013 was passed in WP No. 56564 of 2013; Rajendra Singh and another v. State of U.P. and others. The same is reproduced below: “The arms license of the petitioners was suspended and other residents of three police stations of Muzaffarnagar, namely, Bhowrakala, Fugana, Shahpur in Writ Petition No. 56564 of 2013 and Nai mandi in another writ petition. A specific allegation was made in paragraph 17, 18 and 32 of the writ petition that 1744 licenses have been suspended, who are Hindu by religion and that no license of the minority community, namely, Muslims have been suspended. On this assertion, the Court entertained the writ petition and directed the learned Standing Counsel to file a counter-affidavit. “A counter-affidavit has been filed, which upon its perusal, the Court finds that it does not indicate a clear picture. The assertions made in the counter-affidavit are vague. “The learned Additional Advocate General has made submissions justifying the action of the authority in suspending the license based on the alleged reports of the Station House Officer of the aforesaid four police stations. Such report and the basis of the suspension of the licenses of 1744 persons has not been placed on record. The specific assertion of the petitioner that the license of only Hindu’s have been suspended has been denied weakly by asserting that some of the licenses of the Muslim community were also suspended. The details are not known to the Court. The specific assertion of the petitioner that the license of only Hindu’s have been suspended has been denied weakly by asserting that some of the licenses of the Muslim community were also suspended. The details are not known to the Court. The learned Additional Advocate General further asserted that in view of the orders of the Supreme Court dated 19th September, 2013 and 21st October, 2013, any grievance pertaining to the incident that took place on 27th August, 2013 at Muzaffarnagar and nearby places, the aggrieved persons, if any, should approach only the Supreme Court and, consequently, asserted that this Court should relegate the petitioners’ to file an application before the Supreme Court and that the High Court should restrain itself from hearing the matter. “The Additional Advocate General further submitted that the cause of action in the group of petitions is individual and that it is not a public interest litigation and, consequently, even though the period of suspension has not been specified, yet the authority would consider the reply and pass appropriate orders after considering the gravity of the situation. It was also asserted that some orders have been revoked upon the reply being submitted by some of the license holders. “Considering the aforesaid scenario, the Court finds that at the present moment the order of the Supreme Court is not coming in the way for this Court to relegate the matter to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has considered the incident of 27th August, 2013 whereas in the instant case, the show-cause notice suspending the license relates to the incident of 7th September, 2013. Whether the incident is distinct or different can only be ascertained by the report given by the Station House Officer of Police Stations Bhowrakala, Fugana, Shahpur and Nai mandi. Consequently, at this stage, the Court is not inclined to accept the submission of the Additional Advocate General for relegating the petitioners to move an appropriate application to the Supreme Court. “The Court finds that the suspension order was issued on 9th September, 2013. The petitioners have submitted their reply and more than 2 and a months have elapsed even though, the provisions of the Arms Act, namely, Section 17(3) does not depict a specified period for deciding such matter, nonetheless, it is obligatory upon the Licensing Authority to pass appropriate orders. The petitioners have submitted their reply and more than 2 and a months have elapsed even though, the provisions of the Arms Act, namely, Section 17(3) does not depict a specified period for deciding such matter, nonetheless, it is obligatory upon the Licensing Authority to pass appropriate orders. The suspension order cannot remain in suspended animation for an indefinite period, especially when the Court finds from a perusal of the counter-affidavit that orders on the suspension of certain license holders have also been passed. It becomes all the more obligatory upon the Licensing Authority to pass orders, where licenses has been suspended and replies have been received. “In the light of the aforesaid, the Court adjourns the hearing and directs the State Government to file a supplementary counter-affidavit disclosing : (a) The total number of licenses issued in the villages covering the four police stations of Bhowrakala, Fugana, Shahpur and Nai mandi indicating also the religion of these license holders. (b) The total number of arms license, which have been suspended by the Licensing Authority in these four police stations. (c) Whether notices were issued to all these persons, whose license has been suspended or not and if notices were issued, whether the said notices were served upon these license holders. (d) Whether any reply was submitted by these license holders. (e) Action taken by the Licensing Authority on these notices, if any, and. (f) Last but not the least the reports of the Station House Officers of police stations Bhowrakala, Fugana, Shahpur and Nai mandi, pursuant of which the cyclostyled suspension order has been issued. List for further hearing on 5th December, 2013 by which time the supplementary counter-affidavit may be filed. “ 7. Learned standing counsel thus submitted that, after passing of the order dated 11.8.2013, the writ petition should have also been rendered infructuous and there was no justification in imposing cost on the appellants. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants has further addressed the Court with regard to the merits of the order passed and the findings which have been recorded after the counter-affidavit was filed by the appellant before the writ Court. 9. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants has further addressed the Court with regard to the merits of the order passed and the findings which have been recorded after the counter-affidavit was filed by the appellant before the writ Court. 9. In fact, we are of the view that the learned single Judge has rightly taken pains of entering into the merits of the case even after the suspension orders had been withdrawn, as the writ petitioner had suffered because of the mala fide action of the appellant in suspending the fire-arm licence of the petitioner in arbitrary manner, who was thus subjected to harassment. The order revoking the suspension was passed after one year and that too only when the writ Court has framed certain questions to be answered by the appellant. In response to the same, it not only appears, but it is clear that before giving a reply, the District Magistrate withdrew the suspension order so that the writ petition may become infructuous. Efforts of the learned single Judge in passing a detailed order are to be lauded as, with the pressure of work, normally on finding that the suspension order has been revoked, the easy course for any Court would be to dispose of the writ petition as having become infructuous, but in the present case the learned single Judge looked into the merits of the case and found that the writ petitioners were put to unnecessary harassment because of the illegal action of the appellants and imposed a token/nominal cost of Rs. 5000/- for each set of writ petition, which, in the facts of the case, in our view cannot be said to be unjustified. As such, we do not find any good ground to interfere with the orders impugned in these appeals. Accordingly, all the aforesaid appeals are dismissed. —————