JUDGMENT Harsha Devani, J. 1. This appeal under Sec. 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") is directed against the award dated 19th September, 2011 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rajkot (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal") below Exh. 7 in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 1627 of 2009 to the extent the Tribunal has ordered the opponent Nos. 1 and 2 therein, to pay only Rs. 12,500/- with running interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till realisation to the applicant and not Rs. 25,000/- as contemplated under Sec. 140 of the Act. The appellant-original claimant filed a claim petition to recover compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- together with cost and interest on account of the grievous injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident. The case of the appellant was that on 18th August, 2009, he was riding a Hero Honda motorcycle bearing registration No. GJ-3-BQ-4159 with his wife as a pillion-rider with a moderate speed on the correct side road but a tractor bearing No. GJ-3L-1274 along with trolley No. GJ-3V-319 which was being driven in a rash and negligent manner at an excessive speed dashed the motorcycle as a result whereof the appellant sustained severe bodily injuries. In the said claim case, the appellant filed an application at Exh. 7 under Sec. 140 of the Act for compensation of Rs. 25,000/- on the principle of 'No Fault Liability' during the pendency of the claim petition. The Tribunal took note of the fact that the appellant had deleted the opponent No. 4 therein, viz. ICICI, the Insurance Company of the motor cycle, and having regard to the fact that at that juncture, both the vehicles were found to be involved, by the impugned award dated 19th September, 2011, partly allowed the said application by holding that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are liable to pay Rs. 12,500/- with running interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till realisation. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal to the extent of deducting 50% from the amount provided under Sec. 140 of the Act, the appellant has filed the present appeal. 2. Mr. 12,500/- with running interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till realisation. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal to the extent of deducting 50% from the amount provided under Sec. 140 of the Act, the appellant has filed the present appeal. 2. Mr. Tushar Sheth, learned Advocate for the appellant, assailed the impugned award by submitting that Sec. 140 of the Act provides for liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault. By virtue of the said provision, where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of the said Section. Such amount of compensation which is payable under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 140 in respect of permanent disablement of any person has been fixed at Rs. 25,000/-. It was submitted that under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 140 of the Act, in any claim for compensation under sub-sec. (1), the claimant is not required to plead and establish that such permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made is due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. By virtue of sub-sec. (4), a claim for compensation under sub-sec. (1) cannot be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement, the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement. Inviting the attention of the Court to the impugned award, it was pointed out that the Tribunal has taken note of the fact that the appellant has deleted the original opponent No. 4 - ICICI, that is, the Insurance Company of the Hero Honda motorcycle and that at this juncture, both the vehicles are found to have been involved in the accident. According to the Tribunal, since the claimant was riding the motorcycle, he being the tort-feasor, must step in the shoes of the owner, and therefore, on the principle of contributory negligence, he is also responsible, and hence, he could only claim 50% of the compensation payable from the opponent Nos. 1 and 2 jointly and severally. It was submitted that the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal is contrary to the very statutory scheme which envisages payment of full amount of Rs. 25,000/- jointly and severally by those responsible and there is no question of apportionment of any share at the stage of the application under Sec. 140 of the Act. In support of his submissions, the learned Advocate placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of K. Nandakumar v. Managing Director, Thanthal Periyar Transport Corporation, 1996 (2) SCC 736 , which was rendered in the context of Sec. 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which is in pari materia with Sec. 140 of the Act of 1988. It was pointed out that the Court has held that on a plain reading of Sec. 92A, particularly the first part of sub-sec. (4) thereof, there is no basis for holding that a claim thereunder could be made only if the person who has died or suffered permanent disablement has not been negligent. The Court, accordingly, held that the appellant therein was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Sec. 92A of the Act of 1939 and to recover compensation of the sum quantified therein for permanent disability. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Eshwarappa @ Maheshwarappa v. C.S. Gurushanthappa, 2010 (8) SCC 620 , wherein the Court has held that on a plain reading of the provisions of Sec. 140 of the Act, it is evident that all that is required to attract the liability under the said Section is an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle(s) leading to the death or permanent disability of any person. Sub-section (4) provides that the motor accident resulting in the death or permanent disablement might be entirely due to the wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim is made but that too would have no effect either on the right to receive the compensation or the amount of compensation. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Indira Devi v. Bagada Ram, 2010 AIR SCW 4924, wherein the Court made reference to the marginal heading to Sec. 140 of the Act which describes it as based on the principle of no fault and held that the expression 'no fault' suggests that the compensation under Sec. 140 is regardless of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death the claim is made. It was submitted that in the light of the principles laid down in the above decisions, the Tribunal was not justified in deducting 50% of the compensation payable under Sec. 140 of the Act on the ground that there was contributory negligence on the part of the appellant. Mr. Sheth further pointed out that the Tribunal after awarding Rs. 12,500/-, has ordered that after deducting necessary Court-fees, 70% of the amount be deposited in F.D.R. in the name of the applicant in any nationalised bank and the remaining 30% amount to be paid in cash to the applicant. It was submitted that such course of action is not permissible under Sec. 140 of the Act, inasmuch as, the same is meant to provide immediate succour to the injured or to the family members of the deceased. 3. Opposing the appeal, Mr. Dakshesh Mehta, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 2-Insurance Company invited the attention of the Court to the provisions of Sec. 140(1) of the Act to submit that in view of the provisions of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 140, where an accident arises out of the use of more than one motor vehicle, the owners of the said vehicles would be liable to pay compensation in respect of the death in accordance with the provisions of the said Section. (1) of Sec. 140, where an accident arises out of the use of more than one motor vehicle, the owners of the said vehicles would be liable to pay compensation in respect of the death in accordance with the provisions of the said Section. It was pointed out that according to the Tribunal, both, the owner of the motorcycle as well as the owner of the tractor, would be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement. Since, the appellant steps into the shoes of the owner of the motorcycle, he would be also jointly and severally liable to pay 50% of the amount under Sec. 140 of the Act, and therefore, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the appellant would be entitled to only 50% of the amount of compensation as contemplated under Sec. 140 of the Act. It was submitted that since it is the owners who were required to pay the compensation, deletion of the Insurance Company of the owner of the motorcycle would be of no consequence. Insofar as determining the liability of the parties is concerned, Mr. Mehta invited the attention of the Court to the provisions of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 140 of the Act to submit that the same envisages an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle or motor vehicles. Thus, when there is more than one motor vehicle, the owners of the vehicles would be jointly and severally liable to pay compensation in respect of death or disablement arising out of the accident in accordance with the provisions of the said Section. It was submitted that in the present case, two motor vehicles are involved and as such, the owners of both the vehicles would be jointly and severally liable to pay compensation under sub-sec. (1). Referring to the impugned award passed by the Tribunal, it was submitted that, thus the Tribunal ought to have held both, the owner of the motorcycle and the owner of the tractor as well as the Insurance Company, to be jointly and severally liable for payment of the amount of compensation under Sec. 140 of the Act. Though the respondent No. 4 -ICICI had been deleted, the owner of the motorcycle namely, the respondent No. 3 was very much on record. Though the respondent No. 4 -ICICI had been deleted, the owner of the motorcycle namely, the respondent No. 3 was very much on record. Under the circumstances, if at all the Court is of the view that the appellant is entitled to compensation of Rs. 25,000/- under Sec. 140 of the Act, such compensation should be awarded against the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3, jointly and severally, and not against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 alone. It was farther submitted that since the respondent No. 4-Insurer has been deleted, it is likely that the appellant would seek to recover the entire amount of compensation from the respondent No. 2-Insurer. Under the circumstances, liberty should be reserved to the respondent No. 2-Insurer to recover the amount of compensation to the extent of the liability of the respondent No. 3-Owner. 4. Despite service of notice of admission, the respondent No. 3-Owner of the motorcycle has not entered appearance. 5. The scope of the present appeal is very limited. The sole question that arises for consideration is as to whether the Tribunal could have deducted 50% of the amount envisaged under Sec. 140 of the Act while allowing the application under Sec. 140 filed by the appellant. On a plain reading of Sec. 140 of the Act, it is apparent that the same postulates that the owners of the vehicles which are involved in an accident arising out of the use of such motor vehicles, shall be jointly and severally liable to pay compensation in respect of any death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of sub-sec. (1) thereof. Sub-section (2) thereof provides for a fixed sum of Rs. 25,000/- in respect of permanent disablement of any person in such vehicular accident. Sub-section (3) lays down that the claimant is not required to plead or establish that the permanent disablement in respect of which the claim is made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owners of the vehicle. Sub-section (4) of Sec. 140 of the Act, which is relevant for the present purpose, postulates that a claim for compensation under sub-sec. Sub-section (4) of Sec. 140 of the Act, which is relevant for the present purpose, postulates that a claim for compensation under sub-sec. (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement, the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement. 6. Thus, sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 140 of the Act clearly lays down that the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of death or permanent disability shall not be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility. In the present case, the Tribunal has done exactly what is prohibited under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 140 of the Act namely that, it has held that since both the vehicles were involved and the claimant who was riding the motorcycle is also a tort-feasor and steps into the shoes of the owner. Accordingly, the Tribunal has held that the claimant is entitled to ask for 50% of the amount envisaged under Sec. 140 of the Act from the opponent Nos. 1 and 2 jointly and severally. The Tribunal evidently has lost sight of the fact that under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 140 of the Act, a claim of compensation cannot be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such permanent disablement. Besides, at the stage of an application under Sec. 140 of the Act, the Tribunal is not required to go into the question of contributory negligence. Once two vehicles were found to be involved in the accident, the owners of both the vehicles were required to be held jointly and severally responsible for payment of compensation thereunder. In the present case, as noticed earlier, it is only the original respondent No. 4-Insurance Company of the motorcycle that had been deleted, however, the owner of the motorcycle was very much on record. Under the circumstances, the Tribunal ought to have held all the three opponents namely, the opponent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to be jointly and severally liable for payment of the compensation under Sec. 140 of the Act, viz. Rs. 25,000/-. Under the circumstances, the Tribunal ought to have held all the three opponents namely, the opponent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to be jointly and severally liable for payment of the compensation under Sec. 140 of the Act, viz. Rs. 25,000/-. It was not permissible for the Tribunal to reduce the amount of Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 12,500/- by holding the opponent Nos. 1 and 2 liable to pay such amount. 7. The Supreme Court in the case of Nandakumar v. Managing Director (supra) was dealing with a case where the High Court had held the appellant therein to be not entitled to compensation under Sec. 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 because he was found to have been negligent. The Supreme Court held that by reason of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 92A, an absolute liability is cast upon the owner of a vehicle to pay compensation in respect of death or permanent disablement resulting from an accident arising out of its use. By reason of sub-sec. (3), the claimant is not required to plead or establish that the death or disablement was due to a wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner or any other person. Sub-section (4) is in two parts. The first part suggests that a claim for compensation under the Section is not defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person who had died or suffered permanent disablement. The second part states that the quantum of compensation is not to be diminished even if the person who had died or suffered permanent disablement bore some responsibility for such disablement. Therefore, on a plain reading of Sec. 92A, particularly, the first part of sub-sec. (4) thereof, there was no basis for holding that a claim thereunder may be made only if the person who had died or suffered permanent disablement had not been negligent. It may be noted that the provisions of Sec. 92A of the Act of 1939 are in pari materia with Sec. 140 of the Act of 1988 and are identically worded. 8. In Eshwarappa @ Maheshwarappa v. Gurushanthappa (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the appellants therein had filed the application under Sec. 140 at a belated stage. 8. In Eshwarappa @ Maheshwarappa v. Gurushanthappa (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the appellants therein had filed the application under Sec. 140 at a belated stage. The Tribunal rejected the express prayer made on behalf of the appellants and other claimants to at least grant the 'no fault compensation' as provided under Sec. 140 of the Act. The Tribunal observed that had the claim for 'no fault compensation' been made at the beginning of the proceeding, it might have considered it favourably. But the claim was pressed at a belated stage when it was considering the claim for compensation under Sec. 166 of the Act and more importantly, had found that the owner of the car had no responsibility for the accident. The Supreme Court did not agree with the reasons assigned by the Tribunal for denying the appellants therein 'no fault compensation' as provided under Sec. 140 of the Act. It was held that the Tribunal was gravely in error in taking the view that a claim for compensation under Sec. 140 of the Act can succeed only in case it is raised at the initial stage of the proceedings and further that the claim must fail if the accident had taken place by using the car without the consent or knowledge of its owner. Referring to the provisions of Sec. 140 of the Act, the Court held that on a plain reading of the provisions, it is evident that all that is required to attract the liability under Sec. 140 is an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle(s) leading to the death or permanent disablement of any person. The Court held that sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 141 makes the compensation under Sec. 140 independent of any claim of compensation based on the principle of fault under any other provision of the Motor Vehicles Act or under any other law but subject to any claim of compensation under Sec. 163A of me Act. The Court, accordingly, concluded that from the provisions of Chapter X together with Secs. The Court, accordingly, concluded that from the provisions of Chapter X together with Secs. 146 and 147 of the Act, it would appear to be in furtherance of the public policy that in case of death or permanent disablement of any person resulting from a motor accident, a minimum amount must be paid to me injured or the heirs of the deceased, as the case may be, without any questions being asked and independently of the compensation on the principle of fault. 9. As regards me contention raised by the learned Advocate for the Insurance Company that since all me three opponents are held to be jointly and severally liable to pay Rs. 25,000/- with running interest and it is likely that me entire amount of compensation would be recovered from the Insurance Company, the Insurance Company should be permitted to recover such amount from the other opponents, needless to state that it would be always open for the respondent No. 2-Insurance Company to initiate appropriate proceedings if permissible in law. 10. The operative part of the impugned award reveals that me Tribunal has ordered that 70% of the awarded amount be deposited in F.D.R. in the name of the appellant and remaining 30% be paid in cash. Having regard to me object behind the enactment of Sec. 140 of the Act, viz. to provide immediate succour to the victim or to the heirs of the deceased, as well as considering me nominal amount involved, it was not permissible for the Tribunal to pass any order of depositing part of the awarded amount as the same would defeat the very object of Sec. 140 of the Act. Under the circumstances, as and when such amount is deposited with the Tribunal, me same shall be disbursed to me appellant. 11. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned award passed by me Tribunal, being contrary to the provisions of Sec. 140 of the Act as well as the principles laid down in the above decisions of the Supreme Court, cannot be sustained. The appeal, therefore, succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned award passed by the Tribunal is hereby modified by holding that the opponent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 shall be jointly and severally liable to pay Rs. 25,000/- with running interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till realisation to the appellant. The impugned award passed by the Tribunal is hereby modified by holding that the opponent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 shall be jointly and severally liable to pay Rs. 25,000/- with running interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till realisation to the appellant. It is clarified that in view of the award passed by the Tribunal under Sec. 140 of the Act, the bar of constructive res judicata shall not operate in proceedings under Sec. 166 of the Act and it shall be open for all the parties to raise any contention in accordance with law in the said proceedings. It is further clarified that any observation made in this order as well as in the impugned award under Sec. 140 shall not come in the way of the parties under Sec. 166 of the Act. There shall be no order as to costs. Registry shall forthwith send back the record and proceedings of the case, if any.