JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Heard Sri Siddharth Nandan, learned counsel for the petitioner. This writ petition has been filed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 11.9.2014 passed by the District Judge, Gorakhpur, by which the petitioner’s application for furnishing security, as required under the proviso to Section 17 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) has been rejected. 2. While assailing the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the learned District Judge has erred in rejecting the petitioner’s application without assigning any reason. In his submissions, for entertaining an application under Section 17 of the Act for setting aside an ex parte decree, according to the proviso, the applicant is required either to deposit the amount due from him under the decree in cash, or to give such security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment as the Court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed. In his submissions, for satisfying the decree, the legislature has given two options subject to the satisfaction of the Court (i) either to deposit the entire decreetal amount in cash (ii) or to furnish security on an application by the applicant as directed by the Court and once the alternate mode is provided under the statute, the Court concerned while exercising its discretionary power must apply his mind before refusing the mode as prayed for by the applicant and directing the party to adopt particular mode. In his submissions, here the petitioner has filed the application praying the Court to permit him to furnish the security because of his very weak financial position as he happens to be a scooter repairing mechanic and will not be able to deposit the entire amount in cash. In that eventuality the Court, vested with the discretionary power, had to exercise its discretion in a judicious manner but here in this case, the learned Judge without adverting to the reasons as stated in the application for seeking permission of the Court to furnish security has outrightly rejected the application with the direction to deposit the entire amount in cash. In his submissions, the learned Judge has failed to exercise his discretion vested in him in a judicious manner by not recording any reason while rejecting the petitioner’s application seeking permission to furnish security. In his submissions, the learned Judge has failed to exercise his discretion vested in him in a judicious manner by not recording any reason while rejecting the petitioner’s application seeking permission to furnish security. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Haji Ahmed v. Abdul Hussein, 1931 (45) ILR 780 and the decision of this Court in Qazi Nemat Ullah v. VIth Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur and others, 1993 (1) ARC 151 . 3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. The facts giving rise to this case are that the respondent has filed SCC Suit No. 27 of 2013 seeking eviction of the petitioner on account of default in payment of rent including house tax and water tax. In this suit, on the basis of publication of notice in the newspaper, the service was deemed to be sufficient upon the petitioner. On 21.5.2014, an order was passed to proceed ex parte. Thereafter the suit was also decreed ex parte on 28.5.2014 assessing the rent to be Rs. 1500/- per month alongwith house tax, water tax liability with 18% interest. The Court has also awarded compensation of Rs. 36,000/- alongwith 9% interest till the date of the delivery of possession. 4. Thereafter Execution Case No. 93 of 2014 was filed and it is thereafter the petitioner came to know about the ex parte decree, on 10.9.2014 and immediately thereafter, he has filed an application under Section 17 read with under Order IX, Rule 13 of Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the ex parte decree. Alongwith the application, the petitioner has also filed an application praying the Court to permit him to furnish security stating therein that the applicant has no cash in hand for satisfying the decree as his only source of earning is repairing of the scooter being mechanic, therefore he may be permitted to furnish security of Rs. 1,0,5000/-. The learned Judge, without adverting to the facts as stated in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the application, has passed the impugned order. 5. For appreciation, the impugned order passed by the learned Judge is reproduced hereinunder : Heard learned counsel for the applicant. Register as S.C.C. Misc. Case. Issue notice to opposite party. Steps for notice by both ways within 5 days. Fix 11.10.2014 for objection and disposal. 5. For appreciation, the impugned order passed by the learned Judge is reproduced hereinunder : Heard learned counsel for the applicant. Register as S.C.C. Misc. Case. Issue notice to opposite party. Steps for notice by both ways within 5 days. Fix 11.10.2014 for objection and disposal. Application 6-C by applicant under Section 17 P.S.C.C. Act with prayer to deposit security equal to amount under decree. Applicant is directed to deposit whole amount under decree in cash in Court. Application 6-C is disposed of accordingly. 6. From the perusal of the above order, it is apparent that the Court has not accepted the prayer of the petitoner to furnish security and issued a direction to deposit the whole amount. In my opinion, order impugned will fall in the ambit of cryptic order. The Apex Court in Sant Lal Gupta and others v. Modern Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited and others, (2010) 13 SCC 336 , has observed as under : “27.....The reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, the order becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity with objectivity. The absence of reasons renders an order indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. Recording of reasons is principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. The person who is adversely affected must know why his application has been rejected. [Vide: State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar, AIR 2004 SC 1794 ; State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal and others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ; Vishnu Dev Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2008) 3 SCC 172 ; Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, Rourkela I Circle and others, (2008) 9 SCC 407 ; State of Uttaranchal and another v. Sunil Kumar Singh Negi, AIR 2008 SC 2026 ; U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Jagdish Prasad Gupta, AIR 2009 SC 2328 ; Ram Phal v. State of Haryana and others, (2009) 3 SCC 258 ; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sada Ram and another, (2009) 4 SCC 422 ; and The Secretary & Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall v. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity and others, AIR 2010 SC 1285 ). Otherwise also, from the bare reading of Section 17 of the Act, which reads as under : 17. Otherwise also, from the bare reading of Section 17 of the Act, which reads as under : 17. Application of the Code of Civil Procedure.—(1) [29][The procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908[30], shall, save in so far as is otherwise provided by that Code or by this Act], be the procedure followed in a Court of Small Causes in all suits cognizable by it and in all proceedings arising out of such suits: Provided that an applicant for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte or for a review of judgement shall, at the time of presenting his application, either deposit in the Court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment, or give [31][such security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment as the Court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed]. ............it transpires that the legislature has prescribed mode for setting aside an ex parte decree or review of a judgment, with a condition either to deposit the amount due from the applicant in cash towards the satisfaction of the decree or to furnish security as directed by the Court on a previous application filed by the applicant seeking permission of the Court to furnish security. The purpose of providing two alternatives has some meaning and in my considered opinion once more than one mode/alternative is provided and the availability of the alternative is dependent on the discretion of the Court in that eventuality the Court has to apply his mind as to whether the alternative sought by the person concerned is genuine and bona fide or not. It is settled principle of law that the statute shall be interpreted in such a manner by which the purpose and object of the statute is achieved. In Raja Ram Mahadeo Paranjype v. Aba Maruti Mali, AIR 1962 SC 753 , where the tenancy had been terminated according to the provisions of the statute and the landlord had applied for an order for possession to the Mamlatdar who is required by the Act ‘to pass order thereon as he deems fit’, the Apex Court held that the Mamlatdar had no discretion to refuse the relief on equitable considerations not covered by the statute. Sarkar J. observed ‘Section 29 (3) only confers power to make an order in terms of the statue, an order which would give effect to a right which the Act has elsewhere conferred. The words ‘as he deems fit’ do not bestow a power to make any order on consideration dehors the statute which the authorities consider best according to their notions of justice. In Chariant International Ltd. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, (2004) 8 SCC 524 , the Apex Court, in context with the words used as “fairly and bona fide”, has held that the wide discretion conferred by these words has to be exercised keeping in view the purpose for which it is conferred. In Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees of Hindusthan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1979 SC 75 , p.78, the Apex Court has held that even where there is not much indication in the Act of the ground upon which discretion is to be exercised it does not mean that its exercise is dependent upon mere fancy of the Court or Tribunal or Authority concerned. It must be exercised in the words of Lord Halsbury “according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion, according to law and not humour, it is to be not arbitrary,vague and fanciful, but legal and regular. In Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar, (2003) 4 SCC 579 , the Apex Court has observed that the authority in which a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it; it must not act under the dictates of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion, it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorized to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be influenced by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily on capriciously. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be influenced by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily on capriciously. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: (i) failure to exercise a discretion, and (ii) excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account, and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 All ER 935, it has been observed that if the power has been exercised on a non-consideration or non-application of mind to relevant factors, the exercise of power will be regarded as manifestly erroneous. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Hazi Ahmed as well as Qazi Nemat Ullah (supra), in that case, it has been emphasized that in case there are substantial compliance within time as provided under Section 17 of the Act with regard to furnish security, the case has to be heard on merit. 8. Here in this case, the learned Judge, while directing the petitioner to deposit the amount in cash ignoring the petitioner’s prayer to permit him to furnish security, has not considered the reasons on which the application was filed for furnishing security, therefore in my considered opinion, the exercise of power is manifestly erroneous and without application of mind. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 11.9.2014 passed by the District Judge Gorakhpur is hereby quashed. The learned District Judge is directed to pass a fresh order on the application of the petitioner in accordance with law. —————