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Allahabad High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 3247 (ALL)

SANJEEV KUMAR v. STATE OF U. P.

2014-10-31

RAJAN ROY

body2014
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rajan Roy, J.—Heard Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Santosh Kumar Srivastava for the petitioners, Sri G.K. Singh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Samir Sharma for the respondents No. 2, 3 and 4 and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent No. 1. 2. The issue involved herein is the entitlement of the petitioners to regularization of their ad hoc services against sanctioned posts in the regular cadre of service in the District Courts and the validity of the orders passed by the concerned District Judge and the High Court, on the Administrative Side, in this regard. 3. The scheme of Fast Track Courts was introduced by the Union of India and funds were allocated for the said purpose by the 11th Finance Commission. The said Courts were created for short duration, which were extended from time to time. Ultimately, the aforesaid arrangement came to an end on 31.3.2011 when the Union of India refused to extend further financial assistance for the said Courts. Thereafter, in some States, the Fast Track Courts have continued and the expenses have been borne by the concerned State Government, whereas in other States, the employees engaged for running of the said Courts have been absorbed in the regular Courts on such terms and conditions as has been deemed fit. 4. An advertisement was issued by the District Judge, Baghpat on 27.5.2003 inviting applications for selection and appointment of Stenographers/Clerks/Typists and Class-IV employees for the Fast Track Courts referred above and in pursuance thereof a selection was held wherein the petitioners participated and on being found fit for the post in question, were selected and appointed on ad hoc basis with a clear stipulation that the post in question were purely temporary and likely to continue for short duration unless abolished earlier and that no lien etc. will be claimed for further appointment on these posts. 5. The Fast Track Courts Scheme continued till 2005 when the same was withdrawn, however, on revival of the said scheme in the same year, the ex-ad hoc employees, such as the petitioners, who were earlier working, were allowed to continue on the same terms and conditions but with the condition that the salary shall be payable only from the date of fresh joining. The earlier period was to be counted for other purposes, except salary. The earlier period was to be counted for other purposes, except salary. This was provided by the Circular of the High Court dated 24.5.2005. The employees of the Fast Track Courts who were declared surplus on account of shifting of such Courts from one judiciary to another, were to be considered for absorption as per the Circular dated 27.7.1994. 6. On 28.8.2010, a Government Order was sent by the State Government to the Registrar General of the Allahabad High Court communicating extension of the Fast Track Courts w.e.f. 1.6.2010 to 28.2.2011 subject to the terms and conditions mentioned therein. The said Government Order also mentioned that Union of India vide its letter dated 9.8.2010 had informed that the financial assistance provided by it for the Fast Track Courts for the period up to 31.3.2011, was limited to 480 lacs per year and any expenditure beyond it will have to be borne by the State Government, therefore, the High Court should consider keeping the post of Presiding Officer vacant as and when the incumbent relinquishes the post on account of promotion or other such reason and not to fill up the same and also to absorb the supporting staff elsewhere. 7. On 18.3.2011, a Circular was issued by the Registrar General, High Court, Allahabad to all the District Judges in the State to the effect that if they wanted to make appointments in the regular establishment of Class III and IV of their judgeship, they will leave vacant or keep reserved posts for the purpose of adjustment of the employees of the Fast Track Courts working in their judgeship. 8. On 31.3.2011, presumably, consequent to the refusal of the Union of India to extend further financial assistance for such Courts, a Government Order was sent by the State Government to the Registrar General, Allahabad High Court regarding creation of 780 ex-cadre posts for speedy disposal of cases for the period 1.4.2011 to 29.3.2012 unless abolished earlier. These posts were created subject to the condition that as and when the regular posts in the regular cadre fall vacant, the aforesaid ex-cadre posts shall be adjusted/absorbed against said posts and thereafter, the vacancy shall be filled up in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Rules. On 1.4.2011, the Registrar General communicated the Government Order dated 31.3.2011 to all the District and Sessions Judges in the State of U.P. For necessary action. On 1.4.2011, the Registrar General communicated the Government Order dated 31.3.2011 to all the District and Sessions Judges in the State of U.P. For necessary action. The Ad hoc employees of the Fast Track Courts were continued against these ex-cadre post, albeit on Ad hoc basis. 9. The records reveal that in view of the letter of the Registrar General dated 1.4.2011 and the G.O. Dated 31.3.2011 referred therein, a representation was submitted by the petitioners and others for their absorption/regularization, whereupon a Screening Committee was constituted by District Judge vide order dated 12.2.2013, which recommended their absorption/regularization vide undated report, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure 12 to the writ petition. 10. Consequent to the report submitted by the Screening/Grievance Committee, the District Judge, Baghpat issued an order dated 23.5.2013 regularising the services of the petitioners herein allegedly against vacant posts in the regular cadre of the judgeship. 11. Thereafter, on 26.11.2013, the Grievance Committee submitted another report recommending confirmation of the petitioners on the respective posts in the service, which was approved by the District Judge on the same date. 12. Based on another report of the Grievance Committee dated 2.2.2014, the petitioners were granted the first financial upgradation from respective dates on completion of 10 years satisfactory service, including the ad hoc services rendered by them and the same was approved by the District Judge on 2.7.2014. 13. On 30.8.2014, the Joint Registrar (Judicial) (Inspection), Allahabad High Court issued a letter to the District Judge, Baghpat communicating him the decision of the High Court to the District Judges asking them to re-visit the order of regularization/absorption and to bring the same in conformity with the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnatka v. Uma Devi, 2006 (4) SCC 1 and to issue a show-cause-notice to the employees concerned to explain as to why orders of regularization/absorption may not be withdrawn and after considering their reply suitable orders may be passed. It was made clear that these employees of Fast Track Courts, shall not go out of employment because of withdrawal of order of regularization/absorption. They were to be continued till regular appointments are made against the posts, on same terms and conditions as they were working prior to the issuance of the orders of regularization/absorption. 14. It was made clear that these employees of Fast Track Courts, shall not go out of employment because of withdrawal of order of regularization/absorption. They were to be continued till regular appointments are made against the posts, on same terms and conditions as they were working prior to the issuance of the orders of regularization/absorption. 14. In pursuance to the aforesaid, the District Judge, Baghpat issued notices to the petitioners who submitted their replies. It appears that a report was sought from the Administrative Committee of the judgeship, which was submitted on 8.9.2014, based thereon, the impugned order dated 9.9.2014 was passed restoring their status and service, as it was, prior to the passing of orders of regularization/absorption on 23.5.2013 and 30.8.2013 and continuing them as such on ad hoc basis. Thus, the order regularising their services and those granting consequential benefits have been rendered inoperative. 15. Being aggrieved by this order dated 9.9.2014, the petitioners have approached this Court. 16. The contention of Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel is that the appointments of the petitioners was made after due advertisement and selection based on open competition, albeit, on ad hoc basis, therefore, it can neither be termed as illegal nor irregular appointment. It can also not be termed as back door entry. He further contended that the genesis of the dictum of the Supreme Court in Uma Devi’s case was appointments made without any advertisement and selection i.e. through back door and the observations contained therein have to be understood in this background. As, by no stretch of imagination, the entry of the petitioners in the service of the Fast Track Courts can be termed as back door entry, therefore, the observations contained in Uma Devi’s case regarding dis-entitlement of such appointees to regularization are not attracted to their case. The petitioners possessed the requisite qualification for the respective posts and went through a process of selection, which was in consonance with the requirements of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, therefore, the District Judge, rightly regularized their services and absorbed them in terms of the letter of the High Court dated 1.4.2011 and the Government Order dated 31.3.2011, which, according to him contained a decision for absorption/regularization of such employees in the regular cadre of the District Courts. Learned counsel also placed reliance upon Paragraph 53 of the judgement in Uma Devi’s Case as elucidated further in the case State of Jharkhand v. Mamal Prasad, 2014 (7) SCC 223 , in support of his contention that the petitioners having completed more than 10 years of service and their initial appointments neither being illegal nor through back door, their services were rightly regularized. 17. Learned counsel contended that the direction of the High Court vide letter dated 30.8.2014 to the District Judge to re-visit the order of regularization and issue show-cause-notice to the concerned employees etc. amounted to an encroachment upon the authority of the District Judge to take an independent decision in the matter thereby reducing the entire exercise to a mechanical formality indicative of pre-determination, on the part of the respondents, of the issue. The High Court did not give any reason as to how there was a violation of Uma Devi’s case. The consequential order of cancellation of regularization passed by the District Judge on 9.9.2014 is also not sustainable as he has merely mechanically followed the dictates of the High Court without considering the reply submitted by the petitioners to show-cause-notice and without considering and mentioning as to how the dictum in Uma Devi’s case has been violated in the matter of the petitioners. The learned counsel contended that the petitioners have not only been regularized in service but also confirmed and granted the first promotional pay scale, therefore, the impugned action is unjustified, unreasonable and illegal. 18. The learned Senior Counsel invited the attention of the Court to the Government Order dated 31.3.2011 and the Circular of the High Court dated 1.4.2011 as also the letter of the High Court dated 18.3.2011 by which the District Judges were directed to keep the posts in the regular cadre reserved for adjustment of the employees of the Fast Track Courts working in the judgeship, as well as various other documents which have already been referred to hereinabove. 19. Sri G.K. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 submitted that the petitioners were never appointed substantively against any sanctioned post in the regular cadre of the District Courts. 19. Sri G.K. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 submitted that the petitioners were never appointed substantively against any sanctioned post in the regular cadre of the District Courts. He referred to the advertisement annexed with the writ petition to show that the selection on the basis of which the petitioners were appointed, was for Fast Track Courts, that too, on ad hoc basis, wherein, even retired employees could participate. The Fast Track Courts were created for short duration. He referred to the Government Order dated 31.3.2011, to show that the same only spoke of absorption of ex-cadre posts against the regular vacancies in the regular cadre of the District Courts but it does not speak of absorption of incumbents thereof. The petitioners were made to work against ex cadre posts only on ad hoc basis and not on regular basis. No such decision was taken by the State Government or by the High Court to confer status of regular or permanent employee upon the petitioners. The Circular dated 1.4.2011 of the High Court and the G.O. dated 31.3.2011 were misconstrued and misread by the District Judge, Baghpat resulting in an illegal exercise of regularization of services of the petitioners, an error which has now been rectified. There was no provision of law under which the District Judge could have passed the order of regularization of services of the petitioners. There was no policy decision of the Competent Authority for regularization of employees such as the petitioners. The District Judge clearly exceeded his power. 20. He further contended that the reliance placed by the petitioners on Paragraph 53 of the judgement of the Supreme Court in Uma Devi’s case is misplaced as the said paragraph has been considered and explained by it in a subsequent judgement in M.L. Kesri’s case reported in (2010) 9 SCC 247 , wherein, it has been held that period of 10 years of service should have been completed, on the date of decision in the Uma Devi’s case i.e. 10.4.2006. As the petitioners herein had not completed 10 years of service on the said date they were not entitled to be regularized even as per the exception carved out in Para 53 of the dictum of the Supreme Court in Uma Devi’s case. As the petitioners herein had not completed 10 years of service on the said date they were not entitled to be regularized even as per the exception carved out in Para 53 of the dictum of the Supreme Court in Uma Devi’s case. The reliance placed by the petitioners upon the judgement reported in 2014 (7) SCC 2 is also misplaced as it only follows M.L. Kesri’s case and does not overrule it. Both the judgements have to be read and understood in harmony. The employees in the latter case had completed 10 years of service prior to the decision in Uma Devi’s case. In nut shell, the submission was that the orders of regularization were contrary to the dictum of the Supreme Court in Uma Devi’s Case, therefore, remedial measures have been taken which do not suffer from any error. 21. No doubt the petitioners were appointed after Advertisement and after going through a process of selection but indisputably, the petitioners were not appointed against regular posts in the regular cadre of the Judgeship of District, Baghpat. A perusal of the advertisement and other documents relating to their selection and appointment leaves no doubt that their appointment was for working in the Fast Track Courts, which had been created for short duration, that too, purely on ad hoc basis without any right to claim any further appointment on regular basis. The appointment was not a regular appointment nor against a regular sanctioned post in the regular Class III and IV cadre in the judgeship of District Baghpat. The petitioners from the very date of their entry in the service of the Fast Track Courts knew the nature of their appointment, the duration of the Scheme of Fast Track Courts and also the limitations of the terms and conditions of service of such appointments, yet they chose to accept the same. 22. In this context reference may be made to Paragraph 45 of the judgement in Uma Devi’s Case, which reads as under: “While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularised or made permanent, the Courts are swayed by the fact that the person concerned has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain— not at arm’s length—since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the Court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the Court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succour to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not (sic) one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.” 23. Paragraph 19 of the aforesaid judgement is also relevant, which reads as under: “One aspect arises. Obviously, the State is also controlled by economic considerations and financial implications of any public employment. The viability of the department or the instrumentality of the project is also of equal concern for the State. The State works out the scheme taking into consideration the financial implications and the economic aspects. Can the Court impose on the State a financial burden of this nature by insisting on regularisation or permanence in employment, when those employed temporarily are not needed permanently or regularly? As an example, we can envisage a direction to give permanent employment to all those who are being temporarily or casually employed in a public sector undertaking. The burden may become so heavy by such a direction that the undertaking itself may collapse under its own weight. It is not as if this had not happened. So, the Court ought not to impose a financial burden on the State by such directions, as such directions may turn counterproductive.” 24. In paragraph 43, the Constitution Bench held as under: “Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, which we have described as ‘litigious employment’ in the earlier part of the judgement, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The Courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates.” 25. Paragraph 47 of the said judgement reads as under: “47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post.” 26. The Constitution Bench held that such employees do not have any enforceable right of regularization of their services nor of being declared permanent. 27. Having said so, the Supreme Court carved out an exception in Para 53 thereby permitting, as a one time measure, the regularization of such employees irregularly appointed (not illegally appointed) who have completed 10 years or more of service without intervention of the order of the Courts/Tribunal and were duly qualified persons appointed against duly sanctioned vacant posts. 28. The Purport of Paragraph 53 has been clarified by the Supreme Court in a subsequent judgement in M.L. Kesri’s case (supra) wherein Their Lordships have held that the period of 10 years of continuous service referred in para 53 of Uma Devi’s case should be before the date of decision in Uma Devi i.e. 10.4.2006. 28. The Purport of Paragraph 53 has been clarified by the Supreme Court in a subsequent judgement in M.L. Kesri’s case (supra) wherein Their Lordships have held that the period of 10 years of continuous service referred in para 53 of Uma Devi’s case should be before the date of decision in Uma Devi i.e. 10.4.2006. The said Paragraph 53 has also been considered in the subsequent judgement in State of Jharkhand v. Kamal Prasad, 2014 (7) SCC 223 , relied upon by the petitioners and on a perusal of the same, I find that the dictum of M.L. Kesri’s case, has not been deviated from, in any manner. Thus, on a conjoint reading of both the judgements, the requirements of 10 or more years of service before the date of decision in Uma Devi’s Case still holds good. 29. It is not out of place to mention that the Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider the issue of regularization of ad hoc judges appointed in the Fast Track Courts in the case of Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India and others, 2012 (6) SCC 502 , wherein their Lordships after considering the dictum in Uma Devi’s Case (supra), held that such appointees of the Fast Track Courts did not have any enforceable right of regularization of their services, however, in Para 207.9, in exercise of their powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, they gave an opportunity to such appointees for regular appointment in the regular cadre, subject to the terms and conditions mentioned therein. 30. Reference may be made in this regard to Paras 76, 172, 173, 174, 181 and 207 of the said judgement, which read as under: “76. Upon an analysis of the abovestated Rules relating to the different States, the appointment letters issued to the appointees and the methodology that was adopted for appointment of the FTC Judges, it becomes clear that the appointees cannot be said to have any legal, much less an indefeasible right to the posts in question. Firstly, the posts themselves were temporary, as they were created under and within the ambit and scope of the FTC Scheme sponsored by the Union of India, which was initially made only for a limited period of five years. Now, financing of the FTC Scheme has already been stopped by the Central Government with effect from 31.3.2011. Firstly, the posts themselves were temporary, as they were created under and within the ambit and scope of the FTC Scheme sponsored by the Union of India, which was initially made only for a limited period of five years. Now, financing of the FTC Scheme has already been stopped by the Central Government with effect from 31.3.2011. No permanent posts were ever created. In other words, their appointments were temporary appointments against temporary posts. 172. The prayer for regularisation of service and absorption of the petitioner appointees against the vacancies appearing in the regular cadre has been made not only in cases involving the case of the State of Orissa, but even in other States. Absorption in service is not a right. Regularisation also is not a statutory or a legal right enforceable by the persons appointed under different rules to different posts. Regularisation shall depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case as well as the relevant rules applicable to such class of persons. 173. As already noticed, on earlier occasions also, this Court has declined the relief of regularisation of the persons and workmen who had been appointed against a particular scheme or project. A Constitution Bench of this Court has clearly stated the principle that in matters of public employment, absorption, regularisation or permanent continuance of temporary, contractual or casual daily wage or ad hoc employees appointed and continued for long in such public employment would be dehors the constitutional scheme of public employment and would be improper. It would also not be proper to stay the regular recruitment process for the posts concerned. [Refer to Umadevi (3)] 174. It is not not necessary for us to deliberate on this issue all over again in view of the above discussion. Suffice it to notice that the petitioner appointees have no right to the posts in question as the posts themselves were temporary and were bound to come to an end by efflux of time. With reference to the letters of their appointment and the Rules under which the same were issued, it is clear that these petitioners cannot claim any indefeasible right either to regularisation or absorption. It may also be noticed that under the Orissa Superior Judicial Service and Judicial Service Rules, 2007, there is no provision for absorption or regularisation of ad hoc Judges. 181. It may also be noticed that under the Orissa Superior Judicial Service and Judicial Service Rules, 2007, there is no provision for absorption or regularisation of ad hoc Judges. 181. The issues arising for the consideration of this Court under this head, though ancillary, are of significant importance. Having held that the petitioner appointees to FTCs do not have any right to the post and such appointments were temporary, ad hoc and on urgent basis for a limited period, we have yet to examine whether these petitioners would at all be entitled to some relief within the framework of law, with particular reference to certain constitutional provisions. 207. Without any intent to interfere with the policy decision taken by the Government, but unmistakably, to protect the guarantees of Article 21 of the Constitution, to improve the justice delivery system and fortify the independence of judiciary, while ensuring the attainment of constitutional goals as well as to do complete justice to the lis before us, in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution, we pass the following orders and directions: 207.1. Being a policy decision which has already taken effect, we decline to strike down the policy decision of the Union of India vide Letter dated 14.9.2010 not to finance the FTC Scheme beyond 31.3.2011. 207.2. All the States which have taken a policy decision to continue the FTC Scheme beyond 31.3.2011 shall adhere to the respective dates as announced, for example in the cases of States of Orissa (March 2013), Haryana (March 2016), Andhra Pradesh (March 2012) and Rajasthan (February 2013). 207.3. The States which are in the process of taking a policy decision on whether or not to continue the FTC Scheme as a permanent feature of administration of justice in the respective States are free to take such a decision. 207.4. It is directed that all the States, henceforth, shall not take a decision to continue the FTC Scheme on ad hoc and temporary basis. The States are at liberty to decide but only with regard either to bring the FTC Scheme to an end or to continue the same as a permanent feature in the State. 207.5. 207.4. It is directed that all the States, henceforth, shall not take a decision to continue the FTC Scheme on ad hoc and temporary basis. The States are at liberty to decide but only with regard either to bring the FTC Scheme to an end or to continue the same as a permanent feature in the State. 207.5. The Union of India and the State Government shall reallocate and utilise the funds apportioned by the 13th Finance Commission and/or make provisions for such additional funds to ensure regularisation of the FTC Judges in the manner indicated and/or for creation of additional Courts as directed in this judgement. 207.6. All the decisions taken and recommendations made at the Chief Justices and Chief Ministers’ Conference shall be placed before the Cabinet of the Centre or the State, as the case may be, which alone shall have the authority to finally accept, modify or decline the implementation of such decisions and, that too, upon objective consideration and for valid reasons. Let the minutes of the Conference of 2009, at least now, be placed before the Cabinet within three months from the date of pronouncement of this judgement for its information and appropriate action. 207.7. No decision, recommendation or proposal made by the Chief Justices and Chief Minsters’ Conference shall be rejected or declined or varied at any bureaucratic level, in the hierarchy of the Governments, whether in the State or the Centre. 207.8. We hereby direct that it shall be for the Central Government to provide funds for carrying out the directions contained in this judgement and, if necessary, by re-allocation of funds already allocated under the 13th Finance Commission for Judiciary. We further direct that for creation of additional 10 per cent posts of the existing cadre, the burden shall be equally shared by the Centre and the State Governments and funds be provided without any undue delay so that the Courts can be established as per the schedule directed in this judgement 207.9. We further direct that for creation of additional 10 per cent posts of the existing cadre, the burden shall be equally shared by the Centre and the State Governments and funds be provided without any undue delay so that the Courts can be established as per the schedule directed in this judgement 207.9. All the persons who have been appointed by way of direct recruitment from the Bar as Judges to preside over the FTCs under the FTC Scheme shall be entitled to be appointed to the regular cadre of the Higher Judicial Services of the respective State only in the following manner : (a) The direct recruits to the FTCs who opt for regularization shall take a written examination to be conducted by the High Courts of the respective States for determining their suitability for absorption in the regular cadre of Additional District Judges. (b) Thereafter, they shall be subjected to an interview by a Selection Committee consisting of the Chief Justice and four senior-most Judges of that High Court. (c) There shall be 150 marks for the written examination and 100 marks for the interview. The qualifying marks shall be 40 per cent aggregate for general candidates and 35 per cent for SC/ST/OBC candidates. The examination and interview shall be held in accordance with the relevant Rules enacted by the States for direct appointment to Higher Judicial Services. (d) Each of the appointees shall be entitled to one mark per year of service in the FTCs, which shall form part of the interview marks. (e) Needless to point out that this examination and interview should be conducted by the respective High Courts keeping in mind that all these applicants have put in a number of years as FTC Judges and have served the country by administering Justice in accordance with law. The written examination and interview module, should, thus, be framed keeping in mind the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases. (f) The candidates who qualify the written examination and obtain consolidated percentage as afore-indicated shall be appointed to the post of Additional District Judge in the regular cadre of the State. (g) If, for any reason, vacancies are not available in the regular cadre, we hereby direct the State Governments to create such additional vacancies as may be necessary keeping in view the number of candidates selected. (g) If, for any reason, vacancies are not available in the regular cadre, we hereby direct the State Governments to create such additional vacancies as may be necessary keeping in view the number of candidates selected. (h) All sitting and/or former FTC Judges who were directly appointed from the Bar and are desirous of taking the examination and interview for regular appointment shall be given age relaxation. No application shall be rejected on the ground of age of the applicant being in excess of the prescribed age. 207.10. The members of the Bar who have directly been appointed but whose services were either dispensed with or terminated on the ground of doubtful integrity, unsatisfactory work or against whom, on any other ground, disciplinary action had been taken, shall not be eligible to the benefits stated in clause 5 of the judgement. 207.11. Keeping in view the need of the hour and the Constitutional mandate to provide fair and expeditious trial to all litigants and the citizens of the country, we direct the respective States and the Central Government to create 10 per cent of the total regular cadre of the State as additional posts within three months from today and take up the process for filling such additional vacancies as per the Higher Judicial Service and Judicial Services Rules of that State, immediately thereafter. 207.12. These directions, of course, are in addition to and not in derogation of the recommendations that may be made by the Law Commission of India and any other order which may be passed by the Courts of competent jurisdiction, in other such matters. 207.13. The candidates from any State, who were promoted as FTC Judges from the post of Civil Judge, Senior Division having requisite experience in service, shall be entitled to be absorbed and remain promoted to the Higher Judicial Services of that State subject to : (a) Such promotion, when effected against the 25 per cent quota for out-of-turn promotion on merit, in accordance with the judgement of this Court in the case of All India Judges’ Association (2002) (supra), by taking and being selected through the requisite examination, as contemplated for out-of-turn promotion. (b) If the appointee has the requisite seniority and is entitled to promotion against 25 per cent quota for promotion by seniority--cum-merit, he shall be promoted on his own turn to the Higher Judicial Services without any written examination. (b) If the appointee has the requisite seniority and is entitled to promotion against 25 per cent quota for promotion by seniority--cum-merit, he shall be promoted on his own turn to the Higher Judicial Services without any written examination. (c) While considering candidates either under category (a) or (b) above, due weightage shall be given to the fact that they have already put in a number of years in service in the Higher Judicial Services and, of course, with reference to their performance. (d) All other appointees in this category, in the event of discontinuation of the FTC Scheme, would revert to their respective posts in the appropriate cadre.” 31. The aforesaid judgement has been followed in the case of Mahesh Chandra Varma v. State of Jharkhand, 2012 (11) SCC 656 , wherein a similar issue regarding regularization of ad hoc judges of Fast Track Courts in the regular cadre of the Higher Judiciary was under consideration. 32. The terms and conditions of Class III employees in the District Courts in the State of U.P. are governed by Rules known as The Subordinate Courts Ministerial Establishment Rule, 1947, and those of Class IV employees are governed by the Rules known as The U.P. Subordinate Civil Courts Inferior Establishment Rules, 1955. The aforesaid rules do not contain any provision for regularisation nor is it mentioned as a mode of recruitment therein. 33. It is not out of context to refer to the U.P. Regularization of Ad hoc Appointments (on posts outside the purview of Public Service Commission) Rules, 1979 as amended from time to time, which contains a provision for regularization of ad hoc appointments and Rule 4 thereof provides a cut off date i.e. 30.6.1998, thus, only those who are directly appointed on ad hoc basis on or after the said date were eligible for consideration for regularization subject to other conditions mentioned therein. Indisputably, the petitioners herein have been appointed subsequent to 30.6.1998, that too, not against a post in the regular cadre, therefore, they are not covered by the aforesaid regularization Rule, 1979. 34. The validity of the impugned orders is to be considered against the aforesaid factual and legal background. 35. Indisputably, the petitioners herein have been appointed subsequent to 30.6.1998, that too, not against a post in the regular cadre, therefore, they are not covered by the aforesaid regularization Rule, 1979. 34. The validity of the impugned orders is to be considered against the aforesaid factual and legal background. 35. The petitioners have not been able to place before the Court any decision of the State Government or the High Court whereby such ad hoc employees of Fast Track Courts were ordered to be absorbed on regular basis against regularly sanctioned posts in regular cadres of the judgeship or for regularisation of their services. 36. The District Judge passed the order dated 23.5.2013 regularising the services of the petitioners only on the basis of G.O. Dated 31.3.2011 and Letter of High Court dated 1.4.2011. 37. I have care fully perused the G.O. dated 31.3.11, the Circular of the High Court dated 1.4.2011 and 18.3.2011. None of the said orders provide for absorption/regularization of the petitioners in the regular cadre. In fact G.O. dated 31.3.2011 speaks of adjustments of the ex-cadre posts against regular vacancies in the regular cadre and the need to fill up the same as per the prescribed procedure (not regularization/absorption of ad hoc employees of Fast Track Courts). None of the said orders justify the regularization of the services of the petitioners in the regular cadre of the judgeship. The District Judge clearly misconstrued the said orders and treated them to be orders for regularization/absorption of such employees in the regular cadre and erroneously proceeded to regularize the services of the petitioners, therefore, the orders of regularization of service of the petitioners issued by the District Judge on 23.5.2013 were bereft of any sustainable factual and legal basis, therefore illegal. 38. There was no provision under which their services could have been regularized as was done by the District Judge. 39. The petitioners herein were ad hoc employees engaged for short duration in a Scheme of Fast Track Courts which itself was temporary, therefore, in view of the dictum of the Supreme Court in Uma Devi’s case and Brij Mohan Lal’s Case, as quoted hereinabove, they did not have any enforceable right for regularization/absorption of their services. 39. The petitioners herein were ad hoc employees engaged for short duration in a Scheme of Fast Track Courts which itself was temporary, therefore, in view of the dictum of the Supreme Court in Uma Devi’s case and Brij Mohan Lal’s Case, as quoted hereinabove, they did not have any enforceable right for regularization/absorption of their services. They had not completed 10 years of service on the date of decision in Uma Devi’s case i.e. 10.4.2006, therefore, in view of the pronouncement in M.L. Kesri’s case they were also not covered by the exception carved out in Paragraph 53 thereof. 40. Thus, even if, the letter of the High Court dated 30.8.2014 does not spell out in clear terms the violation of the dictum in Uma Devi’s case and the decision of the District Judge dated 9.9.2014 also does not do so, but, in view of the apparent factual and legal position and the discussion made hereinabove, as, the only possible conclusion is that the regularization of the services of the petitioners was not permissible and it was in violation of the dictum of the Supreme Court in Uma Devi’s case, I do not find any valid ground for interfering with the impugned orders. Reference may be made in this regard to the dictum of the Supreme Court : M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237 , wherein their Lordships have observed as under: “ .......If the High Court had quashed the said order, it would have restored an illegal order - it would have given the Health Centre to a village contrary to the valid resolutions passed by the Panchayat Samithi........................... The above case is a clear authority for the proposition that it is not always necessary for the Court to strike down an order merely because the order has been passed against the petitioner in breach of natural justice. The Court can under Article 32 or Article 226 refuse to exercise its discretion of striking down the order if such striking down will result in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite party, in violation of the principles of natural justice or is otherwise not in accordance with law.” 41. The Court can under Article 32 or Article 226 refuse to exercise its discretion of striking down the order if such striking down will result in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite party, in violation of the principles of natural justice or is otherwise not in accordance with law.” 41. In the aforesaid background, the High Court cannot be faulted for having issued the letter dated 30.8.2014 to the District Judge, Baghpat for taking remedial measures in conformity with the dictum of the Supreme Court. The District Judge can also not be faulted for having acted in conformity thereof nor for cancelling orders of regularization after issuing show-cause-notice to them. 42. Having said so, I am also of the view that the High Court does not appear to have considered the judgment of the Supreme Court in Brij Mohan Lal’s Case (supra), specially Paragraph 207.9 thereof, whereby direct recruit ad hoc judges of Fast Track Courts were ordered to be considered for regular appointment/regularisation subject to the terms and conditions mentioned therein. As both judges and employees of Fast Track Courts were part of the same Scheme, in my view, there is no reason as to why they should be treated differently, therefore, I am of the view that the respondents may consider the case of the petitioners for grant of such benefits as has been extended by the Supreme Court in Brij Mohan Lal’s Case (supra) to the Fast Track Courts’ Judges vide paragraph 207.9 thereof, subject to such variations as may be necessary, unless there are exceptional and compelling reasons for not extending such benefit to them. 43. Subject to the above, the writ petition is dismissed. —————