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2014 DIGILAW 325 (MP)

Ramesh Kumar Jain v. Pradeep Kumar Jain

2014-03-24

SUJOY PAUL

body2014
ORDER 1. The respondent No.1 / plaintiff filed a suit against the petitioner and respondent No.2 for declaration and injunction. In the said suit, an application under Order 7 rule 11 CPC was filed by the present petitioner on 21.11.2011. The Court below by the order dated 26.4.2012 (Annexure P/3) decided the said application. 2. It is contended by Shri D.D. Bansal, learned counsel for the petitioner, that a plain reading of this order makes it clear that Court below has given a specific finding that all reliefs of the suit are not properly valued by the plaintiff and proper court-fees is not paid by him and therefore, the plaintiff was directed to properly value his suit and deposit the necessary court-fees. It is contended that by order dated 27.6.2012, the Court again passed an order and opined that presently the plaintiff may pay the fees as mentioned in the said order. Thereafter, petitioner filed another application under Order 7 rule 11 CPC (Annexure P/5). In this application, it is stated by the petitioner that plaintiff has not complied with the order dated 27.6.2012 and therefore, the provisions of Order 7 rule 11 CPC are applicable and therefore, suit be dismissed. The plaintiff filed its reply on 9.8.2012 (Annexure P/6). The Court below by the impugned order dated 5.12.2012 rejected the same application by holding that on different dates orders were passed for the purpose of proper valuation of the suit. The issue No. 4 is specifically framed on the question of valuation and therefore, at this stage application deserves to be dismissed. 3. Shri D.D. Bansal further submits that a plain reading of the order dated 26.4.2012 and 27.6.2012 makes it clear that Court below has given specific finding that the valuation by the plaintiff was not proper and therefore, he was required to pay the necessary fees. Since petitioner has not done the same, Court below has erred in passing the impugned order. Shri D.D. Bansal further submits that if the nature of the relief claimed in the plaint is examined, it will be clear that plaintiff is required to pay separate court-fees. 4. Per Contra, Shri N.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the other side supported the order and submitted that there is no infirmity in the order which warrants interference under Article 227 by this Court. 5. 4. Per Contra, Shri N.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the other side supported the order and submitted that there is no infirmity in the order which warrants interference under Article 227 by this Court. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. The Court below decided the earlier application filed by the petitioner on 21.11.2011 by order dated 26.4.2012. While deciding the earlier application preferred under Order 7 rule 11 CPC, the Court below opined that valuation made by the plaintiff is not proper and therefore, directed the plaintiff to properly value his suit and pay proper court-fees. The Court below opined that at present the plaintiff may pay certain amount of court-fees which is mentioned in the order itself. It is not in dispute that plaintiff has already paid the said amount. The grievance put forth by Shri Bansal is that considering the nature of relief claimed in the suit, the plaintiff is required to pay higher amount of fees and should have deposited the same. The Court below has rejected the application on the ground that on five different dates, the Court has passed orders regarding valuation and payment of court-fees. On 24.9.2012, the Court below opined that it cannot be said that plaintiff presently has not properly valued his suit. Thereafter it was held by the Court below that considering the stand of the parties, issues No. 4 has already been framed. This issue will be decided after recording the evidence of the parties. 7. The order dated 27.6.2012 makes it clear that Court itself provisionally fixed the court-fees and directed the plaintiff to pay the same. Issue, in specific, is framed regarding the valuation and court-fees. The rejection of application of the petitioner is on the ground that grievance of the petitioner can be redressed by deciding the said issue. In the opinion of this Court, the Court below has given a plausible reason. The order of Court below cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. 8. The scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited. If order is shown to be passed by a Court having no jurisdiction, it suffers from manifest procedural impropriety or perversity, interference can be made. Interference is made to ensure that Courts below act within the bounds of their authority. Another view is possible, is not a ground for interference. If order is shown to be passed by a Court having no jurisdiction, it suffers from manifest procedural impropriety or perversity, interference can be made. Interference is made to ensure that Courts below act within the bounds of their authority. Another view is possible, is not a ground for interference. Interference can be made sparingly for the said purpose and not for correcting error of facts and law in a routine manner. 9. In Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [ (2010) 8 SCC 329 ], the apex Court held as under :- 49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of Tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it? in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over t?e orders of Court or Tribunal subor?inate to it. Iv cases where an alternative statutory mode of re?ressal has been provi??d, t?at woul? also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid Shalini Shyam Shetty down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid Shalini Shyam Shetty down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the Tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India , reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgment by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amen?ment of a rat??r cognate provision, like section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 10. In the present case, I find no ingredient on which interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is warranted. Resultantly, petition is dismissed. No Costs.