Judgment 1. The petitioner was appointed as Grade II Police Constable on 16.4.1997 and the petitioner was upgraded as Grade – I.P.C., in 2007 and further upgraded as Head Constable in April, 2014. A criminal case was registered against the petitioner in Crime No.2/2003 on the file of Dhali Police Station, Tiruppur District, for offence under Section 304(b) IPC for having driven his wife to commit suicide by demanding dowry. Therefore, a departmental proceedings was initiated against the petitioner by issuing a charge memo under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, levelling two charges, firstly, demanding dowry of a house or a sum of Rs.3 lakh by cash, he has ill-treated his wife and therefore, the wife committed suicide unable to bear the cruelty and dowry harassment and secondly, a case has been registered against him in Crime No.2/2013 for offence under section 304(B) IPC and by his conduct, he has brought disrepute to the department and he absconded from 11.01.2003 without getting any permission or leave for the purpose of avoiding arrest in Crime No.2/2013. During pendency of the departmental proceedings, criminal trial also proceeded with and he was acquitted by judgment dated 12.10.2004. Nevertheless, the departmental proceedings continued and during departmental proceedings, evidence was let in by the department to prove the dowry harassment by examining 9 witnesses and the enquiry officer found him guilty and that was accepted and he was imposed punishment of pay reduction by two stages for two years with cumulative effect and the punishment of reduction shall operate to postpone his future increment for two years by order dated 25.5.2005 issued by the Superintendent of Police. That order has become final. 2. The father of the deceased, namely, the father-in-law of the petitioner, who was the de-facto complainant in Crime No.2/2003, filed a Criminal Revision Case No.1880 of 2004 before this Court against the order of acquittal in S.C.No.311 of 2003 on the file of the Sessions Judge, Magalir Neethi Mandram, Coimbatore District and so also the brother of the deceased filed Criminal Revision Case No.1907 of 2014. This Court, after hearing both the cases together, by common order dated 31.1.2013 set aside the order of acquittal and ordered retrial. This Court, after hearing both the cases together, by common order dated 31.1.2013 set aside the order of acquittal and ordered retrial. Thereafter, retrial was conducted by the Magalir Neethi Mandram, Tiruppur in S.C.No.88 of 2013 and in that retrial, the petitioner was found guilty for offence under Section 306 IPC and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 5 years with a fine of Rs.10,000/-and he filed an appeal against the conviction before this Court in Criminal Appeal No.293 of 2014 and he also applied for suspension of the substantial sentence. Thereafter, on the basis of the conviction in the criminal case, he was issued with a show cause notice by the respondent by invoking PSO 59(1) under rule 3(c)(i)(1) of TNPSS (D & A) Rules 1955 calling for his explanation as to why a major penalty should not be imposed on him as per the rules stipulated in Police Standing Order for having convicted in the criminal case. He submitted his explanation stating that he applied for suspension of sentence. Without considering the same, an order of dismissal was passed on 23.6.2014 and this order is challenged in this Writ Petition. 3. Mr. K.Vekataramani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that punishment imposed by the respondent dismissing the petitioner from service on the ground that he was convicted by the Criminal Court cannot be sustained as it amounts to double jeopardy and the conviction order was passed without following the principles of natural justice and is also against the rule of TNPSS (D&A) Rules. He also submitted that earlier the respondent issued proceedings in PR No.31/2003 for the very same charges that he ill-treated his wife by demanding dowry and therefore, she committed suicide and the case was registered against the petitioner for offence under Section 304(b) IPC and he also brought disrepute to the department. In that enquiry, witnesses were examined to prove the guilt of the petitioner and all the witnesses deposed to the effect that he demanded dowry and ill-treated his wife and drove her to commit suicide and on the basis of the enquiry report, he was imposed with the punishment of pay reduction by two stages for two years with cumulative effect. During that time, a criminal case was pending and he was initially acquitted but, on the revision case filed by the defacto complainant, retrial was ordered and in the retrial, he was convicted for the same offence and he was dismissed from service after issuing a show cause notice and therefore, it is a case of double jeopardy and relied upon the judgment reported in 2009 (4) MLJ 708 [D.Narayanan vs. District Revenue Officer, Virudhunagar] and also the judgment rendered in W.P.No.13119 of 2009 dated 02.08.2010 in the matter of K.Nagamanickam vs. The Sub Collector, Pollachi and another, in support of his contention. 4. Mr.A.Kumar, learned Special Government Pleader, reiterating the allegations made in the counter affidavit submitted that he was punished in the earlier disciplinary proceedings, and punishment was on the ground of bringing disrepute to the department by his involvement in the criminal case by driving his wife to commit suicide by demanding dowry, but the present misconduct is on the basis of conviction by the criminal court and therefore, both cannot be said to be on the same grounds and relying upon a Full Bench judgment of this Court reported in (2008) 2 MLJ 1203 in the matter of Manikandan and others Vs. Chairman, Tamil Nadu Uniformed Services, Recruitment Board, Chennai and others, and submitted that it is not a case of double jeopardy and therefore, the punishment of dismissal based on the conviction is fully justified and there is no need to interfere with the punishment. He therefore submitted that there is no violation of the principles of natural justice and the petitioner was issued with show cause notice and he also gave explanation and as there was no further proof required, as the petitioner was admittedly convicted for the offence under Section 306 IPC, it amounts to moral turpitude and as per PSO 59 (1), a police officer convicted of offence involving moral turpitude and sentenced to undergo imprisonment shall be dismissed from service and therefore, the petitioner was dismissed. 5. In light of the above facts, we have to see whether the principles of double jeopardy can be applied in this case? 6. 5. In light of the above facts, we have to see whether the principles of double jeopardy can be applied in this case? 6. In the judgment reported in (2002) 1 SCC 405 in the matter of Union of India v. P.D.Yadav, it has been explained as follows:- “This principle is embodied in the well-known maxim nemo debet bis vexari, (si constat curiae quod sit) pro una et eadem causa meaning no one ought to be vexed twice if it appears to the court that it is for one and the same cause. Doctrine of double jeopardy is a protection against prosecution twice for the same offence. Under Articles 20-22 of the Indian Constitution, provisions are made relating to personal liberty of citizens and others. Article 20(2) expressly provides that: 'No one shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. Offences such as criminal breach of trust, misappropriation, cheating, defamation etc., may give rise to prosecution on criminal side and also for action in civil court/other forum for recovery of money by way of damages etc., unless there is a bar created by law.” 7. In the judgment reported in AIR (1983) 3 SCC 401 in the matter of R.Viswan v. Union of India, the issue of double jeopardy was discussed and, in that case, Government servant was punished for the same misconduct both under the Army Act as well as under Central Government Rules, and it was held that, two proceedings under the Army Act and the Central Government Rules operate in two different fields though the crime or the misconduct might arise out of one and the same Act. The Martial Court proceedings deals with the penal aspect of misconduct while proceedings under the Central Government Rules deals with disciplinary proceedings in respect of the misconduct. Therefore, it was held that it does not amount to double jeopardy. 8. In the judgment reported in (2012) 7 SCC 621 in the matter of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, this principle has been discussed as follows:- "if an issue of a fact is decided in favour of an accused, it would not bar trial or conviction of the accused for a different and distinguished offence but it precludes acceptance of evidence to disturb the said finding of the fact. Thus, the principle of estoppel and resjudicata are applicable only to admissibility of evidence in subsequent trial and not to the trial itself for distinct and different offence. 9. Further, the facts of this case is similar to the facts of the case in the judgment reported in (2003) 3 SCC 362 in the matter of State of Haryana v. Balwant Singh, the fact of which is as follows:- “The respondent was a bus-driver under Haryana Roadways. In an accident caused by his rash and negligent driving, one person died and another was injured. An award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal in that matter resulted in the loss of a huge sum to the State. Consequently, a departmental enquiry under Rule 7 of the Haryana Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1987 (for short “the Rules”) was initiated against him and ultimately by an order dated 12-3-1990 punishment of reduction of pay to the minimum of the pay scale was imposed on him. On account of causing the same accident, he was convicted by a court under Section 340-A IPC. Based on that conviction, the Department by an order dated 17-9-1992 terminated his services. His suit challenging the termination order, though initially unsuccessful, was in second appeal decreed by the High Court only on the ground that an employee could not be punished twice for the same offence in view of Article 20(2). Allowing the State’s appeal, the Supreme Court Held: The High Court was not right in equating the departmental enquiries held on different grounds to prosecution in a criminal case. The High Court also has failed to see that the two orders passed against the respondent were on different grounds and were on different cause of actions. In the present case, the first order was passed on 12-3-1990 reducing the pay to the minimum of time scale under Rule 7(1) of the Rules. The second order terminating his services was passed on 17-9-1992 under Rule 7(2)(b). When a major penalty is proposed to be imposed upon a person on the ground of conduct which led to his conviction on a criminal charge compliance with the provisions contained in Rules 7(1) and (2) is not required. Rule 7 itself makes a distinction in regard to the punishment to be imposed depending on the grounds. When a major penalty is proposed to be imposed upon a person on the ground of conduct which led to his conviction on a criminal charge compliance with the provisions contained in Rules 7(1) and (2) is not required. Rule 7 itself makes a distinction in regard to the punishment to be imposed depending on the grounds. Therefore, there was no question of the respondent suffering a double jeopardy.” In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court followed the judgment reported in (2002) 1 SCC 405 supra. 10. In this case also, as stated supra, the earlier disciplinary proceedings was initiated on the ground that he brought disrepute to the police force by getting himself involved in a criminal case for having committed the offence under Section 304(b) IPC by demanding dowry and driving his wife to commit suicide and though evidence was let in to prove the offence of demand of dowry, punishment was imposed by reduction of pay by two stages for two years with cumulative effect taking into consideration the misconduct levelled against him, namely, having brought disrepute to the department by his involvement in a criminal case. The present proceeding of dismissal of the petitioner is on the basis of conviction in the criminal case. Though the criminal case is common in both the departmental proceedings, the earlier proceedings was initiated for having involved in a criminal case by and which he brought disrepute to the police force and the subsequent disciplinary proceedings was on the basis of the conviction of the petitioner in the criminal case. In the earlier charge memo, proceedings were initiated under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955. Subsequent charge memo was under Rule 59 of the Police Standing Orders. Rule 59 of the Police Standing Orders enables the authority to dismiss or remove a civil servant when the civil servant has committed an offence of moral turpitude and sentenced to undergo imprisonment. Admittedly, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to undergo six years imprisonment. Subsequent charge memo was under Rule 59 of the Police Standing Orders. Rule 59 of the Police Standing Orders enables the authority to dismiss or remove a civil servant when the civil servant has committed an offence of moral turpitude and sentenced to undergo imprisonment. Admittedly, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to undergo six years imprisonment. Though it was argued by the learned Senior Counsel that the petitioner has filed an appeal and obtained an order of suspension of sentence and the respondents ought to have waited till the disposal of the criminal appeal filed by him, according to me, this kind of argument cannot be accepted in the light of Rule 59(4) of Police Standing Rules which stipulates that where an order of dismissal or removal or compulsory retirement is called for as a result of the conviction, such order should be passed immediately on conviction by the first trial Court and not be postponed till the convicted government servant has exhausted all his rights of appeal to higher Courts. Therefore, the respondent is justified in dismissing the petitioner from service after conviction and that order was passed by issuing show cause notice calling for explanation and having regard to the facts of the case, there is no need to conduct enquiry as the factum of conviction is admitted. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the Division Bench of this Court reported in (2009) 4 MLJ 708 supra. Though the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court relied upon the judgment reported in (2003) 3 SCC 362 , the Division Bench distinguished the facts of that case and held in their judgment that the order passed by the authority amounts to double jeopardy and set aside the same. 11. With great respect to the Division Bench of this Court, the Supreme Court's judgment reported in (2003) 3 SCC 362 supra was not properly appreciated by the Hon'ble Division Bench in that case. As stated supra, the earlier charge was under Rule 3(b) of the TNPSS (D&A) Rules 1955 and the gravaman of the charge was that, by his involvement in the criminal case, he brought disrepute to the police force. As stated supra, the earlier charge was under Rule 3(b) of the TNPSS (D&A) Rules 1955 and the gravaman of the charge was that, by his involvement in the criminal case, he brought disrepute to the police force. The evidence let in and the finding that he ill-treated his wife and drove her to commit suicide was only incidental and the petitioner was charged for having involved in the criminal case that brought disrepute to the police force. The second show cause notice was based on Rule 59 of the fundamental Police Standing Orders, which is on a different footing, namely, the conviction in a criminal case. Though he might have been convicted on the same set of facts, the cause of action for both the proceedings are different and the proceedings were initiated on the basis of different rules. Therefore, having regard to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court stated supra, it cannot be stated that the subsequent order of dismissal amounts to double jeopardy. 12. Hence, I do not find any infirmity in the order of dismissal and there is no merit in the Writ Petition and the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs. The connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.