JUDGMENT Per Shree Chandrashekhar, J.: - Aggrieved by the order of remand, the State of Jharkhand has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. The brief facts of the case are that, the respondent (who is writ petitioner) was appointed as Khalasi on 22.03.1990 in the Information and Public Relation Department by the Deputy Director, Public Relation Department, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi. The appointment of the respondent was cancelled by order dated 05.09.1991. Challenging the order dated 05.09.1991 terminating his service, the respondent approached the High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 2095 of 1991(R) and by order dated 04.10.1991, the order terminating the service of the respondent was quashed on the ground of the said order being passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. However, it was made clear that the order dated 04.10.1991 would not prevent the appropriate authority from taking any appropriate action in accordance with law. Consequently, the respondent was reinstated in service w.e.f. 04.10.1991 and thereafter, a show-cause notice was issued to the respondent. After considering the reply of the respondent, by order dated 04.04.1997 the service of the respondent was terminated on the ground that it was an illegal appointment. Challenging the same, the respondent approached the High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1869 of 1997 (R) which was disposed of by the impugned order dated 02.09.2004 directing the writ petitioner to submit necessary papers, which the authority was directed to examine and pass an speaking and reasoned order within two months from the date of receipt/production of copy of order dated 02.09.2004. Challenging the same, the State of Jharkhand has approached this Court. 3. A counter-affidavit has been filed supporting the impugned order dated 02.09.2004. It is stated that the learned Single Judge considered the Circular dated 20.01.1950 and rightly held that, Joint Director, Public Relation had power to make appointed on Class-IV posts. It is further stated that in view of paragraph no. 12 of the Government letter dated 03.12.1980 power was given to the Deputy Commissioner for appointment of Class-IV employees at district level. The respondent who had applied for the post and appeared in the interview and who was local resident of Ranchi was thus validly appointed by the Joint Director as he was duly authorised. 4. Mr. 12 of the Government letter dated 03.12.1980 power was given to the Deputy Commissioner for appointment of Class-IV employees at district level. The respondent who had applied for the post and appeared in the interview and who was local resident of Ranchi was thus validly appointed by the Joint Director as he was duly authorised. 4. Mr. Ratnakar Bhengra, the learned Government Pleader-IV submitted that the Class-IV post in Information and Public Relation Department is a State-cadre post on which appointment can be made only by the Director General and since the appointment of the respondent was not made in accordance with the Rules, it was an illegal appointment and therefore, after issuing show-cause notice and considering the explanation of the respondent, by order dated 04.04.1997 the service of the respondent has rightly been terminated. The learned counsel has further submitted that even the initial appointment of the respondent was made only in anticipation of the approval of the Director-General, which was never granted and therefore, the appointment of the respondent was liable to be terminated. 5. Percontra, Mr. V. Shivnath, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal on the ground that the impugned order dated 02.09.2004 is an order of remand by which order, right of the parties has not been finally decided and that being so, the impugned order dated 02.09.2004 is not a judgment within the meaning of Clause10 of the Letters Patent and therefore, the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the State of Jharkhand is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed summarily. On merits, the learned Senior counsel submitted that in terms of paragraph no.12 of the Government letter issued in the year, 1980 the prohibition was only with respect to appointment of field staff and the Deputy-Commissioner was authorised to make appointment of Class-IV employees at the district level. It is further submitted that since the residential certificate etc. of the respondent were not examined by the authority, a direction was issued by the learned Single Judge vide the impugned order dated 02.09.2004 to the authority to verify the documents submitted by the respondent and to take a decision in the matter and therefore, the appellant-State of Jharkhand could not have taken an exception to the direction passed by the learned Single Judge. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Shah Babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaben D. Kania and Another”, reported in (1981) 4 SCC 8 . 6. Replying to the above contention, Mr. Ratnakar Bhengra, the learned counsel appearing for the State of Jharkhand has submitted that the order of remand is in the nature of final order by which the right of the appellant-State of Jharkhand has been adjudicated upon by the learned Single Judge and therefore, the Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable. 7. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties. 8. Relying on Clause10 of the Letters Patent and paragraph nos. 119 and 120 in “Shah Babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaben D. Kania and Another” (supra), the learned Senior Counsel has contended that by the order of remand since neither the question in controversy has been decided nor the issue has attained finality, therefore, the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the State of Jharkhand is not maintainable. Percontra, Mr. Ratnakar Bhengra, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-State of Jharkhand has contended that since the service of the respondent was terminated on the ground that the Joint Director was not competent to make appointment rather, the Director General was the competent Authority to make appointment on Class-IV post, however, referring to paragraph no. 12 of the Circular issued by the State of Bihar in the year, 1980, the learned Single Judge has observed that the said Circular was not applicable for appointment on Class-IV post, and thus, the issue has been finally decided by the learned Single Judge and therefore, the Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable. 9. It is now well settled that the definition of “Judgment” in Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application to Letters Patent. In “Shah Babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaben D. Kania and Another” (supra) also, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the concept of a judgment as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure seems to be rather narrow and the limitations engrafted by sub-Section (2) of Section 2 cannot be physically imported into the definition of the word “Judgment” as used in Clause15 of the Letters Patent (which is parimateria to Clause10 of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court). 10. 10. The question as to whether a judgment or an order is final or not has been the subject matter of a number of decisions. Even an order exfacie interlocutory in character has been held to be final if it finally disposed of the proceeding though, the main controversy between the parties remained undisposed of. In “Shubrook Vs. Tufnell”, reported in (1882) 9 QBD 621, the order passed did not decide the matter in the litigation but referred it back to the arbitrator, though on the application to which such an order was made, a final determination might have been made. The Court held that the order was final. 11. In “State of Orissa Vs. Madan Gopal Rungta”, reported in AIR 1952 SC 12 , the High Court did not decide the dispute but granted a mandamus restraining the Government from taking action until the proposed suits were filed. In an appeal against that order it was contended that the order was not final as it was for an interim relief and the dispute between the parties remained to be determined in the proposed suits. The Hon'ble Supreme Court negatived the contention and held that the order was final. 12. In “Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Another”, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 588 , a workmen claimed interim relief under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which was allowed by the learned Single Judge during the pendency of the writ petition. The order was challenged in the Letters Patent Appeal, in which an objection to the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal was raised. Rejecting the objection, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held the appeal maintainable holding that the order directing payment under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act would fall under the definition of “Judgment”. 13. A perusal of the judgment in “Shah Babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaben D. Kania and Another” (supra) would indicate that the issue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was, whether there is any inconsistency between the Letters Patent jurisdiction and Section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. A perusal of the judgment in “Shah Babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaben D. Kania and Another” (supra) would indicate that the issue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was, whether there is any inconsistency between the Letters Patent jurisdiction and Section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that Section 104 read with Order43, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly authorises and creates a forum for appeal against orders falling under various clauses of Order43, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure to a larger Bench of the High Court without at all disturbing, interfering with or overriding Letters Patent jurisdiction. It has been further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that, whenever a Trial Judge decides a controversy which affects valuable rights of one of the parties, it must be treated to be judgment within the meaning of Letters Patent. It has been held that an order of the Trial Judge refusing to appoint a receiver and/or to grant interim injunction is undoubtedly a judgment within the meaning of Letters Patent. 14. In the present case, it is the specific plea raised by the State of Jharkhand that the Class-IV post is a State cadre post on which only Director-General is competent to make appointment and while so, the appointment of the respondent was cancelled being illegal on the ground that it was not made by the Director General and rather, it was made by the Joint Director, who is not a competent authority to make appointment on Class-IV post. 15. The learned Single Judge though did not interfere with the order of termination of service dated 04.04.1997 however, the matter was remitted back to the Authority for taking a decision afresh. That being so, the plea taken by the appellant-State of Jharkhand that the appointment of the respondent was illegal has been interferred with by the learned Single Judge by directing the appellant-State of Jharkhand to reconsider the matter. The learned Single Judge has in-fact directed the appellant to reconsider the matter afresh and therefore, by the impugned order dated 02.09.2004 the right of the appellant-State of Jharkhand has been seriously affected even though, it is an order of remand. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable. 16. The learned Single Judge has in-fact directed the appellant to reconsider the matter afresh and therefore, by the impugned order dated 02.09.2004 the right of the appellant-State of Jharkhand has been seriously affected even though, it is an order of remand. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable. 16. Now coming to the merits of the case, letter of appointment of the respondent dated 22.03.1990 discloses that the respondent was appointed on the post of Khalasi in anticipation of the approval of his appointment by the Director, Information and Public Relation Department. It is further stated in letter dated 22.03.1990 that payment to the respondent would be made only after sanction given by the Director, Information and Public Relation Department, Govt. of Bihar. A perusal of the order dated 05.09.1991 by which the appointment of the respondent was cancelled, indicates that neither the Joint Director, Information and Public Relation Department, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi had sought any prior approval for appointment nor any permission was given by the Headquarter in this regard. The appointments were made in anticipation of the approval by the Director-General, Directorate of Information and Public Relation. The appointments thus made were beyond the competence of the Joint Director to make such appointments. By order dated 05.09.1991, appointment of respondent and other 11 persons were cancelled. By order dated 04.10.1991, the order of termination of service of the respondent was quashed on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice, however, the appropriate Authority was granted liberty to take appropriate action, in accordance with law. Thereafter, the show-cause notice was issued to the respondent on 11.11.1992 to which the respondent submitted his reply on 19.11.1992, wherein the respondent himself has admitted that his appointment was made in anticipation of approval from Director, Information and Public Relation, Government of Bihar. After considering the reply of the respondent, the service of the respondent was terminated by order dated 04.04.1997 on the ground that his appointment being contrary to the Rules and made by the Joint Director, who was not competent to make appointment on the post of Khalasi. 17. After considering the reply of the respondent, the service of the respondent was terminated by order dated 04.04.1997 on the ground that his appointment being contrary to the Rules and made by the Joint Director, who was not competent to make appointment on the post of Khalasi. 17. Since an objection to the appointment of the respondent has been made on the ground that Joint Director was not competent to make appointment on Class-IV post and the order dated 04.04.1997 terminating the service of the respondent was not interfered with by the learned Single Judge, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge could not have remanded the matter to the Authority for taking a decision afresh in the matter. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.09.2004 is set-aside and Letters Patent Appeal filed by the State of Jharkhand is allowed. Appeal allowed.