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2014 DIGILAW 328 (RAJ)

Bijoy Agarwal v. State of Raj.

2014-01-30

MAHESH CHANDRA SHARMA

body2014
Hon'ble SHARMA, J.—This criminal misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the Criminal Complaint No. 733 of 2012 filed by the respondent No. 2 before the court of Metropolitan Magistrate No. 17 Jaipur City Jaipur for offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 2. The brief and relevant facts giving rise to this criminal misc. petition are that the complainant has filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, interalia alleging that M/s. Gee Pee InfoTech Pvt. Ltd. had allegedly executed an agreement dated 19.1.2012 with the complainant where upon it was vaguely alleged without any specific reference that the accused had provided a Portal, which purportedly was to be activated by the accused, however, it was alleged by the complainant that the said Portal was never activated by the accused as M/s. Gee Pee InfoTech. Pvt. Ltd. was not able to secure a contract with BSNL because of which, it was alleged that M/s. Gee Pee InfoTech Pvt. Ltd. had returned the amount of Rs. 65 lacs by cheque No.943163 dated 15.5.2012 ICICI Bank Ballygunge Branch, Kolkata to the complainant. It is alleged that the complainant himself consumed BSNL epin recharge load. The complainant had presented the said cheque for encashment with Indian Overseas Bank, Tonk Branch, but the said cheque was returned unpaid with the remark "insufficient fund". It is further alleged by the complainant that he has received Rs. 25 lacs by way of RTGS dated 21.5.2012 out of the total Rs. 65 lacs. For the balance of Rs. 40 lacs, the accused had issued a cheque of Rs.20 lacs dated 15.7.2012 of ICICI Bank, Ballygunge Branch, Kolkata. The said cheque of Rs. 20 lacs when presented at Indian Overseas Bank, Tonk Branch, was also returned unpaid with the remark "insufficient Fund" on the cheque return Memo dated 24.7.2012. A registered legal notice dated 21.8.2012 was issued by the complainant to the accused inter-alia demanding the cheque amount of Rs.20 lacs within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of this notice. The Metropolitan Magistrate vide order dated 6.2.2013 took cognizance of the said complaint under Section 138 and issued summons to all the accused. The petitioner Bijoy Agarwal, who is Director of Gee Pee InfoTech Pvt. has filed the above criminal misc. The Metropolitan Magistrate vide order dated 6.2.2013 took cognizance of the said complaint under Section 138 and issued summons to all the accused. The petitioner Bijoy Agarwal, who is Director of Gee Pee InfoTech Pvt. has filed the above criminal misc. petition challenging the order of taking cognizance and for quashing and setting aside the criminal complaint No. 733/2012 as mentioned above. 3. Mr. Rishabh Khandelwal, learned counsel appearing for the accused petitioner has contended that the learned Magistrate was callous in invoking his jurisdiction under Section 204 Cr.P.C. and issuing process to the petitioner without taking into consideration, the simple fact that no allegation whatsoever had been made against him. The order of cognizance has been passed without application of mind. The order of cognizance has been passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate without having any territorial jurisdiction to try the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. It has been submitted that the cheque issued was of Kolkata Branch, presented in Tonk by the complainant for encashment with the ICICI Bank and the same was returned unpaid by the ICICI Bank Kolkata Branch to Indian Overseas Bank, Tonk Branch. It has been stated that no cause of action has even been alleged by the complainant itself to have arisen within the territorial limits of Banipark Area, Jaipur City, Jaipur. It is further argued that in the entire complaint no specific averments or allegation, whatsoever has been made against the accused petitioner, as to how the petitioner was incharge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the said company so as to attract the provisions of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The accused company had replied to the legal notice vide reply dated 4.9.2012 but the same was not considered by the Metropolitan Magistrate while taking cognizance. Reliance has been placed on Harman Electronics Private Limited and another vs. National Panasonic India Private Limited (2009) 1 SCC 720 , State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335 and Adalat Prasad vs. Rooplal Jindal and others (2004) 7 SCC 338 . 4. Mr. R.K. Agarwal, Sr. Advocate assisted Ms. Bharti Trivedi, learned counsel appearing for the complainant has argued that the Metropolitan Magistrate has rightly took the cognizance against the accused petitioner. (1) SCC 335 and Adalat Prasad vs. Rooplal Jindal and others (2004) 7 SCC 338 . 4. Mr. R.K. Agarwal, Sr. Advocate assisted Ms. Bharti Trivedi, learned counsel appearing for the complainant has argued that the Metropolitan Magistrate has rightly took the cognizance against the accused petitioner. The complainant M/s. Nakshatra Telecom, is having its office at D-228, Tulsi Marg, Banipark, Jaipur, hence the Metropolitan Magistrate has rightly took the cognizance. Mr. Bijoy Agarwal, is the authorised signatory and managing Director of Gee Pee InfoTech Pvt. Ltd. hence the court rightly took cognizance against the authorised signatory and managing director and the company itself, who are accused respondents 1 and in the complaint filed before the Metropolitan Magistrate, which has the territorial jurisdiction. He has placed reliance on Nishant Aggrwal vs. Kailash Kumar Sharma (2013) 10 SCC 72 . 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Before proceeding further it would be necessary to have a look at the important rulings of the Apex Court. In K. Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, (1999) 7 SCC 510 the Apex Court held as under: 10. Learned counsel for the appellant first contended that the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try this case and hence the High Court should not have converted the acquittal into conviction on the strength of the evidence collected in such a trial. Of course, the trial court had upheld the pleas of the accused that it had jurisdiction to try the case. 11. We fail to comprehend as to how the trial Court could have found so regarding the jurisdiction question. Under Section 177 of the Code "every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried in a court within whose jurisdiction it was committed." The locality where the Bank (which dishonoured the cheque) is situated cannot be regarded as the sole criterion to determine the place of offence. It must be remembered that offence under Section 138 would not be completed with the dishonour of the cheque. It attains completion only with the failure of the drawer of the cheque to pay the cheque amount within the expiry of 15 days mentioned in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act. It is normally difficult to fix up a particular locality as the place of failure to pay the amount covered by the cheque. It attains completion only with the failure of the drawer of the cheque to pay the cheque amount within the expiry of 15 days mentioned in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act. It is normally difficult to fix up a particular locality as the place of failure to pay the amount covered by the cheque. A place, for that purpose, would depend upon a variety of factors. It can either be at the place where the drawer resides or at the place where the payee resides or at the place where either of them carries on business. Hence, the difficulty to fix up any particular locality as the place of occurrence for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. 12. Even otherwise the rule that every offence shall be tried by a court within whose jurisdiction it was committed is not an unexceptional or unchangeable principle. Section 177 itself has been framed by the legislature thoughtfully by using the precautionary word "ordinarily" to indicate that the rule is not invariable in all cases. Section 178 of the Code suggests that if there is uncertainty as to where, among different localities, the offence would have been committed the trial can be had in a court having jurisdiction over any of those localities. The provision has further widened the scope by stating that in case where the offence was committed partly in one local area and partly in another local area the court in either of the localities can exercise jurisdiction to try the case. Further again, Section 179 of the Code stretches its scope to a still wider horizon. It reads thus: "179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues.- When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be enquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued." 13. The above provisions in the Code should have been borne in mind when the question regarding territorial jurisdiction of the courts to try the offence was sought to be determined. 14. The offence under Section 138 of the Act can be completed only with the concatenation of a number of acts. The above provisions in the Code should have been borne in mind when the question regarding territorial jurisdiction of the courts to try the offence was sought to be determined. 14. The offence under Section 138 of the Act can be completed only with the concatenation of a number of acts. The following are the acts which are components of the said offence: (1) drawing of the cheque, (2) presentation of the cheque to the Bank, (3) returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank, (4) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, (5) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. 15. It is not necessary that all the above five acts should have been perpetrated at the same locality. It is possible that each of those five acts could be done at five different localities. But a concatenation of all the above five is a sine qua non for the completion of the offence under Section 138 of the Code. In this context a reference to Section 178(d) of the Code is useful. It is extracted below: "178. (a)-(c) * * * (d) where the offence consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be enquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas." 16. Thus it is clear, if the five different acts were done in five different localities any one of the courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In other words, the complainant can choose any one of those courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which any one of those five acts was done. As the amplitude stands so widened and so expansive it is an idle exercise to raise jurisdictional question regarding the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. vs. National Panasonic India (P) Ltd., (2009) 1 SCC 720 , the Apex Court held as under: Indisputably all statutes deserve their strict application, but while doing so the cardinal principles therefor cannot be lost sight of. A court derives a jurisdiction only when the cause of action arose within its jurisdiction. In Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. vs. National Panasonic India (P) Ltd., (2009) 1 SCC 720 , the Apex Court held as under: Indisputably all statutes deserve their strict application, but while doing so the cardinal principles therefor cannot be lost sight of. A court derives a jurisdiction only when the cause of action arose within its jurisdiction. The same cannot be conferred by any act of omission or commission on the part of the accused. A distinction must also be borne in mind between the ingredient of an offence. While issuance of a notice by the holder of a negotiable instrument is necessary service thereof is also imperative. Only on a service of such notice and failure on the part of the accused to pay the demanded amount within a period of 15 days thereafter, the commission of an offence completes. Giving of notice, therefore, cannot have any precedent over the service. It is only from that view of the matter that in Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. vs. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd. 2 emphasis has been laid on service of notice. 21. We cannot, as things stand today, be oblivious of the fact that a banking institution holding several cheques signed by the same borrower cannot only present the cheque for its encashment at four different places but also may serve notices from four different places so as to enable it to file four complaint cases at four different places. This only causes grave harassment to the accused. It is, therefore, necessary in a case of this nature to strike a balance between the right of the complainant and the right of an accused vis-a-vis the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 22. Learned counsel for the respondent contents that the principle that the debtor must seek the creditor should be applied in a case of this nature. We regret that such a principle cannot be applied in a criminal case. Jurisdiction of the court to try a criminal case is governed by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and not on common law principle. 23. For the views we have taken it must be held that the Delhi High Court has no jurisdiction to try the case. Jurisdiction of the court to try a criminal case is governed by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and not on common law principle. 23. For the views we have taken it must be held that the Delhi High Court has no jurisdiction to try the case. We, however, while exercising our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India direct that Complaint case No. 1549 pending in the Court of Shri N.K. Kaushik, Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi, be transferred to the Court of the District and Sessions Judge, Chandigarh who shall assign the same to a court of competent jurisdiction. The transferee court shall fix a specific date of hearing and shall not grant any adjournment on the date on which the complainant and its witnesses are present. The transferee court is furthermore directed to dispose of the matter within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the records of the case on assignment by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Chandigarh. Recently in Nishant Aggarwal vs. Kailash Kumar Sharma, (2013) 10 SCC 72 , the Apex Court following the principles laid down in K. Bhaskaran (1999) 7 SCC 510 held as under: 18. In Ishar Alloy Steel (2001) 3 SCC 609 a three-Judge Bench of this Court defined the term "the bank" appearing in clause (a) of Section 138 of the NI Act as the drawer's bank. It was defined in the context of the statutory period of six months as mentioned in clause (a), hence, this Court held that the date of presentation of the cheque for calculating the statutory time period of six months will be the date of presentation of the cheque to the drawer's bank i.e. payee bank and not the drawee's bank i.e. collecting bank. This Court has correctly applied the principle of strict interpretation appreciating that Section 138 of the NI Act creates an offence as the drawer of the cheque cannot be excepted or saddled with the liability to hold the cheque amount in his account beyond six months. The reading of the entire decision in Ishar Alloy steels3 shows that jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance arises only where the cheque is presented to the bank of drawer either by drawee's bank or the drawee/payee personally within six months. The reading of the entire decision in Ishar Alloy steels3 shows that jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance arises only where the cheque is presented to the bank of drawer either by drawee's bank or the drawee/payee personally within six months. In other words, on the analysis of the said decision, the ratio of Ishar Alloy Steels3 deals with such a situation where the cheque has been presented within six months to the drawer's bank by the payee in any manner. Inasmuch as the interpretation relates to filing of complaint within the statutory time period of six months, we are of the view that the reliance on the law laid down in Ishar Alloy Steels3 has no relevance as far as the present case is concerned. In fact, that is the reason that in Ishar Alloy Steel (supra) the judgment in K. Bhaskaran (supra) was not discussed since territorial jurisdiction was not the issue in that case. In view of the same, the definition of the term "the bank" envisaged in Ishar Alloy Steels (supra) cannot be employed to decide the jurisdictional aspect and dilute the ratio of the judgment in K. Bhaskara (2). Hence, we are of the view that on the strength of the judgment in Ishar Alloy Steels (3) defining the term "the bank", it cannot be said that jurisdiction to file a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act does not lie at the place of drawee's bank. 19. To put it clearly, the judgment in Ishar Alloy Steel (supra) does not affect the ratio of the judgment in K. Bhaskara (2) which provides for jurisdiction at the place of residence of the payer and the payee. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the judgment in Ishar Alloy Steel (3) as well as the judgments of various High Courts relied on by the appellant cannot be read against the respondent to hold that the Magistrate at Bhiwani does not have the jurisdiction to try the complaint. 20. Though several decisions of various High Courts were cited before us, we deem it appropriate to refer to only one Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court rendered in Preetha S. Babu v. Voltas Ltd. (2010) 3 Mah LJ 234. 20. Though several decisions of various High Courts were cited before us, we deem it appropriate to refer to only one Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court rendered in Preetha S. Babu v. Voltas Ltd. (2010) 3 Mah LJ 234. The Division Bench, after analysing the factual position of both sides, correctly applied the ratio laid down in K. Bhaskaran (supra) finding that the Mumbai Court has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, and dismissed the said writ petition. 21. Mr. Ahmadi, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has also relied on a decision of this Court in Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. vs. National Panasonic India (P) Ltd. (2009) 1 SCC 720 In Harman Electronic (supra) the complainant and the accused entered into a business transaction. The accused was a resident of Chandigarh. He carried on the business in Chandigarh and issued a cheque in question at Chandigarh. The complainant had a branch office at Chandigarh although his head office was at Delhi. He presented the cheque given by the accused at Chandigarh. The cheque was dishonoured at Chandigarh. The complainant issued a notice upon the accused asking him to pay the amount from New Delhi. The said notice was served on the accused at Chandigarh. On failure on the part of the accused to pay the amount within 15 days from the date of the communication of the said letter, the complainant filed a complaint at Delhi. In the complaint, it was stated that the Delhi court has jurisdiction to try the case because the complainant was carrying on business at Delhi, the demand notice was issued from Delhi, the amount of cheque was payable at Delhi and the accused failed to make the payment of the said cheque within the statutory period of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice. It is further seen that the cognizance of the offence was taken by the learned Magistrate at Delhi. The accused questioned the jurisdiction of the Magistrate at Delhi before the Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi. The Sessions Judge held that the Magistrate at Delhi had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as, admittedly, the notice was sent by the complainant to the accused from Delhi and the complainant was having its registered office at Delhi and was carrying on business at Delhi. The Sessions Judge held that the Magistrate at Delhi had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as, admittedly, the notice was sent by the complainant to the accused from Delhi and the complainant was having its registered office at Delhi and was carrying on business at Delhi. The learned Judge has also observed that the accused failed to make payment at Delhi as the demand was made from Delhi and the payment was to be made to the complainant at Delhi. The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition filed by the accused. Thereafter, the accused approached this Court. 22. This Court in Harman Electronics case (supra) considered Section 138 of the NI Act and also referred to K. Bhaskaran case (supra) and quoted the five components of offence under Section 138 which have been noted in paragraph supra. This Court reiterated that the five different acts which are the components of offence under Section 138 of the NI Act were done in five different localities, any one of the courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act and the complainant would be at liberty to file a complaint at any of those places. Ultimately, this Court held that the Chandigarh Court had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint because the parties were carrying on business at Chandigarh, branch office of the complainant was also in Chandigarh, the transactions were carried on only from Chandigarh and the cheque was issued and presented at Chandigarh. This Court pointed out that the complaint did not show that the cheque was presented at Delhi, because it was absolutely silent in that regard and, therefore, there was no option but to presume that the cheque was presented at Chandigarh. It is not in dispute that the dishonour of the cheque also took place at Chandigarh and, therefore, the only question which arose before this Court for consideration was whether the sending of notice from Delhi itself would give rise to a cause of action in taking cognizance under the NI Act. It is not in dispute that the dishonour of the cheque also took place at Chandigarh and, therefore, the only question which arose before this Court for consideration was whether the sending of notice from Delhi itself would give rise to a cause of action in taking cognizance under the NI Act. In such circumstances, we are of the view that Harman Electronic (supra) is only an authority on the question where a court will have jurisdiction because only notice is issued from the place which falls within its jurisdiction and it does not deviate from the other principles laid down in K. Bhaskaran (supra). This Court has accepted that the place where the cheque was presented and dishonoured has jurisdiction to try the complaint. In this way, this Court concluded that issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action but communication of the notice would. In other words, the Court clarified that only on the service of such notice and failure on the part of the accused to pay the demanded amount within a period of 15 days thereafter, the commission of an offence completes. 23. We are of the view that this Court in Harman Electronics (5) affirmed what it had said in K. Bhaskaran (2) that court within whose jurisdiction the cheque is presented and in whose jurisdiction there is failure to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of notice can have jurisdiction to try the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act. It is also relevant to point out that while holding that the Chandigarh court has jurisdiction, this Court in Harman Electronic (supra) observed that in the case before it, the complaint was silent as to whether the said cheque was presented at Delhi. In the case on hand, it is categorically stated that the cheque was presented at Bhiwani whereas in Harman Electronic (supra) the dishonour had taken place at Chandigarh and this fact was taken into account while holding that Chandigarh court has jurisdiction. In the complaint in question, it is specifically stated that the dishonour took place at Bhiwani. We are also satisfied that nothing said in Harman Electronics (supra) had adverse impact on the complainants case in the present case. 24. In the complaint in question, it is specifically stated that the dishonour took place at Bhiwani. We are also satisfied that nothing said in Harman Electronics (supra) had adverse impact on the complainants case in the present case. 24. As observed earlier, we must note that in K. Bhaskaran (supra) this Court has held that Section 178 of the Code has widened the scope of jurisdiction of a criminal court and Section 179 of the Code has stretched it to still a wider horizon. Further, for the sake of repetition, we reiterate that the judgment in Ishar Alloy (3) does not affect the ratio in K. Bhaskaran (2) which provides jurisdiction at the place of residence of the payer and the payee. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances and even on merits, the High Court rightly refused to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code and dismissed the petition filed by the appellant-accused. 25. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the ratio laid down in K. Bhaskaran (supra) squarely applies to the case on hand. The said principle was correctly applied by the learned Sessions Judge as well as the High Court. Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. In view of the dismissal of the appeal, the interim order 6 granted by this Court on 9.12.2011 shall stand vacated." In State of Haryana & Others vs. Bhajan Lal & Others 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, the Apex Court in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. gave the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Thus, this court made it clear that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised: "(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if any are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifest attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." This court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & Others vs. Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Another (2005) 1 SCC 122 observed thus:- "It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. Sharaful Haque & Another (2005) 1 SCC 122 observed thus:- "It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto." 6. A three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Inder Mohan Goswami and Another vs. State of Uttaranchal & Others (2007) 12 SCC 1 comprehensively examined the legal position. The court came to a definite conclusion and the relevant observations of the court are reproduced in para 24 of the said judgment as under:- "Inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute." In view of the rulings of the Apex Court, I have gone through the complaint. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute." In view of the rulings of the Apex Court, I have gone through the complaint. In the complaint in para 12 the complainant mentioned as under: ^^12- ;g fd ifjoknh QeZ dk dk;kZy; 'kh"kZd esa of.kZr irk Mh 228] rqylh ekxZ] cuhikdZ t;iqj ¼jkt-½ esa fLFkr gS rFkk ifjoknh ogha ls viuk lEiw.kZ O;olk; djrh gSA O;olkf;d ckrphr ,oa vuqcU/kksa dk fu"iknu Hkh mDr irk ij gh gqvk gSA ifjoknh QeZ dk mDr irk iqfyl Fkkuk cuhikdZ ds {ks=kf/kdkj esa gksus ls ekuuh; U;k;ky; gktk dks izdj.k dks lquus ,oa fofuf'pr djus dk {ks=kf/kdkj izkIr gSA** In view of the ratio laid down in K. Bhaslaram case (supra) recently followed in Nishant Aggrawal vs. Kailash Kumar Sharma (supra), the ingredient of principles (iv) and (v) in K. Bhaslaran (supra) giving of notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount and failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice the trial court rightly took cognizance under the Negotiable Instruments Act. I have also gone through the contents of the complaint that the accused paid Rs. 25,000 through RTGS on 21.5.2012 and thereafter Rs. 20,000/- to the complainant company through RTGS account of the earlier cheque dated 15.7.2012 which was returned by the Bank to the complainant due to "funds insufficient". At this stage, to make any comments in the matter, will prejudice the either case of the parties. For the reasons mentioned above, the criminal misc. petition filed by the petitioner is rejected. The stay application also stands rejected. The interim orders passed from time to time also stand vacated.