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2014 DIGILAW 329 (HP)

Shailendra H. Jani v. State of H. P.

2014-04-02

RAJIV SHARMA

body2014
JUDGMENT Rajiv Sharma, J. This petition has been instituted for quashing of FIR No. 282/2009 dated 28.10.2009 registered at Police Station, Sundernagar under sections 420, 483 and 486 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. “Key facts” necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that the petitioner and his partnership firm had been supplying spare parts to respondent No.4-company. According to the petitioner, no dispute was ever raised by respondent No.4-company as to the quality, quantity or the price of the material supplied to it. Petitioner has maintained proper books of accounts and a sum of Rs. 27,14,302.60 paisa is due from the respondent No.4-company. Several reminders have been sent to respondent No.4-company to make the payment. Respondent No.4-company has promised to clear the outstanding amount. However, the fact of the matter is that the outstanding amount has not been paid to the petitioner. According to the petitioner, spare parts supplied to respondent No.4-company are VOLVO OEM (original equipment manufacture) and the petitioner was directly importing the same from “Heavy Parts Solutions Company”. 3. According to the reply filed by respondent No.4, petitioner and his partnership firm had been supplying spurious and counterfeit spare parts to the company. It is specifically averred in the reply by respondent No.4 that the petitioner has purchased the supplied spare parts from Heavy Parts Solution whereas VOLVO EAST ASIA (PTE) LTD., VOLVO CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT, REGION ASIA, Singapore has certified that Heavy Parts Solution is not its authorized dealer. Petitioner had been supplying unauthentic, sub-standard and duplicate spare parts and he has put counterfeit mark of VOLVO on supplied sub-standard spare parts. The material was supplied to respondent No.4-company in proper packaging and it was taken out as per requirement. It transpired that as and when the spare parts were used, they were found to be of sub-standard. It is in these circumstances, FIR was registered against the petitioner on 28.10.2009. 4. Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar has vehemently argued that petitioner and partnership firm had been supplying genuine spare parts to respondent No.4. A sum of Rs.27,14,302.60 paisa is outstanding against respondent No.4. Respondent No.4 instead of clearing the outstanding amount has filed an FIR against the petitioner on 28.10.2009. 5. Mr. Parmod Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General and Mr. C.N. Singh have vehemently argued that the contents of FIR clearly discloses commission of cognizable offence. A sum of Rs.27,14,302.60 paisa is outstanding against respondent No.4. Respondent No.4 instead of clearing the outstanding amount has filed an FIR against the petitioner on 28.10.2009. 5. Mr. Parmod Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General and Mr. C.N. Singh have vehemently argued that the contents of FIR clearly discloses commission of cognizable offence. They have also contended that investigation is complete and the challan has been put up against the petitioner on 24.12.2010 against the accused and he was to be served for 11.9.2012. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the pleadings carefully. 7. Petitioner had been supplying spare parts to respondent No.4-company. It is established from Annexure R-1 that VOLVO EAST ASIA (PTE) LTD VOLVO CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT REGION ASIA has no other authorized dealer. Petitioner had been importing spare parts from the firm of Korea, i.e. Heavy Parts Solution to supply the same to respondent No.4-company. Rather, it is the case of the petitioner that he had been importing the spare parts from Heavy Parts Solution. Petitioner and partnership firm was required to import spare parts from VOLVO EAST ASIA (PTE) LTD and not from Heavy Part Solution, Korea. In order to see the genuineness of the spare parts, these were sent to Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Gutkar, District Mandi. These were found to be spurious/counterfeit. FIR No. 282/2009 prima facie discloses commission of cognizable offence by the petitioner and partnership firm . The investigation is complete and the challan has also been put up before the competent court of law on 24.12.2010, as noticed hereinabove. Whether the payment of Rs. 27,14,302.60 paisa is outstanding or not has no bearing at all on this case. 8. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that respondent No.4-company has registered FIR against the petitioner only to avoid its liability. 9. Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar has also argued that respondent No.4-company has never raised any dispute regarding genuineness of the spare parts. Mr. C.N. Singh has submitted that spare parts were supplied in proper packaging and the same were to be used as and when the occasion arose. It was not possible to find out whether the spare parts were genuine or not when the packed material was received. 10. Mr. C.N. Singh has submitted that spare parts were supplied in proper packaging and the same were to be used as and when the occasion arose. It was not possible to find out whether the spare parts were genuine or not when the packed material was received. 10. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. B.R. Bajaj and others, 1994 Cri.L.J. 2086 have held that FIR containing some important allegations which make out a cognizable offence at that stage and registration of FIR was only beginning of investigation, quashing of FIR by High Court be not proper. Their Lordships have held as under: “8. In the instant case the High Court while interfering at the stage of F.I. R. holding that the FIR did not disclose any offence, as a matter of fact, took into consideration several other records produced by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and also relied on the affidavit filed by Shri Banerjee and also on a letter written by the Director, State Lotteries. This approach of the High Court, to say the least, to some extent amounts to investigation by the Court whether the offences alleged in the F.I.R. are made out or not. In the F.I.R. it is clearly mentioned that a false note was recorded by respondent No. 1 with a view to help M/ s. Orn Prakash & Co. and its sister concerns. It is also mentioned in the F. I.R. that the information so far received disclosed that before the agreement dated 7-11-85 was signed between M/s. H. K. Chugh & Co. and the Council, M/ s. V. Kumar Lotterywala sent a telegram and also complaintalleging mal-practices in the awarding of the contract and the same was also sent to the President and Shri B. R. Bajaj However, even after receiving such a telegram, Shri B. R. Bajaj did not take any steps to stop the loss to the Council because of his deep involvement in the conspiracy and it is also clearly mentioned that the total loss, caused to the Council and gain to the accused persons is to the tune of Rs. 1,43,34,000/ -when compared to the offer made by the highest tenderer M/ s. Bharat & Co. or at least Rs. 1,13,34,000 when compared to the next highest tenderer M/ s. V. Kumar Lotterywala. 1,43,34,000/ -when compared to the offer made by the highest tenderer M/ s. Bharat & Co. or at least Rs. 1,13,34,000 when compared to the next highest tenderer M/ s. V. Kumar Lotterywala. These are some of the important allegations in the F.I.R. which make out a cognizable offence at that stage and the registration of ant F.I.R. is only the beginning of the investigation. That being the case, the High Court has grossly erred in quashing the F.I.R. itself when several aspects of the allegations in the F. I. R. had still to be investigated. The learned Judge of the High Court while coming to the conclusion that the allegations in the F.I.R. do not disclose any offence, has taken into consideration several aspects including the idelines, normal duty of Shri B. R. Bajaj etc. and went further and investigated whether that the offences under S. 120-B read with Ss. 418, 468, I.P.C.. and Section 5(2) read with S. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act have been made out. Suffice it to say that the learned Judge has treated the whole matter as though it was an appeal against the order of conviction and that should never be the approach in exercising the inherent power under S. 482, Cr. P.C.particularly at the stage of F.I. R. when the same discloses commission of an cognizable offence which had still to be investigated thoroughly by police. We do not think that in this case we should make a further detailed consideration about the contents of the F.I.R. We are satisfied that this is not at all a fit case for quashing the F.I.R. under Section 482, Cr. P.C. Accordingly the appeal is allowed.” 11. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri, 1995 (4) Crimes 769 have held that High Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to probability, reliability or genuineness of allegations made in FIR or complaint. Their Lordships have held as under: “24. The position of law, in this regard, has been very succinctly stated in the above case that at the stage of quashing a First Information Report or complaint, the High Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuinely of the allegations made therein. Their Lordships have held as under: “24. The position of law, in this regard, has been very succinctly stated in the above case that at the stage of quashing a First Information Report or complaint, the High Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuinely of the allegations made therein. This is precisely what has been done by the learned Judge in the present case. The First Information Report having been lodged, the Government of Maharashtra having accorded sanction and thereafter, the charge having been filed, there was absolutely no justification for the High Court to have stopped the normal procedure of the trial being allowed to continue. it cannot be presumed that there was no application of mind when the First Information Report was prepared and the sanction of the Government obtained. The allegations as made in the First Information Report and the order granting sanction, if true, would clearly establish that the respondent was rightly prosecuted and was guilty of criminal misconduct. The truthfulness of the allegations and the establishment of the guilt can only take place when the trial proceeds without any interruption. There was no justification for the High Court to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. in quashing the prosecution. For the above said reasons, the appeals are allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside.” 12. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.L. Bhatt vs. M.K. Pandita and others, 2002 (4) Crimes 343 (SC) have held that High Court would be entitled only to examine allegations made in FIR. Their Lordships have held as under: “1. Heard Mr. Sushil Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and the respondent-in-person. On the basis of an allegations made by the petitioner, an FIR was registered being no. 3/1997, and that FIR made some allegations against the respondent of commission of offence under section 420/120-B, IPC, in relation to certain allotment of land in Delhi. While the matter was under investigation, the respondent having invoked jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in CrI. 3/1997, and that FIR made some allegations against the respondent of commission of offence under section 420/120-B, IPC, in relation to certain allotment of land in Delhi. While the matter was under investigation, the respondent having invoked jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in CrI. W.P. No. 969/1999, the division bench of Delhi High Court on a detailed examination of the entire materials including the statement recorded in course of investigation quashed the FIR on a conclusion that the allegations in the FIR do not constitute an offence. On examining the impugned judgment, we have no manner of doubt that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction and the parameters prescribed in a catena of decisions where a Court could be justified in quashing the FIR. At this stage, the High Court would be entitled to only examine the allegations made in the FIR and would not be entitled to appreciate by way of shifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statement recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We are told that in the meantime the investigation is complete and challan has been filed. The accused has always the remedy at the time of framing of charge to pray for discharge if the materials on the basis of which the challan has been filed can be said to be insufficient to frame a charge. But by no means, the court would be justified in quashing an FIR by appreciating and shifting the materials collected during the investigation. In the aforesaid premises, we set aside the impugned order of the Delhi High Court and direct that the criminal proceedings pending before the appropriate court, may be proceeded with. We reiter ate that the accused respondent has the right to make application for being discharged, if he is of the opinion that the materials collected, in fact, do not make out the offence for which the challan has been filed.” 13. Learned Single Judge of Chhattisgarh High Court in Ajit Pramod Kumar Jogi vs. Union of India and others, 2004 Cr.L.J. 3304 has held that FIR cannot be quashed when alleged facts in FIR taken at their face value prima facie constitute any offence. Learned Single Judge has held as under: “28. Learned Single Judge of Chhattisgarh High Court in Ajit Pramod Kumar Jogi vs. Union of India and others, 2004 Cr.L.J. 3304 has held that FIR cannot be quashed when alleged facts in FIR taken at their face value prima facie constitute any offence. Learned Single Judge has held as under: “28. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the various judgments referred above, at this stage, while considering the case of the petitioner for quashment of the F.I.R., the Court is required to see as to whether on the alleged facts in the F.I.R., if the facts are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused and if the facts mentioned in the F.I.R. prima facie disclose cognizable offence, then this Court is not required to look into the veracity, reliability, sufficiency and adequate proof of the facts alleged and to make a meticulous scrutiny and whether all the ingredients have been precisely spelled out in the complaint is not the need at this stage. If the factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint the Court should not hasten to quash criminal proceeding during investigation stage merely on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with details. If all the above conditions are satisfied, then the inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. In Murad Ali Khan's case (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the Court should exercise the power sparingly and with circumspection and has given the working that in exercising that jurisdiction, the High Court should not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not. In Murad Ali Khan's case (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the Court should exercise the power sparingly and with circumspection and has given the working that in exercising that jurisdiction, the High Court should not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not. The Court has to exercise its jurisdiction in rarest of rare case only when the Court reaches the conclusion that on the basis of the allegations in the F.I.R. no prima facie offence is constituted and on the facts if the investigation is allowed to be continued then that will lead to failure of the justice. 31. In the result, I do not find any reason to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution for quashing of the F.I.R. at this stage, because the investigation is still at the preliminary stage. Therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed and it is dismissed.” 14. Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Om Prakash Singh and another vs. State of U.P. and others, 2004 Cri.L.J. 3567 have held that when FIR discloses commission of cognizable offence, Court can neither interfere with investigation nor can quash FIR. 15. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of A.P. vs. Golconda Linga Swamy and another, (2004) 6 SCC 522 have held that High Court should not assume the role of a trial court and embark upon an enquiry as to reliability of evidence and sustainability of accusation on a reasonable appreciation of such evidence. It is only when on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant or made in FIR it appears that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint/FIR is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, the proceedings cannot be quashed. Their Lordships have further held that while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court should function as court of appeal or revision. Their Lordships have held as under: “5. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. Their Lordships have held as under: “5. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the Section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All Courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alique concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the Section, the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercises of the powers Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the Section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. At the same time the Section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative cetegories indicated by this Court are as follows: "(1) Where the allegations made in the first Information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cog nizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under S. 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 8. As noted above the powers possessed by the HighCourt under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordi nary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage (See: The Janata Dal etc. v. H. S. Chowdhary and others etc. ( AIR 1993 SC 892 ), Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar and another ( AIR 1964 SC 1 ). It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint/F.I.R. has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant or disclosed in the F.I.R. that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint/F.I.R. is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceeding. (See: Mrs. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceeding. (See: Mrs. Dhana-lakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar and others ( AIR 1990 SC 494 ), State of Bihar and another v. P. P. Sharma, I.A.S. and another (1992) Suppl(1) SCC 222) Rupan Deol Bajaj (Mrs.) and another v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and another ( 1995 (6) SCC 194 ),State of Kerala and others v. O. C. Kuttan and others ( 1999 (2) SCC 651 ), State of U.P. v. O. P. Sharma ( 1996 (7) SCC 705 ), Rashmi Kumar (Smt.) v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada ( 1997 (2) SCC 397 ), Satvinder Kaur v. State Govt of NCT of Delhi) and another ( 1999 (8) SCC 728 ), Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi and others ( AIR 1999 SC 1216 ), State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another 2002 ( 2002 (3) SCC 89 ).” 16. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T. Vengama Naidu vs. T. Dora Swamy Naidu and others, (2007) 12 SCC 93 have held that it is settled law that an FIR and the consequent investigation cannot be quashed unless there is no offence spelt out from the same. FIR is to be taken on its face value for adjudging the same. Their Lordships have held as under: “3. The appellant herein had filed a private complaint against these respondents which was sent for investigation under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. to the Police whereupon a criminal case was registered as Crime No.22/2002 dated 13.1.2002 for the offences punishable under Sections 464, 423, 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. It is an admitted position that this investigation is not complete and while the investigation was in progress, the respondents filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court for quashing the FIR, which was lodged on the basis of the complaint, as well as the investigation. Aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court, the original complainant has now come up before us. 4. We have gone through the FIR ourselves. Aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court, the original complainant has now come up before us. 4. We have gone through the FIR ourselves. In the FIR the complainant had complained that he was the absolute owner of the vacant site in Sy.No.479/2 situated at Tirupathi in Ward No.18 of Santhi Nagar Residential area jointly along with one Dammalapati Nagulu Naid. He had executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of the first respondent. However, since the first respondent was seen misusing the General Power of Attorney, the appellant-complainant cancelled the said General Power of Attorney on 26.6.1997 by issuing a legal notice. It is alleged that the first respondent had filed a false complaint against the appellant herein alleging the offences punishable under Sections 447, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code wherein the respondent no.2 was shown as one of the witnesses. It is alleged that inspite of cancellation of General Power of Attorney in 1997, the first respondent executed a registered sale deed dated 16.6.2000 in favour of the second respondent. The other accused, namely, respondent nos.3 to 6, who are not parties before us, were shown as the witnesses therein. It was, therefore alleged that both the accused persons were well aware that the first respondent did not own the said land and could not have executed such a document and thereby had cheated the complainant. The respondent no.1 had also dishonestly executed sale deed without any authority and had also made a false document. 7. It cannot be disputed that a private complaint was filed before the learned Magistrate who had made over the said complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. That order of the Magistrate has not been challenged. On the basis of that order the police registered a crime probably treating the complaint as the FIR. It is settled law that an FIR and the consequent investigation cannot be quashed unless there is no offence spelt out from the same. The law in this respect is settled that the said FIR has to be taken on its face value and then it is to be examined as to whether it spells out the offences complained of. There was no question of considering the merits of the allegations contained in the FIR at that stage or testing the veracity of allegations. The law in this respect is settled that the said FIR has to be taken on its face value and then it is to be examined as to whether it spells out the offences complained of. There was no question of considering the merits of the allegations contained in the FIR at that stage or testing the veracity of allegations. In this case, admittedly, the investigation was in progress. The police had also not reported back to the Magistrate the result of their investigation. Under such circumstances, the FIR could have been quashed only and only if there appeared to be no offence spelt out therein.” 17. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra and ors. Vs. Arun Gulab Gawali and ors., (2010) 9 Supreme Court Cases 701 have held that the court under its inherent powers can neither intervene at an uncalled for stage nor can it “soft-pedal the course of justice” at crucial stage of investigation/proceedings. Power is to be exercised with due care and caution. Their Lordships have held as under:- “13. The power of quashing criminal proceedings has to be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases and the Court cannot be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of allegations made in the F.I.R./Complaint, unless the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion. The extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice. However, the Court, under its inherent powers, can neither intervene at an uncalled for stage nor it can soft-pedal the course of justice' at a crucial stage of investigation/ proceedings. The provisions of Articles 226, 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called as ‘Cr.P.C.') are a device to advance justice and not to frustrate it. The power of judicial review is discretionary, however, it must be exercised to prevent the miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave errors and to ensure that esteem of administration of justice remains clean and pure. The power of judicial review is discretionary, however, it must be exercised to prevent the miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave errors and to ensure that esteem of administration of justice remains clean and pure. However, there are no limits of power of the Court, but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. (Vide State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors. AIR 1982 SC 949 ; M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. AIR 1998 SC 128; G. Sagar Suri & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 754 ; and Ajay Mitra Vs. State of M.P. & Ors. AIR 2003 SC 1069 ). 14. In R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 , this Court laid down the following principles :- (I) Where institution/continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice; (II) where it manifestly appears that there is alegal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, e.g. want of sanction; (III) where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; and (IV) where the allegations constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 15. In State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors. AIR 1992 SC 604 , this Court laid down the similar guidelines for exercising the inherent power, giving types of cases where the Court may exercise its inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings. However, the types of cases mentioned therein do not constitute an exhaustive list, rather the cases are merely illustrative. 16. In State of Karnataka Vs. L.Muniswamy & Ors. AIR 1977 SC 1489 , this Court held as under:-"In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction." (Emphasis added). 17. The inherent power is to be exercised ex debitojustitiae, to do real and substantial justice, for administration of which alone Courts exist. Wherever any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent the abuse. It is, however, not necessary that at this stage there should be a meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case ends in conviction or acquittal. (Vide Mrs. Dhanalakshmi Vs. R. Prasanna Kumar & Ors. AIR 1990 SC 494 ; Ganesh Narayan Hegde Vs. S. Bangarappa & Ors. (1995) 4 SCC 41 ; and M/s Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Md. Sharaful Haque & Ors. AIR 2005 SC 9 ). 18. In State of Orissa & Anr. Vs. Saroj Kumar Sahoo (2005) 13 SCC 540 , it has been held that probabilities of the prosecution version can not be analysed at this stage. Likewise the allegations of mala fides of the informant are of secondary importance. The relevant passage reads thus: "It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. The relevant passage reads thus: "It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with." (Emphasis added). 19. In B.S. Joshi & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr. AIR 2003 SC 1386 , this Court held that inherent power must be utilised with the sole purpose of preventing the abuse of the process of the court or to otherwise serve the ends of justice. In exercise of inherent powers, proper scrutiny of facts and circumstances of the case concerned are absolutely imperative. 20. In Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia & Anr. Vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors. AIR 1988 SC 709 , this court held as under:- "The legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage." (Emphasis added). 21. This Court, while reconsidering the Judgment in Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia (supra), consistently observed that where matters are also of civil nature i.e. matrimonial, family disputes, etc., the Court may consider "special facts", "special features" and quash the criminal proceedings to encourage genuine settlement of disputes between the parties. 22. The said Judgment was reconsidered andexplained by this Court in State of Bihar & Anr. Vs. Shri P.P. Sharma & Anr. 22. The said Judgment was reconsidered andexplained by this Court in State of Bihar & Anr. Vs. Shri P.P. Sharma & Anr. AIR 1991 SC 1260 , as under : "Madhaorao J. Scindhia v. Sambhaji Rao AIR 1988 SC 709 , also does not help the respondents. In that case the allegations constituted civil wrong as the trustees created tenancy of Trust property to favour the third party. A private complaint was laid for the offence under Section 467 read with Section 34 and Section 120B I.P.C. which the High Court refused to quash under Section 482. This Court allowed the appeal and quashed the proceedings on the ground that even on its own contentions in the complaint, it would be a case of breach of trust or a civil wrong but no ingredients of criminal offences were made out. On those facts and also due to the relation of the settler, the mother, the appellant and his wife, as the son and daughter-in-law, this Court interfered and allowed the appeal.........Therefore, the ratio therein is of no assistance to the facts in this case. It cannot be considered that this Court laid down as a proposition of law that in every case the court would examine at the preliminary stage whether there would be ultimate chances of conviction on the basis of allegation and exercise of the power under Section 482 or Article 226 to quash the proceedings or the charge-sheet." (Emphasis added). 23. In Alpic Finance Ltd. Vs. P. Sadasivan & Anr. AIR 2001 SC 1226 , this Court explained the ratio of the Judgment in Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia (supra), that law laid down therein would only apply where it is a question of a civil wrong, which may or may not amount to a criminal offence. Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia (supra) was the case involving a trust where proceedings were initiated by some of the trustees against other trustees. This Court, after coming to the conclusion, that the dispute was predominantly civil in nature and that the parties were willing to compromise, quashed the proceedings. 24. In M.N.Damani Vs. S.K. Sinha & Ors. AIR 2001 SC 2037 , this Court again explained the Judgment in Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia (supra) in a similar manner. 25. Thus, the judgment in Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia (supra) does not lay down a law of universal application. 24. In M.N.Damani Vs. S.K. Sinha & Ors. AIR 2001 SC 2037 , this Court again explained the Judgment in Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia (supra) in a similar manner. 25. Thus, the judgment in Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia (supra) does not lay down a law of universal application. Even as per the law laid down therein the court can not examine the facts/evidence etc. in every case to find out as to whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in conviction. The ratio of the said Judgment is applicable in limited cases where the Court finds that the dispute involved therein is predominantly civil in nature and that the parties should be given a chance to reach a compromise e.g. matrimonial, property and family disputes etc. etc. The Superior Courts have been given inherent powers to prevent the abuse of the process of Court where the Court finds that the ends of justice may be met by quashing the proceedings, it may quash the proceedings, as the end of achieving justice is higher than the end of merely following the law. It is not necessary for the court to hold a full-fledged inquiry or to appreciate the evidence, collected by the Investigating Agency, if any to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal.” 18. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Gourishetty Mahesh and ors., (2010) 11 Supreme Court Cases 226 have held that interference at the threshold, quashing FIR, is to be exceptional and not routine. Their Lordships have held as under: “21 In the case on hand, apart from specific allegations about the transportation of Jaggery for preparation of illicit distilled liquor, prosecution also placed reliance on laboratory analysis report which mentions that the transported Jaggery is fit for fermentation, producing alcohol unfit for consumption. In those circumstances, whether the raw material in existence would be sufficient for holding the accused persons concerned guilty or not has to be considered only at the time of trial. Further, at the time of framing the charge, it can be decided whether prima facie case has been made out showing the commission of offence and involvement of the charged persons. It is immaterial whether the case is based on direct or circumstantial evidence. Further, at the time of framing the charge, it can be decided whether prima facie case has been made out showing the commission of offence and involvement of the charged persons. It is immaterial whether the case is based on direct or circumstantial evidence. That being so, the interference at the threshold quashing the FIR is to be exceptional and not like routine as ordered by the High Court in the present case. It is not a case where it can be said that the complaint did not disclose commission of an offence. The acceptability of the materials to fasten culpability on the accused persons is a matter of trial. 22. In the light of the above principles and the materials placed by the prosecution, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in quashing the FIR in Crime No. 288/2002-03 of Excise and Prohibition Station, Hazurabad, Karimnagar District, accordingly the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. 23. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case except holding that interference by the High Court at the threshold is not warranted. We further make it clear that it is for the prosecution to establish its charge beyond reasonable doubt. With these observations, the State appeal is allowed.” 19. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sushil Suri vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and another (2011) 5 Supreme Court Cases 708 have reiterated the inherent powers of the High Court to quash proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as under:- “15. Before embarking on an evaluation of the rival submissions, it would be instructive to briefly notice the scope and ambit of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 16. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. itself envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised by the High Court, namely: (i) to give effect to an order under the Cr.P.C.; (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of Court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is trite that although the power possessed by the High Court under the said provision is very wide but it is not unbridled. It has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and cautiously, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for which alone the Court exists. It is trite that although the power possessed by the High Court under the said provision is very wide but it is not unbridled. It has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and cautiously, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for which alone the Court exists. Nevertheless, it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Yet, in numerous cases, this Court has laid down certain broad principles which may be borne in mind while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Though it is emphasised that exercise of inherent powers would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, but, the common thread which runs through all the decisions on the subject is that the Court would be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction where the allegations made in the Complaint or Chargesheet, as the case may be, taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. 17. In one of the earlier cases in R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 this Court had culled out some of the categories of cases where the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. could be exercised by the High Court to quash criminal proceedings against the accused. These are: "(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge." 18. In Dinesh Dutt Joshi Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (2001) 8 SCC 570 , while explaining the object and purpose of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., this Court had observed thus: "6.......The principle embodied in the section is based upon the maxim: quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest i.e. when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself would be unavailable. The section does not confer any new power, but only declares that the High Court possesses inherent powers for the purposes specified in the section. As lacunae are sometimes found in procedural law, the section has been embodied to cover such lacunae wherever they are discovered. The use of extraordinary powers conferred upon the High Court under this section are however required to be reserved, as far as possible, for extraordinary cases." 19. Recently, this Court in A. Ravishankar Prasad & Ors. (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the CBI, referring to several earlier decisions on the point, including R.P. Kapur (supra); State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Janata Dal Vs. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors. (1992) 4 SCC 305 ; B.S. Joshi & Ors. (supra); Nikhil Merchant (supra) etc. has reiterated that the exercise of inherent powers would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 20. It has been further observed that:“the inherent powers should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where all the facts are incomplete and hazy, more so, when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of such magnitude that they cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material.” 20. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Asmathunnisa vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2011) 11 Supreme Court Cases 259 have held that interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be on sound principle and the inherent power should not be exercised to stifle the legitimate prosecution. Their Lordships have held as under:- “12. This Court, in a number of cases, has laid down the scope and ambit of the High Court's power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute. 13. The law has been crystallized more than half a century ago in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 wherein this Court has summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. This Court summarized the following three broad categories where the High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under section 482: (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge." 14. In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others (1976) 3 SCC 736 , according to the court, the process against the accused can be quashed or set aside : "(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like". 21. 21. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor vs Ramesh Chander and another, (2012) 9 SCC 460 have laid down the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly with regard to quashing of a charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under section 397 or section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or together, as the case may be, as under: “(1) Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. (2) The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. (3) The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. (4) Where the exercise of such power is absolutelyessential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loathe to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. (5) Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. (6) The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. (7) The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. (6) The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. (7) The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. (8) Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a 'civil wrong' with no 'element of criminality' and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the Court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. (9) Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction, the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. (10) It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. (11) Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. (12) In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed with by the prosecution. (13) Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. (14) Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. (15) Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.” 22. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satish Mehra vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and another, (2012) 13 SCC 614 have held that extraordinary power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be exercised carefully and sparingly. Their Lordships have held as under: “14. The power to interdict a proceeding either at the threshold or at an intermediate stage of the trial is inherent in a High Court on the broad principle that in case the allegations made in the FIR or the criminal complaint, as may be, prima facie do not disclose a triable offence there can be reason as to why the accused should be made to suffer the agony of a legal proceeding that more often than not gets protracted. A prosecution which is bound to become lame or a sham ought to interdicted in the interest of justice as continuance thereof will amount to an abuse of the process of the law. This is the core basis on which the power to interfere with a pending criminal proceeding has been recognized to be inherent in every High Court. The power, though available, being extra ordinary in nature has to be exercised sparingly and only if the attending facts and circumstances satisfies the narrow test indicated above, namely, that even accepting all the allegations levelled by the prosecution, no offence is disclosed. The power, though available, being extra ordinary in nature has to be exercised sparingly and only if the attending facts and circumstances satisfies the narrow test indicated above, namely, that even accepting all the allegations levelled by the prosecution, no offence is disclosed. However, if so warranted, such power would be available for exercise not only at the threshold of a criminal proceeding but also at a relatively advanced stage thereof, namely, after framing of the charge against the accused. In fact the power to quash a proceeding after framing of charge would appear to be somewhat wider as, at that stage, the materials revealed by the investigation carried out usually comes on record and such materials can be looked into, not for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused but for the purpose of drawing satisfaction that such materials, even if accepted in its entirety, do not, in any manner, disclose the commission of the offence alleged against the accused.” 23. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajiv Thapar and others vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 have held that where allegations bring out all ingredients of charge(s) levelled, and material placed before court prima facie shows truthfulness of allegations, trial must proceed even when accused is successful in raising some suspicion or doubt in allegations levelled. Their Lordships have further held that to invoke its inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings on basis of defence material High Court has to be fully satisfied that material produced or relied on by accused: a) leads to conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; b) rules out and displaces the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused without necessity of recording any evidence; c) should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being of sterling and impeccable quality i.e. a reasonable man should be persuaded to dismiss and condemn actual basis of accusations as false; and d) whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice. 24. In the instant case, material placed on record prima facie discloses triable offence. There would not be miscarriage of justice if the proceedings are permitted to be continued. 25. 24. In the instant case, material placed on record prima facie discloses triable offence. There would not be miscarriage of justice if the proceedings are permitted to be continued. 25. Accordingly, in view of analysis and discussion made hereinabove, there is no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed, so also the pending application, if any. However, it is made clear that the observations made hereinabove shall have no bearing on the merits of the main case. The Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No.2 is directed to proceed with the matter in accordance with law and decide the same within a period of six months from today.